

1. By definition (4.1),

$$\begin{aligned} V_n(i) &= \max_{\{a_{T-n+1}, \dots, a_T\}} \mathbf{E} \left[ \sum_{t=T-n+1}^T R(X_t, a_t) \middle| X_{T-n+1} = i \right] \\ &= \max_{\{\dots\}} \left\{ R(X_{T-n+1}, a_{T-n+1}) + \mathbf{E} \left[ \sum_{t=T-n+2}^T R(X_t, a_t) \middle| X_{T-n+1} = i \right] \right\}, \end{aligned}$$

where by the TPF the last expectation can be computed as

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_j \mathbf{E}[\dots | X_{T-n+1} = i, X_{T-n+2} = j] \mathbf{P}(X_{T-n+2} = j | X_{T-n+1} = i) \\ = \sum_j \mathbf{E}[\dots | X_{T-n+2} = j] p_{ij}(a_{T-n+1}) \end{aligned}$$

by Markov property. Complete the argument!

2. (i)  $X_t = Z_t$  if has not bought yet,  $X_t = 0$  otherwise,  $t = 1, 2, 3, 4$  (with  $Z_4 = \infty$  to make the person purchase the land!). Actions:  $a = 1$  is “buy”;  $a = 0$  is “do nothing”. Transition probabilities for  $a = 0$  at different times  $t$  are specified by the table, while  $a = 1$  always means transition to 0. Reward function:  $R(x, 0) = 0$ ,  $R(x, 1) = -x$ .

(ii) As the process is non-homogeneous (in time), we have

$$V_n(i) = \max_a \left[ R(i, a) + \mathbf{E}_a(V_{n-1}(X_{5-n}) | X_{4-n} = i) \right], \quad n = 1, 2, 3$$

(since  $T = 3$ ,  $T - n + 1 = 4 - n$  now) with  $V_0(x) = -x$  (inflicting a huge penalty in case the person has not bought land during the three days).

(iii) Decision tree: DIY. Optimal policy: in week one, buy if the price is 2.2 else wait; in week two, buy if the price is 2.2 or 2.3, else wait; in week three buy if you haven't yet. The minimum expected price is 2.2574 (i.e., \$225,740).

3. The optimality equation becomes

$$V_n(x) = \max_{a \in [0,1]} \mathbf{E} V_{n-1}(x + axZ) = \max_{a \in [0,1]} \left( pV_{n-1}(x(1+a)) + qV_{n-1}(x(1-a)) \right),$$

so that, since  $V_0(x) = \log x$ ,

$$V_1(x) = \log x + \max_{a \in [0,1]} (p \log(1+a) + q \log(1-a)).$$

(i) If  $p \leq 1/2$ , the function on the right-hand side is decreasing in  $a \in [0, 1]$ , so the optimal  $a = 0$ ,  $V_1(x) = \log x$ . Repeating the argument, we derive that all  $V_n(x) = \dots = V_1(x) = V_0(x) = \log x$ , and the optimal action is always  $a = 0$ .  
(ii) If  $p > 1/2$ , the maximum is attained at  $a^* = 2p - 1 = p - q$ . As  $V_1(x) = \log x + c$ ,  $c = \mathbf{E}(1 + a^* Z) = \text{const}$ , repeating the argument yields that  $a^*$  is optimal at each step.

4. (i)  $X_t = Z_t$  if has not sold yet;  $X_t = 0$  otherwise. Actions:  $a = 1$  is "sell";  $a = 0$  is "do nothing". The evolution of  $\{X_t\}$ : given  $X_t = 0$ ,  $X_{t+1} = 0$  for any  $a$ ; given  $X_t = x > 0$ ,  $X_{t+1} = 0$  if  $a = 1$  and  $X_{t+1} = Z_{t+1}$  if  $a = 0$ . Reward function:  $R(x, 0) = 0$ ,  $R(x, 1) = x$ . The sum of one-step reward equals the only term ( $\neq 0$ ) giving the selling price.

(ii)  $V_n(x) = \max_{a=0,1} [R(x, a) + \mathbf{E}_a(V_{n-1}(X_1) | X_0 = x)] = \max\{\mathbf{E}_0(V_{n-1}(X_1) | X_0 = x), x\}$ , where the subscript  $a$  indicates that the expectation is taken under action  $a$ . If  $x = 0$ , then  $V_n(x) = 0$ , so can only consider case  $x > 0$ , and then

$$V_n(x) = \max\{\mathbf{E} V_{n-1}(Z), x\}, \quad Z \sim U(0, 1),$$

with the initial condition  $V_0(x) = 0$  (as nothing can be gained after time  $T = 4$ ).  
Solution:

$n = 1$ : For  $x > 0$ ,  $V_1(x) = x$  and the optimal action (for which the maximum is attained) is always  $a = 1$ .

$n = 2$ :  $V_2(x) = \max\{\mathbf{E} V_1(Z), x\} = \max\{\mathbf{E} Z, x\} = \max\{1/2, x\}$ . Optimal action:  $a = 1$  iff  $x > 1/2$ .

$n = 3$ : Here

$$V_3(x) = \max\{\mathbf{E} V_2(Z), x\} = \max\{\mathbf{E} \max\{1/2, Z\}, x\} = \max\{5/8, x\}$$

since (using the hint)

$$\mathbf{E} \max\{c, Z\} = c \mathbf{P}(Z \leq c) + \int_c^1 x dx = \frac{1}{2}(1 + c^2).$$

The optimal action:  $a = 1$  iff  $x > 5/8$ .

$n = 4$ : Now

$$V_4(x) = \max\{\mathbf{E} V_3(Z), x\} = \max\{\mathbf{E} \max\{5/8, Z\}, x\} = \max\{89/128, x\}.$$

The optimal action:  $a = 1$  iff  $x > 89/128$ .  
Day 2: sell if  $Z_2 > 5/8 = 0.625$ .

(iii) Day 1: sell if  $Z_1 > 89/128 \approx 0.695$ . Day 3: sell if  $Z_3 > 1/2 = 0.5$ . Day 4: sell. Maximum expected price:  $\mathbf{E} V_4(X_1) = \mathbf{E} \max\{89/128, Z\} \approx 0.742$ .

5. As we proved that  $\{s_n\}$  is non-decreasing, it suffices to show that  $s_2 = \infty$ . Since  $V_1 \geq s - c$ , we get  $\mathbf{E} V_1(s + Y_1) \geq \mathbf{E}(s + Y_1 - c) = s - c + \mu > s - c$ , so from (4.4) with  $n = 2$  we see that (4.5) holds for all  $s$ , i.e.,  $s_2 = \infty$ .

6. (i)  $\mathbf{E} Y = \sum_{j \leq n} \lambda_j \mathbf{E} X_j = \mu$ ;  $\text{Var}(Y) = \sigma^2 \sum_{j \leq n} \lambda_j^2 = \sigma^2 (\lambda_1^2 + \cdots + \lambda_{n-1}^2 + (1 - \lambda_1 - \cdots - \lambda_{n-1})^2)$ . Solve  $\partial(\cdots)/\partial \lambda_j = 0$ ,  $j = 1, \dots, n-1$ , to get  $\lambda_j = 1/n$  for all  $j$  (and note that this is a minimum indeed!).

(ii) First show that  $f(\boldsymbol{\lambda}) := \mathbf{E} u\left(\sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j X_j\right)$  is a strictly concave function of  $\boldsymbol{\lambda} = (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_n)$ : for any  $\boldsymbol{\lambda}'$ ,  $\boldsymbol{\lambda}''$  and  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ ,

$$f(\boldsymbol{\lambda}) > \alpha f(\boldsymbol{\lambda}') + (1 - \alpha) f(\boldsymbol{\lambda}''). \quad (13.46)$$

Next assume that the maximum of  $f(\boldsymbol{\lambda})$  is attained at a point  $\boldsymbol{\lambda}'$  such that  $\lambda'_i \neq \lambda'_j$  for some  $i \neq j$ . Define  $\boldsymbol{\lambda}''$  by setting  $\lambda''_j := \lambda'_i$ ,  $\lambda''_i := \lambda'_j$ , and  $\lambda''_k := \lambda'_k$  for all  $k \neq i, j$ . As  $\sum \lambda''_k X_k$  has the same distribution as  $\sum \lambda'_k X_k$  (since  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  are exchangeable),  $f(\boldsymbol{\lambda}'') = f(\boldsymbol{\lambda}')$  is also a maximum, and by taking  $\alpha = 1/2$  we see from (13.46) that for the midpoint  $\boldsymbol{\lambda} = (\boldsymbol{\lambda}' + \boldsymbol{\lambda}'')/2$ ,  $f(\boldsymbol{\lambda}) > (f(\boldsymbol{\lambda}') + f(\boldsymbol{\lambda}''))/2 = f(\boldsymbol{\lambda}')$ , a contradiction! So must have  $\lambda'_i = \lambda'_j$  for all  $i, j$  at the maximum point.

7. Since  $u_n(x) = \max\{x, \mu_{n-1}\}$ , assuming  $\mu_{n-1} \leq \mu_n$ , we get

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{n+1} - \mu_n &= \alpha \mathbf{E}(u_{n+1}(Z) - u_n(Z)) \\ &= \alpha(\mu_n - \mu_{n-1}) \mathbf{P}(Z \leq \mu_{n-1}) + \alpha \mathbf{E}((Z - \mu_{n-1}); \mu_{n-1} < Z \leq \mu_n). \end{aligned}$$

Clearly,  $0 \leq (\text{right-hand side}) \leq \alpha|\mu_n - \mu_{n-1}|$ . Similar argument if  $\mu_{n-1} > \mu_n$ .