

The impact of tax differentials on pre-tax income of Swiss MNEs

Rafael Schlatter

2nd JUMS Conference

Hamburg, 22.-23.03.2019

What is it about?
oooo

How was it done?
ooooo

What are the findings?
oo

Conclusion
ooo

What is it about?

How was it done?

What are the findings?

Conclusion

About me



- studied at the University of Zurich (2011-2017)
- thesis written in Summer 2017, appeared in JUMS in March 2018
- currently working in an analytics role in Oslo
- like running, snow sports, coding and reading

What is it about?

- **Do Swiss multinational enterprises shift profits?**
- *multinational enterprise*: Corporate group with different legal affiliates (Swiss parent & foreign subsidiaries) in different countries
- *shifting profits*: deliberately and artificially relocate income to low-taxed jurisdictions

Ways to shift profits

Affiliates (parent & subsidiary companies of the same enterprise)

- Sell intermediate goods from high-taxed (low-taxed) affiliate to low-taxed (high-taxed) affiliate at above (below) market price
- Provide loans from high-taxed (low-taxed) affiliate to low-taxed (high-taxed) affiliate at below (above) market interest rate
- The taxes saved amount to the difference in tax rates multiplied by the transfer price or interest payment

Why is it interesting to study profit shifting in Switzerland?




Figure 1: Tax differentials in Europe in 2015

- Tax differential: $\tau = \text{foreign tax rate} - \text{Swiss tax rate}$

How to study profit shifting?

- Find a relationship between earnings **before** interest and taxes, and tax differentials
- H_0 : EBIT is not influenced by taxes (in the absence of profit shifting)
- There exist other ways (e.g. using transfer prices)

Data

- unit of observation: subsidiary of a Swiss parent company
- panel data: each subsidiary observed over multiple years, 2007-2015
- balance sheet data from ORBIS (Bureau van Dijk)
- tax data from KPMG, GDP data from the World Bank
- sample size: 4'862 subsidiaries, 26'869 observations (from 63 countries)

More data




Figure 2: Number of subsidiaries per country

Model

$$\ln \Pi_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \ln A_{it} + \beta_2 \cdot \ln L_{it} \\ + \beta_3 \cdot \ln K_{it} - \beta_4 \cdot \tau_{it} + u_{it}$$

- Π_{it} : Earnings before interest and taxes,
- A : Technology input (GDP per capita),
- L : Labour input,
- K : Capital input,
- τ : Tax differential (subsidiary rate - Swiss rate)
- Fixed effects (subsidiary, time) also included but left out for simplicity

$\rightarrow H_0: \beta_4 = 0, \rightarrow H_A$ (profit shifting): $\beta_4 < 0$

How to use the model?

$$\ln \Pi_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \ln A_{it} + \beta_2 \cdot \ln L_{it} \\ + \beta_3 \cdot \ln K_{it} - \beta_4 \cdot \tau_{it} + u_{it}$$

- Marginal effect: $\partial \ln \Pi_{it} / \partial \tau_{it} = -\beta_4$
- log-level specification: Marginal effect can be interpreted as a semi-elasticity
- **“A change in τ_{it} by 1 percentage point (0.01) is associated with an average decrease of Π_{it} by β_4 percent.”**

Some results

- $\beta_4 = -1.458$ (t -statistic: -3.390), statistically significant
- **If the tax differential increases by 1 percentage point, the subsidiary EBIT decreases by 1.458%.**
- Beer & Loeprick (2015): -1.00 , Dischinger (2008): -0.75

Interpreting the result

Example 1: The average subsidiary

$\text{EBIT} = 698'716 \text{ CHF}$, tax differential = 0.082 \rightarrow effect =
 $698'716 \text{ CHF} \cdot -1.458\% = -10'481 \text{ CHF}$

Example 2: ABB AS, Norwegian subsidiary (wholly owned, 2013 data)

$\text{EBIT} = 127'834'360 \text{ CHF}$, tax differential = 0.10 \rightarrow effect =
 $127'834'360 \text{ CHF} \cdot -1.458\% = -1'863'825 \text{ CHF}$

Shortcomings

- Ownership data: not available, shifting between subsidiaries not respected
- Ownership data: for last year available only
- ORBIS: low coverage for tax havens
- Losses: Companies with a loss have a different incentive to shift profits

Points for discussion

- Is profit shifting unethical or a smart way to maximise income?
- Should countries with low effective taxes be put under pressure?
- Is international cooperation necessary to build tax laws or should market forces guide the way to an equilibrium?

Thank you!

If you have further questions, or want to get in touch:

 rafaelschlatter@gmail.com

 linkedin.com/in/rafaelschlatter

 github.com/rafaelschlatter