# Modern Cryptography

## Symmetric ciphers

### Cryptography: terminology (1/2)

#### Cryptography

- Art or science of hidden writing (confidential writing)
  - from Gr. kryptós, hidden + graph, r. de graphein, to write
- Initially used to maintain confidentiality of information
- Steganography: art of concealing data
  - from Gr. steganós, hidden + graph, r. de graphein, to write

#### **Cryptanalysis**

Art or science of breaking cryptographic systems or encrypted information

#### Cryptology

Cryptography + cryptanalysis

### Cryptography: terminology (2/2)


#### Cipher

Specific cryptographic technique

#### **Cipher operation**

- Encryption: original information → cryptogram
- Decryption: cryptogram -> original information
- Original information aka plaintext or cleartext
- Cryptogram aka ciphertext
- Algorithm: way of transforming data
- Key: algorithm parameter
  - Influences algorithm execution

### Operations of a cipher



### Use cases (symmetric ciphers)

### Self protection with key K

- Alice encrypts plaintext P with key K  $\rightarrow$  Alice: C =  $\{P\}_k$
- Alice decrypts ciphertext C with key K  $\rightarrow$  Alice: P'= {C}<sub>k</sub>
- P' should be equal to P (requires checking)
- Only Alice needs to know K

#### Secure communication with key K

- Alice encrypts plaintext P with key K  $\rightarrow$  Alice: C =  $\{P\}_k$
- Bob decrypts cyphertext C with key K  $\rightarrow$  Bob: P'= {C}<sub>k</sub>
- P' should be equal to P (requires checking)
- K needs to be known by Alice & Bob

### Cryptanalysis: goals

#### Discover original plaintext

Which originated a given ciphertext


#### Discover a cipher key

Allows the decryption of ciphertexts created with the same key

#### Discover the cipher algorithm

- Or an equivalent algorithm
- Usually algorithms are not secret, but there are exceptions
  - Lorenz, A5 (GSM), RC4 (WEP), Crypto-1 (Mifare)
  - Algorithms for DRM (Digital Rights Management)
- Using reverse engineering

# Cryptanalysis attacks: Approaches



# Cryptanalysis attacks: Approaches

#### **Brute force**

- Exhaustive search of the key space until finding a match
- Usually unfeasible for a large key space
  - e.g., 128 bits keys have a search space of 2128 values
- Randomness is fundamental!

#### **Clever attacks**

- Reduce the search space to a smaller set of potential candidates: words, numbers, restricted size or alphabet
- Identify patterns in different operations, etc.

### Computer ciphers

#### Operate by making substitutions

- Original information is a sequence of symbols
- Each symbol is replaced by a substitution symbol
  - Usually with the same size
  - Polyphonic substitution: several, larger substitution symbols for each original symbol
- Substitution symbols are picked from a substitution alphabet

### **Usual symbols**

- Bit
- Block of bits

### **Strategies**

- Polyalphabetic substitution: key → several substitution alphabets

### Computer ciphers: stream ciphers

#### **Encrypt/decrypt by mixing streams**

- They consider the data to cipher or decipher as a bit stream
- Each plaintext/ciphertext bit is XORed (⊕) with each keystream bit plaintext ⊕ keystream → ciphertext

ciphertext ⊕ keystream → plaintext

### Are polyalphabetic ciphers

Usually explored in low-level communication protocols

#### Keystream

- Randomly produced, as long as the processed data
  - Vernam cipher (or one-time pad)
  - The only perfect cipher
  - Rarely used
- Pseudo-randomly produced from a limited key
  - Ordinary stream ciphers

### Computer ciphers: block ciphers

### **Encrypt/decrypt sequences of blocks**

- Symbols <=> fixed-length blocks of bits
- Usually use byte blocks as symbols

### Are monoalphabetic ciphers

Some may be polyphonic ciphers

### Computer ciphers: symmetric

### **Encrypt/decrypt with the same key**

The oldest strategy

### Computer ciphers: asymmetric

### Encrypt/decrypt with the different, related keys

- Key pair
  - Private component, public component
- An approach that was first proposed in 1978

### Computer ciphers: combinations

### (Symmetric) stream ciphers

- Polyalphabetic ciphers
- Keystream defined by the key
- Keystream and XOR implement a polyalphabetic transformation

### Symmetric block ciphers

- Monoalphabetic ciphers
- Substitution alphabet is defined by the key

### **Asymmetric (block) ciphers**

- Polyphonic ciphers
  - Not by nature, but for security reasons
- The functionalities of these ciphers are not homogeneous

### Techniques used by ciphers

#### Confusion

- Complex relationship between the key, plaintext and the ciphertext
  - Output bits (ciphertext) should depend on the input bits (plaintext + key) in a very complex way

#### **Diffusion**

- Plaintext statistics are dissipated in the ciphertext
  - If one plaintext bit toggles, then the ciphertext changes substantially, in an unpredictable or pseudorandom manner
- Avalanche effect

# (Symmetric) stream ciphers: Examples

#### A5/1, A5/2

- Cellular communications
- Initially secret, reverse engineered
- Explored in a weak fashion (64-bit keys w/ 10 bits stuck at zero)

#### **E0**

- Bluetooth communications
- Keys up to 128 bits

#### RC4

- Wi-Fi communications (WEP, deprecated)
- Initially secret, reverse engineered, never officially published
- Keys with 40 to 2048 bits

#### Other

Salsa20, Chacha20, etc.

### (Symmetric) stream ciphers: Approach


### Use a cryptographically secure, pseudo-random bit generator

- This generator produces the keystream
- The generator implements a state machine
- The generator is controlled by two values:
  - Initialization Vector (defines the initial state of the state machine)
  - Key (defines how one state moves to the next to produce the keystream)

### Cryptographically secure, pseudo-random means:

- Statistically, the keystream looks like a totally random sequence of zeros and ones
- If an attacker learns a part of the keystream, it cannot infer:
  - Past keystream values
  - Future keystream values

### (Symmetric) stream ciphers: Approach



### (Symmetric) stream ciphers: Exploitation considerations

### No two messages should be encrypted with the same key and IV

- Because they will be encrypted with the same keystream
- The knowledge about um message reveals the other

```
C1 = P1 \oplus KS
C2 = P2 \oplus KS P2 = C2 \oplus KS = C2 \oplus C1 \oplus P1
```

- Knowledge about P1 => immediate knowledge about P2
- Known/chosen –plaintext attacks become very effective!

### Keystreams may be periodic (have a cycle)

- Depends on the generator
- Same problem as the one above
- Plaintext should be shorter than the period length

### (Symmetric) stream ciphers: Exploitation considerations

### Ciphertexts can be deterministically manipulated

Each cipher bit depends only on one plaintext bit

$$C' = C \oplus \Delta \rightarrow P' = P \oplus \Delta$$

- It is fundamental to have integrity control elements
  - In the ciphertext
  - In the plaintext

# Symmetric Block ciphers: Examples

### **DES (Data Encryption Standard)**

- Proposed in 1974, standard in 1977
- Input/output: 64-bit blocks
- Key: 56 bits

### **AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)**

- Proposed in 1998 (Rijndael), standard in 2001
- Input/output: 128-bit blocks
- Key: 128, 192 or 256 bits

#### Other

IDEA, CAST, Twofish, Blowfish, RC5, RC6, Kasumi, etc.


### Symmetric block ciphers: Approach

### Use a pipeline of transformation rounds

- Each round adds confusion and diffusion
- Each round is usually controlled by a subkey
  - Key schedule
  - A key derived from the key used provided for encryption/decryption

#### Rounds need to be reversible


- To allow decrypting what was encrypted
- Feistel networks
- Substitution-permutation networks



### Feistel networks


$$L_{i}=R_{i-1}$$

$$R_{i}=L_{i-1} \oplus f(R_{i-1}, K_{i})$$



$$R_{i-1} = L_i$$

$$L_{i-1} = R_i \oplus f(L_i, K_i)$$



The function f(KS<sub>i</sub>) doesn't need to be reversible!

### Substitution-Permutation Network


#### **SBox**

- Table with an output for an input (index)output = SBox[input]
- SBoxes may be constant or key-dependent
  - DES and AES use constant Sboxes
  - Blowfish and Twofish use variable, key-dependent SBoxes
- In SP networks, SBoxes must be reversible
  - Bijective transformations
  - $\circ y = SBox[x] \qquad x = SBox^{-1}[y]$


#### **PBox**

Changes the positions of the input bits


### Substitution-Permutation Network




### AES architecture



### AES (encryption) round





https://aescryptography.blogspot.com

### AES in CPU instruction sets

### Intel AES New Instructions (AES-NI)

AESENC	Perform one round of an AES encryption flow
AESENCLAST	Perform the last round of an AES encryption flow
AESDEC	Perform one round of an AES decryption flow
AESDECLAST	Perform the last round of an AES decryption flow
AESKEYGENASSIST	Assist in AES round key generation
AESIMC	Assist in AES Inverse Mix Columns

### **ARMv8 Cryptographic Extension**

#### ... and other

### Cipher Modes: Electronic Code Book (ECB)

Direct encryption of each block:  $C_i = E_K(P_i)$ 


Direct decryption of each block:  $P_i = D_K(C_i)$ 

### Blocks are processed independently

- Parallelism is possible
- Uniform random access exists

#### **Problem:**

- Pattern exposure
- If  $P_1 = P_2$  then  $C_1 = C_2$



### Cipher Modes: Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

Encrypt each block T<sub>i</sub> with feedback from C<sub>i-1</sub>

 $\circ$   $C_i = E_K(P_i \oplus C_{i-1})$ 

Decrypt each block C<sub>i</sub> with feedback from C<sub>i-1</sub>


- $P_i = D_K(C_i) \oplus C_{i-1}$
- Parallelism and uniform random access is possible

#### First block uses an IV


- IV: Initialization Vector
- Better not reuse for the same key
  - Random value, sequence value
- May be sent in clear

#### Polyalphabetic transformation


- The feedback prevents equal blocks from being equally processed
- Seems like we have a different key per block




### ECB vs CBC: pattern exposure



https://xkcd.com/538/





### ECB/CBC cipher modes: Contents not block-aligned

### **ECB** and **CBC** require block-aligned inputs

Final sub-blocks need special treatment

# Alternatives Padding Of last block, identifiable PKCS #7 X = B - (M mod B) M B X X X X = X = X X X X X X X X X X

PKCS #5: Equal to PKCS #7 with B = 8

X extra bytes, with the value X

- Perfectly aligned inputs get an extra padding block!
- Different processing for the sub-block
  - Adds complexity, rarely used


### Stream cipher modes

#### Stream ciphers use a pseudorandom generator


- There are multiple techniques to implement them
- Some techniques are specially suited for hardware implementations
  - Typically used in mobile, battery-powered devices
- Other techniques are more suitable for CPU-based implementations


#### **Stream cipher modes**


- They use a block cipher to implement a stream cipher generator
- The fundamental idea is:
  - The generator e a state machine with state S<sub>i</sub> on iteration i
  - The output of the generator for state  $S_i$  is  $O_{i+1} = E_{\kappa}(S_i)$
  - The state S<sub>i</sub> is updated to S<sub>i+1</sub> using some transformation function f
  - S<sub>0</sub> is defined by an IV
- The generator only uses block cipher encryptions
  - Or decryptions, it is irrelevant




### Stream cipher modes: n-bit OFB (Output Feedback)










### Stream cipher modes: n-bit CFB (Ciphertext Feedback)







### Cipher modes: n-bit CTR (Counter)







# Stream cipher modes: Galois with Counter Mode (GCM)



### Cipher Modes: Comparison

	ВІ	ock	Stream			
	ECB	СВС	OFB	CFB	CTR	GCM
Input pattern hiding		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Same key for different messages	<b>✓</b>	<b>✓</b>	other IV	other IV	other IV	other IV
Tampering difficulty	✓	<b>√</b> ()		()		✓
Pre-processing			✓		✓	✓
Parallel processing	<b>√</b>	decryp t	With pre-proc	decrypt	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>
Uniform random access						
Cryptogram single bit error propagation on decryption	same block	same & next block		a few next bits		detected
Capacity to recover from losses	some	some		some		detected

# Cipher modes: multiple encryption

### Invented for extending the lifetime of DES

- DES was never cryptanalysed
- But its key was too short (56 bits only)
- Its key could be discovered by brute force

#### Triple encryption EDE, or 3DES-EDE

- $\circ C_i = E_{K3}(D_{K2}(E_{K1}(P_i)))$
- $P_{i} = D_{K1}(E_{K2}(D_{K3}(C_{i})))$
- With  $K1 \neq K2 \neq K3$ , it uses a 168-bit key
- With  $K1 = K3 \neq K2$ , it uses a 112-bit key
- If K1 = K2 = K3, then we get simple encryption
- In all cases, 3 times slower than DES

# Cipher modes: DESX

### Another solution for extending the lifetime of DES

- Much faster than 3DES
- Two extra keys are used to add confusion
  - Before the cipher input
  - After the cipher output

$$\circ$$
  $C_i = E_K(K_1 \oplus P_i) \oplus K_2$ 

$$P_i = K_1 \oplus D_K(K_2 \oplus C_i)$$

- The length of the equivalent key is 184 bits
  - 64 + 64 + 56 bits
  - More than with 3DES

