


WANNACRY RANSOMWARE

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Background on wannacry

WannaCry exploited a vulnerability in the SMB protocol, known as EternalBlue. It quickly spread across networks, encrypting files and demanding Bitcoin payments to restore access.



How it works?



1

Initial Infection

3

Persistence

2

Encryption

4

Kill-Switch Mechanism





Our Goal

- 1 Understanding malware behavior
- 2 Identifying API calls
- 3 Debugging
- 4 Dumping

Overview of tools



Wireshark
RegShot
ProcMon
ProcessHacker
ProcDot



hashmyfile
DIE
X32dbg
PeStudio



Hxd
PeStudio

Sample used




Source: GitHub repository by kh4sh3i (Ransomware-Samples)





Sample Verification: Calculating the file hash with HashMyFiles




Comparison: Verifying the hash with VirusTotal's database for integrity and authenticity



Sample used



Behavior Analysis




The image shows a Windows desktop environment with two terminal windows open. The left terminal window displays the output of the 'fakedns' command, showing DNS responses for various domains. The right terminal window displays the output of the 'httpd start' and 'wireshark' commands. The desktop taskbar at the bottom includes a search bar, several application icons, and system status information.

```
remnux@remnux:~$ fakedns
fakedns[INFO]: dom.query. 60 IN A 7.7.7.7
fakedns[INFO]: Response: config.edge.skype.com -> 7.7.7.7
fakedns[INFO]: Response: update.googleapis.com -> 7.7.7.7
fakedns[INFO]: Response: self.events.data.microsoft.com -> 7.7.7.7
fakedns[INFO]: Response: au.download.windowsupdate.com -> 7.7.7.7
[]

remnux@remnux:~$ httpd start
remnux@remnux:~$ wireshark
```


Windows taskbar: Type here to search, 31°C غائم جزئياً, 9:59 PM, 10/30/2024

Behavior Analysis




first shot

after running the malware




Behavior Analysis

Ransom note



Behavior Analysis

ransom note generated by the WannaCry malware.



```
@Please_Read_Me@.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
Q: What's wrong with my files?

A: Ooops, your important files are encrypted. It means you will not be able to access them anymore until they are decrypted.
If you follow our instructions, we guarantee that you can decrypt all your files quickly and safely!
Let's start decrypting!

Q: What do I do?

A: First, you need to pay service fees for the decryption.
Please send $300 worth of bitcoin to this bitcoin address: 12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw

Next, please find an application file named "@WanaDecryptor@.exe". It is the decrypt software.
Run and follow the instructions! (You may need to disable your antivirus for a while.)

Q: How can I trust?

A: Don't worry about decryption.
We will decrypt your files surely because nobody will trust us if we cheat users.


* If you need our assistance, send a message by clicking <Contact Us> on the decryptor window.
```


Behavior Analysis



```
*retaj.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
hi im retaj farhan
this is malware project
cyber security |
```

before running
the malware



```
retaj.txt.WNCRY - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
WANACRY!  şëðé×ÁÄkûMÊÆrîjUÆžj-,ifÍfZg3
£ä[]lË[]x=# ÷<gc>w<\?Áz<Ä9 °i=%İ
wá5
:ÜV.,é;Bo0[]úhaæEJİäş0†H×Î Â<[]{âð<+{[]BMÖ«>âæPxy'†â[]šF)Ë[]~[▲Èİ
^OxÚâ]³[]ðx!'‘gKñTT[]Ee-0H069“æiý²J<Ö>ý...F>K[]
?  %w.ÿÜJø[]İ#Úm,Ö00ÆÿZ»}¼LÜln
zIç▲"Èx\5Bð"-çæÜ7FiÆ)"rfyi->
%Ö†#VióÄ™[]-àîî,I#!gVL;[]öİ-[] =          9Ü0%€
%¥€%s™%-óþPGAÔ[]²šG[]òJiÊ-ó|%-’3Ü€4ê™f[]f%!%#İonE“İÜð£1¹[]r
```

after running the
malware

Behavior Analysis

REMnux (default 2 new) [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help

Activities Wireshark Nov 5 01:32

*enp0s3

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

ip.src == 7.7.7.11

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1313	162.079799811	7.7.7.11	194.109.206.212	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49881 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1314	162.079800111	7.7.7.11	45.62.255.25	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49880 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1315	162.845249772	7.7.7.11	173.255.245.116	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49882 → 9001 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1316	170.095348577	7.7.7.11	45.62.255.25	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49880 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1317	170.095348737	7.7.7.11	194.109.206.212	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49881 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1318	170.846278754	7.7.7.11	173.255.245.116	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49882 → 9001 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1319	176.992127876	7.7.7.11	92.222.20.130	TCP	66	49883 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1320	176.992588078	7.7.7.11	86.59.21.38	TCP	66	49884 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1321	178.015025366	7.7.7.11	92.222.20.130	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49883 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1322	178.015025746	7.7.7.11	86.59.21.38	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49884 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1323	180.030622867	7.7.7.11	92.222.20.130	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49883 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1324	180.030623137	7.7.7.11	86.59.21.38	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49884 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1327	183.035744761	7.7.7.11	185.100.85.101	TCP	66	49885 → 9001 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1328	183.994398629	7.7.7.11	7.7.7.7	DNS	76	Standard query 0x59d8 A dns.msftncsi.com
1330	184.037221029	7.7.7.11	92.222.20.130	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49883 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1331	184.037221310	7.7.7.11	86.59.21.38	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49884 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1332	184.037221340	7.7.7.11	185.100.85.101	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49885 → 9001 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1333	186.052738267	7.7.7.11	185.100.85.101	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49885 → 9001 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1336	190.059624980	7.7.7.11	185.100.85.101	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49885 → 9001 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1339	192.065987135	7.7.7.11	92.222.20.130	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49883 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1340	192.065987436	7.7.7.11	86.59.21.38	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49884 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1342	198.063700798	7.7.7.11	185.100.85.101	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49885 → 9001 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1343	198.985267181	7.7.7.11	94.23.204.175	TCP	66	49888 → 9001 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1344	198.985343584	7.7.7.11	171.25.193.9	TCP	66	49889 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1345	200.007072767	7.7.7.11	94.23.204.175	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49888 → 9001 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1346	200.007072998	7.7.7.11	171.25.193.9	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49889 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1347	200.015010610	7.7.7.11	84.88.88.175	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] [TCP Port numbers reused] 49889 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1

Frame 1278: 66 bytes on wire (528 bits), 66 bytes captured (528 bits) on interface enp0s3, id 0



0000 08 00 27 cd 4d 55 08 00 27 7c 65 19 08 00 45 00 ..'.MU..'|e...E.
0010 00 34 62 74 40 00 80 06 7c 30 07 07 07 0b 07 07 .4bt@...|0.....
0020 07 07 c2 d3 00 50 6d 0f b4 82 00 00 00 00 80 02Pm.....
0030 fa f0 73 4a 00 00 02 04 05 b4 01 03 03 08 01 01 ...sJ.....
0040 04 02


wireshark_enp0s35JEVW2.pcapng Packets: 3138 · Displayed: 1624 (51.8%) Profile: Default

[Desktop] remnux@remnux: ~ remnux@remnux: ~ *enp0s3 1/2

Type here to search 28°C مشمس 9:32 AM 11/5/2024

Behavior Analysis





Behavior Analysis

Show
Registry
activity

Windows 10 - Flare-VM (Ransomware) [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com

File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help

Show Registry Activity



Time ...	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Show Registry Activity	Result	Detail	Sequence	TID
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: Name	0	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...	1	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...	2	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{56AD...		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	3	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{56AD4C5D-B908-4F85-...		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	4	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCU		SUCCESS	Desired Access: Q...	5	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegCloseKey	HKCU		SUCCESS		6	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: Name	7	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...	8	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...	9	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{56AD...		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	10	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{56AD4C5D-B908-4F85-...		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	11	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: Name	12	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...	13	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...	14	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications...		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	15	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCR\Applications\Procmon64.exe		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	16	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: Name	17	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...	18	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: Name	19	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications...		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	20	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCR\Applications\Procmon64.exe		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	21	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCU		SUCCESS	Desired Access: Q...	22	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegCloseKey	HKCU		SUCCESS		23	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: Name	24	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...	25	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...	26	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{56AD...		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	27	1616
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{56AD4C5D-B908-4F85-...		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	28	1616
12:57:...	dw.exe	356	RegQueryValue	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Window...		SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWO...	29	1316
12:57:...	dw.exe	356	RegQueryValue	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Window...		SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWO...	30	1316
12:57:...	services.exe	636	RegOpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Servi...		SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...	31	8664
12:57:...	services.exe	636	RegQueryValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Servi...		NAME NOT FOUND	Length: 268	32	8664
12:57:...	services.exe	636	RegCloseKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Servi...		SUCCESS		33	8664
12:57:...	dw.exe	356	RegQueryValue	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Window...		SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWO...	34	1316
12:57:...	dw.exe	356	RegQueryValue	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Window...		SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWO...	35	1316
12:57:...	dw.exe	356	RegQueryValue	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Window...		SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWO...	36	1316
12:57:...	dw.exe	356	RegQueryValue	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Window...		SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWO...	37	1316
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKLM		SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...	38	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows N...		SUCCESS	Desired Access: Q...	39	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Window...		NAME NOT FOUND	Length: 16	40	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Window...		SUCCESS		41	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\...		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	42	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemC...		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	43	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\System...		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...	44	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryKey	HKCU		SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...	45	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop		SUCCESS	Desired Access: Q...	46	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryValue	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\PaintDes...		SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWO...	47	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegCloseKey	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop		SUCCESS		48	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Contr...		REPARSE	Desired Access: R...	49	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegOpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Contr...		SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...	50	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Contr...		BUFFER TOO SM...	Length: 0	51	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	RegQueryValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Contr...		SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ, Le...	52	2416
12:57:...	Explorer.FXF	2424	RegCloseKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Contr...		SUCCESS		53	2416

Showing 344,763 of 2,545,047 events (21%) Backed by virtual memory

1:21 PM 11/2/2024

Behavior Analysis

ProcDot tool:



This is the
ransom note
image created by
WannaCry
ransomware.

Behavior Analysis

Show process
and thread
activity

Windows 10 - Flare-VM (Ransomware) [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com

File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help

Show Process and Thread Activity


Time ...	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Detail	Sequence	TID
11:54:...	ApplicationFram...	7028	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 2024, ...	842	2024
11:54:...	ApplicationFram...	7028	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 1488, ...	843	1488
11:54:...	ApplicationFram...	7028	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 9032, ...	844	9032
11:54:...	taskl.exe	6768	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 5516, ...	845	5516
11:54:...	taskl.exe	6768	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 5004, ...	846	5004
11:54:...	taskl.exe	6768	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 7180, ...	847	7180
11:54:...	taskl.exe	6768	Process Exit		SUCCESS Exit Status: 0. User...	848	7180
11:54:...	SystemInform...	1416	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8716, ...	849	8716
11:54:...	VBoxTray.exe	7068	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 2904, ...	850	7112
11:54:...	VBoxTray.exe	7068	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 2904, ...	851	2904
11:54:...	svchost.exe	1548	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8724, ...	852	1648
11:54:...	ed01ebfbc9eb5...	5876	Process Create	C:\Users\vagha\Desktop\@WanaDecr...	SUCCESS PID: 9124, Comma...	853	6228
11:54:...	@WanaDecryp...	9124	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8320, ...	854	6228
11:54:...	StartMenuExpe...	5336	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 3340, ...	855	3340
11:54:...	taskhostw.exe	4312	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 6680, ...	856	6680
11:54:...	svchost.exe	4708	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 6244, ...	857	6244
11:54:...	SystemInform...	1416	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8316, ...	858	3928
11:54:...	SystemInform...	1416	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8328, ...	859	8316
11:54:...	@WanaDecryp...	9124	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8372, ...	860	8320
11:54:...	@WanaDecryp...	9124	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 6036, ...	861	8372
11:54:...	svchost.exe	6912	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 7204, ...	862	7204
11:54:...	svchost.exe	1712	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 1812, ...	863	8144
11:54:...	ed01ebfbc9eb5...	5876	Process Create	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	SUCCESS PID: 1596, Comma...	864	6228
11:54:...	cmd.exe	1596	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 3364, ...	865	6228
11:54:...	AggregatorHost...	4212	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 3784, ...	866	36
11:54:...	AggregatorHost...	4212	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 1476, ...	867	3784
11:54:...	csrss.exe	496	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 1736, ...	868	36
11:54:...	SystemInform...	1416	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 5452, ...	869	3928
11:54:...	svchost.exe	1712	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 1120, ...	870	36
11:54:...	ApplicationFram...	7028	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 5872, ...	871	36
11:54:...	ApplicationFram...	7028	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 1440, ...	872	5872
11:54:...	Explorer.EXE	2424	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8648, ...	873	8648
11:54:...	svchost.exe	760	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 1620, ...	874	2468
11:54:...	SystemInform...	1416	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 5452, ...	875	5452
11:54:...	@WanaDecryp...	9124	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8360, ...	876	6036
11:54:...	VBoxService.exe	1372	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 608, ...	877	8464
11:54:...	cmd.exe	1596	Process Create	C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe	SUCCESS PID: 2444, Comma...	878	3364
11:54:...	Conhost.exe	2444	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8140, ...	879	3364
11:54:...	svchost.exe	8276	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 5360, ...	880	5360
11:54:...	SystemInform...	1416	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 1940, ...	881	3928
11:54:...	svchost.exe	8276	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 6920, ...	882	6920
11:54:...	msedge.exe	876	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 3028, ...	883	3028
11:54:...	VBoxTray.exe	7068	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 4036, ...	884	7112
11:54:...	VBoxTray.exe	7068	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 4036, ...	885	4036
11:54:...	SystemInform...	1416	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 9008, ...	886	9008
11:54:...	SystemInform...	1416	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 1940, ...	887	1940
11:54:...	msedge.exe	876	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 5552, ...	888	36
11:54:...	svchost.exe	2576	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 6852, ...	889	6852
11:54:...	svchost.exe	6108	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 2760, ...	890	2760
11:54:...	SearchIndexer...	3268	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8092, ...	891	8092
11:54:...	svchost.exe	7820	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 6924, ...	892	6924
11:54:...	svchost.exe	7820	Thread Exit		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8808, ...	893	8808
11:54:...	svchost.exe	7252	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 8608, ...	894	36
11:54:...	Conhost.exe	2444	Thread Create		SUCCESS Thread ID: 9092, ...	895	8140

Showing 1,371 of 2,415,833 events (0.056%) Backed by virtual memory


Activate Windows
Go to Settings to activate Windows.

12:40 PM
11/2/2024

Behavior Analysis



Workflow of WannaCry Ransomware



Identify Malicious API



Purpose:

Understand how the malware interacts with the system to perform harmful actions.

Tool Used:


pestudio

Overview of the Listed DLLs



kernel32.dll: This library includes the basic and core functionality for all programs, including reading a file and writing a file.

advapi32.dll: This library is used mainly for working with the registry and cryptography



library (4)	duplica
KERNEL32.dll	-
USER32.dll	-
ADVAPI32.dll	-
MSVCRT.dll	-

imports (114)	flag (11)	first-thunk-original (INT)	first-thunk (IAT)	hint	group (0)	technique (11)	type (6)	ordinal (1)	library (0)	
InitializeCriticalSection	-	0x0000D930	0x0000D930	547 (0x0223)	synchro	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
DeleteCriticalSection	-	0x0000D94C	0x0000D94C	129 (0x0081)	synchro	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
LeaveCriticalSection	-	0x0000D98A	0x0000D98A	593 (0x0251)	synchro	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
EnterCriticalSection	-	0x0000D9A2	0x0000D9A2	152 (0x0098)	synchro	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
OpenMutexA	-	0x0000DA84	0x0000DA84	644 (0x0284)	synchro	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
WaitForSingleObject	-	0x0000D81C	0x0000D81C	912 (0x0390)	synchro	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
CreateServiceA	✖	0x0000DC2A	0x0000DC2A	100 (0x0064)	services	T1543 Create or Modify System Proc...	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll	
OpenServiceA	-	0x0000DC62	0x0000DC62	431 (0x01AF)	services	T1543 Create or Modify System Proc...	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll	
StartServiceA	-	0x0000DC52	0x0000DC52	585 (0x0249)	services	T1569 System Services	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll	
CloseServiceHandle	-	0x0000DC3C	0x0000DC3C	62 (0x003E)	services	T1569 System Services	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll	
OpenSCManagerA	-	0x0000DC72	0x0000DC72	429 (0x01AD)	services	T1569 System Services	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll	
SizeofResource	-	0x0000DA3A	0x0000DA3A	853 (0x0355)	resource	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
LockResource	-	0x0000DA4C	0x0000DA4C	613 (0x0265)	resource	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
LoadResource	-	0x0000DA5C	0x0000DA5C	599 (0x0257)	resource	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
FindResourceA	-	0x0000DA6C	0x0000DA6C	227 (0x00E3)	resource	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
RegCreateKeyW	-	0x0000DC04	0x0000DC04	467 (0x01D3)	registry	T1112 Modify Registry	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll	
RegSetValueExA	✖	0x0000DBF2	0x0000DBF2	516 (0x0204)	registry	T1112 Modify Registry	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll	
RegQueryValueExA	-	0x0000DBDE	0x0000DBDE	503 (0x01F7)	registry	T1012 Query Registry	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll	
RegCloseKey	-	0x0000DBD0	0x0000DBD0	459 (0x01CB)	registry	-	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll	
GetWindowsDirectoryW	-	0x0000DA0C	0x0000DA0C	500 (0x01F4)	reconnaissance	T1083 File and Directory Discovery	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
GetStartupInfoA	-	0x0000DF5E	0x0000DF5E	439 (0x01B7)	reconnaissance	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
GetComputerNameW	-	0x0000D8B2	0x0000D8B2	279 (0x0117)	reconnaissance	T1082 System Information Discovery	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
VirtualAlloc	✖	0x0000DAC8	0x0000DAC8	897 (0x0381)	memory	T1055 Process Injection	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
VirtualFree	-	0x0000DAD8	0x0000DAD8	899 (0x0383)	memory	T1055 Process Injection	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
HeapAlloc	-	0x0000DAF4	0x0000DAF4	528 (0x0210)	memory	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
GetProcessHeap	-	0x0000DB00	0x0000DB00	419 (0x01A3)	memory	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
VirtualProtect	✖	0x0000DB36	0x0000DB36	902 (0x0386)	memory	T1055 Process Injection	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
HeapFree	-	0x0000DB58	0x0000DB58	534 (0x0216)	memory	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
GlobalAlloc	-	0x0000D874	0x0000D874	504 (0x01F8)	memory	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
GlobalFree	-	0x0000D844	0x0000D844	511 (0x01FF)	memory	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
memset	-	0x0000DD00	0x0000DD00	665 (0x0299)	memory	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll	
memcpy	-	0x0000DD4C	0x0000DD4C	662 (0x0296)	memory	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll	
memcpy	-	0x0000DDA2	0x0000DDA2	663 (0x0297)	memory	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll	
malloc	-	0x0000DDFA	0x0000DDFA	657 (0x0291)	memory	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll	
GetFileAttributesW	-	0x0000D8FC	0x0000D8FC	353 (0x0161)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
GetFileSizeEx	-	0x0000D912	0x0000D912	356 (0x0164)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
CreateFileA	-	0x0000D922	0x0000D922	83 (0x0053)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
ReadFile	-	0x0000D964	0x0000D964	693 (0x02B5)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
GetFileSize	-	0x0000D970	0x0000D970	355 (0x0163)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
WriteFile	✖	0x0000D97E	0x0000D97E	932 (0x03A4)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
SetFileAttributesW	-	0x0000D9BA	0x0000D9BA	794 (0x031A)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
CreateDirectoryW	-	0x0000D9E8	0x0000D9E8	78 (0x004E)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
GetTempPathW	-	0x0000D9FC	0x0000D9FC	470 (0x01D6)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll	
480439C6E5BABE8E080E41AA	cpu: 32-bit	file > type: executable	subsystem: GUI	entry-point: 0x000077BA						

imports (114)	flag (11)	first-thunk-original (INT)	first-thunk (IAT)	hint	group (0)	technique (11)	type (6)	ordinal (1)	library (0)
CopyFileA	-	0x0000DAA6	0x0000DAA6	67 (0x0043)	file	T1105 Remote File Copy	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
SystemTimeToFileTime	-	0x0000DB64	0x0000DB64	859 (0x035B)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
LocalFileTimeToFileTime	-	0x0000DB7C	0x0000DB7C	602 (0x025A)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
CreateDirectoryA	-	0x0000DB96	0x0000DB96	75 (0x004B)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
SetFilePointer	-	0x0000D8D4	0x0000D8D4	795 (0x031B)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
SetFileTime	-	0x0000D8C6	0x0000D8C6	799 (0x031F)	file	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
fclose	-	0x0000DCB8	0x0000DCB8	588 (0x024C)	file	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
fwrite	-	0x0000DCC2	0x0000DCC2	614 (0x0266)	file	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
fread	-	0x0000DCCC	0x0000DCCC	605 (0x025D)	file	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
fopen	-	0x0000DCD4	0x0000DCD4	599 (0x0257)	file	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
Sleep	-	0x0000DA7C	0x0000DA7C	854 (0x0356)	execution	T1497 Sandbox Evasion	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
GetCurrentDirectoryA	-	0x0000D89A	0x0000D89A	320 (0x0140)	execution	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
CreateProcessA	✗	0x0000D832	0x0000D832	102 (0x0066)	execution	T1106 Execution through API	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
TerminateProcess	✗	0x0000D808	0x0000D808	862 (0x035E)	execution	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
GetExitCodeProcess	-	0x0000D7F2	0x0000D7F2	346 (0x015A)	execution	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
GetModuleFileNameA	-	0x0000DAB2	0x0000DAB2	381 (0x017D)	dynamic-library	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
FreeLibrary	-	0x0000DAE6	0x0000DAE6	248 (0x00F8)	dynamic-library	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
GetModuleHandleA	-	0x0000DB12	0x0000DB12	383 (0x017F)	dynamic-library	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
LoadLibraryA	-	0x0000D864	0x0000D864	594 (0x0252)	dynamic-library	T1106 Execution through API	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
GetProcAddress	-	0x0000D852	0x0000D852	416 (0x01A0)	dynamic-library	T1106 Execution through API	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
SetLastError	-	0x0000DB26	0x0000DB26	808 (0x0328)	diagnostic	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
CryptReleaseContext	✗	0x0000DC14	0x0000DC14	160 (0x00A0)	crypto	T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll
rand	✗	0x0000DCE6	0x0000DCE6	678 (0x02A6)	crypto	T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
srand	✗	0x0000DCEE	0x0000DCEE	692 (0x02B4)	crypto	T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
SetCurrentDirectoryW	-	0x0000D9D0	0x0000D9D0	779 (0x030B)	-	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
MultiByteToWideChar	-	0x0000D8E6	0x0000D8E6	629 (0x0275)	-	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
IsBadReadPtr	-	0x0000DB48	0x0000DB48	563 (0x0233)	-	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
SetCurrentDirectoryA	✗	0x0000D882	0x0000D882	778 (0x030A)	-	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
CloseHandle	-	0x0000D7E4	0x0000D7E4	52 (0x0034)	-	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
wsprintfA	-	0x0000DBB8	0x0000DBB8	727 (0x02D7)	-	-	implicit	-	USER32.dll
realloc	-	0x0000DDDC	0x0000DDDC	679 (0x02A7)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
sprintf	-	0x0000DCDC	0x0000DCDC	690 (0x02B2)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
strcpy	-	0x0000DCF6	0x0000DCF6	698 (0x02BA)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
strlen	-	0x0000DD0A	0x0000DD0A	702 (0x02BE)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
wcscat	-	0x0000DD14	0x0000DD14	735 (0x02DF)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
wcslen	-	0x0000DD1E	0x0000DD1E	742 (0x02E6)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
_CxxFrameHandler	-	0x0000DD28	0x0000DD28	73 (0x0049)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
??3@YAXPAX@Z	-	0x0000DD3C	0x0000DD3C	16 (0x0010)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
_except_handler3	-	0x0000DD56	0x0000DD56	202 (0x00CA)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
_local_unwind2	-	0x0000DD6A	0x0000DD6A	316 (0x013C)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
wcsrchr	-	0x0000DD7C	0x0000DD7C	747 (0x02EB)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
swprintf	-	0x0000DD86	0x0000DD86	715 (0x02CB)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
??2@YAPAXI@Z	-	0x0000DD92	0x0000DD92	15 (0x000F)	-	-	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll

80439C6E5BABE8E080E41AA
cpu: 32-bit
file > type: executable
subsystem: GUI
entry-point: 0x000077BA

^
🌐
🔊
11:17 PM
11/2/2024

Determining the File Architecture



Purpose:

Identifying the file architecture to choose the correct debugger.


Tool Used:

Detect It Easy (DIE).

Result:

Confirmed the architecture as 32-bit, allowing us to use x32dbg for analysis.

Determining the File Architecture



Determining Workflow of WannaCry Ransomware



Purpose:
Identifying the
API used by
Wannacry to
detrmine the
workflow

Tool Used:

dbgx32


Determining Workflow of WannaCry Ransomware

first we made a breakpoint at GetProcAddress to determine what API function WannaCry are using


Type	Address	Module/Label/Exception	State	Disassembly
Software	004077BA	<ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f10710	One-time	push ebp
	7589F550	<kernel32.dll.GetProcAddress>	Enabled	mov edi,edi

Determining Workflow of WannaCry Ransomware

and this some of the calls by the ransomware



This screenshot shows a debugger window with the assembly code for the `GetProcAddress` function. The code includes instructions like `push ebp`, `mov ebp, esp`, and `call dword ptr ds:[<GetProcAddressForCa`. The registers window on the right shows the state of the CPU registers, including `EAX` (764C0000), `EBX` (00000000), `ECX` (00950000), `EDX` (00950000), `ESP` (0019FED4), `ESI` (7589F550), `EDI` (764C0000), and `EIP` (7589F550). The stack window shows the current stack frame with parameters for `GetProcAddress`.



This screenshot shows a debugger window with the assembly code for the `VirtualQuery` function. The code includes instructions like `push ebp`, `mov ebp, esp`, and `jmp dword ptr ds:[<VirtualQuery>]`. The registers window on the right shows the state of the CPU registers, including `EAX` (764DF4A0), `EBX` (00000000), `ECX` (FF2B43FE), `EDX` (764DF4A0), `ESP` (0019FED4), `ESI` (7589F550), `EDI` (764C0000), and `EIP` (7589F550). The stack window shows the current stack frame with parameters for `VirtualQuery`.

Initial Steps and Cryptographic Setup

Prepare for file encryption by establishing cryptographic keys

CryptAcquireContext

WannaCry first sets up its cryptographic environment by acquiring a handle to the cryptographic service provider (CSP).



CryptGenKey

WannaCry may generate a new encryption key using a specified algorithm usually AES-256



CryptImportKey

WannaCry might import a predefined key if it doesn't generate a new one, allowing it to use a consistent key across multiple infections.


File Targeting and Access with CreateFileW

CreateFileW

WannaCry uses CreateFileW to access and manipulate files for encryption or to leave ransom notes.

setting a breakpoint on CreateFileW, we can view the file paths and names, confirming which files WannaCry targets

Setting a breakpoint on CreateFileW



Debugging Analysis - Observing Targeted Files

Immunity Debugger interface showing a breakpoint on `kernel32.dll!CreateFileW`. The left pane displays assembly instructions with a breakpoint set on `CreateFileW`. The right pane shows CPU registers, with `EIP` pointing to the `CreateFileW` function. The bottom pane shows a memory dump of the stack, with a call to `kernel32.dll!CreateFileW` visible.

HANDLE `CreateFileW(`

<code>,LPCWSTR</code>	<code>lpFileName</code>	<code>[in]</code>
<code>,DWORD</code>	<code>dwDesiredAccess</code>	<code>[in]</code>
<code>,DWORD</code>	<code>dwShareMode</code>	<code>[in]</code>
<code>LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES [in, optional]</code>		
<code>,lpSecurityAttributes</code>		
<code>,DWORD</code>	<code>dwCreationDisposition</code>	<code>[in]</code>
<code>,DWORD</code>	<code>dwFlagsAndAttributes</code>	<code>[in]</code>
<code>HANDLE</code>	<code>hTemplateFile</code>	<code>[in, optional]</code>

Types of Files Created or Modified by WannaCry

Based on the debugging analysis, WannaCry creates and modifies several types of files. These serve different roles in the attack process, from ransom notes to encrypted and temporary files

Ransom Note Files

Encrypted Files

Temporary Files

Registry Modifications for Persistence

Ransom Note Files

@Please_Read_Me@.txt


Filename: @Please_Read_Me@.txt – found in each directory with encrypted files.

Purpose: Contains instructions for the victim, including:

- Ransom Demand: Amount of payment required.
- Payment Instructions: How to pay in Bitcoin.

Ransom Note Files

@Please_Read_Me@.txt



The image shows a screenshot of a ransom note file named "@Please_Read_Me@.txt" opened in a Notepad application. The text is a dialogue between a user and a ransomware operator. The user asks what's wrong with their files, and the operator explains that the files are encrypted and offers to decrypt them for a fee. The user asks what to do, and the operator instructs them to pay \$300 in Bitcoin to a specific address and to find a decryption tool named "@WanaDecryptor@.exe". The user asks how they can trust the operator, and the operator assures them that they will decrypt the files. A final note at the bottom suggests contacting the operator if assistance is needed.

@Please_Read_Me@.txt - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

Q: What's wrong with my files?

A: Oops, your important files are encrypted. It means you will not be able to access them anymore until they are decrypted. If you follow our instructions, we guarantee that you can decrypt all your files quickly and safely! Let's start decrypting!

Q: What do I do?

A: First, you need to pay service fees for the decryption.
Please send \$300 worth of bitcoin to this bitcoin address: 115p7UMMngo1pMvkpHijcRdfJNXj6LrLn

Next, please find an application file named "@WanaDecryptor@.exe". It is the decrypt software. Run and follow the instructions! (You may need to disable your antivirus for a while.)

Q: How can I trust?

A: Don't worry about decryption.
We will decrypt your files surely because nobody will trust us if we cheat users.

* If you need our assistance, send a message by clicking <Contact Us> on the decryptor window.

Encrypted Files with .WNCRY Extension

Filename Extension: .WNCRY – appended to files post-encryption.

Targeted File Types:

- Documents: .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx.
- Images: .jpg, .png, .bmp.
- Archives: .zip, .rar, .7z.
- Database Files: .sql, .db, .sqlite.

Purpose: Encryption makes the files inaccessible without a decryption key, which is the core function of the ransomware.

Temporary Files with .tmp Extension

Filename Example: ~SD8F67.tmp – typically used for intermediary data storage during encryption.

Purpose:

- Holds Unencrypted Data: Prepares data before encryption.
- Encryption Process Storage: Stores intermediate encryption data.

Cleanup Strategy: These temporary files are often deleted after encryption to minimize forensic traces.

Temporary Files with .tmp Extension

Cleanup Strategy

The screenshot shows a debugger window with the following details:

- Process:** ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa.exe - PID: 6036 - Module: kernel32.dll - Thread: Main Thread 5452 - x32dbg [Elevated]
- Disassembly:**
 - Address 76433146: `jmp dword ptr ds:[<CreateFile>]` (Symbol: `CreateFile`)
 - Address 76433150: `jmp dword ptr ds:[<DefineDosDevice>]` (Symbol: `DefineDosDevice`)
 - Address 76433150: `jmp dword ptr ds:[<DeleteFile>]` (Symbol: `DeleteFile`)
- Registers:**
 - `rs\\ju\\Desktop`
 - `rs\\ju\\Desktop\\-SD8F67.tmp`
- Stack:**
 - 1: [esp+4] 001908CC 001908CC L"cs\\users\\ju\\Desktop\\-SD8F67.tmp"
 - 2: [esp+8] 40000000 40000000
 - 3: [esp+C] 00000000 00000000
 - 4: [esp+10] 00000000 00000000
 - 5: [esp+14] 00000002 00000002

Registry Modifications for Persistence

Registry Path: WannaCry adds entries under:

- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Purpose: Ensures WannaCry restarts every time the system boots.

The registry key points to WannaCry's executable, making it difficult to remove the infection without cleaning the registry.

Read File Contents

Reads file contents into memory as plaintext

`ReadFile`

Prepares the file data for encryption, so it can later be overwritten with ciphertext

Encrypt File Data

`CryptEncrypt`

Encrypts plaintext data in memory using the established cryptographic key, transforming it into ciphertext

This encryption step makes the file unreadable without a decryption key, fulfilling the ransomware's purpose.

Write Encrypted Data to File

`WriteFile`

Writes the ciphertext back to the file, replacing the original content.

Overwrites the file with encrypted data, enforcing the ransom demand by making the original data inaccessible.

Handle closure and Key destruction

CryptDestroyKey

Destroys the encryption key handle, preventing key recovery.

CloseHandle

Closes all file and cryptographic handles

By destroying keys and closing handles WannaCry performs a thorough cleanup which prevent any recovery of resources

Persistence Mechanism Observed with RegCreateKeyW

RegCreateKeyW

Enables WannaCry to re-establish itself after a system reboot, ensuring it remains active on the infected machine

how ???

By creating a specific registry keys to store settings, configurations, or status information to guarantee that WannaCry relaunches on each reboot.

Persistence Mechanism Observed with RegCreateKeyW

The screenshot shows a debugger window with the following details:

- Process:** ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa.exe - PID: 6976 - Module: advapi32.dll - Thread: Main Thread 5852 - x32dbg [Elevated]
- Breakpoint:** A breakpoint is set at address 7620F560 in the advapi32.dll module, corresponding to the `RegCreateKeyW` function.
- Registers:**
 - EAX: 0019F704 (L"Software\\WanaCryptor")
 - ECX: 0040E034 (L"WanaCryptor")
 - EDX: FFD916E2
 - EBP: 0019F7D8
 - ESP: 0019F4E4
 - ESI: 00000000
 - EDI: 0040E030 ("wd")
- Call Stack:**
 - 1: [esp+4] 80000002: 80000002
 - 2: [esp+8] 0019F704: 0019F704 L"Software\\WanaCryptor"
 - 3: [esp+C] 0019F7D4: 0019F7D4
 - 4: [esp+10] 0019FED0: 0019FED0
 - 5: [esp+14] 76B790E0: <msvcrt.strchr> (76B790E0)
- Registers (continued):**
 - EFLAGS: 00000344
 - ZF: 1 PF: 1 AF: 0
 - OF: 0 SF: 0 DF: 0
 - CF: 0 TF: 1 IF: 1
 - LastError: 000000C8 (ERROR_ENVVAR_NOT_FOUND)
 - LastStatus: C0000100 (STATUS_VARIABLE_NOT_FOUND)
- Registers (continued):**
 - GS: 00000000
 - FS: 00000000
- Registers (continued):**
 - Default (stdcall)

By making a breakpoint at
RegCreateKeyW
we can see from IpSubKey set
to "software\\wanacryptor"

Summary of Workflow of WannaCry Ransomware



Dump And Extract

The background features four decorative purple arrows pointing outwards from the center towards the corners, each accompanied by a swirling line.

Importance and Storage of AES Key in WannaCry

Finding the AES key is important because it allows analysts to decrypt files and understand the ransomware's effects. Also Understanding the encryption method used and helps in developing tools to respond to similar ransomware in the future.

WannaCry hides its AES key using functions like CryptGenKey and CryptProtectData, which secure the key in memory. Sometimes, the key is also hidden within DLL files or encrypted with an RSA key, adding extra layers of protection and making it harder to locate.

Dumping and Extraction Setup



Purpose:

To prepare tools to locate and extract key data , enabling deeper analysis of its encryption methods.


Tool Used:

x32dbg
HxD
PeStudio

Result:


Extracted AES key and relevant data from WannaCry.

Locating the AES Key



In x32dbg, a breakpoint was set on functions or dlls related to encryption. This allowed us to monitor WannaCry's behavior and track down the AES key location.


Locating the AES Key



we found the AES key stored in
ntdll.dll

This shows how WannaCry hides
critical data within system DLLs
for added security.

Discovering Key Encryption Algorithm



WannaCry.exe - PID: 4208 - Module: advapi32.dll - Thread: Main Thread 656 - x32dbg [Elevated]

File View Debug Tracing Plugins Favourites Options Help Oct 3 2024 (TitanEngine)

CPU Log Notes Breakpoints Memory Map Symbols Call Stack SEH Script <> Source References Threads

Hide FPU

EAX 00000000
EBX 00000000
ECX 758C0000
EDX 00000000
EBP 0019FA48
ESP 0019FA1C
ESI 77136A78 "LdrpInitializeProcess"
EDI 771369FC "minkernel\\ntd"

EIP 771E1C13 ntdll.771E1C13

EFLAGS 00000246
ZF 1 PF 1 AE 0
OF 0 SF 0 DF 0
CF 0 TF 0 IF 1

LastError 00000002
LastStatus C0000034

GS 002B FS 0053
ES 002B DS 002B
CS 0023 SS 002B

Default (stdcall) 5 Unlocked

1: [esp+4] 771369FC ntdll.771369FC
2: [esp+8] 77136A78 ntdll.77136A78
3: [esp+C] 00000000 00000000
4: [esp+10] 00A63AE8 00A63AE8
5: [esp+14] 0019FA1C 0019FA1C

ntdll."minkernel\\ntdll\\ldrinit.c"
ntdll."LdrpInitializeProcess"

return to ntdll.RtlCaptureStackConte
Pointer to SEH_Record[1]
ntdll.wcstombs+70


return to ntdll.RtlCaptureStackConte
Activate Windows
Go to Settings to activate Windows

Command: Commands are comma separated (like assembly instructions): mov eax, ebx

Paused 185 string(s) in 2750ms Time Wasted Debugging: 0:03:15:22


A breakpoint was set in advapi32.dll, targeting cryptographic functions to identify WannaCry's encryption algorithm.

Discovering Key Encryption Algorithm



**After the breakpoint, we
found the encryption
algorithm used by WannaCry**



Intercepting CryptDestroyKey for Insights



We use `CryptDestroyKey` as a breakpoint to capture the AES key and other valuable information before they are erased, providing crucial insights for analysis.


Dumping Key Data

After hitting the CryptDestroyKey and also advapi breakpoint, we saved a memory dump from dll, This dump includes decrypted data and essential information




Examining the Dump in HxD

The saved dump was opened in HxD, a hex editor, to inspect and correct the binary data. HxD is useful for low-level file corrections



PeStudio String Analysis for Hidden Clues

Using PeStudio, we analyzed strings within the dumped file to identify interesting text and clues about the ransomware's behavior.



location	flag (686)	label (89)	group (17)	value (6877)
0x00004B70	-	-	windowing	DispatchMessage
0x00004B84	-	-	windowing	TranslateMessage
0x00004B98	-	-	windowing	PeekMessage
0x00004BA8	-	-	synchro	MsgWaitForMultipleObjects
0x00004350	-	-	setup	MsiReinstallProduct
0x00004368	-	-	setup	MsiProductElevated
0x00004380	-	-	setup	MsiQueryProductState
0x00004398	-	-	setup	MsiAdvertiseScript
0x000043AC	-	-	setup	MsiGetProductInfo
0x000043C0	-	-	setup	MsiDecomposeDescriptor
0x000043FC	-	-	setup	MsiConfigureProductEx
0x00004414	-	-	setup	MsiSetInternalUI
0x00064BBE	x	-	services	ChangeServiceConfig2
0x00064BD4	x	-	services	ChangeServiceConfig2
0x00064BEA	x	-	services	ChangeServiceConfig
0x00064BFF	x	-	services	ChangeServiceConfig
0x00064C91	-	-	services	CloseServiceHandle
0x00064D0D	x	-	services	ControlService
0x00065159	x	-	services	CreateService
0x00065178	x	-	services	CreateService
0x0006584F	x	-	services	DeleteService
0x00065AD9	-	-	services	EnumDependentServices
0x00065AF0	-	-	services	EnumDependentServices
0x00065B26	-	-	services	EnumServiceGroup
0x00065B38	-	-	services	EnumServicesStatus
0x00065B4C	-	-	services	EnumServicesStatusEx
0x00065B62	-	-	services	EnumServicesStatusEx
0x00065B78	-	-	services	EnumServicesStatus
0x000663C4	x	-	services	GetServiceDisplayName
0x000663DB	x	-	services	GetServiceDisplayName
0x000663F2	-	-	services	GetServiceKeyName

sha256: C93B15953462E9F59B83B33940459F6A595F8B8D15CAC7EA154A8200B188155

PeStudio String Analysis for Hidden Clues

Using PeStudio, we analyzed strings within the dumped file to identify interesting text and clues about the ransomware's behavior.

location	flag (686)	label (89)	group (17)	value (6877)
0x00006860	-	file	crypto	WINTRUST.dll
0x00006870	-	file	crypto	CRYPTBASE.dll
0x000068A0	-	file	crypto	CRYPT32.dll
0x000068B0	-	file	crypto	bcrypt.dll
0x00061336	x	-	crypto	CryptReleaseContext
0x0006134C	x	-	crypto	CryptSetProviderEx
0x00061362	x	-	crypto	CryptGenKey
0x00061370	-	-	crypto	CryptGetProvParam
0x00061384	x	-	crypto	CryptSetProvider
0x00061398	x	-	crypto	CryptGetHashParam
0x000613AC	x	-	crypto	CryptSignHash
0x000613BE	x	-	crypto	CryptImportKey
0x000613D0	x	-	crypto	CryptSetProviderEx
0x000613E6	x	-	crypto	CryptSetKeyParam
0x000613FA	x	-	crypto	CryptEnumProviderTypes
0x00061414	x	-	crypto	CryptGetDefaultProvider
0x00061430	x	-	crypto	CryptDestroyHash
0x00061444	-	-	crypto	CryptContextAddRef
0x0006145A	x	-	crypto	CryptSetHashParam
0x0006146E	x	-	crypto	CryptHashData
0x0006147E	x	-	crypto	CryptDeriveKey
0x00061490	x	-	crypto	CryptCreateHash
0x000614A2	x	-	crypto	CryptExportKey
0x000614CA	x	-	crypto	CryptVerifySignature
0x000614E2	x	-	crypto	CryptDecrypt
0x000614F2	x	-	crypto	CryptSignHash
0x00061504	x	-	crypto	CryptGetDefaultProvider
0x00061520	x	-	crypto	CryptDuplicateKey
0x00061534	x	-	crypto	CryptGenRandom
0x00061546	x	-	crypto	CryptEncrypt
0x00061556	x	-	crypto	CryptEnumProviderTypes

sha256: C93B15953462E9F59B83B33940459F6A595FBB5BD15CAC7EA154A8200B188155



THANK YOU!

