



SAPIENZA  
UNIVERSITÀ DI ROMA

## Internship Report: MQTT over TLS Security Assessment

Facoltà di Ingegneria dell'Informazione, Informatica e Statistica  
Corso di laurea triennale in Informatica erogato in modalità Teledidattica

**Radek Patrick Di Luca**

ID number 1803854

Responsabile

Prof. Angelo Spognardi

Academic Year 2023/2024

---

**Internship Report: MQTT over TLS Security Assessment**

Relazione di Tirocinio. Sapienza University of Rome

© 2023 Radek Patrick Di Luca. All rights reserved

This thesis has been typeset by L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X and the Sapthesis class.

Author's email: [diluca.1803854@studenti.uniroma1.it](mailto:diluca.1803854@studenti.uniroma1.it)

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Problem Definition . . . . .	1
1.2	Related Works . . . . .	1
1.3	Key Concepts . . . . .	2
1.3.1	MQTT . . . . .	2
1.3.2	TLS . . . . .	3
1.3.3	Certificate Authority . . . . .	3
1.4	TLS Vulnerabilities . . . . .	3
<b>2</b>	<b>Test Suite</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1	Test Case 1 - Legal Connection . . . . .	5
2.2	Test Case 2 - Self Signed Attacker . . . . .	6
2.3	Test Case 3 - Self Signed Attacker's Fake CA . . . . .	7
2.4	Test Case 4 - Alteration 1 (Common Name) . . . . .	7
2.5	Test Case 5 - Alteration 2 (Expiration Date) . . . . .	9
2.6	Test Case 6 - Alteration 3 (Public Key) . . . . .	9
2.7	Test Case 7 - Expired CA (Alteration 4) . . . . .	9
2.8	Test Case 8 - Certificate Extension . . . . .	11
2.9	Test Case 9 - Longer Chain Of Trust Legal Connection . . . . .	13
2.10	Test Case 10 - Altered Intermediate CA Common Name . . . . .	13
2.11	Test Case 11 - Altered Intermediate CA Public Key . . . . .	14
<b>3</b>	<b>Developed Code</b>	<b>23</b>
3.1	TLS Certificates Generation Script . . . . .	23
3.2	TLS Certificate Common Name Alteration Script . . . . .	31
3.3	TLS Certificate Expiration Date Alteration Script . . . . .	32
3.4	TLS Certificate Public Key Alteration Script . . . . .	33
3.5	TLS Certificate Keystores Generation Script . . . . .	34
3.6	MQTT Client Tester Script . . . . .	37
3.7	Library Tester Script . . . . .	38
3.8	Docker Test Environment . . . . .	40
3.8.1	MQTT Client Tester Image . . . . .	40
3.8.2	Moquette MQTT Server Image . . . . .	41
3.8.3	Aedes MQTT Server Image . . . . .	41
3.9	Libraries Differences . . . . .	42
3.9.1	Mosquitto . . . . .	42

3.9.2	HiveMQ . . . . .	42
3.9.3	Aedes . . . . .	43
3.9.4	Moquette . . . . .	43
3.9.5	EMQX . . . . .	43
3.9.6	RouterOS . . . . .	43
<b>4</b>	<b>Test Results</b>	<b>45</b>
4.1	Tested MQTT Libraries . . . . .	45
4.2	Result Table . . . . .	46
4.2.1	Test Case 1 - Legal Connection . . . . .	46
4.2.2	Test Case 2 - Self Signed Attacker . . . . .	46
4.2.3	Test Case 3 - Self Signed Attacker's Fake CA . . . . .	47
4.2.4	Test Case 4 - Alteration 1 (Common Name) . . . . .	47
4.2.5	Test Case 5 - Alteration 2 (Expiration Date) . . . . .	47
4.2.6	Test Case 6 - Alteration 3 (Public Key) . . . . .	47
4.2.7	Test Case 7 - Expired CA (Alteration 4) . . . . .	47
4.2.8	Test Case 8 - Certificate Extension . . . . .	47
4.2.9	Test Case 9 - Longer Chain Of Trust Legal Connection . . . . .	48
4.2.10	Test Case 10 - Altered Intermediate CA Common Name . . . . .	48
4.2.11	Test Case 11 - Altered Intermediate CA Public Key . . . . .	48
4.3	RouterOS Cipher Check Results . . . . .	48
<b>5</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>51</b>
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>53</b>

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Problem Definition

The aim of this internship work was to assess the security of the TLS Protocol implementation of some of the main MQTT Broker Libraries that can be found in the IT community. Some faults in the Application layer Protocol (MQTT) of some of these libraries were found by my colleague Edoardo Di Paolo during his Internship work [5], so the hypothesis was that these libraries might very well have some faults in the Transport layer Protocol (TLS) too. Therefore, through the generation of some forged TLS Certificates and the definition of a Suite of Automated Unit Tests, the goal was to expose vulnerabilities in these libraries, or validate their implementation as secure.

### 1.2 Related Works

As it was just stated, the main inspiration for this work has been the article published by my colleague Edoardo Di Paolo [5], which gave us clear information on the publish-subscribe communication paradigm of the MQTT Protocol and on which libraries to test, finally focusing our efforts on the *Mosquitto*, *HiveMQ*, *Moquette*, *EMQX* and *Aedes* MQTT Broker Libraries. The article [5] also helped us designing our communication Test Environment, which is later discussed in section 3.8.

On top of that, the research led by Stanford and Texas at Austin Universities on SSL Certificate Validation in Non-Browser Software [6] helped us targeting possible MQTT over TLS Implementation Faults, namely *Chain Of Trust Verification*, *Hostname Verification* and *X.509 Extension Verification*. The research [6] also pointed us towards the official RFCs [1, 2, 3] which contain more extensive information regarding TLS Certificate Validation. All these pieces of information allowed us to formally define the TLS Vulnerabilities and Unit Test Suite, described respectively in section 1.4 and chapter 2.

Finally, the article published by University of Padua and the Technical University of Denmark on the design of an SSL Validation Proxy named MITHYS [4] exhibits how similar TLS Implementation Faults could be found in some widely spread Mobile Application Software.

Although all these Related Works helped us shape the criteria behind our work,


none of them tackle specifically the possible faults in the TLS implementation of an MQTT Broker, hence our motivation to research deeper on this topic.

### 1.3 Key Concepts

For the sake of this report, we will be using some core concepts that are critical to understanding the Internship work.

#### 1.3.1 MQTT

MQTT, also known as Message Queuing Telemetry Transport, is a lightweight protocol used on the Application Layer of the TCP/IP stack. MQTT is an alternative to the widely spread HTTP, and it's mainly used for connectivity to and from Internet of Things devices, due to the lightweight nature of the protocol and due to the low memory availability of the above mentioned IoT devices. Since the MQTT protocol is by nature a lightweight protocol, it does not feature many security capabilities, so it must rely on the security checks made by the layer immediately below MQTT, the Transport layer, via TLS. In Figure 1.1 we can see a representation of a typical message exchange via the MQTT protocol.



**Figure 1.1.** MQTT Message Exchange.

The exchange of information is mainly done through the publish/subscribe paradigm:

- **subscribe:** an MQTT Client subscribes to one or more topics. Each topic is identified by a unique string and after subscribing to the topic(s), the MQTT

Client will be in a ‘listening’ state, receiving any new messages that will be published on the topic(s).

- **publish:** an MQTT Client publishes a message to a topic. Each topic is identified by a unique string, and by publishing the message, any Client that was subscribed to the topic will receive the published message.

### 1.3.2 TLS

TLS, also known as Transport Layer Security, is a protocol used on the Transport Layer of the TCP/IP stack, to provide security in the form of confidentiality, integrity and authenticity to one or both parties involved in the message exchange. In fact, TLS consists mainly of a Handshake phase, in which the client and server negotiate the parameters that will be used to establish the security of the following communication. During this Handshake phase, it is possible to negotiate whether the security is one-way (only the server is authenticated towards the client) or both ways (also known as mutual TLS or abbreviated, mTLS). TLS can often be referred to as ‘SSL’, which is the protocol from which TLS originated.

### 1.3.3 Certificate Authority

A Certificate Authority, abbreviated CA, is a secure third party who is trusted by both TLS server and TLS client. In general, the client trusts the CA to certify that the server is who they claim to be. In mutual TLS, the CA is also used by the server, to certify that the client is who they claim to be.

## 1.4 TLS Vulnerabilities

One of the main pieces of work done for this Internship was to define the ways in which an Attacker could possibly exploit a badly implemented TLS connection. Therefore, referencing the specifications RFC 2818 [1], RFC 8446 [3] and RFC 5280 [2], the following list of validations an MQTT Broker Library should implement was produced:

- **Chain of trust:** the certificate has to be either signed by a root Certificate Authority, or it has to have a linked list of references to various Certificate Authorities, up to a root node certificate self-signed by a root Certificate Authority. In this linked list, the certificate of every issuing Certificate Authority has to be signed by the Certificate Authority immediately above it. Validating this check led us to define *Test Cases 1, 2, 3, and 9*.
- **Hostname:** the *Common Name* field should match the identifier of the entity to which we’re connecting (server). Validating this check led us to define *Test Cases 4 and 10*.
- **(Recursive) Expiration:** the *Not Valid Before* and *Not Valid After* fields contain information on the timestamps that delimit the interval in which the certificate should be accepted as valid. The Library should check that today’s

date is contained within that interval. This is valid also recursively for the Certificates of the issuing Certificate Authorities throughout the chain of trust. Validating this check led us to define *Test Cases 5 and 7*.

- **Public key:** the *Public Key Info* > *Public Key* field should match the information provided by the Certificate Authority. This public key will be used to encrypt all the upcoming communication, so using the correct public key is essential. Validating this check led us to define *Test Cases 6 and 11*.
- **X.509 Certificate Extension:** the *Certificate Extensions* should not contain information that would impair the validity of the Certificate itself. In our example, in *Test Case 8*, the Certificate used by the MQTT Server should not be flagged as "Client Only" in the Certificate Extensions, and the tested Library should check for these fields to be valid.
- **Downgrade attack:** some attackers might try pretending that the latests versions of TLS are not supported by one of the two communicating parties, or they could also pretend that the set of supported ciphers is limited to only easily breakable ciphers, for example based on 512 bit-long cipher keys. This is why it's important to support only the versions of TLS that are still considered secure, and it's important to restrict the set of supported ciphers to only implementation-strong ciphers. This known vulnerability led us to test RouterOS for weak ciphers. This will be described later in section 4.3.



## Chapter 2

# Test Suite

To test the MQTT Broker Libraries, a Unit Test Suite was formally defined, with a series of descriptions and assertions made. The Unit Tests are defined following the Triangulation technique, which means that the Test Suite should assert both the valid scenarios in which the connection should be established and the illegal scenarios in which the connection should be rejected. Hence the Tests are defined as follows:

1. Test Case 1 - Legal Connection
2. Test Case 2 - Self Signed Attacker
3. Test Case 3 - Self Signed Attacker's Fake CA
4. Test Case 4 - Alteration 1 (Common Name)
5. Test Case 5 - Alteration 2 (Expiration Date)
6. Test Case 6 - Alteration 3 (Public Key)
7. Test Case 7 - Expired CA (Alteration 4)
8. Test Case 8 - Certificate Extension
9. Test Case 9 - Longer Chain Of Trust Legal Connection
10. Test Case 10 - Altered Intermediate CA Common Name
11. Test Case 11 - Altered Intermediate CA Public Key

Note: The tested libraries are set up as MQTT Broker, or MQTT Server. The Client, which asserts the outcome of the test, always uses the Mosquitto command line tools to connect to the Server.


### 2.1 Test Case 1 - Legal Connection

This Test Case is set up by configuring the MQTT Broker Library with a valid TLS Certificate signed by the real Certificate Authority. The Tester Client connects to

Intruder Access Capabilities	None
Intruder's Attack description	This test case represents the happy path with no intruder attack.
State of TLS Certificate	The TLS Certificate we use for this test is exactly the Server's Certificate.
State of Certificate's Signature	The signature is <i>valid</i>
Assertion	The Library should <i>accept</i> the connection when a client tries connecting to the MQTT Library configured with this certificate.

**Table 2.1.** Test Case 1 Formal Details.

the server checking the Server TLS Certificate against the real Certificate Authority's Certificate. A visual representation of the Test Case's actors' interaction can be found in Figure 2.1. In Table 2.1 we can find the formal details of the Test Case 1.



**Figure 2.1.** Test Case 1 Actors' Interaction.

## 2.2 Test Case 2 - Self Signed Attacker

This Test Case is set up by configuring the MQTT Broker Library with a forged self-signed TLS Certificate. The Tester Client connects to the server checking the

Intruder Access Capabilities	The Intruder impersonates an MQTT Server during the TLS Handshake phase.
Intruder's Attack description	The Intruder creates a self-signed certificate and uses it to configure the MQTT Library.
State of TLS Certificate	The TLS Certificate is self-signed by the attacker, so any field can be completely different from the Server's Certificate.
State of Certificate's Signature	The signature is <i>valid</i>
Assertion	The Library should <i>reject</i> the connection when a client tries connecting to the MQTT Library configured with this certificate.

Table 2.2. Test Case 2 Formal Details.

Server TLS Certificate against the real Certificate Authority's Certificate. A visual representation of the Test Case's actors' interaction can be found in Figure 2.2. In Table 2.2 we can find the formal details of the Test Case 2.

### 2.3 Test Case 3 - Self Signed Attacker's Fake CA

This Test Case is set up by configuring the MQTT Broker Library with a forged TLS Certificate signed by a forged Root Certificate Authority. The Tester Client connects to the server checking the Server TLS Certificate against the real Certificate Authority's Certificate. A visual representation of the Test Case's actors' interaction can be found in Figure 2.3. In Table 2.3 we can find the formal details of the Test Case 3.

### 2.4 Test Case 4 - Alteration 1 (Common Name)


This Test Case is set up by configuring the MQTT Broker Library with an altered TLS Certificate signed by the real Certificate Authority. The intruder alters the Common Name field, therefore the signature is compromised because the Server Certificate has been tampered with. The Tester Client connects to the server checking the Server TLS Certificate against the real Certificate Authority's Certificate. A visual representation of the Test Case's actors' interaction can be found in Figure 2.4. In Table 2.4 we can find the formal details of the Test Case 4.

Intruder Access Capabilities	The Intruder impersonates an MQTT Server during the TLS Handshake phase.
Intruder's Attack description	The Intruder imitates the Server Certificate's chain of trust, creating their own root Certificate Authority and using it to sign their certificate. Then they use their certificate to configure the MQTT Library.
State of TLS Certificate	The TLS Certificate is imitating the Server Certificate, but it's signed by the Attacker's fake Certificate Authority.
State of Certificate's Signature	The signature is <i>valid</i>
Assertion	The Library should <i>reject</i> the connection when a client tries connecting to the MQTT Library configured with this certificate.

Table 2.3. Test Case 3 Formal Details.

Intruder Access Capabilities	The Intruder impersonates an MQTT Server during the TLS Handshake phase.
Intruder's Attack description	The Intruder alters the Common Name field of the Server Certificate, replacing it with their own Common Name. Then they use the altered certificate to configure the MQTT Library.
State of TLS Certificate	The TLS Certificate is equal to the Server Certificate except for the Common Name field.
State of Certificate's Signature	The signature is <i>not</i> valid
Assertion	The Library should <i>reject</i> the connection when a client tries connecting to the MQTT Library configured with this certificate.

Table 2.4. Test Case 4 Formal Details.



**Figure 2.2.** Test Case 2 Actors' Interaction.

## 2.5 Test Case 5 - Alteration 2 (Expiration Date)

This Test Case is set up by configuring the MQTT Broker Library with an altered expired TLS Certificate signed by the real Certificate Authority. The intruder alters the Not Valid After field, therefore the signature is compromised because the Server Certificate has been tampered with. The Tester Client connects to the server checking the Server TLS Certificate against the real Certificate Authority's Certificate. A visual representation of the Test Case's actors' interaction can be found in Figure 2.5. In Table 2.5 we can find the formal details of the Test Case 5.

## 2.6 Test Case 6 - Alteration 3 (Public Key)

This Test Case is set up by configuring the MQTT Broker Library with an altered TLS Certificate signed by the real Certificate Authority. The intruder replaces the contents of the Public Key field with their own Public Key, therefore the signature is compromised because the Server Certificate has been tampered with. The Tester Client connects to the server checking the Server TLS Certificate against the real Certificate Authority's Certificate. A visual representation of the Test Case's actors' interaction can be found in Figure 2.6. In Table 2.6 we can find the formal details of the Test Case 6.

## 2.7 Test Case 7 - Expired CA (Alteration 4)


This Test Case is set up by configuring the MQTT Broker Library with a forged TLS Certificate signed by an expired (real) Certificate Authority. This test represents a scenario in which the Intruder manages to decrypt the Certificate Authority's

Intruder Access Capabilities	The Intruder has access to an old expired Server Certificate
Intruder's Attack description	The Intruder alters the expiration date of the expired Server Certificate, making it valid for the current date. Then the Intruder tries to configure the MQTT Library with the altered Certificate.
State of TLS Certificate	The TLS Certificate is the expired Server Certificate, but the Not Valid After field has been tampered with.
State of Certificate's Signature	The signature is <i>not</i> valid
Assertion	The Library should <i>reject</i> the connection when a client tries connecting to the MQTT Library configured with this certificate.

**Table 2.5.** Test Case 5 Formal Details.

Intruder Access Capabilities	The Intruder impersonates an MQTT Server during the TLS Handshake phase.
Intruder's Attack description	The Intruder alters the Public Key Info > Public Key field of the Server Certificate, replacing it with their own Public Key. Then they use the altered certificate to configure the MQTT Library.
State of TLS Certificate	The TLS Certificate is equal to the Server Certificate except for the Public Key field.
State of Certificate's Signature	The signature is <i>not</i> valid
Assertion	The Library should <i>reject</i> the connection when a client tries connecting to the MQTT Library configured with this certificate.

**Table 2.6.** Test Case 6 Formal Details.



**Figure 2.3.** Test Case 3 Actors' Interaction.

Public Key over a long period of time, during which the Client under attack is not updated with a new CA Certificate. Because of this, the Tester Client in this Test Case connects to the server checking the Server TLS Certificate against the expired Certificate Authority's Certificate. A visual representation of the Test Case's actors' interaction can be found in Figure 2.7. In Table 2.7 we can find the formal details of the Test Case 7.

## 2.8 Test Case 8 - Certificate Extension

This Test Case is set up by configuring the MQTT Broker Library with a valid TLS Certificate signed by the real Certificate Authority, though this Certificate has been signed by the CA for the MQTT Broker to use only as a Client Certificate towards other Brokers (in mTLS). The Tester Client connects to the server checking the Server TLS Certificate against the real Certificate Authority's Certificate. A visual representation of the Test Case's actors' interaction can be found in Figure 2.8. In Table 2.8 we can find the formal details of the Test Case 8.


Intruder Access Capabilities	The Intruder has access to an old expired Certificate Authority Root or Intermediate Certificate
Intruder's Attack description	The Intruder tries using the formerly valid, but now expired, Certificate Authority Certificate, to sign their own certificate. Then they try using this certificate to configure the MQTT Library.
State of TLS Certificate	The TLS Certificate is a completely different certificate from the Server Certificate.
State of Certificate's Signature	The signature is <i>valid</i>
Assertion	The Library should <i>reject</i> the connection when a client tries connecting to the MQTT Library configured with this certificate.

**Table 2.7.** Test Case 7 Formal Details.

Intruder Access Capabilities	The Intruder has access to a certificate belonging to the Server's entity, but one that is used for TLS Client Authentication.
Intruder's Attack description	The Intruder tries using the TLS Client Certificate to configure the MQTT Library as a MQTT Server, hence using the certificate as a TLS Server Certificate.
State of TLS Certificate	The TLS Certificate is rightfully authenticating the MQTT Server entity, but this TLS Certificate is not intended to be used for Server Authentication.
State of Certificate's Signature	The signature is <i>valid</i>
Assertion	The Library should <i>reject</i> the connection when a client tries connecting to the MQTT Library configured with this certificate.

**Table 2.8.** Test Case 8 Formal Details.






**Figure 2.4.** Test Case 4 Actors' Interaction.

## 2.9 Test Case 9 - Longer Chain Of Trust Legal Connection

This Test Case is set up by configuring the MQTT Broker Library with a valid TLS Certificate signed by the real Intermediate Certificate Authority, which in turn is signed by the real Root Certificate Authority. The Tester Client connects to the server checking the Server TLS Certificate against the real Root Certificate Authority's Certificate. A visual representation of the Test Case's actors' interaction can be found in Figure 2.9. In Table 2.9 we can find the formal details of the Test Case 9.

### 2.10 Test Case 10 - Altered Intermediate CA Common Name

This Test Case is set up by configuring the MQTT Broker Library with a forged TLS Certificate signed by an altered Intermediate Certificate Authority, which in turn is signed by the real Root Certificate Authority. The intruder alters their Intermediate CA's Common Name to pretend they are the real Intermediate CA, therefore the signature of the Intermediate CA is compromised. The Tester Client connects to the server checking the Server TLS Certificate against the real Root Certificate



**Figure 2.5.** Test Case 5 Actors' Interaction.

Authority's Certificate. A visual representation of the Test Case's actors' interaction can be found in Figure 2.10. In Table 2.10 we can find the formal details of the Test Case 10.

## 2.11 Test Case 11 - Altered Intermediate CA Public Key


This Test Case is set up by configuring the MQTT Broker Library with a forged TLS Certificate signed by an altered Intermediate Certificate Authority, which in turn is signed by the real Root Certificate Authority. The intruder replaces the real Intermediate CA's Public Key field contents with their own Public Key, to be able to decrypt the traffic easily, therefore the signature of the Intermediate CA is compromised. The Tester Client connects to the server checking the Server TLS Certificate against the real Root Certificate Authority's Certificate. A visual representation of the Test Case's actors' interaction can be found in Figure 2.11. In Table 2.11 we can find the formal details of the Test Case 11.

Intruder Access Capabilities	None
Intruder's Attack description	This test case represents a happy path with no intruder attack and with a longer chain of trust (Root CA + Intermediate CA).
State of TLS Certificate	The TLS Certificate we use for this test is exactly the Server's Certificate. (In this case, the Client connecting to the Server expects to receive a certificate signed by the Intermediate CA)
State of Certificate's Signature	The signature is <i>valid</i>
Assertion	The Library should <i>accept</i> the connection when a client tries connecting to the MQTT Library configured with this certificate.

Table 2.9. Test Case 9 Formal Details.

Intruder Access Capabilities	The Intruder owns an intermediate CA certificate signed by the Root CA.
Intruder's Attack description	The Intruder alters its certificate Common Name, trying to trick the client into believing the Intruder is signed by the real Intermediate CA.
State of TLS Certificate	The TLS Certificate is imitating the Server Certificate, but it's signed by the Attacker's fake Certificate Authority. (In this case, the Client connecting to the Server expects to receive a certificate signed by the Intermediate CA)
State of Certificate's Signature	The signature is <i>not</i> valid
Assertion	The Library should <i>reject</i> the connection when a client tries connecting to the MQTT Library configured with this certificate.

Table 2.10. Test Case 10 Formal Details.



**Figure 2.6.** Test Case 6 Actors' Interaction.




Figure 2.7. Test Case 7 Actors' Interaction.






Figure 2.8. Test Case 8 Actors' Interaction.



**Figure 2.9.** Test Case 9 Actors' Interaction.




**Figure 2.10.** Test Case 10 Actors' Interaction.

Intruder Access Capabilities	The Intruder owns the Intermediate CA's Certificate.
Intruder's Attack description	The Intruder alters the Intermediate CA's Public Key field with their own Public Key, trying to trick the client into sending their traffic in a way that is easy to decrypt for the Intruder.
State of TLS Certificate	The TLS Certificate is imitating the Server Certificate, but it's signed by the Attacker's fake Certificate Authority. (In this case, the Client connecting to the Server expects to receive a certificate signed by the Intermediate CA)
State of Certificate's Signature	The signature is <i>not</i> valid
Assertion	The Library should <i>reject</i> the connection when a client tries connecting to the MQTT Library configured with this certificate.

Table 2.11. Test Case 11 Formal Details.



**Figure 2.11.** Test Case 11 Actors' Interaction.



## Chapter 3

# Developed Code

The code developed for this Internship is used to setup the laboratory environment and to execute the Unit Tests for each library. For each file there will be the code snippet followed by an explanation of the code.

### 3.1 TLS Certificates Generation Script

```
1  #!/bin/sh
2
3  CONTAINER_IP=$1
4
5  sh clean.sh
6
7  mkdir ca
8  cd ca
9  mkdir ca.db.certs
10 touch ca.db.index
11 echo "1234" > ca.db.serial
12 cd ../
13
14 mkdir second-level-ca
15 cd second-level-ca
16 mkdir ca.db.certs
17 touch ca.db.index
18 echo "1234" > ca.db.serial
19 cd ../
20
21 mkdir expired-ca
22 cd expired-ca
23 mkdir ca.db.certs
24 touch ca.db.index
25 echo "1234" > ca.db.serial
26 cd ../
27
28 mkdir fake-ca
29 cd fake-ca
30 mkdir ca.db.certs
31 touch ca.db.index
32 echo "1234" > ca.db.serial
33 cd ../
```

```

34
35 mkdir second-level-ca-2
36 cd second-level-ca-2
37 mkdir ca.db.certs
38 touch ca.db.index
39 echo "1234" > ca.db.serial
40 cd ../
41
42 mkdir second-level-ca-alt1-common-name
43 cd second-level-ca-alt1-common-name
44 mkdir ca.db.certs
45 touch ca.db.index
46 echo "1234" > ca.db.serial
47 cd ../
48
49 mkdir second-level-ca-alt2-public-key
50 cd second-level-ca-alt2-public-key
51 mkdir ca.db.certs
52 touch ca.db.index
53 echo "1234" > ca.db.serial
54 cd ../
55
56 mkdir server-certificate
57 mkdir attacker-certificate
58 mkdir alt1-common-name
59 mkdir alt2-expiration-date
60 mkdir alt3-public-key
61 mkdir alt4-expired-ca
62 mkdir fake-chain-of-trust
63 mkdir attacker-certificate-signed-by-altered-int-ca
64
65 # Root Certificate Authority's Certificate
66 openssl genrsa -out ca/ca.key 2048
67 openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -key ca/ca.key -out ca/ca.pem \
68 -sha256 \
69 -subj "/C=it/ST=State/L=City/CN=Certificate Authority"
70
71 # Legit Server Certificate Request and CA Signing
72 openssl genrsa -out server-certificate/serverKey.pem 2048
73 openssl req -new -nodes -key server-certificate/serverKey.pem \
74 -sha256 \
75 -out server-certificate/serverCertificateRequest.pem \
76 -subj "/C=it/ST=State/L=City/CN=$CONTAINER_IP" \
77 -batch
78
79 openssl ca -config ca.conf -out server-certificate/serverCertificate.
    pem \
80 -in server-certificate/serverCertificateRequest.pem \
81 -batch
82
83 # Legit Server Certificate Request as Client and CA Signing
84 echo "unique_subject = no" > ca/ca.db.index.attr # Allow duplicate
    subjects to be signed by CA. In this case, the same subject wants
    to have a general SSL certificate and one for client
    authentication only.
85 openssl genrsa -out server-certificate/serverKeyAsClient.pem 2048

```

```

86 openssl req -new -nodes -key server-certificate/serverKeyAsClient.pem \
87 -sha256 \
88 -out server-certificate/serverCertificateRequestAsClient.pem \
89 -subj "/C=it/ST=State/L=City/CN=$CONTAINER_IP" \
90 -batch
91
92 openssl ca -config ca.conf -out server-certificate/
  serverCertificateAsClient.pem \
93 -in server-certificate/serverCertificateRequestAsClient.pem \
94 -extfile clientCertificateExtensions.conf \
95 -batch
96
97 # Intermediate Certificate Authority's Certificate Signing Request
  and Root CA Signing of it,
98 # then Signing the Certificate Signing Request of the Server with the
  Intermediate Certificate
99 openssl genrsa -out second-level-ca/ca.key 2048
100 openssl req -new -nodes -key second-level-ca/ca.key \
101 -sha256 \
102 -out second-level-ca/intermediateCACertificateRequest.pem \
103 -subj "/C=it/ST=State/L=City/CN=Intermediate Certificate Authority" \
104 -batch
105
106 openssl ca -config ca.conf -out second-level-ca/ca.pem \
107 -in second-level-ca/intermediateCACertificateRequest.pem \
108 -extfile intermediateCAExtensions.conf \
109 -batch
110
111 openssl ca -config second-level-ca.conf -out server-certificate/
  serverCertificateSignedByIntermediate.pem \
112 -in server-certificate/serverCertificateRequest.pem \
113 -batch
114
115 touch server-certificate/serverCertificateSignedByIntermediate-
  withRootCAIntegrated.pem
116 touch second-level-ca/ca-chain-of-trust.pem
117 cat second-level-ca/ca.pem ca/ca.pem > second-level-ca/ca-chain-of-
  trust.pem
118 cat server-certificate/serverCertificateSignedByIntermediate.pem
  second-level-ca/ca-chain-of-trust.pem > server-certificate/
  serverCertificateSignedByIntermediate-withRootCAIntegrated.pem
119
120 # Attacker's Self Signed Root Certificate
121 openssl genrsa -out attacker-certificate/attackerKey.pem 2048
122
123 openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -key attacker-certificate/
  attackerKey.pem \
124 -sha256 \
125 -out attacker-certificate/attackerCertificate.der \
126 -outform DER \
127 -subj "/C=it/ST=State/L=City/CN=False Server" \
128 -batch
129
130 # Fake Chain of Trust (Attacker uses a self signed certificate as
  Root Certificate Authority)
131 openssl genrsa -out fake-ca/ca.key 2048

```

```

132 openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -key fake-ca/ca.key -out fake-ca/ca.
    pem \
133 -sha256 \
134 -subj '/C=it/ST=State/L=City/CN=Certificate Authority'
135
136 openssl req -new -nodes -key attacker-certificate/attackerKey.pem \
137 -sha256 \
138 -out fake-chain-of-trust/attackerCertificateRequest.pem \
139 -subj "/C=it/ST=State/L=City/CN=$CONTAINER_IP" \
140 -batch
141
142 openssl ca -config fake-ca.conf -out fake-chain-of-trust/
    attackerCertificate.pem \
143 -in fake-chain-of-trust/attackerCertificateRequest.pem \
144 -batch
145
146 # Second Intermediate CA
147 openssl genrsa -out second-level-ca-2/ca.key 2048
148 openssl req -new -nodes -key second-level-ca-2/ca.key \
149 -sha256 \
150 -out second-level-ca-2/intermediateCACertificateRequest.pem \
151 -subj "/C=it/ST=State/L=City/CN=Second Intermediate Certificate
    Authority" \
152 -batch
153
154 openssl ca -config ca.conf -out second-level-ca-2/ca.pem \
155 -in second-level-ca-2/intermediateCACertificateRequest.pem \
156 -extfile intermediateCAExtensions.conf \
157 -batch
158
159 openssl req -new -nodes -key attacker-certificate/attackerKey.pem \
160 -sha256 \
161 -out attacker-certificate-signed-by-altered-int-ca/
    attackerCertificateRequest.pem \
162 -subj "/C=it/ST=State/L=City/CN=$CONTAINER_IP" \
163 -batch
164
165 # Intermediate CA Alt 1
166 cp second-level-ca-2/ca.key second-level-ca-alt1-common-name/ca.key
167 openssl x509 -in second-level-ca-2/ca.pem \
168 -outform DER \
169 -out second-level-ca-2/ca.der
170
171 openssl x509 -in second-level-ca/ca.pem \
172 -outform DER \
173 -out second-level-ca/ca.der
174
175 ~/.venv/mqtt-over-tls/bin/python3 scriptsToAlterCertificate/
    alterCommonName.py \
176 'second-level-ca-2/ca.der' \
177 'second-level-ca-alt1-common-name/ca.der' \
178 'second-level-ca/ca.der'
179
180 openssl x509 -in second-level-ca-alt1-common-name/ca.der \
181 -inform DER \
182 -out second-level-ca-alt1-common-name/ca.pem
183

```

```

184 openssl ca -config second-level-ca-alt1-common-name.conf -out
    attacker-certificate-signed-by-altered-int-ca/attackerCertificate-
    alt1.pem \
185 -in attacker-certificate-signed-by-altered-int-ca/
    attackerCertificateRequest.pem \
186 -batch
187
188 touch second-level-ca-alt1-common-name/ca-chain-of-trust.pem
189 cat second-level-ca-alt1-common-name/ca.pem ca/ca.pem > second-level-
    ca-alt1-common-name/ca-chain-of-trust.pem
190
191 # Intermediate CA Alt 2
192 cp second-level-ca-2/ca.key second-level-ca-alt2-public-key/ca.key
193
194 ~/.venv/mqtt-over-tls/bin/python3 scriptsToAlterCertificate/
    alterPublicKey.py \
195 'second-level-ca/ca.der' \
196 'second-level-ca-alt2-public-key/ca.der' \
197 'second-level-ca-2/ca.der'
198
199 openssl x509 -in second-level-ca-alt2-public-key/ca.der \
200 -inform DER \
201 -out second-level-ca-alt2-public-key/ca.pem
202
203 openssl ca -config second-level-ca-alt2-public-key.conf -out attacker
    -certificate-signed-by-altered-int-ca/attackerCertificate-alt2.pem
    \
204 -in attacker-certificate-signed-by-altered-int-ca/
    attackerCertificateRequest.pem \
205 -batch
206
207 touch second-level-ca-alt2-public-key/ca-chain-of-trust.pem
208 cat second-level-ca-alt2-public-key/ca.pem ca/ca.pem > second-level-
    ca-alt2-public-key/ca-chain-of-trust.pem
209
210 # Convert Signed Server Certificate to .der (ASN.1 encoding) for
    alteration purposes
211 openssl x509 -in server-certificate/serverCertificate.pem \
212 -outform DER \
213 -out server-certificate/serverCertificate.der
214
215 # Alteration 1 - Changing the Common Name
216 ~/.venv/mqtt-over-tls/bin/python3 scriptsToAlterCertificate/
    alterCommonName.py \
217 'server-certificate/serverCertificate.der' \
218 'alt1-common-name/attackerCertificate.der' \
219 'attacker-certificate/attackerCertificate.der'
220
221 # Alteration 2 - Expired Certificate
222 ~/.venv/mqtt-over-tls/bin/python3 scriptsToAlterCertificate/
    alterExpirationDate.py
223
224 # Alteration 3 - Replacing the Public Key
225 ~/.venv/mqtt-over-tls/bin/python3 scriptsToAlterCertificate/
    alterPublicKey.py \
226 'server-certificate/serverCertificate.der' \
227 'alt3-public-key/attackerCertificate.der' \

```

```

228 'attacker-certificate/attackerCertificate.der'
229
230 # Alteration 4 - Certificate signed by an Expired Certificate
    Authority Certificate
231 openssl x509 -in ca/ca.pem -out expired-ca/caCopy.der -outform DER
232 cp ca/ca.key expired-ca/ca.key
233 ~/.venv/mqtt-over-tls/bin/python3 scriptsToAlterCertificate/
    alterCertificateAuthorityExpirationDate.py
234 openssl x509 -in expired-ca/ca.der -out expired-ca/ca.pem -inform DER
235
236 openssl req -new -nodes -key attacker-certificate/attackerKey.pem \
237 -sha256 \
238 -out alt4-expired-ca/attackerCertificateRequest.pem \
239 -subj "/C=it/ST=State/L=City/CN=$CONTAINER_IP" \
240 -batch
241
242 openssl ca -config expired-ca.conf -out alt4-expired-ca/
    attackerCertificate.pem \
243 -in alt4-expired-ca/attackerCertificateRequest.pem \
244 -batch
245
246 # For each Attacker Certificate, convert from .der to .pem for MQTT
    Library
247 openssl x509 -inform DER -in attacker-certificate/attackerCertificate
    .der -out attacker-certificate/attackerCertificate.pem
248 openssl x509 -inform DER -in alt1-common-name/attackerCertificate.der
    -out alt1-common-name/attackerCertificate.pem
249 openssl x509 -inform DER -in alt2-expiration-date/attackerCertificate
    .der -out alt2-expiration-date/attackerCertificate.pem
250 openssl x509 -inform DER -in alt3-public-key/attackerCertificate.der
    -out alt3-public-key/attackerCertificate.pem

```

This script, `'setupCertificates.sh'`, is the main piece of code which creates the certificates for all the actors involved in the above defined Unit Tests, using the OpenSSL library to do so. When executed, we need to pass as argument the IP address of the MQTT Library Docker Container which will act as our MQTT Server. The reason we need this argument is that, when generating the certificates, we will need to specify this IP as the Server Certificate's Common Name. To start off, the script calls the subscript `'clean.sh'` to remove existing certificates and folders that we are going to create later. This is done in order to allow the script to be called multiple times if needed. The script then proceeds creating the following Certificate Authority folders:

- `ca`: this is the Root Certificate Authority used to sign the MQTT Server's TLS Certificate.
- `second-level-ca`: this is the Intermediate Certificate Authority, signed by the Root CA and used to sign the MQTT Server's TLS Certificate in the Test Case 9.
- `expired-ca`: this is a Root Certificate Authority which has been used to sign the MQTT Server's TLS Certificate but is now expired.
- `fake-ca`: this is a Root Certificate Authority forged by the Attacker to look like the real Root CA.



- `second-level-ca-2`: this is an Intermediate Certificate Authority owned by the Attacker and signed by the Root CA. It is used by the Attacker in Test Case 10 to pretend to be the real Intermediate Certificate Authority.
- `second-level-ca-alt1-common-name`: this is the destination folder of the Attacker's Intermediate Certificate Authority after they tampered with its Common Name field.
- `second-level-ca-alt2-public-key`: this is the destination folder of the altered Intermediate Certificate Authority after the attacker tampered with its Public Key field. Used in Test Case 11.

The script then proceeds creating the following TLS Certificate folders:

- `server-certificate`: this folder will contain the TLS Certificate belonging to the MQTT Server.
- `attacker-certificate`: this folder will contain the self-signed TLS Certificate belonging to the Attacker.
- `alt1-common-name`: this folder will contain the MQTT Server's Altered TLS Certificate, after the attacker tampered with its Common Name field.
- `alt2-expiration-date`: this folder will contain the MQTT Server's Altered TLS Certificate, after the attacker tampered with its Not Valid After field.
- `alt3-public-key`: this folder will contain the MQTT Server's Altered TLS Certificate, after the attacker tampered with its Public Key field.
- `alt4-expired-ca`: this folder will contain the Attacker's TLS Certificate signed by the expired Root CA.
- `fake-chain-of-trust`: this folder will contain the Attacker's TLS Certificate signed by their Fake Root Certificate Authority.
- `attacker-certificate-signed-by-altered-int-ca`: this folder will contain the Attacker's Intermediate CA Altered TLS Certificates, for Test Case 10 (Altered CA's Common Name) and Test Case 11 (Altered CA's Public Key)

The script then generates, in order:

- the Root Certificate Authority's Private Key and TLS self-signed Certificate:
  - `ca/ca.key`
  - `ca/ca.pem`
- the Legit MQTT Server's Private Key:
  - `server-certificate/serverKey.pem`
- the Legit MQTT Server's TLS Certificate signed by the Root CA:
  - `server-certificate/serverCertificate.pem`

- the Legit MQTT Server's Private Key for usage as a Client:
  - server-certificate/serverKeyAsClient.pem
- the Legit MQTT Server's TLS Certificate for usage as a Client, signed by the Root CA:
  - server-certificate/serverCertificateAsClient.pem
- the Intermediate Certificate Authority's Private Key:
  - second-level-ca/ca.key
- the Intermediate Certificate Authority TLS Certificate signed by the Root CA:
  - second-level-ca/ca.pem
- the Legit MQTT Server's TLS Certificate signed by the Intermediate CA:
  - server-certificate/serverCertificateSignedByIntermediate.pem
- the concatenation of Root CA's and Intermediate CA's TLS Certificates:
  - second-level-ca/ca-chain-of-trust.pem
- the Attacker's Private Key and TLS self-signed Certificate:
  - attacker-certificate/attackerKey.pem
  - attacker-certificate/attackerCertificate.pem
- the Attacker's Fake Root Certificate Authority's Private Key and TLS self-signed Certificate:
  - fake-ca/ca.key
  - fake-ca/ca.pem
- the Attacker's TLS Certificate signed by the Fake Root CA:
  - fake-chain-of-trust/attackerCertificate.pem
- a second (different) Intermediate Certificate Authority's Private Key:
  - second-level-ca-2/ca.key
- the TLS Certificate of the second Intermediate CA, signed by the Root CA:
  - second-level-ca-2/ca.pem
- the Alteration 1 (Common Name) of the second Intermediate CA's TLS Certificate:
  - second-level-ca-alt1-common-name/ca.der
- the Attacker's TLS Certificate signed by the Altered Intermediate CA (Alteration 1):

- attacker-certificate-signed-by-altered-int-ca/attackerCertificate-alt1.pem
- the concatenation of Root CA's and Altered Intermediate CA (Alteration 1)'s TLS Certificates:
  - second-level-ca-alt1-common-name/ca-chain-of-trust.pem
- the Alteration 2 (Public Key) of the second Intermediate CA's TLS Certificate:
  - second-level-ca-alt2-public-key/ca.der
- the Attacker's TLS Certificate signed by the Altered Intermediate CA (Alteration 2):
  - attacker-certificate-signed-by-altered-int-ca/attackerCertificate-alt2.pem
- the concatenation of Root CA's and Altered Intermediate CA (Alteration 2)'s TLS Certificates:
  - second-level-ca-alt2-public-key/ca-chain-of-trust.pem
- the Alteration 1 (Common Name) of the Legit MQTT Server's TLS Certificate:
  - alt1-common-name/attackerCertificate.der
- the Alteration 2 (Expiration Date) of the Legit MQTT Server's TLS Certificate:
  - alt2-expiration-date/attackerCertificate.der
- the Alteration 3 (Public Key) of the Legit MQTT Server's TLS Certificate:
  - alt3-public-key/attackerCertificate.der
- the Expired Root CA's TLS Certificate:
  - expired-ca/ca.pem
- the Attacker's TLS Certificate signed by the Expired CA:
  - alt4-expired-ca/attackerCertificate.der

Lastly, the script converts back to **'.pem'** all the certificates that were saved in **'.der'** extension by the alteration scripts.

## 3.2 TLS Certificate Common Name Alteration Script

```

1 from pyasn1.codec.der.decoder import decode
2 from pyasn1.codec.der.encoder import encode
3 from pyasn1_modules import rfc2459
4 import sys
5
6 # Usage: this script takes 3 arguments:
7 # 1 - Certificate to be altered
8 # 2 - Destination path where to save the altered certificate

```

```

9 # 3 - Certificate to use as reference for altering the common name
10
11 with open(sys.argv[1], 'rb') as fileInput, \
12 open(sys.argv[2], 'wb') as fileOutput, \
13 open(sys.argv[3], 'rb') as alterationReferenceFileInput:
14     certificateToAlter, restOfCertificate = decode(fileInput.read(),
15         asn1Spec=rfc2459.Certificate())
16     assert not restOfCertificate
17     referenceCertificate, _ = decode(alterationReferenceFileInput.read()
18         ), asn1Spec=rfc2459.Certificate())
19     certificateToAlter['tbsCertificate']['subject'] =
20         referenceCertificate['tbsCertificate']['subject']
21     outputSubstrate = encode(certificateToAlter)
22     fileOutput.write(outputSubstrate)
23     print("Finished saving Alteration 1 - Common Name in " + sys.argv
24         [2])

```

Because this script is used to alter both the Legit MQTT Server's TLS Certificate and the second Intermediate CA's TLS Certificate, the script is designed to have 3 inputs:

- Path of the certificate to be altered.
- Path of the destination where the altered certificate will be saved.
- Path of the reference certificate that will be used to copy and paste the Common Name from.

The script uses the 'pyasn1', 'pyasn1\_modules' and 'sys' libraries to:

1. Read the certificate to be altered and the reference certificate from disk.
2. Decode the certificate to be altered and the reference certificate, from ASN1-base64-encoded data to a Dictionary data structure.
3. Overwrite the **Common Name** of the certificate to be altered with the **Common Name** of the reference Certificate.
4. Encode the resulting Altered Certificate from a Dictionary data structure to a ASN1-base64-encoded data.
5. Save the Altered Certificate on disk.

### 3.3 TLS Certificate Expiration Date Alteration Script

```

1 from pyasn1.codec.der.decoder import decode
2 from pyasn1.codec.der.encoder import encode
3 from pyasn1_modules import rfc2459
4
5 with open('server-certificate/serverCertificate.der', 'rb') as
6     fileInput, \
7     open('alt2-expiration-date/attackerCertificate.der', 'wb') as
8         fileOutput:
9         certificate, restOfCertificate = decode(fileInput.read(),
10             asn1Spec=rfc2459.Certificate())

```

```

8  assert not restOfCertificate
9  certificate['tbsCertificate']['validity']['notBefore']['utcTime'] =
    "010530070422Z"
10 certificate['tbsCertificate']['validity']['notAfter']['utcTime'] =
    "400530070422Z"
11 outputSubstrate = encode(certificate)
12 fileOutput.write(outputSubstrate)
13 print("Finished saving Alteration 2 - Expired Certificate")

```

The script uses the 'pyasn1', 'pyasn1\_modules' and 'sys' libraries to:

1. Read the certificate to be altered ('server-certificate/serverCertificate.der') from disk.
2. Decode the certificate to be altered from ASN1-base64-encoded data to a Dictionary data structure.
3. Change the validity range ('Not Valid Before' and 'Not Valid After' fields) to a range that contains the current date, for example in the script it's changed to years 2001 until 2040.
4. Encode the resulting Altered Certificate from a Dictionary data structure to a ASN1-base64-encoded data.
5. Save the Altered Certificate on disk.

### 3.4 TLS Certificate Public Key Alteration Script

```

1  from pyasn1.codec.der.decoder import decode
2  from pyasn1.codec.der.encoder import encode
3  from pyasn1_modules import rfc2459
4  import sys
5
6  # Usage: this script takes 3 arguments:
7  # 1 - Certificate to be altered
8  # 2 - Destination path where to save the altered certificate
9  # 3 - Certificate to use as reference for altering the public key
10
11 with open(sys.argv[1], 'rb') as fileInput, \
12 open(sys.argv[2], 'wb') as fileOutput, \
13 open(sys.argv[3], 'rb') as alterationReferenceFileInput:
14     certificateToAlter, restOfCertificate = decode(fileInput.read(),
15         asn1Spec=rfc2459.Certificate())
16     assert not restOfCertificate
17     referenceCertificate, _ = decode(alterationReferenceFileInput.read(
18         ), asn1Spec=rfc2459.Certificate())
19     certificateToAlter['tbsCertificate']['subjectPublicKeyInfo'] =
20         referenceCertificate['tbsCertificate']['subjectPublicKeyInfo']
21     outputSubstrate = encode(certificateToAlter)
22     fileOutput.write(outputSubstrate)
23     print("Finished saving Alteration 3 - Public Key in " + sys.argv
24         [2])

```

Because this script is used to alter both the Legit MQTT Server's TLS Certificate and the Intermediate CA's TLS Certificate, the script is designed to have 3 inputs:

- Path of the certificate to be altered.

- Path of the destination where the altered certificate will be saved.
- Path of the reference certificate that will be used to copy and paste the Common Name from.

The script uses the ‘pyasn1’, ‘pyasn1\_modules’ and ‘sys’ libraries to:

1. Read the certificate to be altered and the reference certificate from disk.
2. Decode the certificate to be altered and the reference certificate, from ASN1-base64-encoded data to a Dictionary data structure.
3. Overwrite the **Public Key** of the certificate to be altered with the **Public Key** of the reference Certificate.
4. Encode the resulting Altered Certificate from a Dictionary data structure to a ASN1-base64-encoded data.
5. Save the Altered Certificate on disk.

### 3.5 TLS Certificate Keystores Generation Script

```

1  #!/bin/sh
2
3  CERTIFICATES='certificates'
4
5  rm -rf keystores
6  mkdir keystores
7
8  # Generate TLS Certificates for Test Cases, in case it was not
   already done for other libraries tests
9  cd $CERTIFICATES
10 sh setupCertificates.sh $1
11 cd -
12
13 # Convert all test-case certificates into .p12 stores (PKCS12)
14 openssl pkcs12 -export \
15 -in $CERTIFICATES/server-certificate/serverCertificate.pem \
16 -inkey $CERTIFICATES/server-certificate/serverKey.pem \
17 -passout pass:hivemqStorePassword \
18 -name hivemq \
19 -out keystores/serverCertificate.p12
20
21 openssl pkcs12 -export \
22 -in $CERTIFICATES/server-certificate/
   serverCertificateSignedByIntermediate-withRootCAIntegrated.pem \
23 -inkey $CERTIFICATES/server-certificate/serverKey.pem \
24 -passout pass:hivemqStorePassword \
25 -name hivemq \
26 -out keystores/serverCertificateSignedByIntermediate.p12
27
28 openssl pkcs12 -export \
29 -in $CERTIFICATES/server-certificate/serverCertificateAsClient.pem \
30 -inkey $CERTIFICATES/server-certificate/serverKeyAsClient.pem \
31 -passout pass:hivemqStorePassword \

```

```
32 -name hivemq \  
33 -out keystores/serverCertificateAsClient.p12  
34  
35 openssl pkcs12 -export \  
36 -in $CERTIFICATES/attacker-certificate/attackerCertificate.pem \  
37 -inkey $CERTIFICATES/attacker-certificate/attackerKey.pem \  
38 -passout pass:hivemqStorePassword \  
39 -name hivemq \  
40 -out keystores/attackerCertificate.p12  
41  
42 openssl pkcs12 -export \  
43 -in $CERTIFICATES/fake-chain-of-trust/attackerCertificate.pem \  
44 -inkey $CERTIFICATES/attacker-certificate/attackerKey.pem \  
45 -passout pass:hivemqStorePassword \  
46 -name hivemq \  
47 -out keystores/attackerCertificateFakeChainOfTrust.p12  
48  
49 openssl pkcs12 -export \  
50 -in $CERTIFICATES/attacker-certificate-signed-by-altered-int-ca/  
    attackerCertificate-alt1.pem \  
51 -inkey $CERTIFICATES/attacker-certificate/attackerKey.pem \  
52 -passout pass:hivemqStorePassword \  
53 -name hivemq \  
54 -out keystores/attackerCertificateAlteredIntCACommonName.p12  
55  
56 openssl pkcs12 -export \  
57 -in $CERTIFICATES/attacker-certificate-signed-by-altered-int-ca/  
    attackerCertificate-alt2.pem \  
58 -inkey $CERTIFICATES/attacker-certificate/attackerKey.pem \  
59 -passout pass:hivemqStorePassword \  
60 -name hivemq \  
61 -out keystores/attackerCertificateAlteredIntCAPublicKey.p12  
62  
63 openssl pkcs12 -export \  
64 -in $CERTIFICATES/alt1-common-name/attackerCertificate.pem \  
65 -inkey $CERTIFICATES/server-certificate/serverKey.pem \  
66 -passout pass:hivemqStorePassword \  
67 -name hivemq \  
68 -out keystores/alteration1CommonName.p12  
69  
70 openssl pkcs12 -export \  
71 -in $CERTIFICATES/alt2-expiration-date/attackerCertificate.pem \  
72 -inkey $CERTIFICATES/server-certificate/serverKey.pem \  
73 -passout pass:hivemqStorePassword \  
74 -name hivemq \  
75 -out keystores/alteration2ExpirationDate.p12  
76  
77 openssl pkcs12 -export \  
78 -in $CERTIFICATES/alt3-public-key/attackerCertificate.pem \  
79 -inkey $CERTIFICATES/attacker-certificate/attackerKey.pem \  
80 -passout pass:hivemqStorePassword \  
81 -name hivemq \  
82 -out keystores/alteration3PublicKey.p12  
83  
84 openssl pkcs12 -export \  
85 -in $CERTIFICATES/alt4-expired-ca/attackerCertificate.pem \  
86 -inkey $CERTIFICATES/attacker-certificate/attackerKey.pem \
```

```

87 -passout pass:hivemqStorePassword \
88 -name hivemq \
89 -out keystores/alteration4ExpiredCA.p12
90
91 # For each PKCS12, convert to JKS for HiveMQ
92 cd keystores
93
94 keytool -importkeystore \
95 -srckeystore serverCertificate.p12 -srcstoretype PKCS12 \
96 -destkeystore serverCertificate.jks -deststoretype JKS \
97 -srcstorepass hivemqStorePassword \
98 -deststorepass hivemqStorePassword
99
100 keytool -importkeystore \
101 -srckeystore serverCertificateSignedByIntermediate.p12 -srcstoretype
    PKCS12 \
102 -destkeystore serverCertificateSignedByIntermediate.jks -
    deststoretype JKS \
103 -srcstorepass hivemqStorePassword \
104 -deststorepass hivemqStorePassword
105
106 keytool -importkeystore \
107 -srckeystore serverCertificateAsClient.p12 -srcstoretype PKCS12 \
108 -destkeystore serverCertificateAsClient.jks -deststoretype JKS \
109 -srcstorepass hivemqStorePassword \
110 -deststorepass hivemqStorePassword
111
112 keytool -importkeystore \
113 -srckeystore attackerCertificate.p12 -srcstoretype PKCS12 \
114 -destkeystore attackerCertificate.jks -deststoretype JKS \
115 -srcstorepass hivemqStorePassword \
116 -deststorepass hivemqStorePassword
117
118 keytool -importkeystore \
119 -srckeystore attackerCertificateFakeChainOfTrust.p12 -srcstoretype
    PKCS12 \
120 -destkeystore attackerCertificateFakeChainOfTrust.jks -deststoretype
    JKS \
121 -srcstorepass hivemqStorePassword \
122 -deststorepass hivemqStorePassword
123
124 keytool -importkeystore \
125 -srckeystore attackerCertificateAlteredIntCACCommonName.p12 -
    srcstoretype PKCS12 \
126 -destkeystore attackerCertificateAlteredIntCACCommonName.jks -
    deststoretype JKS \
127 -srcstorepass hivemqStorePassword \
128 -deststorepass hivemqStorePassword
129
130 keytool -importkeystore \
131 -srckeystore attackerCertificateAlteredIntCAPublicKey.p12 -
    srcstoretype PKCS12 \
132 -destkeystore attackerCertificateAlteredIntCAPublicKey.jks -
    deststoretype JKS \
133 -srcstorepass hivemqStorePassword \
134 -deststorepass hivemqStorePassword
135

```



```

136 keytool -importkeystore \
137 -srckeystore alteration1CommonName.p12 -srcstoretype PKCS12 \
138 -destkeystore alteration1CommonName.jks -deststoretype JKS \
139 -srcstorepass hivemqStorePassword \
140 -deststorepass hivemqStorePassword
141
142 keytool -importkeystore \
143 -srckeystore alteration2ExpirationDate.p12 -srcstoretype PKCS12 \
144 -destkeystore alteration2ExpirationDate.jks -deststoretype JKS \
145 -srcstorepass hivemqStorePassword \
146 -deststorepass hivemqStorePassword
147
148 keytool -importkeystore \
149 -srckeystore alteration3PublicKey.p12 -srcstoretype PKCS12 \
150 -destkeystore alteration3PublicKey.jks -deststoretype JKS \
151 -srcstorepass hivemqStorePassword \
152 -deststorepass hivemqStorePassword
153
154 keytool -importkeystore \
155 -srckeystore alteration4ExpiredCA.p12 -srcstoretype PKCS12 \
156 -destkeystore alteration4ExpiredCA.jks -deststoretype JKS \
157 -srcstorepass hivemqStorePassword \
158 -deststorepass hivemqStorePassword

```

Some of the tested MQTT Libraries work with Java Keystores (JKS) instead of retrieving the TLS Certificates from absolute paths. Therefore this script is designed to save the TLS Certificates generated by the **'setupCertificates.sh'** script into Java Keystores. More specifically, the script applies these steps to the certificates and private keys of each Test Case:

1. Save a **'p12'** keystore containing the Server's Certificate and Private Key, using the **'openssl pkcs12'** tool.
2. Convert the **'p12'** keystore to a **'jks'** keystore using the **default-jre's 'keytool'** command.

All the derived keystores are saved in the 'keystores' folder.

## 3.6 MQTT Client Tester Script

```

1  #!/bin/sh
2
3  NC='\033[0;0m'
4  RED='\033[0;31m'
5  GREEN='\033[0;32m'
6
7  echo "Setting up MQTT client subscription..."
8
9  if [ -z $2 ];
10 then
11     caPath=certificates/ca/ca.pem
12 else
13     caPath=$2
14 fi
15
16 echo "Using validation ca certificate on tester client: $caPath"

```

```

17 mosquitto_sub -h $1 -p 8883 -i 'subid' -t 'test' --cafile $caPath &
18 subPID=$!
19
20 sleep 1.5
21
22 echo "Killing $subPID"
23 kill $subPID
24
25 if [ $? = "0" ]
26 then
27     echo "${GREEN}The MQTT client subscription was working correctly${NC}"
28 else
29     echo "${RED}The MQTT client subscription was not active${NC}"
30 fi

```

The Tester (MQTT Client) uses a Tester Script named `testMQTTBroker.sh`, invoking a Mosquitto Command-Line Interface distribution subscription command to connect to the MQTT Server set up by the Test Environment. The Tester Script then checks if the subscription was active (if exit code is 0) and prints a line on **stdout** that represents the Unit Test Result. The Tester Script also accepts an optional argument to specify a Certificate Authority TLS Certificate path to use to connect to the MQTT Server. This is used mainly for **Test Case 7**, where the reference CA TLS Certificate to use must be the expired one.

### 3.7 Library Tester Script

```

1  #!/bin/bash
2  bold=$(tput bold)
3  normal=$(tput sgr0)
4
5  MOSQUITTO_CONTAINER_IP=$(docker inspect -f '{{range.NetworkSettings.
6      Networks}}{{.IPAddress}}{{end}}' mosquittoContainer)
7
8  testConfigurations=(
9      "mosquitto.conf"
10     "mosquitto-self-signed.conf"
11     "mosquitto-fake-ca.conf"
12     "mosquitto-alt1.conf"
13     "mosquitto-alt2.conf"
14     "mosquitto-alt3.conf"
15     "mosquitto-alt4.conf"
16     "mosquitto-using-client-cert.conf"
17     "mosquitto-longer-chain-of-trust.conf"
18     "mosquitto-altered-common-name-longer-chain-of-trust.conf"
19     "mosquitto-altered-public-key-longer-chain-of-trust.conf"
20 )
21
22 testTitles=(
23     "Test Case 1 - Legal Connection"
24     "Test Case 2 - Self Signed Attacker"
25     "Test Case 3 - Self Signed Attacker Fake CA"
26     "Test Case 4 - Alteration 1 (Common Name)"
27     "Test Case 5 - Expired Certificate altered Expiration Date (
28     Alteration 2)"
29     "Test Case 6 - Alteration 3 (Public Key)"

```

```

28     "Test Case 7 - Expired CA (for laboratory purposes, Alteration 4)
29     "
30     "Test Case 8 - Certificate Extension (MQTT Broker Client
31     Certificate)"
32     "Test Case 9 - Longer Chain Of Trust Legal Connection"
33     "Test Case 10 - Altered Intermediate CA Common Name"
34     "Test Case 11 - Altered Intermediate CA Public Key"
35 )
36
37 # Test Case 7 has to be validated against expired ca on client side,
38 # not default legal ca.
39 caPathOverride=(
40     ""
41     ""
42     ""
43     ""
44     ""
45     ""
46     "certificates/expired-ca/ca.pem"
47     ""
48     ""
49     ""
50 )
51
52 for i in ${!testConfigurations[@]}; do
53     echo "${bold}Running ${testTitles[$i]}${normal}"
54     CONFIGURATION_FOR_CURRENT_TEST=${testConfigurations[$i]}
55     echo "Configuring mosquittoContainer with new certificates..."
56     docker exec mosquittoContainer cp /mosquitto/config/test-
57     configurations/$CONFIGURATION_FOR_CURRENT_TEST /mosquitto/config/
58     mosquitto.conf
59     sleep 1
60     echo "Restarting mosquittoContainer..."
61     docker restart mosquittoContainer
62     sleep 3
63     docker exec testerContainer bash -c "cd /app/src && sh
64     testMQTTBroker.sh $MOSQUITTO_CONTAINER_IP ${caPathOverride[$i]}"
65 done

```

For each library an automated Tester Script has been developed. The script is designed to loop through the Test Cases, and for each test case the script will:

1. Configure the MQTT Server Docker Container with the Broker Configuration of the current Test Case.
2. Restart the MQTT Server Docker Container
3. Command the MQTT Client Docker Container to try connecting to the MQTT Server using the MQTT Client Tester Script ('testMQTTBroker.sh')
4. Proceed to the next Test Case

The automated script works only if, before executing it, both the MQTT Server and MQTT Client Docker Containers are running.

## 3.8 Docker Test Environment

### 3.8.1 MQTT Client Tester Image

For the Docker Test Environment, the main piece of work was to setup the MQTT Client Tester Docker Container Image. The code used for the generation of this Image can be found in the following Dockerfile:

```
1 # Based off the docker/welcome-to-docker Image, for more info check
  MAINTAINERS.md
2 FROM debian:stable
3
4 WORKDIR /app
5
6 COPY ./src ./src
7
8 SHELL ["/bin/bash", "-c"]
9
10 RUN apt-get update -yq \
11     && apt-get install -yq python3 python3-pip python3.11-venv git
    openssl mosquitto mosquitto-clients default-jre
12
13 RUN python3 -m venv ~/.venv/mqtt-over-tls
14 RUN ~/.venv/mqtt-over-tls/bin/pip3 install -r ./src/requirements.txt
```

The Dockerfile is based on the Linux Debian operating system image. It stores all its files in the folders ‘/app’ and ‘/app/src’. The main files that are copied in these folders are:

- setupCertificates.sh
- setupKeystores.sh
- testMQTTBroker.sh
- requirements.txt (configuration file to install python package dependencies)
- Test configurations for: **EMQX**, **HiveMQ** and **Mosquitto**
- Automated scripts to run all Test Cases for: **EMQX**, **HiveMQ**, **Mosquitto**, **Aedes** and **Moquette**

The Dockerfile also installs all the tools and libraries needed to run the tests:

- python
- pip
- python virtual environment
- git
- openssl
- mosquitto
- mosquitto-clients
- default-jre

### 3.8.2 Moquette MQTT Server Image

There was no official Moquette Docker Container Image on Docker Hub, so our work included also the creation of a MQTT Server Docker Container Image which runs Moquette on startup. The code used for the generation of this Image can be found in the following Dockerfile:

```
1 # Based off the docker/welcome-to-docker Image, for more info check
  MAINTAINERS.md
2 FROM debian:stable
3
4 WORKDIR /app
5
6 COPY ./src ./src
7
8 SHELL ["/bin/bash", "-c"]
9
10 RUN apt-get update -yq \
11     && apt-get install -yq openssl default-jre
12
13 ENTRYPOINT ["src/moquette/bin/moquette.sh"]
```

This Dockerfile is also based on the Linux Debian operating system image. It stores all its files in the folder `/app/src/moquette`. This folder contains a pre-compiled version of the Moquette MQTT Broker library. The Dockerfile also installs all the dependencies needed by Moquette to run the MQTT Server:

- openssl
- default-jre

Lastly, the Dockerfile runs on startup the script `/app/src/moquette/bin/moquette.sh`

### 3.8.3 Aedes MQTT Server Image

The official Aedes Docker Container Image found on Docker Hub had a very complex Container setup that used Docker Volumes to setup the configuration of the library. Because this procedure was not fitting our means of testing, we decided to create a custom MQTT Server Docker Container Image which runs Aedes on startup.

The code used for the generation of this Image can be found in the following Dockerfile:

```
1 # Based off the docker/welcome-to-docker Image, for more info check
  MAINTAINERS.md
2 FROM debian:stable
3
4 WORKDIR /app
5
6 COPY ./src ./src
7
8 SHELL ["/bin/bash", "-c"]
9
10 RUN apt-get update -yq \
11     && apt-get install -yq openssl default-jre npm
12
13 RUN npm install aedes-cli -g
```

```
14  
15 ENTRYPOINT ["src/run.sh"]
```

This Dockerfile is also based on the Linux Debian operating system image. It stores all its files in the folder `‘/app/src’`. This folder contains:

- the Aedes test configurations needed to run each Test Case
- a `‘run.sh’` script which simply runs `aedes-cli` getting the configuration from the path `‘/app/src/config/conf.js’`

The Dockerfile also installs all the dependencies needed to run Aedes’ MQTT Server, and it installs the latest version of Aedes itself. The dependencies are:

- openssl
- default-jre
- npm

Lastly, the Dockerfile runs on startup the above mentioned script `‘run.sh’`.

## 3.9 Libraries Differences

### 3.9.1 Mosquitto

Mosquitto has been the easiest Library to setup. Clear documentation and fast startup times, Mosquitto works with configurations defined by single-line key-value parameters. The parameters used for TLS purposes are:

- Root Certificate Authority’s Certificate path
- Broker Certificate path
- Broker Private Key path

Once that is done, the configuration can be loaded directly by the command line interface using the `‘-c’` parameter.

### 3.9.2 HiveMQ

HiveMQ’s configuration is in XML tree format, and it is loaded automatically by the library in a pre-defined reserved path inside the library’s folder. The TLS parameters in this configuration are:

- Path to the Certificate’s Java Keystore
- Password for the Certificate’s Java Keystore

In fact, HiveMQ does not use path references to the Certificate Components (CA, Certificate, Private Key). Instead, it uses a Java Keystore containing all the Certificate Components that are otherwise defined one by one in other Libraries, such as Mosquitto.

### 3.9.3 Aedes

Aedes's configuration is in Java Object format, it's defined by setting the 'module.exports' value in JSON format. Similarly to Mosquitto, it requires the user to define the path to the Broker Certificate and to the respective Private Key. The configuration is then loaded by the command line interface using the '-config' parameter.

### 3.9.4 Moquette

Moquette has been the hardest Library to setup, due to a faulty distribution. We had to manually download the latest release from their GitHub and compile it using 'maven'. Once this is done, the configuration setup is similar to both Mosquitto and HiveMQ: the configuration format is single-line key-value parameters, and the TLS Certificate information has to be stored in a Java Keystore. Lastly, the configuration is being retrieved by the library automatically thanks to a pre-defined reserved path inside the library's folder.

### 3.9.5 EMQX

EMQX's default configuration is already set to support TLS, so the way we configured it for our Test Cases is by rewriting the Certificate Components (CA, Certificate, Private Key) used by the default configuration. For that purpose, we created a simple configuration system in which each configuration file would define as first line the Certificate Authority's Certificate path, as second line the Server Certificate path, as third line the Server's Private Key path.

### 3.9.6 RouterOS

The RouterOS setup was done through a Virtual Machine environment. To upload the needed TLS Certificates to the Virtual Machine, we used the 'Winbox' helper tool. Then, from the RouterOS console we would define a new broker via the 'iot mqtt broker add' command. This command retrieves the TLS Certificate Components via path, but for some persistency bug it would not retrieve new TLS Certificates when the same path was rewritten via 'winbox'. Therefore, in each Test Case we had to remove and re-add the broker before publishing a message.





## Chapter 4

# Test Results

### 4.1 Tested MQTT Libraries

These are the Libraries that were subjected to Unit Testing and their respective version:

Library Name	Tested Version
Mosquitto	2.0.18
HiveMQ Community Edition	2023.9
Aedes	0.8.0
Moquette	0.18
EMQX	5.3.0
RouterOS <b>6</b>	CHR (6.49.10 Long-term)
RouterOS <b>7</b>	CHR (7.13.3 Stable)

All the Libraries except RouterOS have been set up as MQTT Broker and have been interacted with using the Mosquitto command line tools as MQTT Tester Client. On the other hand, RouterOS is a Library that enables MQTT connection in the form of Client-only up until version **v7.4beta4**. Therefore, RouterOS has been submitted to the same Test Suite as the other Libraries, except the Client connection was made by the tested Library itself, and the MQTT Tester Broker we chose was Mosquitto.

## 4.2 Result Table

The Test Results for the tested Libraries can be found in the following tables. A tick '✓' represents a positive test outcome, a cross '✗' represents a failed test outcome.

	Chain of Trust			Host-name	Exp. Date	Public Key
Library Name	Test Case 1	Test Case 2	Test Case 3	Test Case 4	Test Case 5	Test Case 6
Mosquitto	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
HiveMQ Community Edition	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Aedes	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Moquette	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
EMQX	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
RouterOS 6	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
RouterOS 7	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

	Exp. Date	Cert. Extensions	Chain of trust	Host-name	Public Key
Library Name	Test Case 7	Test Case 8	Test Case 9	Test Case 10	Test Case 11
Mosquitto	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
HiveMQ Community Edition	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Aedes	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Moquette	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
EMQX	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
RouterOS 6	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
RouterOS 7	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓

### 4.2.1 Test Case 1 - Legal Connection

In this Test Case we expected the Libraries to correctly accept the connection of our MQTT Tester Client, since the TLS Certificates used were all valid. All the Libraries passed this test, since all Libraries accepted our MQTT Tester Client connection. RouterOS passed this test too, since it correctly connected to the Mosquitto Broker.

### 4.2.2 Test Case 2 - Self Signed Attacker

In this Test Case the attacker forges a self-signed server certificate, so we expected the Libraries to refuse the connection of our MQTT Tester Client due to an invalid signature and invalid chain of trust. All the Libraries passed this test, since all

Libraries refused our MQTT Tester Client connection. Also RouterOS refused the connection to the Mosquitto Broker.

#### 4.2.3 Test Case 3 - Self Signed Attacker's Fake CA

In this Test Case the attacker forges a self-signed Root Certificate Authority Certificate, used to sign a forged server certificate, so we expected the Libraries to refuse the connection of our MQTT Tester Client due to an invalid signature. All the Libraries passed this test, since all Libraries refused our MQTT Tester Client connection. Also RouterOS refused the connection to the Mosquitto Broker.

#### 4.2.4 Test Case 4 - Alteration 1 (Common Name)

In this Test Case the attacker alters a valid server certificate by changing its Common Name, so we expected the Libraries to refuse the connection of our MQTT Tester Client due to an invalid signature. All the Libraries passed this test, since all Libraries refused our MQTT Tester Client connection. Also RouterOS refused the connection to the Mosquitto Broker.

#### 4.2.5 Test Case 5 - Alteration 2 (Expiration Date)

In this Test Case the attacker alters an expired server certificate by changing its Expiration Date, trying to make it look valid, so we expected the Libraries to refuse the connection of our MQTT Tester Client due to an invalid signature. All the Libraries passed this test, since all Libraries refused our MQTT Tester Client connection. Also RouterOS refused the connection to the Mosquitto Broker.

#### 4.2.6 Test Case 6 - Alteration 3 (Public Key)

In this Test Case the attacker alters a valid server certificate by changing its Public Key, so we expected the Libraries to refuse the connection of our MQTT Tester Client due to an invalid signature. All the Libraries passed this test, since all Libraries refused our MQTT Tester Client connection. Also RouterOS refused the connection to the Mosquitto Broker.

#### 4.2.7 Test Case 7 - Expired CA (Alteration 4)

In this Test Case the Library is checking the server certificate using an expired Root Certificate Authority Certificate as signature reference, so we expected the Libraries to refuse the connection of our MQTT Tester Client due to the expired signature. All the Libraries passed this test, since all Libraries refused our MQTT Tester Client connection. Also RouterOS refused the connection to the Mosquitto Broker.

#### 4.2.8 Test Case 8 - Certificate Extension

In this Test Case the attacker uses a valid server certificate that has a wrong Certificate Extension, so we expected the Libraries to refuse the connection of our MQTT Tester Client due to a wrong usage of the Server Certificate. The MQTT Broker Libraries passed this test, since they all Libraries refused our MQTT Tester

Client connection. On the other hand, RouterOS version 7 **accepted** the connection to the Mosquitto Broker, which represents a regression in comparison to RouterOS version 6, which refused the connection to the Mosquitto Broker as expected.

#### 4.2.9 Test Case 9 - Longer Chain Of Trust Legal Connection

In this Test Case we expected the Libraries to correctly accept the connection of our MQTT Tester Client, since the TLS Certificates used were all valid. The main difference with Test Case 1 is that in this Test Case we used a chain of trust consisting of a Root Certificate Authority and an additional Intermediate Certificate Authority Certificate signed by the Root CA. All the Libraries passed this test, since all Libraries accepted our MQTT Tester Client connection. RouterOS passed this test too, since it correctly connected to the Mosquitto Broker.

#### 4.2.10 Test Case 10 - Altered Intermediate CA Common Name

In this Test Case the attacker alters a valid Intermediate Certificate Authority's Certificate by changing its Common Name. Then they use this Certificate to sign a forged server certificate. Therefore, we expected the Libraries to refuse the connection of our MQTT Tester Client due to an invalid chain of trust. All the Libraries passed this test, since all Libraries refused our MQTT Tester Client connection. Also RouterOS refused the connection to the Mosquitto Broker.

#### 4.2.11 Test Case 11 - Altered Intermediate CA Public Key

In this Test Case the attacker alters a valid Intermediate Certificate Authority's Certificate by changing its Public Key. Then they use this Certificate to sign a forged server certificate. Therefore, we expected the Libraries to refuse the connection of our MQTT Tester Client due to an invalid chain of trust. All the Libraries passed this test, since all Libraries refused our MQTT Tester Client connection. Also RouterOS refused the connection to the Mosquitto Broker.

### 4.3 RouterOS Cipher Check Results

While subjecting RouterOS to the Test Suite, we found out that neither version 6 nor version 7 of RouterOS support TLS version 1.3. This led us to do a check on the TLS 1.2. Cipher Suite supported by RouterOS, to find out if any weak Ciphers were supported. In Table 4.1 are the results of this test, where we can see that both versions support some weak Ciphers, according to [7], but the support for some of those weak Ciphers has been removed in version 7. Table 4.1 omits all TLS 1.2. Ciphers that aren't supported by either RouterOS version, to avoid clutter. Also, Table 4.1 mentions the Ciphers' OpenSSL identifiers in the first column, more verbose info on the Ciphers can be found through the OpenSSL Command Line Interface or in [7].

Cipher Identifier (OpenSSL)	Supported by RouterOS 6	Supported by RouterOS 7	Security Level
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384	✓	✓	secure
DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384	✓	✓	weak
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256	✓	✓	secure
DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256	✓	✓	weak
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384	✓	✓	weak
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256	✓	✗	weak
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256	✓	✓	weak
DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256	✓	✗	weak
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA	✓	✓	weak
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA	✓	✓	weak
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA	✓	✓	weak
DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA	✓	✓	weak
AES256-GCM-SHA384	✓	✓	weak
AES128-GCM-SHA256	✓	✗	weak
AES256-SHA256	✓	✗	weak
AES128-SHA256	✓	✓	weak
AES256-SHA	✓	✓	weak
AES128-SHA	✓	✓	weak

Table 4.1. Router OS Supported Ciphers.



## Chapter 5

# Conclusion

MQTT is a protocol which, inherently to its lightweight nature, has little security measures. Therefore it needs to rely on the Transport Layer Security protocol much more than other Application Level protocols such as SFTP.

Thanks to our literary research, we could produce a formally defined Test Suite, with Test Cases designed to expose possible weaknesses of a faulty TLS implementation of any Application, all the more so of a faulty TLS implementation of an MQTT Broker.

Through the setup of our Test Laboratory Environment, we managed to adapt those formal Test Cases in a reproducible manner, allowing us to recreate the same conditions and reach the same results over time. More specifically, our results showed that most of the tested Libraries are secure from the Transport Layer Security perspective, and we even managed to find a security threat on RouterOS version 7.

Furthermore, the developed Test Suite and Laboratory Environment will enable us for future monitoring of the TLS security requirements of new versions of the tested libraries, or of additional Libraries altogether.





# Bibliography

- [1] RFC 2818. *HTTP over TLS*. URL: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2818.txt>.
- [2] RFC 5280. *Internet X.509 public key infrastructure certificate and certificate revocation list (CRL) profile*. URL: <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280>.
- [3] RFC 8446. *TLS v1.3*. URL: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446>.
- [4] Mauro Conti, Nicola Dragoni, and Sebastiano Gottardo. “MITHYS: Mind The Hand You Shake - Protecting mobile devices from SSL usage vulnerabilities”. In: (2013). DOI: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41098-7\\_5](http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41098-7_5).
- [5] Edoardo Di Paolo, Enrico Bassetti, and Angelo Spognardi. “Security assessment of common open source MQTT brokers and clients”. In: (2021). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2309.03547>.
- [6] Martin Georgiev et al. “The most dangerous code in the world: validating SSL certificates in non-browser software”. In: (2012). DOI: <https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2382196.2382204>.
- [7] Hans Christian Rudolph and Grundmann Nils. *www.ciphersuite.info*. URL: <https://ciphersuite.info/cs/?singlepage=true&software=openssl&tls=tls12>.