

Detection of Wormhole Attack in Wireless Networks

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October, 2018

Bachelor of Science in Computer Science and Engineering


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Chittagong University of Engineering & Technology
Chittagong-4349, Bangladesh.**

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science & Engineering.

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It is hereby declared that the contents of this thesis is original and any part of it has not been submitted elsewhere for the award of any degree or diploma.

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Acknowledgment

First of all thanks to God for his great blessings on me to complete this project successfully. There after I am expressing my gratitude to my honorable project Supervisor Mir Md. Saki Kowsar, Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chittagong University of Engineering and Technology, for his valuable suggestion, constructive advice, encouragement and sincere guidance in my entire project.

It was a real opportunity to work with him. I learned a lot from him. I am grateful that he invested so much of his precious time with us. It was really an amazing experience.

I am also expressing my gratitude to Professor Dr. Mohammed Moshiul Hoque, honorable head of the Department of Computer Science and Engineering for his kind support. I am highly indebted to all of my teachers for their valuable effort in teaching us for last four and a half years.

This thesis would not be possible without the support of our faculty staffs especially Mr. Osman Billah, Mr. Shafikul Islam, Mr. Liton Kar, Mr. Provatosh and others.

I would like to give thanks to my family, friends, seniors, juniors, batchmates for their constant support and motivation. I thank them for giving me confidence and drive for pursuing my degree.

Special thanks to Moinul Islam Bappi, Shourav Sinha Klingon and Raihan Roman for working day and night for the completion of the thesis. I am looking forward to work with them in future again.

Abstract

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) provide flexible infrastructures for numerous applications like healthcare, industry automation, surveillance and defence. Wormhole attack is one of the most dangerous attack which can destabilize or disable wireless sensor networks. In order to provide a stable and uninterrupted packet sending experience to a network, Wormhole attack detection is required to maintain the network connection stable. Ideally, Wormhole attack detection should be completely transparent to legitimate users in a network. However the current IEEE 802.11 standards do not detect the Wormhole attack well. In this thesis current network layer attacks scheme is analyzed and an efficient method is proposed. Finally, it is implemented in network simulator 3 and analyzed. The analysis shows that the proposed scheme reduces the packet loss and improves the overall network performance.

Existing solutions on reducing the packet loss in WSNs ignore one important factor for the long handoff delay. Data can be lost during the multihop transmission resulting in increase in packet loss and the data collection becomes incomplete[17]. Studies have revealed that standard hand-off on IEEE 802.11 WLANs increase a latency of the order of hundreds of milliseconds to several seconds. Moreover the discovery step in the handoff process accounts for more than 99% of this latency.

Ad-hoc wireless network signals are not really strong as compared to the wireless connections which uses routers to function properly. On discovery steps, multiple paths between source and destination is discovered using AODV routing protocol. Discovering multipath comes with a number of disadvantages like link failure, congestion error etc. To overcome those disadvantages, the AODV protocol is modified to select the main path for data transmission based on the time on the time of routing establishment

The feasibility of the proposed scheme to support fast handoff in WSNs has been demonstrated through computer simulations under different network conditions. The results from the simulations show that the latency associated with handoff can be reduced by using this technique. This scheme can improve the overall performance by increasing packet delivery fraction and throughput and reducing ETE delay.

In conclusion, it can be said that the latency in the link layer is reduced by introducing an efficient and powerful technique which also improves the overall performance.

Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Wormhole Attack in Wireless Sensor Network	1
1.2	Background or Previous works	3
1.3	Present state and Contribution	4
1.4	Motivation	5
1.5	Prospects of the problem	5
1.6	Organization of the Project	5
2	Literature Review	6
2.1	Wireless Sensor Network	6
2.1.1	Network Architecture	7
2.1.2	Characteristics	9
2.1.3	Advantages of Wireless Mesh Network	10
2.1.4	Application	11
2.2	IEEE 802.11s	12
2.2.1	Network design	12
2.2.2	WSN formation and management	12
2.3	IEEE 802.11s model in NS-3	13
2.3.1	Network Simulator 3	13
2.3.2	Model design	14
2.3.3	Model implementation	14
2.4	Wormhole attack in 802.11b WSN	15
2.5	Related Works	15
2.6	Chapter Summary	16
3	Methodology	17
3.1	Detection, Prevention and Reactive AODV	17
3.2	Malicious Node Detection	18
3.3	Route Lookup in Network Layer	18
3.4	Isolation in Network Layer	18
3.5	Intrusion Detection System AODV (IDSAODV)	18
3.6	Enhanced AODV (EAODV)	19
3.7	Secure AODV (SAODV)	19
3.8	Solution utilizing network redundancy	20
3.9	Proposed Methodology	20
3.10	Chapter Summary	24

4 Implementation	25
4.1 Implementation Tools	25
4.2 Implementation Details	26
4.3 Simulation Parameters	26
4.4 Simulation of black hole attack and greyhole attack	26
4.4.1 AODV Modifications	27
4.5 Simulation Visualization	27
4.6 Chapter Summary	30
5 Simulation Results and Analysis	31
5.1 Parameters for Evaluating Simulation Model	31
5.2 Performance of Proposed Method	32
5.2.1 Average End to End Delay	32
5.2.2 Average Throughput	33
5.2.3 Packet delivery fraction(PDF)	34
5.3 Comparison with Traditional Dos attack	35
5.3.1 Average End to End Delay	36
5.3.2 Average Throughput	36
5.3.3 Packet delivery fraction(PDF)	37
5.4 Chapter Summary	37
6 Conclusion	38
6.1 Findings of the Work	38
6.2 Future Works	38
A Source Code	39
B NS-3 802.11s modules	74
B.1 MeshHelper	74

List of Figures

1.1	Encapsulation Wormhole	2
1.2	Out-of-band Wormhole	3
2.1	Wireless Sensor Network	6
2.2	Wireless Sensor Network Architecture	7
2.3	Wireless Sensor Network Topologies	8
2.4	Taxonomy of Wormhole attack	15
3.1	Blackhole attack in wireless mesh network	21
3.2	Greyhole attack in wireless mesh network	22
3.3	Flow chart for DoS attack detection mechanism.	23
4.1	Normal Network Model for Simulation	27
4.2	Malicious Network Model for Simulation	28
4.3	Network model	28
4.4	Active probing	29
4.5	Transmission of Data Packets in normal mode	29
4.6	Transmission of data packets Under Blackhole attack	30
4.7	Transmission of data packets Under Greyhole attack	30
5.1	Number of Hops vs. Avg. ETE Delay	32
5.2	Number of Hops vs. Avg. Throughput	33
5.3	Number of MCs vs. Avg. Throughput	33
5.4	Number of Hops vs. PDF	34
5.5	Number of hopes vs. Number of Packets	35
5.6	Number of hopes vs. Number of Packets	35
5.7	Number of Hops vs. Avg. ETE Delay	36
5.8	Number of Hops vs. Avg. Throughput	36
5.9	Number of Hops vs. PDF	37

List of Tables

1.1	Different types of Layering based attacks	2
5.1	No. of hops vs Packet delivery fraction	34

List of Abbreviations

WSN	Wireless Sensor Network
SN	Sensor Node
MR	Mesh Router
MC	Mesh Client
AP	Access Point
AODV	Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
NS-3	Network Simulator 3

Chapter 1

Introduction

Wireless sensor networks(WSNs) consist of many interconnected self-controlled device(i.e sensor nodes) that are used in a collective manner to monitor and/or control environmental phenomena in local or remote environments[8]. Sensor nodes which are spacially distributed communicate with their peers in order to send aggregated data to the base station efficiently. WSN is a spacial kind of Mobile Ad-hoc network that has gained popularity for its versatile application in military and civil domains such as battlefield monitoring, tracking objects, healthcare and home automation. Due to the broadcast nature of the transmission medium and fact that sensor nodes often operate in hostile environments. WSN are vulnerable to variety of security attacks[1]. This chapter contains some introductory information on wormhole attack in wireless sensor network, motivation of our work, challenges of implementing our work and our objectives.

1.1 Wormhole Attack in Wireless Sensor Network

The wormhole attack is recognized as one of the most dangerous security threats for WSNs. This attack has one or more malicious node and a tunnel between them. The attacking nodes capture the packets from one location and transfers them to other distant location node which distributes them locally[1]. The tunnel can be established in many ways e.g in-band and out-of-band channel. Routing mechanisms which rely on the knowledge about distance between nodes can get confuse because because wormhole nodes fake a route that is shorter than the original one within the network[1].

Wireless sensor networks are susceptible to wide range of security attacks due to the multi-hop nature of the transmission medium. Also, wireless sensor networks have an additional vulnerability because nodes are generally deployed in a hostile or unprotected environment. From [2] a summarization of possible attacks in different layers with respect to ISO-OSI model are shown in the Table 1.1

Layer	Attacks
Physical Layer	Denial of Service, Tampering
Data Link Layer	Jamming, Collision, Traffic manipulation
Routing/Network Layer	Wormhole, Sinkhole, Flooding

Table 1.1: Different types of Layering based attacks

For the nature wireless transmission the attacker can create a wormhole even for packets not addressed to itself, since it can overhear them in wireless transmission and tunnel them in wireless transmission and tunnel them to the colluding attacker at the opposite end of wormhole[7].

However, in wireless sensor networks, mobility, limited bandwidth, routing functionalities etc. associated with each node, present many new opportunities for launching a Wormhole attack. Wormhole attack is classified into four models[3] :-

Encapsulation: Here a malicious node at one part of the network overhears the RREQ packet. It is then tunnel through a low latency link with the help of normal node, to the second colluding malicious node at a distance near to the destination node. Once this packet is received by the second malicious code, the legitimate neighbour of the node drops any further legitimate requests from a legitimate neighbour node. This result to the routes between the source and the destination go through the wormhole link, because it has broadcast itself has the fastest route. It prevents legitimate nodes from discovering legitimate paths more than two hops away.




Figure 1.1: Encapsulation Wormhole

Packet Relay: This is another type of wormhole attack where malicious relays packet between source and destination nodes. Unlike encapsulation, this type of wormhole attack can be launched using only one malicious node.

Out-of-band Channel: As the name suggest is a type of worm-hole attack that uses a long range directional wireless link or a wired link. It is a very difficult attack to launch because its needs a specialized hardware.




Figure 1.2: Out-of-band Wormhole

High Power Transmission: In this mode of attack, a single malicious node can create a wormhole without colluding node. when this single malicious node received a RREQ, it rebroadcasts the request at a very high power level capability compared to normal node, thereby attracting normal nodes to overhear this RREQ and further on broadcast the packet towards destination.

1.2 Background or Previous works

Security in WSNs is still in its infancy as very little attention has been devoted thus so far to this topic by the research community and so it has become more vulnerable to various types of attacks.

An efficient method for detecting wormhole attacks against the routing functionality of network is proposed in [11]. The author propose an algorithm which is meant to secure each link. In this algorithm, each node considers the distance which separates it from its direct neighbors. This estimate is performed using an exchange of message simultaneously by using a radio interferometry generating ultrasonic waves. Then each node exchanges the information of these values of calculated distances. Once these data are exchanged, each node runs a set of geometric tests on the local data thus obtained, in order to detect false links present due to the Wormhole attack. The disadvantage of this approach is that each node must be equipped with a second ultrasound radio, allowing the estimation of distances between neighboring nodes.

In paper[12], a statistical approach is proposed, known as SWAN, in which each sensor collects a recent number of neighbors. A wormhole attack is identified if the current number of neighbors exhibits an unusual increase, compared to the previous neighborhood counts taken outside of the wormhole zones. This is a distributed approach so that it doesn't cause any overhead, unlike a centralized approach. However, this schemes has been designed for and perform better in a uniformly distributed network, but their performance is in question for networks in which sensors are distributed non-uniformly.

In [6], Hu and Evans propose a solution to wormhole attacks for ad hoc networks in which all nodes are equipped with directional antennas. When directional antennas are used, nodes use specific 'sectors' of their antennas to communicate with each other. Therefore, a node receiving a message from its neighbor has some information about the location of that neighbor, which knows the relative orientation of the neighbor with respect to itself. This extra bit information makes wormhole discovery much easier than in networks with exclusively omni-directional antennas. This approach does not require either location information or clock synchronization, and is more efficient with energy. They use directional antenna and consider the packet arrival direction to defend the attacks. They use the neighbor verification methods and verified neighbors are really neighbors and only accept messages from verified neighbors. But it has the drawback that the need of the directional antenna is impossible for sensor networks.

HU et al [4] describe a defense based on the leases of the packet, where the distance of a message route is limited, each message having a timestamp and a location of its transmitter. The receiver compares this information with its own location and timestamp to check if the intervals of transmissions are exceeded. However, this proposal presents two disadvantages: It requires a coordinate system such as the GPS in order to obtain the geographic information about each node; It requires a precise synchronization of clocks between different nodes in order to use timely data.

In WSNs are vulnerable to several kinds of attacks because of their inherent attributes such as the open communication medium. Malicious sensor devices can launch attacks to disrupt the network routing operations, then putting the entire sensor network at risk. Many techniques have been suggested for Wormhole attack detection and characterization. Most of these techniques have one or more limitations. Network visualization method can be effective against Wormhole attack but it requires central coordination and the mobility is not studied for this method.

1.3 Present state and Contribution

The objective of this thesis is to develop a Procedure to detect Wormhole attack in Infrastructure based WSNs. After a study and analysis of the wireless sensor network Wormhole attack detection procedure, the detection process was divided into two phases: neighborhood sensing and malicious node detection. A fast

Wormhole attack detection scheme have been developed to provide a novel use of the channel in wireless sensor network. This detection scheme may be implemented by upgrading the protocol of wireless sensor network, no hardware upgrade is required. NS-3 simulations were used in order to verify the feasibility of the proposed scheme. The results presented in chapter 5 indicate that the latency associated with Wormhole attack can be efficiently detect by using the proposed technique. The performance of the proposed scheme was also analyzed. The results show that the scheme continued to successfully operate under different network conditions.

1.4 Motivation

security in wireless sensor network system is one of the main concerns to provide protected communication between mobile nodes in strange environment. Unlike the wired line networks, the unique characteristics of WSN create a number of nontrivial challenges to security design like open peer-to-peer network architecture, shared wireless medium, inflexible resources constraints and highly dynamic network topology.

Guarding against Wormhole attack is a critical component of any WSN security system. Security services in WSNs are needed to protect from attacks and to ensure the security of the information. The wireless channel is accessible to both intended and unintended users. There is no well-defined place where traffic monitoring or access control mechanisms can be brought into life. As a result, there is no clear boundary that separates the inside network from the outside world.

1.5 Prospects of the problem

Our main prospects of this project is to detect the Wormhole attack in infrastructure base wireless sensor network and improve the overall performance.

1.6 Organization of the Project

The remainder of the report is organized as follows. In the next chapter, an overview of our project related terminologies and contains brief discussion on previous works that is already implemented with their limitations. Chapter three describes the working procedure of our proposed system. In Chapter 4, we have illustrated our implementation of the project in details. Chapter 5 focuses on the experimental result of the proposed system. The thesis concludes with a summary of research contributions and future plan of our work in chapter 6. This thesis contains an appendix intended for persons who wish to explore the source code.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Wormhole attack detection is an essential issue to ensure continuous communications in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The Wormhole attack performance in WSNs can be largely degraded by the packet loss which dropped the valuable information by neighborhood sensing at each sensor node, especially when the backbone traffic volume is high. In this chapter, we present studies on the terminologies related to the project which are important to understand. This chapter also contains brief discussion on previous works that is already implemented along with their limitations.

2.1 Wireless Sensor Network

A Wireless Sensor Network is one kind of wireless network includes a large number of circulating, self-directed, minute, low powered devices named sensor nodes called motes. These networks certainly cover a huge number of spatially distributed, little, battery-operated, embedded devices that are networked to caringly collect, process, and transfer data to the operators, and it has controlled the capabilities of computing & processing. Nodes are the tiny computers, which work jointly to form the networks.




Figure 2.1: Wireless Sensor Network

The sensor node is a multi-functional, energy efficient wireless device. The applications of motes in industrial are widespread. A collection of sensor nodes collects the data from the surroundings to achieve specific application objectives. The communication between motes can be done with each other using transceivers. In a wireless sensor network, the number of motes can be in the order of hundreds/ even thousands. In contrast with sensor n/w, Ad Hoc networks will have fewer nodes without any structure.

2.1.1 Network Architecture

The most common WSN architecture follows the OSI architecture Model. The architecture of the WSN includes five layers and three cross layers. Mostly in sensor n/w we require five layers, namely application, transport, n/w, data link & physical layer. The three cross planes are namely power management, mobility management, and task management. These layers of the WSN are used to accomplish the n/w and make the sensors work together in order to raise the complete efficiency of the network.




Figure 2.2: Wireless Sensor Network Architecture

Application Layer: The application layer is liable for traffic management and offers software for numerous applications that convert the data in a clear form to find positive information. Sensor networks arranged in numerous applications in different fields such as agricultural, military, environment, medical, etc.

Transport Layer: The function of the transport layer is to deliver congestion avoidance and reliability where a lot of protocols intended to offer this function are either practical on the upstream. These protocols use dissimilar mechanisms for loss recognition and loss recovery. The transport layer is exactly needed when a system is planned to contact other networks.

Network Layer: The main function of the network layer is routing, it has a lot of tasks based on the application, but actually, the main tasks are in the power conserving, partial memory, buffers, and sensor don't have a universal ID and have to be self-organized.

Data Link Layer: The data link layer is liable for multiplexing data frame detection, data streams, MAC, & error control, confirm the reliability of point-point (or) point-multipoint.

Physical Layer: The physical layer provides an edge for transferring a stream of bits above physical medium. This layer is responsible for the selection of frequency, generation of a carrier frequency, signal detection, Modulation & data encryption.

WSN Network Topologies

For radio communication networks, the structure of a WSN includes various topologies like the ones given below.




Figure 2.3: Wireless Sensor Network Topologies

Star Topologies: Star topology is a communication topology, where each node connects directly to a gateway. A single gateway can send or receive a message to a number of remote nodes. In star topologies, the nodes are not permitted to send messages to each other. This allows low-latency communications between the remote node and the gateway (base station).

Tree Topologies: Tree topology is also called as cascaded star topology. In tree topologies, each node connects to a node that is placed higher in the tree, and then to the gateway. The main advantage of the tree topology is that the expansion of a network can be easily possible, and also error detection becomes easy. The disadvantage with this network is that it relies heavily on the bus cable; if it breaks, all the network will collapse.

Mesh Topologies: The Mesh topologies allow transmission of data from one node to another, which is within its radio transmission range. If a node wants to send a message to another node, which is out of radio communication range, it needs an intermediate node to forward the message to the desired node. The advantage with this mesh topology includes easy isolation and detection of faults in the network. The disadvantage is that the network is large and requires huge investment.

2.1.2 Characteristics

There have been several characteristics of WSNs. Some of characteristics are explained as follows:

- **Low cost:** In the WSN normally hundreds or thousands of sensor nodes are deployed to measure any physical environment. In order to reduce the overall cost of the whole network the cost of the sensor node must be kept as low as possible.
- **Energy efficient:** Energy in WSN is used for different purpose such as computation, communication and storage. Sensor node consumes more energy compare to any other for communication. If they run out of the power they often become invalid as we do not have any option to recharge. So, the protocols and algorithm development should consider the power consumption in the design phase.
- **Computational power:** Normally the node has limited computational capabilities as the cost and energy need to be considered.
- **Communication Capabilities:** WSN typically communicate using radio waves over a wireless channel. It has the property of communicating in short range, with narrow and dynamic bandwidth. The communication channel can be either bidirectional or unidirectional. With the unattended and hostile operational environment it is difficult to run WSN smoothly. So, the hardware and software for communication must have to consider the robustness, security and resiliency.
- **Distributed sensing and processing:** the large number of sensor node is distributed uniformly or randomly. WSNs each node is capable of collecting, sorting, processing, aggregating and sending the data to the sink. Therefore the distributed sensing provides the robustness of the system.
- **Dynamic network topology:** In general WSN are dynamic network. The sensor node can fail for battery exhaustion or other circumstances, communication channel can be disrupted as well as the additional sensor node may be added to the network that result the frequent changes in the network topology. Thus, the WSN nodes have to be embedded with the function of reconfiguration, self adjustment.

- **Multi-hop communication:** A large number of sensor nodes are deployed in WSN. So, the feasible way to communicate with the sinker or base station is to take the help of a intermediate node through routing path. If one need to communicate with the other node or base station which is beyond its radio frequency it must me through the multi-hop route by intermediate node.
- **Application oriented:** WSN is different from the conventional network due to its nature. It is highly dependent on the application ranges from military, environmental as well as health sector. The nodes are deployed randomly and spanned depending on the type of use.
- **Robust Operations:** Since the sensors are going to be deployed over a large and sometimes hostile environment. So, the sensor nodes have to be fault and error tolerant. Therefore, sensor nodes need the ability to self-test, self-calibrate, and self repair.
- **Security and Privacy:** Each sensor node should have sufficient security mechanisms in order to prevent unauthorized access, attacks, and unintentional damage of the information inside of the sensor node. Furthermore, additional privacy mechanisms must also be included.
- **Small physical size:** sensor nodes are generally small in size with the restricted range. Due to its size its energy is limited which makes the communication capability low.

2.1.3 Advantages of Wireless Mesh Network

The advantages of WSN over other networks are very significant and have great deal of importance. There are some unique features compared to other network in WSN. These features are explained below:

- Network arrangements can be carried out without immovable infrastructure.
- Apt for the non-reachable places like mountains, over the sea, rural areas and deep forests.
- Flexible if there is a casual situation when an additional workstation is required.
- Execution pricing is inexpensive.
- It avoids plenty of wiring.
- The data processing is pretty fast.
- Easy installation and uninstall.
- It might provide accommodations for the new devices at any time.
- It can be opened by using a centralized monitoring.

Building a network without any wire brings a great deal of advantage. In most the case bigger network don't really use any wire. The internet we use in our daily life is a realistic example for this. It is seen that most of the network are inter connected with each other wirelessly creating a mesh topology which is also called seamlessly. It is cheap as it don't use any wire. In WSN the nodes automatically adjust themselves according to the situation, so there is no need for network administrator if there is a problem regarding nodes or the network. WSN nodes can communicate with their neighboring nodes as well without going back to the central device, which increases its data processing speed. According to the requirement WSN nodes can be installed or uninstalled. Like all other wireless networks standards, WSN also uses one of those standards. Being a new technology it does not require new Wi-Fi standard. WSNs are very much tolerant to faults, if couple of nodes in a network fails, the communication will always keep on going.

2.1.4 Application

Wireless sensor networks may comprise of numerous different types of sensors like low sampling rate, seismic, magnetic, thermal, visual, infrared, radar, and acoustic, which are clever to monitor a wide range of ambient situations. Sensor nodes are used for constant sensing, event ID, event detection & local control of actuators. The applications of wireless sensor network mainly include health, military, environmental, home, & other commercial areas.

- Military Applications
- Health Applications
- Environmental Applications
- Home Applications
- Commercial Applications
- Area monitoring
- Health care monitoring
- Environmental/Earth sensings
- Air pollution monitoring
- Forest fire detection
- Landslide detection
- Water quality monitoring
- Industrial monitoring

In addition to the above applications, these systems has low power consumption, low cost and is a convenient way to control real-time monitoring for unprotected agriculture and habitat. Moreover, it can also be applied to indoor living monitoring, greenhouse monitoring, climate monitoring and forest monitoring. These approaches have been proved to be an alternative way to replace the conventional method that use men force to monitor the environment and improves the performance, robustness, and provides efficiency in the monitoring system.

2.2 IEEE 802.11s

In this section a detailed explanation of how the IEEE 802.11s works is presented.

2.2.1 Network design

In 802.11, an extended service set (ESS) consists of multiple basic service sets (BSSs) connected through a distributed system (DS) and integrated with wired LANs. The DS service (DSS) is provided by the DS for transporting MAC service data units (MSDUs) between APs, between APs and portals, and between stations within the same BSS [5] that choose to involve DSS. The portal is a logical point for letting MSDUs from a non-802.11 LAN to enter the DS. The ESS appears as single BSS to the logical link control layer at any station associated with one of the BSSs. As is explained in, the 802.11 standard has pointed out the difference between independent basic service set (IBSS) and ESS. IBSS actually has one BSS and does not contain a portal or an integrated wired LANs since no physical DS is available. Thus, an IBSS cannot meet the needs of client support or Internet access, while the ESS architecture can. However, IBSS has its advantage of self-configuration and ad-hoc networking. Thus, it is a good strategy to develop schemes to combine the advantages of ESS and IBSS. The solution being specified by IEEE 802.11s is one of such schemes. In 802.11s, a meshed wireless LAN is formed via ESS mesh networking. In other words, BSSs in the DS do not need to be connected by wired LANs. Instead, they are connected via wireless mesh networking possibly with multiple hops in between. Portals are still needed to interconnect 802.11 wireless LANs and wired LANs.

2.2.2 WSN formation and management

There are four elements that characterize a wireless sensor network:

- Gateway
- Relay Node
- Sink Node
- Sensor

Together these four elements define a profile. If we compare the structure of Mesh Network on IEEE 802.11s with heterogeneous hierarchical wireless sensor

net-work, we can find that they are very similar. Mesh Portal can work as a gateway and provide access to other networks, Mesh Portal is similar to the sink node of wireless sensor network, Mesh Access Point is similar to the cluster head of heterogeneous hierarchical network, and mobile client terminals are similar to the common nodes in wireless sensor network[21]. Most of the nodes of wireless sensor network are powered by batteries, so their node energy is restricted and the calculating capability and storage capacity are limited. So the network protocols of WiFi Wireless Mesh Network can only be used in the new generation of remote AMR network after being optimized. Since the default routing protocol of Wireless Mesh is HWMP, we should reduce the energy consumption of nodes running with HWMP.

2.3 IEEE 802.11s model in NS-3

This section provides an explanation of how is implemented the 802.11s wireless sensor networking model in the Network Simulator 3 (NS-3) and which features or characteristics are supported and which not. First, NS3 is briefly explained to see why this simulator has been chosen. The model used has been the one developed by the Wireless Software R&D Group of IITP RAS and included in NS-3 from the release 3.6. Although it is based in the IEEE P802.11s/D3.0, for the aim of this research, the characteristics used and analyzed are not different from the ones present in the last draft of 802.11s.

2.3.1 Network Simulator 3

NS-3 is a discrete-event network simulator for Internet systems, targeted primarily for research and educational use. NS-3 is free software, licensed under the GNU GPLv2 license, and is publicly available for research, development, and use. It is a tool aligned with the simulation needs of modern networking research allowing researchers to study Internet protocols and large-scale systems in a controlled environment. The following trends is how Internet research is being conducted are responded by NS-3:

- **Extensible software core:** written in C++ with optional Python interface and an extensively documented API (doxygen).
- **Attention to realism:** model nodes more like a real computer and support key interfaces such as sockets API and IP/device driver interface (in Linux).
- **Software integration:** conforms to standard input/output formats (pcap trace output, NS-2 mobility scripts, etc.) and adds support for running implementation code.
- **Support for virtualization and testbeds:** Develops two modes of integration with real systems:
 - Virtual machines run on top of ns-3 devices and channels
 - NS-3 stacks run in emulation mode and emit/consume packets over real devices.

- **Flexible tracing and statistics:** decouples trace sources from trace sinks so we have customizable trace sinks.
- **Attribute system:** controls all simulation parameters for static objects, so you can dump and read them all in configuration files.
- **New models:** includes a mix of new and ported models.

To sum up, NS-3 tries to avoid some problems of its predecessor, NS-2, which is still being used by many researchers, but it has some important lacks such as: interoperability and coupling between models, lack of memory management, debugging of split language objects or lack of realism (in the creation of packets for example). Mainly, the new available high fidelity IEEE 802.11 MAC and PHY models together with real world design philosophy and concepts made NS-3 the choice for developing this 802.11s model as well as for carrying out this research.

2.3.2 Model design

To meet these requirements imposed by 802.11s of supporting multiple interfaces (wireless devices) and also different mesh networking protocol stacks, WS RD Group designed and implemented a runtime configurable multi-interface and multi-protocol Mesh STA architecture.

Supported features

The most important features supported are the implementation of the Peering Management Protocol, the HWMP and the ALM. A part from the functionality described in section 2.3, the PMP includes link close heuristics and beacon collision avoidance. HWMP includes proactive and on-demand modes, unicast/broadcast propagation of management traffic and, as an extra functionality not specified yet in the draft, multi-radio extensions. However, for the moment RANN mechanism is implemented but there is no support, so only the PREQ can be used.

Unsupported features

The most important feature not implemented is Mesh Coordinated Channel Access (MCCA). Internetworking using a Mesh Access Point or a Portal is not implemented neither, but this functionality is not needed to evaluate the performance in the creation of mesh networks. As other less relevant features not implemented we can point out the security, power safe mode and although multi-radio operation is supported, no channel assignment protocol is proposed.

2.3.3 Model implementation

The description of which modules are implemented in C++ and how they interconnect with each other is presented in appendix B. The explanation is in a high-level in order to see which modules and classes need to be accessed or created when designing a mesh network, but the low-level code structure is not described. For

more information on each module and a more detailed low level explanation, please check NS-3 documentation under Doxygen [19]. First is explained the way the MAC-layer routing is implemented presenting the most important classes. Then are analyzed the class MeshHelper (used to create a 802.11s network easier) and MeshPointDevice (developed to create mesh point devices). They provide some functions to configure the different parameters of the network and its devices, so the main parameters and the way to configure them is studied.

2.4 Wormhole attack in 802.11b WSN

Due to multihop routing in wireless sensor network, it is prone to various types of attacks. Wormhole attack in an IEEE 802.11bWSN occurs when a mobile STA sends data to the destination beyond the radio range and receives data by another mobile STA in MN. During the data sending and receiving process, management of frames are exchanged between the STA and the MN. Consequently, there is a latency involved in the Wormhole attack process during which the STA is unable to send or receive traffic because of malicious attribute of a node in WSN which prevent service to the legitimate users and drop packets in Wormhole attack.




Figure 2.4: Taxonomy of Wormhole attack

2.4.1 Wormhole using Packet Encapsulation

Here several nodes exist between two malicious nodes and data packets are encapsulated between the malicious nodes. Hence it prevents nodes on way from incrementing hop counts. The packet is converted into original form by the second end point. This mode of wormhole attack is not difficult to launch since the two ends of wormhole do not need to have any cryptographic information, or special requirement such as high-power source or high bandwidth channel.

2.4.2 Wormhole using Packet Relay

One or more malicious nodes can launch packet-relay-based wormhole attacks. In this type of attack malicious node replays data packets between two far nodes and this way fake neighbours are created.

2.4.3 Wormhole using Out-of-Band Channel

This kind of wormhole approach has only one malicious node with much high transmission capability in the network that attracts the packets to follow path passing from it. The chances of malicious nodes present in the routes established between sender and receiver increases in this case. Also this type is referred as “black hole attack” in the literature.

2.4.4 Wormhole using High Power Transmission

In this mode of attack, a single malicious node can create a wormhole without colluding node. When this single malicious node received a RREQ, it rebroadcasts the request at a very high power level capability compared to normal node, thereby attracting normal nodes to overhear this RREQ and further on broadcast the packet towards destination.

2.5 Related Works

Many Wormhole attack detection schemes have been proposed in the researched literature for WSN networks. An efficient method for detecting wormhole attacks against the routing functionality of network is proposed in [11] in which the author propose an algorithm which is meant to secure each link. The disadvantage of this approach is that each node must be equipped with a second ultrasound radio, allowing the estimation of distances between neighboring nodes. In paper[12], a statistical approach is proposed, known as SWAN, in which each sensor collects a recent number of neighbors. In [6], Hu and Evans propose a solution to wormhole attacks for ad hoc networks in which all nodes are equipped with directional antennas. HU et al [4] describe a defense based on the leases of the packet, where the distance of a message route is limited, each message having a timestamp and a location of its transmitter. But this proposal presents two disadvantages: It requires a coordinate system such as the GPS in order to obtain the geographic information about each node; It requires a precise synchronization of clocks between different nodes in order to use timely data.

2.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has discussed what Wormhole attack is and why detection is important to WSNs and also outlines some fundamental aspects of the operation of IEEE 802.11 WLANs and WSNs. The chapter ended with discussion of related works. The following chapters will further outline the technical details of the proposed scheme and its implementation, as well as an analysis of its performance along with the comparing with the existing system.

Chapter 3

Methodology

In this chapter, a detailed description of the proposed Dos attack detection methodology is given. Besides an analysis of the existing Dos attack detection procedure is provided.

3.1 Detection, Prevention and Reactive AODV

In[?], they proposed DPRAODV. In this scheme, AODV protocol is modified to have a new control packet called ALARM and a threshold value. A threshold value is the average of the difference of destination sequence number in the routing table and sequence number in the RREP packet.

In the usual operation of AODV, the value of sequence number is checked in the routing table by the node that receives a RREP packet. The sequence number of RREP packet has to be higher than the sequence number value in the routing table in order for RREP to be accepted. In DPRAODV, there is an extra threshold value that is compared to RREP sequence number, and if RREP sequence number is greater than the threshold value, then the sender is considered malicious and added to the black list. The neighbouring nodes are notified using an ALARM packet so that the RREP packet from the malicious node is not processed and gets blocked. Automatically, the threshold value gets updated using the data collected in the time interval. This updating of the threshold value helps to detect and stop black hole attacks.

The ALARM packet contains the black list that has a malicious node, so that the neighbouring nodes reject any RREP packet from a malicious node. Any node that receives a RREP packet checks the black list and if the reply comes from a node that has been blacklisted, it is ignored and further replies from that node will be discarded. Thus the ALARM packet isolates a malicious node from the network.

3.2 Malicious Node Detection

The malicious node detection technique is responsible for detecting the Black Hole nodes in the network. Initially, the Black Hole detector initializes the malicious node detection process. First, it broadcasts the spoofed RREQ packets. As discussed above, the spoofed RREQ packet contains the non existence source id and the TTL value set to 1. Then this spoofed RREQ packet is broadcast to all the other nodes in the network. The broadcasted Honeypot spoofed RREQ packet waits for the reply from the neighbor nodes. If any neighbor replies to this packet, those nodes are marked as Black Hole nodes in the routing table. The reason is, since the normal nodes which are not malicious will not reply to this spoofed RREQ packet. So the routing table updates this Black Hole node information by marking it as malicious.

3.3 Route Lookup in Network Layer

In order to resolve the route, the AODV calls the modified Route Lookup function. This algorithm is very important, because it detects the Black Hole attacks by checking the node id. If the malicious node replies that, it has the route towards the non-existence node, then that vulnerable (Black Hole) node is marked as malicious. In order to find a Black Hole node, a detection flag is set on the routing table. If the detection flag is true then, it is observed that the malicious node id is marked. Thus, routing via the malicious node is avoided. The Route Lookup algorithm for the network layer is responsible for updating the reply from the neighbor nodes. The node which replies to the spoofed RREQ packet is identified as the Black Hole node. Then, the node is marked as malicious in RTF and this information is updated in the routing table. Hence the above route lookup algorithm is responsible which marks the malicious node ids in the routing table.

3.4 Isolation in Network Layer

The isolation technique is responsible for isolating the malicious node from the network. This technique is important, because it prevents broadcasting routes via the malicious node. A flag is set as malicious, and the nodes which reply to the non-existence node id are marked as malicious.

3.5 Intrusion Detection System AODV (IDSAODV)

In[?], they proposed IDSAODV in order to decrease the impact of black hole. This is achieved by altering the way normal AODV updates the routing process. The routing update process is modified by adding a procedure to disregard the route that is established first.

The tactic applied in this method is that the network that is attacked has many RREP packets from various paths, so is assumed that the first RREP packet is

generated by a malicious node. The assumption is based on the fact that a black hole node does not look up into its routing table before sending a RREP packet. Therefore, to avoid updating routing table with wrong route entry, the first RREP is ignored.

This method improves packet delivery but it has limitations that; the first RREP can be received from an intermediate node that has an updated route to the destination node, or if RREP message from a malicious node can arrive second at the source node, the method is not able to detect the attack.

3.6 Enhanced AODV (EAODV)

In[?], they proposed EAODV. Similar to IDSAODV, EAODV allows numerous RREPs from various paths to lighten the effect of black hole attack. This method makes an assumption that eventually the actual destination node will send a RREP message, so the source node overlooks all previous RREP entries, including the ones from malicious node and takes the latest RREP packet.

The source node keeps on updating its routing table with RREPs being received until a RREP from the actual destination is received. Then all RREPs get analysed and suspicious nodes are detected and isolated from the network. The limitation to this method is that it adds two processes that increase delay and exhaust energy of the nodes.

3.7 Secure AODV (SAODV)

In[?], they proposed a secure routing protocol SAODV that addresses black hole attack in AODV. The difference between AODV and SAODV is that in SAODV, there are random numbers that are used to verify the destination node. An extra verification packet is introduced in the route discovery process. After receiving a RREP packet, the source node stores it in the routing table and immediately sends a verification packet using reverse route of received RREP. The verification packet contains a random number generated by source node.

When two or more verification packets from the source node are received at the destination node, coming from different routes, the destination node stores them in its routing table and checks whether the contents contain the same random numbers. If the verification packets contain same random numbers along different paths, the destination node sends verification confirm packet to the source node which contains random number generated by destination node.

If verification confirm packet contains different random numbers, the source node will wait until at least two or more verification confirm packets contain same random numbers. When the source node receives two or more verification confirm packet with same random numbers, it will use the shortest route to send data to the

destination node. The security mechanism in this protocol is that malicious node cannot pretend to be destination node and send correct verification confirm packet to the source node.

3.8 Solution utilizing network redundancy

This is an improvement of the normal AODV. The solution proposes that the source node does not immediately start sending data packets after receiving a route reply. It waits to receive other route replies from nearby nodes to confirm that they contain the same next hop information. This solution uses an assumption that there are redundant routes that can be used to reach the destination node. When a RREP packet arrives at the source node, the full path is extracted and the source node waits for another RREP packet. The routes from other RREP packets are compared with the route extracted from the first RREP, and they must have shared hops. If there are no shared hops in the routes, the source node takes the routes to be untrustworthy and waits for more RREP packets until there are shared hops or until the expiration of the routing timer. Even though this solution assures a safe route, it increases the time delay and messages will never be forwarded to the destination node if there are no shared hops in the paths.

3.9 Proposed Methodology

The proposed methodology is based on calculation on the hop by hop to find out Dos attacks like Blackhole and Greyhole attacks.

In order to detect Dos, attack a malicious node has been created in wireless mesh network which attributes is drop all packets for Blackhole attack and selectively drop some packets for Greyhole attack. The specific value of those thresholds can be calculated based probability of packet dropping for those attacks.

The DoS attack detection algorithm is divided into the several steps as shown in Figure 4:

Header addition: Add a 16-bit header in each packet for source id and destination id. First 8-bit is used for source id and last 8-bit is used for destination id.

Collection: Find the route for sending packet from source to destination in wireless mesh network by OSLR algorithm. Also collect the forwarding and received packet for all node in wireless mesh network.

Calculation: For forwarding node calculate the forwarding packet FP and for receiving node calculate the receiving packet RP. Determination: Determine forwarded and received packet difference. If the difference is zero, then there is no types of attack. So, send the next packet.

Packet analysis: Analyse the packet. If the forwarded and received packet difference is less than threshold value which is for attacker, then send next packet. If the forwarded and received packet difference is greater than threshold value which is

for channel and other losses, then save the node id, from routing table. Then, calculate the packet loss and also calculate the probability of attack. If the probability of attack is greater than the probability of Blackhole attack, then notify that there is Blackhole attack and send message to all mesh nodes and update the attack table. If the probability of attack is greater than the probability of Grayhole attack, then notify that there is Grayhole attack and send message to all mesh nodes and update the attack table.

For Blackhole attack:




Figure 3.1: Blackhole attack in wireless mesh network

At time threshold 1, the Blackhole attack detection process will be triggered in advance in order to detect the Blackhole attack.

For Greyhole attack: At time threshold 2, the Greyhole attack detection




Figure 3.2: Greyhole attack in wireless mesh network

process will be triggered in advance in order to detect the Greyhole attack.

Methodology :




Figure 3.3: Flow chart for DoS attack detection mechanism.

3.10 Chapter Summary

This chapter has outlined the different phases of this study including Dos attack detection analysis and the operation of the proposed scheme. A detailed description of the scheme was given also. The next chapter will outline the implement of the scheme in NS-3

Chapter 4

Implementation

This study evaluated the black hole attack impact on performance of WMN using AODV protocols. It further compared the performance of AODV under black hole attack. The solutions that have been previously proposed to combat effects of black hole attack, which were tested using the base protocol AODV, were studied and the study tries to determine the solution that performs better than others. This is achieved by using network simulator version 3 (NS-3) to simulate Wireless mesh network scenarios that include black hole node. It can be very expensive to carry out a networking research by setting up an actual network with several computers and routers. Network simulators save a lot of money and time in accomplishing network research goals that is why a simulator-based approach has been chosen for this study. The disadvantage of simulation is that some factors have to be estimated because it is not possible to accurately duplicate the whole world inside a computer model. Thus simulation over simplifies real network scenarios. There exists a variety of network simulation tools that are used in research, but NS-3 has been selected for this study because the protocols under study (AODV) have not been implemented in NS-3. Also NS-3 is distributed freely and is an open source environment which allows the creation of new protocols, and modification of existing ones, so it is possible to introduce a black hole attack in NS-3 by modifying its source code. Moreover, NS-3 is well documented and user online support is provided. This chapter explains the implementation of the research study on NS-3 simulation tool stipulating in detail the parameters used in the simulation and outlining the changes made to the NS-3 source code to introduce black hole attack.

4.1 Implementation Tools

The necessary tools to implement this system can be divided in to two categories. Hardware & Software as described below:

- Hardware Requirements
 - Personal Computer with basic configuration
-

Software Tools

- Operating System:Ubuntu 14.04 LTS
- Network Simulator 3 version 3.23
- NetAnim
- PyViz
- Wireshark
- Flow Monitor

4.2 Implementation Details

As discussed in the previous chapter, a Dos attack detection scheme have been developed for reducing packet loss in wireless mesh network. It is implemented in NS-3 in order to analyze its performance through experiments. The basis of the scheme is to decrease the total packet loss by detecting the Blackhole and Greyhole attack.

4.3 Simulation Parameters

- Number of Nodes: 15
- Simulation Time: 80s
- Mobility Model: Constant Position Mobility Model, Random Walk Mobility Model
- Routing Protocol: AODV Routing Protocol
- Size of packets in UDP ping: 1024 bytes
- Packet interval: 0.1 sec
- Data Rate of Wireless links: 250Kbps
- Data Rate of Wireless Mesh links: 500Kbps
- Data Rate of CSMA connection: 100Mbps
- Node distance: 50 meters

4.4 Simulation of black hole attack and greyhole attack

A malicious node is introduced to both AODV to implement a black hole and greyhole by modifying NS-3 C++ source code as shown below. A malicious node attracts the packets and discards them.

4.4.1 AODV Modifications

- i. Declared malicious node variable in aodv.h file.

```
bool malicious;
```

- ii. Initialized the variable to false in aodv.cc constructor function to show that initially all nodes are not malicious.

```
malicious= false;
```

- iii. In AODV.cc route handling function, the following code was added to maliciously drop packets.

```
if(IsMalicious)//When malicious node receives packet it drops the packet.  
std :: cout << "Blackhole Attack! in wireless mesh network Packet dropped  
. .  
return false;
```

4.5 Simulation Visualization

The network model used in our simulation is shown in Figure 4.1. The mesh backbone size varies when mesh routers are added in the network. The link between Mesh Router and all other connections are wireless.

The figure 4.1 shows the normal behavior of in the wireless mesh network and the figure 4.2 shows the malicious attribute in the wireless mesh network.




Figure 4.1: Normal Network Model for Simulation




Figure 4.2: Malicious Network Model for Simulation

For the analysis and evaluation ns-3 (network simulator 3) and for the visualization NetAnim and PyViz is used. Wireshark is used to analyze the signaling packet and data packets.

The network model shown above is simulated in PyViz as below:




Figure 4.3: Network model




Figure 4.4: Active probing




Figure 4.5: Transmission of Data Packets in normal mode




Figure 4.6: Transmission of data packets Under Blackhole attack




Figure 4.7: Transmission of data packets Under Greyhole attack

4.6 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, the details of the implementation of the scheme is given in NS-3. The next chapter will present the results generated from the simulations.

Chapter 5

Simulation Results and Analysis

In this section the simulation results are presented in detail and an explanation is provided.

5.1 Parameters for Evaluating Simulation Model

The following parameters are needed for evaluating our simulation.

Average Throughput: Number of bits received divided by the difference between the arrival time of the first packet and the last one.

$$\text{Throughput} = \frac{\text{Bits Received}}{\text{timeLastRxPacket} - \text{timeFirstTxPacket}}$$

Average Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF): Number of packets received divided by the number of packets transmitted.

$$PDF = \frac{\text{No. of Packets Received}}{\text{No. of Packets Transmitted}}$$

Average end-to-end Delay: The sum of the delay of all received packets divided by the number of received packets.

$$ETE\ Delay = \frac{\sum \text{Delay of all received packets}}{\text{number of received packets}}$$

5.2 Performance of Proposed Method

5.2.1 Average End to End Delay




Figure 5.1: Number of Hops vs. Avg. ETE Delay

5.2.2 Average Throughput




Figure 5.2: Number of Hops vs. Avg. Throughput




Figure 5.3: Number of MCs vs. Avg. Throughput

5.2.3 Packet delivery fraction(PDF)




Figure 5.4: Number of Hops vs. PDF

No. of hops	Normal	Blachole attack	Greyhole attack
0	0	0	1
1	1	1	1
2	1	1	0.90
3	1	0	0.90
4	1	0	0.90
5	1	0	0.90

Table 5.1: No. of hops vs Packet delivery fraction

5.3 Comparison with Traditional Dos attack




Figure 5.5: Number of hopes vs. Number of Packets




Figure 5.6: Number of hopes vs. Number of Packets

5.3.1 Average End to End Delay




Figure 5.7: Number of Hops vs. Avg. ETE Delay

In terms of average end to end delay, our proposed method performs better than the traditional method with the increasing number of hops.

5.3.2 Average Throughput




Figure 5.8: Number of Hops vs. Avg. Throughput

From the above figure we can see that our proposed method gives better throughput than traditional method.

5.3.3 Packet delivery fraction(PDF)




Figure 5.9: Number of Hops vs. PDF

In terms of packet delivery fraction, our proposed method performs better than the traditional method with the increasing number of hops.

From the above information, it is clearly shown that the proposed scheme performs better than traditional Dos attack scheme in terms of packet delivery ratio, end to end delay and throughput.

5.4 Chapter Summary

The objective for the simulation work was to verify the feasibility of the scheme and to compare its latency with the current standard. From the results presented above, the conclusion can be made that this scheme shows the better performance in finding the next AP for STA to associate with when handoff is required compared to other scan techniques.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This chapter contains an overview of the system and its limitations with future recommendations.

6.1 Findings of the Work

In this thesis, a practical Dos attack management scheme have been developed, to manage the transmitted packet. Theoretically, this scheme can reduce the latency associated with Dos attack in a network. A set of simulation studies were conducted in order to investigate the performance of the scheme in an IEEE 802.11. In the computer simulations, NS-3 was used to implement the theoretical procedures of the scheme and to simulate the scheme under different network scenarios in order to verify the feasibility of the scheme. Over the course of simulation, the effectiveness of our scheme was demonstrated by comparing it to the IEEE 802.11 standard Dos attack and other schemes. The following main observations were made:

- The proposed scheme can reduce the ETE delay by 31.54%.
- It can improve the overall performance by increasing Packet Delivery Fraction by 5.81% and Throughput by 15.06%.

6.2 Future Works

In this work a Dos attack scheme for Infrastructure WMNs has been developed and analyzed. Although this scheme has shown improved Dos attack latency in WMN, further analysis of the scheme under different network conditions could be performed. There are some limitations that should be pointed out which concern the experimental setup.

Appendix A

Source Code

Normal Mode Source Code:

```
1 #include "ns3/aodv-module.h"
2 #include "ns3/netanim-module.h"
3 #include "ns3/core-module.h"
4 #include "ns3/network-module.h"
5 #include "ns3/internet-module.h"
6 #include "ns3/applications-module.h"
7 #include "ns3/mobility-module.h"
8 #include "ns3/wifi-module.h"
9 #include "ns3/mesh-module.h"
10 #include "ns3/ipv4-global-routing-helper.h"
11 #include "ns3/olsr-helper.h"
12 #include "ns3/point-to-point-module.h"
13 #include "ns3/csma-module.h"
14 #include "ns3/netanim-module.h"
15 #include "ns3/flow-monitor-module.h"
16 #include "ns3/mobility-module.h"
17 #include "myapp.h"
18 #include "ns3/simulator.h"
19 #include "ns3/nstime.h"
20 #include "ns3/command-line.h"
21 #include "ns3/random-variable-stream.h"
22 #include <iostream>
23 #include <sstream>
24 #include <fstream>
25
26 NS_LOG_COMPONENT_DEFINE ("Blackhole");
27
28 using namespace ns3;
29
30
31     int      m_xSize=3;
32     int      m_ySize=3;
33     int      m_sta=1;
34     int      m_ap=1;
35     uint16_t m_packetSize=1024;
36     uint16_t m_NumOfPacket=50;
37
38 int packetCount , received_bits=0,transmitted_bits=0,endtoenddelay ;
39 float first_transmittedpacket , last_transmittedpacket ;
```

```

40 float throughput ,localThrou ,pdf ,sum_of_ete_delay ;
41
42 FlowMonitorHelper flowmon ;
43 Ptr<FlowMonitor> monitor ;
44
45 uint64_t simulationTime = 30; //seconds
46
47 void ReceivePacket(Ptr<const Packet> p, const Address & addr)
48 {
49     packetCount++;
50     std::cout << packetCount << "\t" << Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds
51     () << "\t" << p->GetSize() << "\n";
52
53     if (packetCount==1)
54     {
55         first_transmittedpacket=Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds ();
56     }
57
58     transmitted_bits+=p->GetSize () *8;
59     received_bits+=p->GetSize () *8;
60
61     if (packetCount==m_NumOfPacket)
62     {
63
64         last_transmittedpacket=Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds ();
65         sum_of_ete_delay=last_transmittedpacket -
66         first_transmittedpacket;
67         //std::cout << "Flow ID      : " << 1 << " ; " << "source : " <<
68         Address.addr << " -----> " << "Destination : " <<Address.addr << std::endl;
69         std::cout << "*****" << std::endl;
70         std::cout << "Total Sent Packet=" << m_NumOfPacket << std::endl;
71         std::cout << "*****" << std::endl;
72         std::cout << "Total Received Packet=" << (packetCount) << std::endl;
73         std::cout << "*****" << std::endl;
74         std::cout << "Duration      : " << Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds
75         ()<< "Seconds" << std::endl;
76         std::cout << "*****" << std::endl;
77         std::cout << "transmitted bits : " << transmitted_bits << "bits"
78         << std::endl;
79         std::cout << "*****" << std::endl;
80         std::cout << "received bits : " << (received_bits) << "bits" <<
81         std::endl;
82         std::cout << "*****" << std::endl;
83         std::cout << "Throughput      : " << (received_bits)/(Simulator
84         ::Now ().GetSeconds () - first_transmittedpacket)/1024/1024 << "
85         Mbps" << std::endl;
86         localThrou = (received_bits)/(Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds ()
87         - first_transmittedpacket)/1024/1024;
88         pdf = (double)(packetCount)/m_NumOfPacket;
89         std::cout << "*****" << std::endl;
90         std::cout << "Avereage Throughput = " << localThrou << "Mbps" << std::endl;
91         std::cout << "*****" << std::endl;
92         std::cout << "Avereage End to End Delay = " << sum_of_ete_delay
93         *1000/(packetCount) << "ms" << std::endl;

```

```

84     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
85     std :: cout<<" Average Packet Delivery Fraction = "<<pdf<<"<<std
86     :: endl;
87     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
88     std :: cout<<" Percentage OF Packet loss = "<<(1-pdf)*100<<"%"<<
89     std :: endl;
90     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
91     packetCount=0;
92     transmitted_bits=0;
93     received_bits=0;
94     sum_of_ete_delay=0;
95 }
96
97
98 int main ( int argc , char *argv [] )
99 {
100    Time :: SetResolution ( Time :: NS );
101    LogComponentEnable ( " UdpEchoClientApplication " , LOG_LEVEL_INFO );
102    LogComponentEnable ( " UdpEchoServerApplication " , LOG_LEVEL_INFO );
103
104    bool enableFlowMonitor = false ;
105    std :: string phyMode ( " DsssRate1Mbps " );
106
107    CommandLine cmd;
108    cmd.AddValue ( " EnableMonitor " , " Enable Flow Monitor " ,
109      enableFlowMonitor );
110    cmd.AddValue ( " phyMode " , " Wifi Phy mode " , phyMode );
111    cmd.Parse ( argc , argv );
112    ApplicationContainer clientApps;
113
114    NS_LOG_INFO ( " Create nodes . " );
115    NodeContainer nc_meshNodes , nc_stal , nc_stal2 , nc_ap11 , nc_ap12 ,
116    nc_ap13 , nc_ap14 , nc_ap11Mbb1 , nc_ap12Mbb1 , nc_ap13Mbb1 ,
117      nc_ap14Mbb1 , not_malicious , malicious ; // ALL Nodes
118
119    NetDeviceContainer meshDevices , staApDevices1 , staApDevices2 ,
120    staDevices1 , staDevices2 , apDevices1 , apDevices2 , ap11Mbb1Devices ,
121    ap12Mbb1Devices , ap13Mbb1Devices , ap14Mbb1Devices ;
122    Ipv4InterfaceContainer interfaces , staAp_interfaces1 ,
123    staAp_interfaces2 , staAp_interfaces3 , staAp_interfaces4 ,
124      csmaInterfaces1 ,
125      csmaInterfaces2 , csmaInterfaces3 ,
126      csmaInterfaces4 ;
127
128    CsmaHelper csma1 , csma2 , csma3 , csma4 ;
129
130    // **** station device creation
131    // ****
132    nc_stal.Create ( m_sta );
133    nc_stal2.Create ( m_sta );
134

```

```

129 // ****mesh device creation
130 ****
131 nc_meshNodes . Create( m_xSize * m_ySize );
132
133 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 1 ) );
134 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 2 ) );
135 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 3 ) );
136 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 4 ) );
137 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 5 ) );
138 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 6 ) );
139 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 7 ) );
140 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 8 ) );
141 malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 0 ) );
142 // ****Accesspoint device creation
143 ****
144 nc_ap11 . Create( m_ap );
145 nc_ap12 . Create( m_ap );
146 nc_ap13 . Create( m_ap );
147 nc_ap14 . Create( m_ap );
148 nc_ap11Mbb1=NodeContainer( nc_ap11 , nc_meshNodes . Get( 6 ) );
149 nc_ap12Mbb1=NodeContainer( nc_ap12 , nc_meshNodes . Get( 0 ) );
150 nc_ap13Mbb1=NodeContainer( nc_ap13 , nc_meshNodes . Get( 8 ) );
151 nc_ap14Mbb1=NodeContainer( nc_ap14 , nc_meshNodes . Get( 3 ) );
152
153 // Set up mesh
154 WifiHelper wifi ;
155
156 YansWifiPhyHelper wifiPhy = YansWifiPhyHelper :: Default () ;
157 wifiPhy . SetPcapDataLinkType ( YansWifiPhyHelper :: DLT_ IEEE802_11 );
158
159 YansWifiChannelHelper wifiChannel ;
160 wifiChannel . SetPropagationDelay ( " ns3 :: "
161 ConstantSpeedPropagationDelayModel " );
162 wifiChannel . AddPropagationLoss ( " ns3 :: "
163 TwoRayGroundPropagationLossModel " ,
164
165 wifiPhy . Set ( " TxPowerStart " , DoubleValue( 33 ) );
166 wifiPhy . Set ( " TxPowerEnd " , DoubleValue( 33 ) );
167 wifiPhy . Set ( " TxPowerLevels " , UintegerValue( 1 ) );
168 wifiPhy . Set ( " TxGain " , DoubleValue( 0 ) );
169 wifiPhy . Set ( " RxGain " , DoubleValue( 0 ) );
170 wifiPhy . Set ( " EnergyDetectionThreshold " , DoubleValue( -61.8 ) );
171 wifiPhy . Set ( " CcaMode1Threshold " , DoubleValue( -64.8 ) );
172
173 wifiPhy . SetChannel ( wifiChannel . Create () );
174
175 // Add a non-QoS upper mac
176 NqosWifiMacHelper wifiMac = NqosWifiMacHelper :: Default () ;
177
178 NetDeviceContainer devices ;
179 meshDevices = wifi . Install ( wifiPhy , wifiMac , nc_meshNodes );
180

```

```

181
182 // **** Setup WiFi for network
183 ****
184 WifiHelper wifi1 = WifiHelper::Default();
185 wifi1.SetStandard(WIFI_PHY_STANDARD_80211b);
186 wifi1.SetRemoteStationManager("ns3::AarfWifiManager");
187
188 NqosWifiMacHelper mac1 = NqosWifiMacHelper::Default();
189
190 Ssid ssid1 = Ssid("network-1");
191 mac1.SetType("ns3::StaWifiMac",
192             "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid1),
193             "ActiveProbing", BooleanValue(true));
194
195 staDevices1 = wifi1.Install(wifiPhy, mac1, nc_sta1.Get(0));
196
197 // Setup AP for network 1
198 mac1.SetType("ns3::ApWifiMac",
199             "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid1));
200
201 apDevices1.Add(wifi1.Install(wifiPhy, mac1, nc_ap11.Get(0)));
202
203 staApDevices1.Add(staDevices1);
204 staApDevices1.Add(apDevices1);
205 // ****End wifi
206 ****
207
208 // **** Setup WiFi for network
209 ****
210 WifiHelper wifi2 = WifiHelper::Default();
211 wifi2.SetStandard(WIFI_PHY_STANDARD_80211b);
212 wifi2.SetRemoteStationManager("ns3::AarfWifiManager");
213
214 NqosWifiMacHelper mac2 = NqosWifiMacHelper::Default();
215
216 Ssid ssid2 = Ssid("network-3");
217 mac2.SetType("ns3::StaWifiMac",
218             "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid2),
219             "ActiveProbing", BooleanValue(true));
220
221 staDevices2 = wifi2.Install(wifiPhy, mac2, nc_sta2);
222
223 // Setup AP for network 1
224 mac2.SetType("ns3::ApWifiMac",
225             "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid2));
226
227 apDevices2.Add(wifi2.Install(wifiPhy, mac2, nc_ap14.Get(0)));
228
229 staApDevices2.Add(staDevices2);
230 staApDevices2.Add(apDevices2);
231
232

```

```

233 // ****End wifi
234
235
236 // *****Property for csma1
237 csma1.SetChannelAttribute ("DataRate",StringValue ("100Mbps"));
238 csma1.SetChannelAttribute ("Delay", TimeValue (NanoSeconds (6560)))
);
239 ap11Mbb1Devices = csma1.Install (nc_ap11Mbb1);
240
241 //*****Property for csma2
242 csma2.SetChannelAttribute ("DataRate",StringValue ("100Mbps"));
243 csma2.SetChannelAttribute ("Delay", TimeValue (NanoSeconds (6560)))
);
244 ap12Mbb1Devices = csma2.Install (nc_ap12Mbb1);
245
246 //*****Property for csma3
247 csma3.SetChannelAttribute ("DataRate",StringValue ("100Mbps"));
248 csma3.SetChannelAttribute ("Delay", TimeValue (NanoSeconds (6560)))
);
249 ap13Mbb1Devices = csma3.Install (nc_ap13Mbb1);
250
251 //*****Property for csma4
252 csma4.SetChannelAttribute ("DataRate",StringValue ("100Mbps"));
253 csma4.SetChannelAttribute ("Delay", TimeValue (NanoSeconds (6560)))
);
254 ap14Mbb1Devices = csma4.Install (nc_ap14Mbb1);
255
256
257
258 //*****mobility for mesh
259
260 MobilityHelper mobility;
261 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc = CreateObject <
262 ListPositionAllocator>();
263 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(150, 0, 0)); // node0
264 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(200, 0, 0)); // node1
265 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(200, 300, 0)); // node2
266 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(150,300, 0)); // node3
267 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(150, 150, 0)); // node4
268 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(200, 150, 0)); // node5
269 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(250, 0, 0)); // node6
270 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(250,150, 0)); // node7
271 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(250, 300, 0)); // node8
272 mobility.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc);
273 mobility.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
274 mobility.Install(nc_meshNodes);
275
276 //*****mesh accesspoint 1 mobility
277 MobilityHelper mobility1;

```

```

277     Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc1 = CreateObject <
278         ListPositionAllocator >();
279     positionAlloc1 ->Add(Vector(250, -50, 0)); // ap11
280     mobility1.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc1);
281     mobility1.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
282     mobility1.Install(nc_ap11);
283
284 //*****mesh accesspoint 2 mobility
285 *****mobility
286 MobilityHelper mobility2;
287     Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc2 = CreateObject <
288         ListPositionAllocator >();
289     positionAlloc2 ->Add(Vector(150, -50, 0)); // ap12
290     mobility2.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc2);
291     mobility2.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
292     mobility2.Install(nc_ap12);
293
294 //*****mesh accesspoint 3 mobility
295 *****mobility
296 MobilityHelper mobility3;
297     Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc3 = CreateObject <
298         ListPositionAllocator >();
299     positionAlloc3 ->Add(Vector(250, 350, 0)); // ap13
300     mobility3.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc3);
301     mobility3.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
302     mobility3.Install(nc_ap13);
303
304 //*****mesh accesspoint 4 mobility
305 *****mobility
306 MobilityHelper mobility4;
307     Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc4 = CreateObject <
308         ListPositionAllocator >();
309     positionAlloc4 ->Add(Vector(150, 350, 0)); // ap13
310     mobility4.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc4);
311     mobility4.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
312     mobility4.Install(nc_ap14);
313
314 //*****station node 1 mobility
315 *****mobility
316 MobilityHelper mobility5;
317     Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc5 = CreateObject <
318         ListPositionAllocator >();
319     positionAlloc5 ->Add(Vector(250, -100, 0)); // ap13
320     mobility5.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc5);
321     mobility5.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
322     mobility5.Install(nc_sta1);
323
324 //*****station node 2 mobility
325 *****mobility
326 MobilityHelper mobility6;
327     Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc6 = CreateObject <
328         ListPositionAllocator >();
329     positionAlloc6 ->Add(Vector(150, 400, 0)); // ap13
330     mobility6.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc6);
331     mobility6.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
332     mobility6.Install(nc_sta2);

```

```

322
323 // Enable AODV
324 AodvHelper aodv;
325
326 // Set up internet stack
327 InternetStackHelper internetStack;
328 internetStack.SetRoutingHelper (aodv);
329 internetStack.Install (not_malicious);
330 internetStack.Install (malicious);
331 internetStack.Install (nc_st1);
332 internetStack.Install (nc_st2);
333 internetStack.Install (nc_ap11);
334 internetStack.Install (nc_ap12);
335 internetStack.Install (nc_ap13);
336 internetStack.Install (nc_ap14);
337
338
339 //*****Setup IP Address
340 *****Ipv4AddressHelper address;
341 NS_LOG_INFO ("Assign IP Addresses.");
342 address.SetBase ("10.1.2.0", "255.255.255.0");
343 interfaces = address.Assign (meshDevices);
344
345
346 address.SetBase ("10.1.4.0", "255.255.255.0");
347 csmaInterfaces1 = address.Assign (ap11Mbb1Devices);
348
349 address.SetBase ("10.1.5.0", "255.255.255.0");
350 csmaInterfaces2 = address.Assign (ap12Mbb1Devices);
351
352 address.SetBase ("20.1.4.0", "255.255.255.0");
353 csmaInterfaces3 = address.Assign (ap13Mbb1Devices);
354
355 address.SetBase ("20.1.5.0", "255.255.255.0");
356 csmaInterfaces4 = address.Assign (ap14Mbb1Devices);
357
358 address.SetBase ("10.1.3.0", "255.255.255.0");
359 staAp_interfaces1 = address.Assign (staApDevices1);
360
361 address.SetBase ("20.1.3.0", "255.255.255.0");
362 staAp_interfaces2 = address.Assign (staApDevices2);
363
364
365
366 NS_LOG_INFO ("Create Applications.");
367
368 //*****client to nc_ap11
369 *****uint16_t sinkPort3 = 7;
370 Address sinkAddress3 (InetSocketAddress (staAp_interfaces1.
371 GetAddress (1), sinkPort3)); // interface of n3
372 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper3 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
373 InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort3));
374 ApplicationContainer sinkApps3 = packetSinkHelper3.Install (
375 nc_ap11.Get (0)); //n3 as sink

```

```

373     sinkApps3.Start (Seconds (0.));
374     sinkApps3.Stop (Seconds (10.));
375
376     Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket3 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_sta1.Get (0),
377                                                       UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ());
378     //source at n1
379
380     Ptr<MyApp> app3 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
381     app3->Setup (ns3UdpSocket3, sinkAddress3, 1024, m_NumOfPacket,
382                   DataRate ("250Kbps"));
383     nc_sta1.Get (0)->AddApplication (app3);
384     app3->SetStartTime (Seconds (5.));
385     app3->SetStopTime (Seconds (10.));
386
387 //*****nc_ap11 to mesh node
388 //*****
389     uint16_t sinkPort = 6;
390     Address sinkAddress (InetSocketAddress (csmaInterfaces1.GetAddress
391                                         (1), sinkPort)); // interface of n3
392     PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
393                                       InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort));
394     ApplicationContainer sinkApps = packetSinkHelper.Install (
395       nc_meshNodes.Get (6)); //n3 as sink
396     sinkApps.Start (Seconds (10.));
397     sinkApps.Stop (Seconds (20.));
398
399     Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_ap11.Get (0),
400                                                       UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ());
401     //source at n1
402
403     Ptr<MyApp> app = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
404     app->Setup (ns3UdpSocket, sinkAddress, m_packetSize, m_NumOfPacket
405                  , DataRate ("500Kbps"));
406     nc_ap11.Get (0)->AddApplication (app);
407     app->SetStartTime (Seconds (15.));
408     app->SetStopTime (Seconds (20.));
409
410 //*****mesh node 6 to mesh node
411 //*****
412     uint16_t sinkPort1 = 5;
413     Address sinkAddress1 (InetSocketAddress (interfaces.GetAddress (5)
414                           , sinkPort1)); // interface of n3
415     PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper1 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
416                                       InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort1));
417     ApplicationContainer sinkApps1 = packetSinkHelper1.Install (
418       nc_meshNodes.Get (5)); //n3 as sink
419     sinkApps1.Start (Seconds (20.));
420     sinkApps1.Stop (Seconds (30.));
421
422     Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket1 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_meshNodes.Get
423                                         (6), UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ());
424     //source at n1
425
426     Ptr<MyApp> app1 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
427     app1->Setup (ns3UdpSocket1, sinkAddress1, m_packetSize,
428                   m_NumOfPacket, DataRate ("500Kbps"));
429     nc_meshNodes.Get (6)->AddApplication (app1);
430     app1->SetStartTime (Seconds (25.));
431     app1->SetStopTime (Seconds (30.));

```

```

415 //***** mesh node 6 to mesh node
416 3*****
417 uint16_t sinkPort9 = 3;
418 Address sinkAddress9 (InetSocketAddress (interfaces.GetAddress (3)
419 , sinkPort9)); // interface of n3
420 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper9 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
421 InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort9));
422 ApplicationContainer sinkApps9 = packetSinkHelper9.Install (
423 nc_meshNodes.Get (3)); //n3 as sink
424 sinkApps9.Start (Seconds (30.));
425 sinkApps9.Stop (Seconds (40.));
426
427 Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket9 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_meshNodes.Get
428 (5), UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1
429
430 //***** mesh node 3 to ap13
431 *****
432 uint16_t sinkPort2 = 4;
433 Address sinkAddress2 (InetSocketAddress (csmaInterfaces4.
434 GetAddress (1), sinkPort2)); // interface of n3
435 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper2 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
436 InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort2));
437 ApplicationContainer sinkApps2 = packetSinkHelper2.Install (
438 nc_meshNodes.Get (3)); //n3 as sink
439 sinkApps2.Start (Seconds (40.0));
440 sinkApps2.Stop (Seconds (50.));
441
442 Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket2 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_ap14.Get (0),
443 UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1
444
445 //***** nc_ap13 to sta2
446 *****
447 uint16_t sinkPort4 = 2;
448 Address sinkAddress4 (InetSocketAddress (staAp_interfaces2.
449 GetAddress (1), sinkPort4)); // interface of n3
450 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper4 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
451 InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort4));
452 ApplicationContainer sinkApps4 = packetSinkHelper4.Install (
453 nc_ap14.Get (0)); //n3 as sink
454 sinkApps4.Start (Seconds (50.));
455 sinkApps4.Stop (Seconds (60.));

```

```

454     Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket4 = Socket::CreateSocket ( nc_sta2.Get (0) ,
455     UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId () ); //source at n1
456
457     Ptr<MyApp> app4 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
458     app4->Setup ( ns3UdpSocket4, sinkAddress4, m_packetSize ,
459     m_NumOfPacket, DataRate ("250Kbps") );
460     nc_sta2.Get (0)->AddApplication (app4);
461     app4->SetStartTime (Seconds (55.));
462     app4->SetStopTime (Seconds (60.));
463
464 //*****flow monitor
465 //*****Trace Received Packet
466 Config::ConnectWithoutContext ("/NodeList/*/$ns3::PacketSink/Rx", MakeCallback (&ReceivePacket));
467 //Config::ConnectWithoutContext ("/NodeList/*/$ns3::WiFiNetDevice/Mac/MacTxDrop", MakeCallback (&MacTxDrop));
468 //Config::ConnectWithoutContext ("/NodeList/*/$ns3::WiFiNetDevice/Mac/MacRxDrop", MakeCallback (&MacRxDrop));
469 monitor->CheckForLostPackets ();
470
471 Simulator::Stop (Seconds (simulationTime+1));
472 Simulator::Run ();
473
474 Simulator::Destroy ();
475
476 return 0;
477 }

```

Blackhole Attack Mode Source Code:

```

1 #include "ns3/aodv-module.h"
2 #include "ns3/netanim-module.h"
3 #include "ns3/core-module.h"
4 #include "ns3/network-module.h"
5 #include "ns3/internet-module.h"
6 #include "ns3/applications-module.h"
7 #include "ns3/mobility-module.h"
8 #include "ns3/wifi-module.h"
9 #include "ns3/mesh-module.h"
10 #include "ns3/ipv4-global-routing-helper.h"
11 #include "ns3/olsr-helper.h"
12 #include "ns3/point-to-point-module.h"
13 #include "ns3/csma-module.h"
14 #include "ns3/netanim-module.h"
15 #include "ns3/flow-monitor-module.h"
16 #include "ns3/mobility-module.h"
17 #include "myapp.h"
18
19 #include <iostream>
20 #include <sstream>
21 #include <fstream>
22
23 NS_LOG_COMPONENT_DEFINE ("Blackhole");

```

```

24
25 using namespace ns3;
26
27 uint32_t MacTxDropCount, MacRxDropCount, PhyTxDropCount,
28     PhyRxDropCount;
29 int packetCount;
30
31 void MacTxDrop(Ptr<const Packet> p)
32 {
33     NS_LOG_INFO("Packet Drop");
34     MacTxDropCount++;
35 }
36
37 void MacRxDrop(Ptr<const Packet> p)
38 {
39     NS_LOG_INFO("Packet Drop");
40     MacRxDropCount++;
41 }
42
43 void PrintDrop()
44 {
45     //std :: cout << Simulator :: Now() . GetSeconds () << "\t" <<
46     MacTxDropCount << "\t" << MacRxDropCount << "\t" << PhyTxDropCount
47     << "\t" << PhyRxDropCount << "\n";
48     std :: cout << Simulator :: Now() . GetSeconds () << "\t" << MacTxDropCount
49     << "\t" << MacRxDropCount << "\n";
50     Simulator :: Schedule(Seconds(20.0) , &PrintDrop);
51 }
52
53 void PhyTxDrop(Ptr<const Packet> p)
54 {
55     NS_LOG_INFO("Packet Drop");
56     PhyTxDropCount++;
57 }
58
59 void PhyRxDrop(Ptr<const Packet> p)
60 {
61     NS_LOG_INFO("Packet Drop");
62     PhyRxDropCount++;
63 }
64
65 //*****Flow monitor
66
67 void ThroughputMonitor(FlowMonitorHelper *fmhelper , Ptr<FlowMonitor>
68     flowMon , double m_totalTime)
69 {
70     double localThrou = 0;
71     double pdf = 0;
72     double sent_pack=0;
73     double received_pack=0;
74 }
```

```

73
74     std :: map<FlowId , FlowMonitor :: FlowStats> flowStats = flowMon->
75     GetFlowStats(); //FlowId is index type of flowState and FlowMonitor
76     :: FlowStats is data type of flowStates
77     Ptr<Ipv4FlowClassifier> classing = DynamicCast<Ipv4FlowClassifier>
78     (fmhelper->GetClassifier()); //Classifies packets by looking at
79     their IP and TCP/UDP headers.
80 //From these packet headers, a tuple (source-ip , destination-ip ,
81     protocol , source-port , destination-port) is created , and a unique
82     flow identifier is assigned for each different tuple combination
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

```

```

106     if ( Simulator ::Now() . GetSeconds ()==m_totalTime )
107     {
108         std :: cout << " **** * **** * **** * **** * **** * " << std :: endl ;
109         std :: cout << " Average Throughput = " << localThrou << " Mbps " << std :: endl ;
110         std :: cout << " Average Packet Delivery Fraction = " << pdf << " " << std :: endl ;
111         std :: cout << " **** * **** * **** * **** * **** * " << std :: endl ;
112         std :: cout << " Total Sent Packet=" << sent_pack / 2 << std :: endl ;
113         std :: cout << " **** * **** * **** * **** * **** * " << std :: endl ;
114         std :: cout << " Total Received Packet=" << received_pack / 2 << std :: endl ;
115         std :: cout << " **** * **** * **** * **** * **** * " << std :: endl ;
116     }
117 }
118 else
119 {
120     Simulator :: Schedule ( Seconds ( 1.0 ) , ThroughputMonitor , fmhelper ,
121     flowMon , m_totalTime );
122 }
123 }
124
125 int main ( int argc , char *argv [] )
126 {
127     bool enableFlowMonitor = false ;
128     std :: string phyMode ( " DsssRate1Mbps " );
129     ApplicationContainer clientApps ;
130
131     uint64_t simulationTime = 100 ; //seconds
132
133     CommandLine cmd ;
134     cmd . AddValue ( " EnableMonitor " , " Enable Flow Monitor " ,
135     enableFlowMonitor );
136     cmd . AddValue ( " phyMode " , " Wifi Phy mode " , phyMode );
137     cmd . Parse ( argc , argv );
138
139 // Explicitly create the nodes required by the topology (shown above).
140 //
141     NS_LOG_INFO ( " Create nodes ." );
142     NodeContainer nc_meshNodes , nc_st1 , nc_st2 , nc_ap11 , nc_ap12 , nc_ap13 ,
143     nc_ap14 , nc_ap11Mbb1 , nc_ap12Mbb1 , nc_ap13Mbb1 ,
144     nc_ap14Mbb1 , not_malicious , malicious ; // ALL Nodes
145
146     NetDeviceContainer meshDevices , staApDevices1 , staApDevices2 ,
147     staDevices1 , staDevices2 , apDevices1 , apDevices2 , ap11Mbb1Devices ,
148     ap12Mbb1Devices , ap13Mbb1Devices , ap14Mbb1Devices ;
149     Ipv4InterfaceContainer interfaces , staAp_interfaces1 ,
150     staAp_interfaces2 , staAp_interfaces3 , staAp_interfaces4 ,
151     csmaInterfaces1 ,
152     csmaInterfaces2 , csmaInterfaces3 ,
153     csmaInterfaces4 ;
154
155     CsmaHelper csma1 , csma2 , csma3 , csma4 ;

```

```

151
152 //*****station device creation
153 *****
153 nc_stal.Create(1);
154 nc_stal.Create(1);
155
156 //*****mesh device creation
157 *****
157 nc_meshNodes.Create(3*3);
158
159     not_malicious.Add(nc_meshNodes.Get(1));
160     not_malicious.Add(nc_meshNodes.Get(2));
161     not_malicious.Add(nc_meshNodes.Get(3));
162     not_malicious.Add(nc_meshNodes.Get(4));
163     not_malicious.Add(nc_meshNodes.Get(5));
164     not_malicious.Add(nc_meshNodes.Get(6));
165     not_malicious.Add(nc_meshNodes.Get(7));
166     not_malicious.Add(nc_meshNodes.Get(8));
167     malicious.Add(nc_meshNodes.Get(0));
168
169 //*****Accesspoint device creation
170 *****
170 nc_ap11.Create(1);
171 nc_ap12.Create(1);
172 nc_ap13.Create(1);
173 nc_ap14.Create(1);
174
175 nc_ap11Mbb1=NodeContainer(nc_ap11, nc_meshNodes.Get(6));
176 nc_ap12Mbb1=NodeContainer(nc_ap12, nc_meshNodes.Get(0));
177 nc_ap13Mbb1=NodeContainer(nc_ap13, nc_meshNodes.Get(8));
178 nc_ap14Mbb1=NodeContainer(nc_ap14, nc_meshNodes.Get(3));
179
180 // Set up mesh
181 WifiHelper wifi;
182
183 YansWifiPhyHelper wifiPhy = YansWifiPhyHelper::Default();
184 wifiPhy.SetPcapDataLinkType(YansWifiPhyHelper::DLT_IEEE802_11);
185
186 YansWifiChannelHelper wifiChannel;
187 wifiChannel.SetPropagationDelay("ns3::ConstantSpeedPropagationDelayModel");
188 wifiChannel.AddPropagationLoss("ns3::TwoRayGroundPropagationLossModel",
189                               "SystemLoss", DoubleValue(1),
190                               "HeightAboveZ", DoubleValue(1.5));
191
192 wifiPhy.Set("TxPowerStart", DoubleValue(33));
193 wifiPhy.Set("TxPowerEnd", DoubleValue(33));
194 wifiPhy.Set("TxPowerLevels", UintegerValue(1));
195 wifiPhy.Set("TxGain", DoubleValue(0));
196 wifiPhy.Set("RxGain", DoubleValue(0));
197 wifiPhy.Set("EnergyDetectionThreshold", DoubleValue(-61.8));
198 wifiPhy.Set("CcaModelThreshold", DoubleValue(-64.8));
199
200 wifiPhy.SetChannel(wifiChannel.Create());
201

```

```

202 // Add a non-QoS upper mac
203 NqosWifiMacHelper wifiMac = NqosWifiMacHelper::Default();
204
205 NetDeviceContainer devices;
206 meshDevices = wifi.Install(wifiPhy, wifiMac, nc_meshNodes);
207
208
209 // ****Setup WiFi for network
210 // ****
211 WifiHelper wifi1 = WifiHelper::Default();
212 wifi1.SetStandard(WIFI_PHY_STANDARD_80211b);
213 wifi1.SetRemoteStationManager("ns3::AarfWifiManager");
214
215 NqosWifiMacHelper mac1 = NqosWifiMacHelper::Default();
216
217 Ssid ssid1 = Ssid("network-1");
218 mac1.SetType("ns3::StaWifiMac",
219             "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid1),
220             "ActiveProbing", BooleanValue(true));
221
222 staDevices1 = wifi1.Install(wifiPhy, mac1, nc_sta1.Get(0));
223
224 // Setup AP for network 1
225 mac1.SetType("ns3::ApWifiMac",
226               "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid1));
227
228 apDevices1.Add(wifi1.Install(wifiPhy, mac1, nc_ap11.Get(0)));
229
230 staApDevices1.Add(staDevices1);
231 staApDevices1.Add(apDevices1);
232 // ****End wifi
233 // ****
234
235 // ****Setup WiFi for network
236 // ****
237 WifiHelper wifi2 = WifiHelper::Default();
238 wifi2.SetStandard(WIFI_PHY_STANDARD_80211b);
239 wifi2.SetRemoteStationManager("ns3::AarfWifiManager");
240
241 NqosWifiMacHelper mac2 = NqosWifiMacHelper::Default();
242
243 Ssid ssid2 = Ssid("network-3");
244 mac2.SetType("ns3::StaWifiMac",
245             "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid2),
246             "ActiveProbing", BooleanValue(true));
247
248 staDevices2 = wifi2.Install(wifiPhy, mac2, nc_sta2);
249
250 // Setup AP for network 1
251 mac2.SetType("ns3::ApWifiMac",
252               "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid2));
253
254

```

```

255     apDevices2.Add(wifi2.Install(wifiPhy, mac2, nc_ap14.Get(0)));
256
257     staApDevices2.Add(staDevices2);
258     staApDevices2.Add(apDevices2);
259
260     //*****End wifi
261
262
263 //*****Property for csma1
264
265     csma1.SetChannelAttribute("DataRate",StringValue("100Mbps"));
266     csma1.SetChannelAttribute("Delay",TimeValue(NanoSeconds(6560)));
267
268     ap11Mbb1Devices = csma1.Install(nc_ap11Mbb1);
269
270 //*****Property for csma2
271
272     csma2.SetChannelAttribute("DataRate",StringValue("100Mbps"));
273     csma2.SetChannelAttribute("Delay",TimeValue(NanoSeconds(6560)));
274
275     ap12Mbb1Devices = csma2.Install(nc_ap12Mbb1);
276
277 //*****Property for csma3
278
279     csma3.SetChannelAttribute("DataRate",StringValue("100Mbps"));
280     csma3.SetChannelAttribute("Delay",TimeValue(NanoSeconds(6560)));
281
282     ap13Mbb1Devices = csma3.Install(nc_ap13Mbb1);
283
284 //*****Property for csma4
285
286     csma4.SetChannelAttribute("DataRate",StringValue("100Mbps"));
287     csma4.SetChannelAttribute("Delay",TimeValue(NanoSeconds(6560)));
288
289     ap14Mbb1Devices = csma4.Install(nc_ap14Mbb1);
290
291
292
293 //*****mobility for mesh
294
295     MobilityHelper mobility;
296     Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc = CreateObject<
297     ListPositionAllocator>();
298
299     positionAlloc->Add(Vector(150, 0, 0)); // node0
300     positionAlloc->Add(Vector(200, 0, 0)); // node1
301     positionAlloc->Add(Vector(200, 300, 0)); // node2
302     positionAlloc->Add(Vector(150,300, 0)); // node3
303     positionAlloc->Add(Vector(150, 150, 0)); // node4
304     positionAlloc->Add(Vector(200, 150, 0)); // node5
305     positionAlloc->Add(Vector(250, 0, 0)); // node6
306     positionAlloc->Add(Vector(250,150, 0)); // node7
307     positionAlloc->Add(Vector(250, 300, 0)); // node8
308     mobility.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc);
309     mobility.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");

```

```

    );
300     mobility.Install(nc_meshNodes);
301
302 //*****mesh accesspoint 1 mobility
303 *****MobilityHelper mobility1;
304 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc1 = CreateObject<
305 ListPositionAllocator>();
306     positionAlloc1->Add(Vector(250, -50, 0)); // ap11
307     mobility1.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc1);
308     mobility1.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
309     mobility1.Install(nc_ap11);
310
311 //*****mesh accesspoint 2 mobility
312 *****MobilityHelper mobility2;
313 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc2 = CreateObject<
314 ListPositionAllocator>();
315     positionAlloc2->Add(Vector(150, -50, 0)); // ap12
316     mobility2.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc2);
317     mobility2.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
318     mobility2.Install(nc_ap12);
319
320 //*****mesh accesspoint 3 mobility
321 *****MobilityHelper mobility3;
322 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc3 = CreateObject<
323 ListPositionAllocator>();
324     positionAlloc3->Add(Vector(250, 350, 0)); // ap13
325     mobility3.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc3);
326     mobility3.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
327     mobility3.Install(nc_ap13);
328
329 //*****mesh accesspoint 4 mobility
330 *****MobilityHelper mobility4;
331 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc4 = CreateObject<
332 ListPositionAllocator>();
333     positionAlloc4->Add(Vector(150, 350, 0)); // ap13
334     mobility4.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc4);
335     mobility4.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
336     mobility4.Install(nc_ap14);
337
338 //*****station node 1 mobility
339 *****MobilityHelper mobility5;
340 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc5 = CreateObject<
341 ListPositionAllocator>();
342     positionAlloc5->Add(Vector(250, -100, 0)); // ap13
343     mobility5.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc5);
344     mobility5.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
345     mobility5.Install(nc_sta1);
346
347 //*****station node 2 mobility

```

```

*****  

343 MobilityHelper mobility6;  

344 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc6 = CreateObject <  

   ListPositionAllocator >();  

345 positionAlloc6 ->Add(Vector(150, 400, 0)); // ap13  

346 mobility6.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc6);  

347 mobility6.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");  

348 mobility6.Install(nc_st1);  

349  

350 // Enable AODV  

351 AodvHelper aodv;  

352 AodvHelper malicious_aodv;  

353  

354  

355 // Set up internet stack  

356 InternetStackHelper internetStack;  

357 internetStack.SetRoutingHelper(aodv);  

358 internetStack.Install(not_malicious);  

359   internetStack.Install(nc_st1);  

360   internetStack.Install(nc_st2);  

361 internetStack.Install(nc_ap11);  

362   internetStack.Install(nc_ap12);  

363   internetStack.Install(nc_ap13);  

364   internetStack.Install(nc_ap14);  

365  

366  

367 malicious_aodv.Set("IsMalicious", BooleanValue(true)); // putting *  

   false* instead of *true* would disable the malicious behavior of  

   the node  

368 internetStack.SetRoutingHelper(malicious_aodv);  

369 internetStack.Install(malicious);  

370  

371 //*****Setup IP Address*****  

372 Ipv4AddressHelper address;  

373 NS_LOG_INFO("Assign IP Addresses.");  

374 address.SetBase("10.1.2.0", "255.255.255.0");  

375 interfaces = address.Assign(meshDevices);  

376  

377  

378 address.SetBase("10.1.4.0", "255.255.255.0");  

379 csmaInterfaces1 = address.Assign(ap1Mbb1Devices);  

380  

381 address.SetBase("10.1.5.0", "255.255.255.0");  

382 csmaInterfaces2 = address.Assign(ap12Mbb1Devices);  

383  

384 address.SetBase("20.1.4.0", "255.255.255.0");  

385 csmaInterfaces3 = address.Assign(ap13Mbb1Devices);  

386  

387 address.SetBase("20.1.5.0", "255.255.255.0");  

388 csmaInterfaces4 = address.Assign(ap14Mbb1Devices);  

389  

390 address.SetBase("10.1.3.0", "255.255.255.0");  

391 staAp_interfaces1 = address.Assign(staApDevices1);  

392  

393 address.SetBase("20.1.3.0", "255.255.255.0");

```

```

394     staAp_interfaces2 = address.Assign (staApDevices2);
395
396
397
398     NS_LOG_INFO ("Create Applications.");
399
400 //*****client to nc_ap11
401
402     uint16_t sinkPort3 = 7;
403     Address sinkAddress3 (InetSocketAddress (staAp_interfaces1.
404         GetAddress (1), sinkPort3)); // interface of n3
405     PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper3 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
406         InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort3));
407     ApplicationContainer sinkApps3 = packetSinkHelper3.Install (nc_ap11.
408         Get (0)); //n3 as sink
409     sinkApps3.Start (Seconds (0.));
410     sinkApps3.Stop (Seconds (30.));
411
412     Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket3 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_stal.Get (0),
413         UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1
414
415 // Create UDP application at n1
416     Ptr<MyApp> app3 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
417     app3->Setup (ns3UdpSocket3, sinkAddress3, 1024, 50, DataRate ("500
418         Kbps"));
419     nc_stal.Get (0)->AddApplication (app3);
420     app3->SetStartTime (Seconds (5.));
421     app3->SetStopTime (Seconds (30.));
422
423 //*****nc_ap11 to mesh node
424
425     uint16_t sinkPort = 6;
426     Address sinkAddress (InetSocketAddress (csmaInterfaces1.GetAddress
427         (1), sinkPort)); // interface of n3
428     PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
429         InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort));
430     ApplicationContainer sinkApps = packetSinkHelper.Install (
431         nc_meshNodes.Get (6)); //n3 as sink
432     sinkApps.Start (Seconds (15.));
433     sinkApps.Stop (Seconds (30.));
434
435     Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_ap11.Get (0),
436         UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1
437
438 // Create UDP application at n1
439     Ptr<MyApp> app = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
440     app->Setup (ns3UdpSocket, sinkAddress, 1024, 50, DataRate ("500Kbps"
441         ));
442     nc_ap11.Get (0)->AddApplication (app);
443     app->SetStartTime (Seconds (25.));
444     app->SetStopTime (Seconds (30.));
445
446 //***** mesh node 6 to mesh node
447
448     uint16_t sinkPort1 = 5;
449     Address sinkAddress1 (InetSocketAddress (interfaces.GetAddress (3),

```

```

        sinkPort1)); // interface of n3
437 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper1 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
438     InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort1));
439 ApplicationContainer sinkApps1 = packetSinkHelper1.Install (
440     nc_meshNodes.Get (3)); //n3 as sink
441 sinkApps1.Start (Seconds (30.));
442 sinkApps1.Stop (Seconds (45.));

443 Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket1 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_meshNodes.Get
444     (6), UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1

445 // Create UDP application at n1
446 Ptr<MyApp> app1 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
447 app1->Setup (ns3UdpSocket1, sinkAddress1, 1024, 50, DataRate ("500
448     Kbps"));
449 nc_meshNodes.Get (6)->AddApplication (app1);
450 app1->SetStartTime (Seconds (35.));
451 app1->SetStopTime (Seconds (45.));

452 //***** mesh node 3 to ap13
453 *****

454 uint16_t sinkPort2 = 4;
455 Address sinkAddress2 (InetSocketAddress (csmaInterfaces4.GetAddress
456     (0), sinkPort2)); // interface of n3
457 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper2 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
458     InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort2));
459 ApplicationContainer sinkApps2 = packetSinkHelper2.Install (
460     nc_ap14Mbb1.Get (0)); //n3 as sink
461 sinkApps2.Start (Seconds (45.0));
462 sinkApps2.Stop (Seconds (60.));

463 Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket2 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_meshNodes.Get
464     (3), UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1

465 // Create UDP application at n1
466 Ptr<MyApp> app2 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
467 app2->Setup (ns3UdpSocket2, sinkAddress2, 1024, 50, DataRate ("500
468     Kbps"));
469 nc_meshNodes.Get (3)->AddApplication (app2);
470 app2->SetStartTime (Seconds (50.));
471 app2->SetStopTime (Seconds (60.));

472 //***** nc_ap13 to sta2
473 *****

474 uint16_t sinkPort4 = 8;
475 Address sinkAddress4 (InetSocketAddress (csmaInterfaces4.GetAddress
476     (1), sinkPort4)); // interface of n3
477 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper4 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
478     InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort4));
479 ApplicationContainer sinkApps4 = packetSinkHelper4.Install (nc_sta1.
480     Get (0)); //n3 as sink
481 sinkApps4.Start (Seconds (50.));
482 sinkApps4.Stop (Seconds (75.));

483 Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket4 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_ap14.Get (0),
484     UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1

```

```

477
478 // Create UDP application at n1
479 Ptr<MyApp> app4 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
480 app4->Setup (ns3UdpSocket4, sinkAddress4, 1024, 50, DataRate ("500
481   Kbps"));
482 nc_ap14.Get (0)->AddApplication (app4);
483 app4->SetStartTime (Seconds (65.));
484 app4->SetStopTime (Seconds (75.));

485
486
487
488 //Ptr<OutputStreamWrapper> routingStream = Create<
489 //OutputStreamWrapper> ("blackholewmn.routes", std::ios::out);
490 //aodv.PrintRoutingTableAllAt (Seconds (45), routingStream);
491
492 // Trace Received Packets
493 Config::ConnectWithoutContext ("/ NodeList /* ApplicationList */ $ns3 ::"
494   "PacketSink/Rx", MakeCallback (&ReceivePacket));
495 // Trace Collisions
496 //Config::ConnectWithoutContext ("/ NodeList /* DeviceList */ $ns3 ::"
497   "WifiNetDevice/Mac/MacTxDrop", MakeCallback (&MacTxDrop));
498 //Config::ConnectWithoutContext ("/ NodeList /* DeviceList */ $ns3 ::"
499   "WifiNetDevice/Mac/MacRxDrop", MakeCallback (&MacRxDrop));
500 //Config::ConnectWithoutContext ("/ NodeList /* DeviceList */ $ns3 ::"
501   "WifiNetDevice/Phy/PhyRxDrop", MakeCallback (&PhyRxDrop));
502 //Config::ConnectWithoutContext ("/ NodeList /* DeviceList */ $ns3 ::"
503   "WifiNetDevice/Phy/PhyTxDrop", MakeCallback (&PhyTxDrop));
504
505 // Calculate Throughput using Flowmonitor
506 // FlowMonitorHelper flowmon;
507 // Ptr<FlowMonitor> monitor = flowmon.InstallAll();
508 // ThroughputMonitor(&flowmon, monitor, simulationTime);
509 // Simulator::Stop (Seconds(simulationTime+1));
510 // Now, do the actual simulation.
511 // NS_LOG_INFO ("Run Simulation.");
512 PrintDrop();
513 monitor->CheckForLostPackets();
514
515 Simulator::Run();
516 Simulator::Destroy();
517
518 return 0;
519 }

```

Greyhole Attack Mode Source Code:

```

1 #include "ns3/aodv-module.h"
2 #include "ns3/netanim-module.h"
3 #include "ns3/core-module.h"
4 #include "ns3/network-module.h"

```

```

5 #include "ns3/internet-module.h"
6 #include "ns3/applications-module.h"
7 #include "ns3/mobility-module.h"
8 #include "ns3/wifi-module.h"
9 #include "ns3/mesh-module.h"
10 #include "ns3/ipv4-global-routing-helper.h"
11 #include "ns3/olsr-helper.h"
12 #include "ns3/point-to-point-module.h"
13 #include "ns3/csma-module.h"
14 #include "ns3/netanim-module.h"
15 #include "ns3/flow-monitor-module.h"
16 #include "ns3/mobility-module.h"
17 #include "myapp.h"
18 #include "ns3/simulator.h"
19 #include "ns3/nstime.h"
20 #include "ns3/command-line.h"
21 #include "ns3/random-variable-stream.h"
22 #include <iostream>
23 #include <sstream>
24 #include <fstream>
25
26 NS_LOG_COMPONENT_DEFINE ("Blackhole");
27
28 using namespace ns3;
29
30
31     int      m_xSize=3;
32     int      m_ySize=3;
33     int      m_sta=1;
34     int      m_ap=1;
35     uint16_t m_packetSize=1024;
36     uint16_t m_NumOfPacket=50;
37
38 int packetCount , received_bits=0,transmitted_bits=0;
39 float throughput , localThrou , pdf;
40 float first_transmittedpacket , last_transmittedpacket , sum_of_eta_delay ;
41
42 FlowMonitorHelper flowmon;
43 Ptr<FlowMonitor> monitor;
44
45 uint64_t simulationTime = 30; //seconds
46
47 int drop_packet=5;
48 float random_value1 ,random_value2 ,random_value3 ,random_value4 ,
      random_value5 ;
49 int random_value11 ,random_value22 ,random_value33 ,random_value44 ,
      random_value55 ;
50
51 void ReceivePacket(Ptr<const Packet> p, const Address & addr)
52 {
53     InetSocketAddress transport = InetSocketAddress::ConvertFrom (addr);
54
55     std :: map<FlowId , FlowMonitor :: FlowStats> flowStats1 = monitor->
      GetFlowStats () ;
56

```

```

57     if(packetCount==1)
58     {
59         first_transmittedpacket=Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds ();
60     }
61     if(transport.GetIpv4 () == "10.1.2.7")
62     {
63         if(random_value11==packetCount)
64         {
65             std::cout<<"Grey hole attack in wireless mesh network:: Packet
66             dropped !!!"<<std::endl;
67             packetCount++;
68         }
69         else if(random_value22==packetCount)
70         {
71             std::cout<<"Grey hole attack in wireless mesh network:: Packet
72             dropped !!!"<<std::endl;
73             packetCount++;
74         }
75         else if(random_value33==packetCount)
76         {
77             std::cout<<"Grey hole attack in wireless mesh network:: Packet
78             dropped !!!"<<std::endl;
79             packetCount++;
80         }
81         else if(random_value44==packetCount)
82         {
83             std::cout<<"Grey hole attack in wireless mesh network:: Packet
84             dropped !!!"<<std::endl;
85             packetCount++;
86         }
87         else if(random_value55==packetCount)
88         {
89             std::cout<<"Grey hole attack in wireless mesh network:: Packet
90             dropped !!!"<<std::endl;
91             packetCount++;
92         }
93         else
94         {
95             packetCount++;
96             std::cout << packetCount << "\t" << Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds
97             () << "\t" << p->GetSize() << "\n";
98             if(packetCount==m_NumOfPacket)
99             {
100                 last_transmittedpacket=Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds ();
101                 sum_of_ete_delay=last_transmittedpacket -
102                 first_transmittedpacket;
103
104                 std::cout << "Flow ID      : " << 1 << " ; " <<"source: " <<
105                 transport.GetIpv4 () << " ----- " <<"Destination: " << transport.
106                 GetIpv4 () << std::endl;
107                 std::cout<<"*****" << std::endl;
108                 std::cout<<"Total Sent Packet=" <<m_NumOfPacket << std::endl;
109                 std::cout<<"*****" << std::endl;

```

```

104     std :: cout<<" Total Received Packet=" <<(packetCount-drop_packet)
105     <<std :: endl;
106     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
107     std :: cout << "Duration : " <<Simulator ::Now () .GetSeconds
108     ()<< "Seconds" << std :: endl;
109     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
110     std :: cout << "transmitted bits : " <<transmitted_bits<< "bits"
111     << std :: endl;
112     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
113     std :: cout << "received bits : " <<(received_bits -(1024*
114     drop_packet))<< "bits" << std :: endl;
115     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
116     std :: cout << "Throughput : " << ( received_bits -(1024*
117     drop_packet))/(Simulator ::Now () .GetSeconds () -
118     first_transmittedpacket)/1024/1024 << " Mbps" <<std :: endl;
119     localThrou = ( received_bits -(1024*drop_packet))/(Simulator ::Now () .
120     GetSeconds () - first_transmittedpacket)/1024/1024;
121     pdf = (double)(packetCount-drop_packet)/m_NumOfPacket;
122     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
123     std :: cout<<"Avereage Throughput = "<<localThrou<<"Mbps" <<std :: endl;
124     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
125     std :: cout<<"Avereage End to End Delay = "<<sum_of_etae_delay
126     *1000/(packetCount-drop_packet)<<"ms" <<std :: endl;
127     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
128     std :: cout<<"Average Packet Delivery Fraction = "<<pdf<<"<<std :: endl;
129     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
130     std :: cout<<"Percentage of Packet loss = "<<(1-pdf)*100<<"%" <<
131     std :: endl;
132     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
133     std :: cout<<"Greyhole Attack In wireless mesh network .....
134     Simulation Stopped"<<std :: endl;
135     std :: cout<<"*****" <<std :: endl;
136     packetCount=0;
137     transmitted_bits=0;
138     received_bits=0;
139     sum_of_etae_delay=0;
140     return ;
141   }
142   }
143   transmitted_bits+=p->GetSize () *8;
144   received_bits+=p->GetSize () *8;
145 }
```

```

146     std :: cout << "Flow ID      : " << 1 << " ; " <<"source: "<<
transport.GetIpv4 () << " -----> " <<"Destination: "<<transport .
GetIpv4 () << std :: endl ;
147     std :: cout<<"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"<<std :: endl ;
148     std :: cout<<"Total Sent Packet=" <<m_NumOfPacket<<std :: endl ;
149     std :: cout<<"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"<<std :: endl ;
150     std :: cout<<"Total Received Packet=" <<(packetCount-drop_packet )
<<std :: endl ;
151     std :: cout<<"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"<<std :: endl ;
152     std :: cout << "Duration      : " <<Simulator ::Now () .GetSeconds
()<< " Seconds" << std :: endl ;
153     std :: cout<<"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"<<std :: endl ;
154     std :: cout << "transmitted bits : " <<transmitted_bits<< " bits"
<< std :: endl ;
155     std :: cout<<"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"<<std :: endl ;
156     std :: cout << "received bits : " <<(received_bits)<< " bits" <<
std :: endl ;
157     std :: cout<<"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"<<std :: endl ;
158     std :: cout << "Throughput      : " << ( received_bits)/(Simulator
::Now () .GetSeconds () - first_transmittedpacket)/1024/1024 << "
Mbps" <<std :: endl ;
159     localThrou = ( received_bits)/(Simulator ::Now () .GetSeconds () -
first_transmittedpacket)/1024/1024;
160     pdf = (double)(packetCount)/m_NumOfPacket ;
161     std :: cout<<"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"<<std :: endl ;
162     std :: cout<<"Avereage Throughput = " <<localThrou<<"Mbps"<<std :: endl ;
163     std :: cout<<"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"<<std :: endl ;
164     std :: cout<<"Avereage End to End Delay = " <<sum_of_ende_delay
*1000/(packetCount)<<"ms"<<std :: endl ;
165     std :: cout<<"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"<<std :: endl ;
166     std :: cout<<"Average Packet Delivery Fraction = " <<pdf<<"%"<<std
:: endl ;
167     std :: cout<<"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"<<std :: endl ;
168     std :: cout<<"Percentage of Packet loss = " <<(1-pdf)*100<<"%"<<
std :: endl ;
169     std :: cout<<"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"*****"<<std :: endl ;
170     packetCount=0;
171     transmitted_bits=0;
172     received_bits=0;
173     return ;
174 }
175 }

176
177     transmitted_bits+=p->GetSize () *8;
178     received_bits+=p->GetSize () *8;
179 }

180
181
182 int main (int argc , char *argv [])
183 {
184     Time :: SetResolution (Time ::NS) ;
185     LogComponentEnable ("UdpEchoClientApplication" , LOG_LEVEL_INFO) ;
186     LogComponentEnable ("UdpEchoServerApplication" , LOG_LEVEL_INFO) ;
187
188     bool enableFlowMonitor = false ;

```

```

189 std :: string phyMode ("DsssRate1Mbps");
190
191 CommandLine cmd;
192 cmd.AddValue ("EnableMonitor", "Enable Flow Monitor",
193   enableFlowMonitor);
193 cmd.AddValue ("phyMode", "Wifi Phy mode", phyMode);
194 cmd.Parse (argc, argv);
195 ApplicationContainer clientApps;
196
197
198     Ptr<UniformRandomVariable> uv = CreateObject<
199 UniformRandomVariable () ;
200     random_value1=uv->GetValue ();
201     random_value1=(random_value1*100)/2;
201     random_value11= (int)random_value1;
202
203     random_value2=uv->GetValue ();
204     random_value2=(random_value2*100)/2;
205     random_value22= (int)random_value2;
206
207     random_value3=uv->GetValue ();
208     random_value3=(random_value3*100)/2;
209     random_value33= (int)random_value3;
210
211     random_value4=uv->GetValue ();
212     random_value4=(random_value4*100)/2;
213     random_value44= (int)random_value4;
214
215     random_value5 = uv->GetValue ();
216     random_value5=(random_value5*100)/2;
217     random_value55= (int)random_value5;
218
219
220
221 NS_LOG_INFO ("Create nodes.");
222 NodeContainer nc_meshNodes , nc_sta1 , nc_sta2 , nc_ap11 , nc_ap12 ,
223 nc_ap13 , nc_ap14 , nc_ap11Mbb1 , nc_ap12Mbb1 , nc_ap13Mbb1 ,
223 nc_ap14Mbb1 , not_malicious , malicious ; // ALL Nodes
224
225 NetDeviceContainer meshDevices , staApDevices1 , staApDevices2 ,
226 staDevices1 , staDevices2 , apDevices1 , apDevices2 , ap11Mbb1Devices ,
226 ap12Mbb1Devices , ap13Mbb1Devices , ap14Mbb1Devices ;
226 Ipv4InterfaceContainer interfaces , staAp_interfaces1 ,
226 staAp_interfaces2 , staAp_interfaces3 , staAp_interfaces4 ,
226 csmaInterfaces1 ,
227 csmaInterfaces2 , csmaInterfaces3 ,
227 csmaInterfaces4 ;
228
229 CsmaHelper csma1 , csma2 , csma3 , csma4 ;
230
231
232 // **** station device creation
232 ****
233 nc_sta1 . Create (m_st a) ;
234 nc_sta2 . Create (m_st a) ;
235

```

```

236 // ****mesh device creation
237 nc_meshNodes . Create( m_xSize * m_ySize );
238
239 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 1 ) );
240 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 2 ) );
241 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 3 ) );
242 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 4 ) );
243 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 5 ) );
244 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 6 ) );
245 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 7 ) );
246 not_malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 8 ) );
247 malicious . Add( nc_meshNodes . Get( 0 ) );
248
249 // ****Accesspoint device creation
250 nc_ap11 . Create( m_ap );
251 nc_ap12 . Create( m_ap );
252 nc_ap13 . Create( m_ap );
253 nc_ap14 . Create( m_ap );
254
255 nc_ap11Mbb1=NodeContainer( nc_ap11 , nc_meshNodes . Get( 6 ) );
256 nc_ap12Mbb1=NodeContainer( nc_ap12 , nc_meshNodes . Get( 0 ) );
257 nc_ap13Mbb1=NodeContainer( nc_ap13 , nc_meshNodes . Get( 8 ) );
258 nc_ap14Mbb1=NodeContainer( nc_ap14 , nc_meshNodes . Get( 3 ) );
259
260 // Set up mesh
261 WifiHelper wifi ;
262
263 YansWifiPhyHelper wifiPhy = YansWifiPhyHelper :: Default () ;
264 wifiPhy . SetPcapDataLinkType ( YansWifiPhyHelper :: DLT_ IEEE802_11 );
265
266 YansWifiChannelHelper wifiChannel ;
267 wifiChannel . SetPropagationDelay ( " ns3 :: "
268 ConstantSpeedPropagationDelayModel " );
269 wifiChannel . AddPropagationLoss ( " ns3 :: "
270 TwoRayGroundPropagationLossModel " ,
271 " SystemLoss " , DoubleValue( 1 ) ,
272 " HeightAboveZ " , DoubleValue( 1.5 ) );
273
274 wifiPhy . Set ( " TxPowerStart " , DoubleValue( 33 ) );
275 wifiPhy . Set ( " TxPowerEnd " , DoubleValue( 33 ) );
276 wifiPhy . Set ( " TxPowerLevels " , UintegerValue( 1 ) );
277 wifiPhy . Set ( " TxGain " , DoubleValue( 0 ) );
278 wifiPhy . Set ( " RxGain " , DoubleValue( 0 ) );
279 wifiPhy . Set ( " EnergyDetectionThreshold " , DoubleValue( -61.8 ) );
280 wifiPhy . Set ( " CcaMode1Threshold " , DoubleValue( -64.8 ) );
281
282 // Add a non-QoS upper mac
283 NqosWifiMacHelper wifiMac = NqosWifiMacHelper :: Default () ;
284
285 NetDeviceContainer devices ;
286 meshDevices = wifi . Install ( wifiPhy , wifiMac , nc_meshNodes );
287

```

```

288
289 // **** Setup WiFi for network
1*****
290 WifiHelper wifi1 = WifiHelper::Default();
291 wifi1.SetStandard(WIFI_PHY_STANDARD_80211b);
292 wifi1.SetRemoteStationManager("ns3::AarfWifiManager");
293
294 NqosWifiMacHelper mac1 = NqosWifiMacHelper::Default();
295
296 Ssid ssid1 = Ssid("network-1");
297 mac1.SetType("ns3::StaWifiMac",
298             "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid1),
299             "ActiveProbing", BooleanValue(true));
300
301 staDevices1 = wifi1.Install(wifiPhy, mac1, nc_sta1.Get(0));
302
303
304 // Setup AP for network 1
305 mac1.SetType("ns3::ApWifiMac",
306             "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid1));
307
308 apDevices1.Add(wifi1.Install(wifiPhy, mac1, nc_ap11.Get(0)));
309
310 staApDevices1.Add(staDevices1);
311 staApDevices1.Add(apDevices1);
312 // ****End wifi
1*****
313
314
315 // **** Setup WiFi for network
2*****
316 WifiHelper wifi2 = WifiHelper::Default();
317 wifi2.SetStandard(WIFI_PHY_STANDARD_80211b);
318 wifi2.SetRemoteStationManager("ns3::AarfWifiManager");
319
320
321 NqosWifiMacHelper mac2 = NqosWifiMacHelper::Default();
322
323 Ssid ssid2 = Ssid("network-3");
324 mac2.SetType("ns3::StaWifiMac",
325             "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid2),
326             "ActiveProbing", BooleanValue(true));
327
328 staDevices2 = wifi2.Install(wifiPhy, mac2, nc_sta2);
329
330
331 // Setup AP for network 1
332 mac2.SetType("ns3::ApWifiMac",
333             "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid2));
334
335 apDevices2.Add(wifi2.Install(wifiPhy, mac2, nc_ap14.Get(0)));
336
337 staApDevices2.Add(staDevices2);
338 staApDevices2.Add(apDevices2);
339
340 // ****End wifi

```

```

2*****
341
342
343 //*****Property for csma1
344 *****csma1.SetChannelAttribute ("DataRate",StringValue ("100Mbps"));
345 csma1.SetChannelAttribute ("Delay", TimeValue (NanoSeconds (6560)))
346 );
347 ap11Mbb1Devices = csma1.Install (nc_ap11Mbb1);
348
349 //*****Property for csma2
350 *****csma2.SetChannelAttribute ("DataRate",StringValue ("100Mbps"));
351 csma2.SetChannelAttribute ("Delay", TimeValue (NanoSeconds (6560)))
352 );
353 ap12Mbb1Devices = csma2.Install (nc_ap12Mbb1);
354
355 //*****Property for csma3
356 *****csma3.SetChannelAttribute ("DataRate",StringValue ("100Mbps"));
357 csma3.SetChannelAttribute ("Delay", TimeValue (NanoSeconds (6560)))
358 );
359 ap13Mbb1Devices = csma3.Install (nc_ap13Mbb1);
360
361 //*****Property for csma4
362 *****csma4.SetChannelAttribute ("DataRate",StringValue ("100Mbps"));
363 csma4.SetChannelAttribute ("Delay", TimeValue (NanoSeconds (6560)))
364 );
365 ap14Mbb1Devices = csma4.Install (nc_ap14Mbb1);
366
367
368 //*****mobility for mesh
369 *****MobilityHelper mobility;
370 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc = CreateObject <
371 ListPositionAllocator >();
372 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(150, 0, 0)); // node0
373 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(200, 0, 0)); // node1
374 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(200, 300, 0)); // node2
375 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(150,300, 0)); // node3
376 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(150, 150, 0)); // node4
377 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(200, 150, 0)); // node5
378 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(250, 0, 0)); // node6
379 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(250,150, 0)); // node7
380 positionAlloc ->Add(Vector(250, 300, 0)); // node8
381 mobility .SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc);
382 mobility .SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
383 mobility .Install(nc_meshNodes);
384
385 //*****mesh accesspoint 1 mobility
386 *****MobilityHelper mobility1;
387 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc1 = CreateObject <

```

```

ListPositionAllocator >();
385 positionAlloc1 ->Add(Vector(250, -50, 0)); // ap11
386 mobility1.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc1);
387 mobility1.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
388 mobility1.Install(nc_ap11);
389
390 //*****mesh accesspoint 2 mobility
391 MobilityHelper mobility2;
392 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc2 = CreateObject<
393 ListPositionAllocator>();
394 positionAlloc2 ->Add(Vector(150, -50, 0)); // ap12
395 mobility2.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc2);
396 mobility2.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
397 mobility2.Install(nc_ap12);
398
399 //*****mesh accesspoint 3 mobility
400 MobilityHelper mobility3;
401 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc3 = CreateObject<
402 ListPositionAllocator>();
403 positionAlloc3 ->Add(Vector(250, 350, 0)); // ap13
404 mobility3.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc3);
405 mobility3.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
406 mobility3.Install(nc_ap13);
407
408 //*****mesh accesspoint 4 mobility
409 MobilityHelper mobility4;
410 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc4 = CreateObject<
411 ListPositionAllocator>();
412 positionAlloc4 ->Add(Vector(150, 350, 0)); // ap14
413 mobility4.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc4);
414 mobility4.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
415 mobility4.Install(nc_ap14);
416
417 //*****station node 1 mobility
418 MobilityHelper mobility5;
419 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc5 = CreateObject<
420 ListPositionAllocator>();
421 positionAlloc5 ->Add(Vector(250, -100, 0)); // ap15
422 mobility5.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc5);
423 mobility5.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
424 mobility5.Install(nc_sta1);
425
426 //*****station node 2 mobility
427 MobilityHelper mobility6;
428 Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc6 = CreateObject<
429 ListPositionAllocator>();
430 positionAlloc6 ->Add(Vector(150, 400, 0)); // ap16
431 mobility6.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc6);
432 mobility6.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
433 mobility6.Install(nc_sta2);

```

```

430 // Enable AODV
431 AodvHelper aodv;
432
433 // Set up internet stack
434 InternetStackHelper internetStack;
435 internetStack.SetRoutingHelper (aodv);
436 internetStack.Install (not_malicious);
437 internetStack.Install (malicious);
438 internetStack.Install (nc_st1);
439 internetStack.Install (nc_st2);
440 internetStack.Install (nc_ap11);
441 internetStack.Install (nc_ap12);
442 internetStack.Install (nc_ap13);
443 internetStack.Install (nc_ap14);
444
445
446 //*****Setup IP Address*****
447 Ipv4AddressHelper address;
448 NS_LOG_INFO ("Assign IP Addresses.");
449 address.SetBase ("10.1.2.0", "255.255.255.0");
450 interfaces = address.Assign (meshDevices);
451
452
453 address.SetBase ("10.1.4.0", "255.255.255.0");
454 csmaInterfaces1 = address.Assign (ap11Mbb1Devices);
455
456 address.SetBase ("10.1.5.0", "255.255.255.0");
457 csmaInterfaces2 = address.Assign (ap12Mbb1Devices);
458
459 address.SetBase ("20.1.4.0", "255.255.255.0");
460 csmaInterfaces3 = address.Assign (ap13Mbb1Devices);
461
462 address.SetBase ("20.1.5.0", "255.255.255.0");
463 csmaInterfaces4 = address.Assign (ap14Mbb1Devices);
464
465 address.SetBase ("10.1.3.0", "255.255.255.0");
466 staAp_interfaces1 = address.Assign (staApDevices1);
467
468 address.SetBase ("20.1.3.0", "255.255.255.0");
469 staAp_interfaces2 = address.Assign (staApDevices2);
470
471
472 NS_LOG_INFO ("Create Applications.");
473
474 //*****client to nc_ap11*****
475 uint16_t sinkPort3 = 7;
476 Address sinkAddress3 (InetSocketAddress (staAp_interfaces1.
477 GetAddress (1), sinkPort3)); // interface of n3
478 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper3 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
479 InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort3));
480 ApplicationContainer sinkApps3 = packetSinkHelper3.Install (
481 nc_ap11.Get (0)); //n3 as sink
482 sinkApps3.Start (Seconds (0.));

```

```

481 sinkApps3.Stop (Seconds (10.));
482
483 Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket3 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_sta1.Get (0),
484 UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1
485
486 Ptr<MyApp> app3 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
487 app3->Setup (ns3UdpSocket3, sinkAddress3, 1024, m_NumOfPacket,
488 DataRate ("250Kbps"));
489 nc_sta1.Get (0)->AddApplication (app3);
490 app3->SetStartTime (Seconds (5.));
491 app3->SetStopTime (Seconds (10.));
492
493 //*****nc_ap11 to mesh node
494 //*****nc_ap11 to mesh node
495 uint16_t sinkPort = 6;
496 Address sinkAddress (InetSocketAddress (csmaInterfaces1.GetAddress
497 (1), sinkPort)); // interface of n3
498 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
499 InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort));
500 ApplicationContainer sinkApps = packetSinkHelper.Install (
501 nc_meshNodes.Get (6)); //n3 as sink
502 sinkApps.Start (Seconds (10.));
503 sinkApps.Stop (Seconds (20.));
504
505 Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_ap11.Get (0),
506 UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1
507
508 Ptr<MyApp> app = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
509 app->Setup (ns3UdpSocket, sinkAddress, m_packetSize, m_NumOfPacket
510 , DataRate ("500Kbps"));
511 nc_ap11.Get (0)->AddApplication (app);
512 app->SetStartTime (Seconds (15.));
513 app->SetStopTime (Seconds (20.));
514
515 //*****mesh node 6 to mesh node
516 //*****mesh node 6 to mesh node
517 uint16_t sinkPort1 = 5;
518 Address sinkAddress1 (InetSocketAddress (interfaces.GetAddress (5)
519 , sinkPort1)); // interface of n3
520 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper1 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
521 InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort1));
522 ApplicationContainer sinkApps1 = packetSinkHelper1.Install (
523 nc_meshNodes.Get (5)); //n3 as sink
524 sinkApps1.Start (Seconds (20.));
525 sinkApps1.Stop (Seconds (30.));
526
527 Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket1 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_meshNodes.Get
528 (6), UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1
529
530 Ptr<MyApp> app1 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
531 app1->Setup (ns3UdpSocket1, sinkAddress1, m_packetSize,
532 m_NumOfPacket, DataRate ("500Kbps"));
533 nc_meshNodes.Get (6)->AddApplication (app1);
534 app1->SetStartTime (Seconds (25.));
535 app1->SetStopTime (Seconds (30.));

```

```

523 if (drop_packet==0)
524 {
525
526 //***** mesh node 6 to mesh
527 node 3*****
528 uint16_t sinkPort9 = 3;
529 Address sinkAddress9 (InetSocketAddress (interfaces.GetAddress (3),
530 , sinkPort9)); // interface of n3
531 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper9 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
532 InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort9));
533 ApplicationContainer sinkApps9 = packetSinkHelper9.Install (
534 nc_meshNodes.Get (3)); //n3 as sink
535 sinkApps9.Start (Seconds (30.));
536 sinkApps9.Stop (Seconds (40.));
537
538 Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket9 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_meshNodes.Get
539 (5), UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1
540
541 Ptr<MyApp> app9 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
542 app9->Setup (ns3UdpSocket9, sinkAddress9, m_packetSize,
543 m_NumOfPacket, DataRate ("500Kbps"));
544 nc_meshNodes.Get (5)->AddApplication (app9);
545 app9->SetStartTime (Seconds (35.));
546 app9->SetStopTime (Seconds (40.));
547
548 //***** mesh node 3 to ap13
549 ***** mesh node 3 to ap13
550 uint16_t sinkPort2 = 4;
551 Address sinkAddress2 (InetSocketAddress (csmaInterfaces4.
552 GetAddress (1), sinkPort2)); // interface of n3
553 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper2 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
554 InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort2));
555 ApplicationContainer sinkApps2 = packetSinkHelper2.Install (
556 nc_meshNodes.Get (3)); //n3 as sink
557 sinkApps2.Start (Seconds (40.0));
558 sinkApps2.Stop (Seconds (50.));
559
560 Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket2 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_ap14.Get (0),
561 UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); //source at n1
562
563 Ptr<MyApp> app2 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
564 app2->Setup (ns3UdpSocket2, sinkAddress2, m_packetSize,
565 m_NumOfPacket, DataRate ("500Kbps"));
566 nc_ap14.Get (0)->AddApplication (app2);
567 app2->SetStartTime (Seconds (45.));
568 app2->SetStopTime (Seconds (50.));
569
570 //***** nc_ap13 to sta2
571 ***** nc_ap13 to sta2
572 uint16_t sinkPort4 = 2;
573 Address sinkAddress4 (InetSocketAddress (staAp_interfaces2.
574 GetAddress (1), sinkPort4)); // interface of n3
575 PacketSinkHelper packetSinkHelper4 ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
576 InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), sinkPort4));
577 ApplicationContainer sinkApps4 = packetSinkHelper4.Install (
578 nc_ap14.Get (0)); //n3 as sink
579 sinkApps4.Start (Seconds (50));

```

```

563     sinkApps4.Stop (Seconds (60.));
564
565     Ptr<Socket> ns3UdpSocket4 = Socket::CreateSocket (nc_st2.Get (0),
566                                         UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ());
567                                         //source at n1
568
569     Ptr<MyApp> app4 = CreateObject<MyApp> ();
570     app4->Setup (ns3UdpSocket4, sinkAddress4, m_packetSize,
571                 m_NumOfPacket, DataRate ("250Kbps"));
572     nc_st2.Get (0)->AddApplication (app4);
573     app4->SetStartTime (Seconds (55.));
574     app4->SetStopTime (Seconds (60.));
575
576 }
577
578 //*****flow monitor
579 *****monitor = flowmon.InstallAll ();
580
581 //*****Trace Received Packet
582 *****Config :: ConnectWithoutContext ("/ NodeList /* ApplicationList /* $ns3
583 :: PacketSink/Rx", MakeCallback (&ReceivePacket));
584 //Config :: ConnectWithoutContext ("/ NodeList /* DeviceList /* $ns3 :: WiFiNetDevice/Mac/MacTxDrop",
585 MakeCallback (&MacTxDrop));
586 //Config :: ConnectWithoutContext ("/ NodeList /* DeviceList /* $ns3 :: WiFiNetDevice/Mac/MacRxDrop",
587 MakeCallback (&MacRxDrop));
588 monitor->CheckForLostPackets ();
589
590 Simulator::Stop (Seconds (simulationTime+1));
591 Simulator::Run ();
592
593 Simulator::Destroy ();
594
595 return 0;
596 }
```

Appendix B

NS-3 802.11s modules

In this appendix, the modules implemented in C++ and how they interconnect with each other is presented.

B.1 MeshHelper

void SetSpreadInterfaceChannels

Parameters: (ChannelPolicy)

Set the channel policy which can be SPREAD CHANNELS or ZERO CHANNEL: Spread or not spread frequency channels of MP interfaces. If set to true different non-overlapping 20MHz frequency channels will be assigned to different mesh point interfaces.

void SetStackInstaller

Parameters: (std::string type, std::string n0 = "", const AttributeValue & v0 = Empty-AttributeValue (),...)

You need to tell which Mesh stack do you want, in this case Dot11sStack, so you can use the characteristics of the 802.11s. n0 and v0 are the name and the value of the attribute to set, respectively. For example you can set the root node in the mesh network.

void SetNumberOfInterfaces

Parameters: (uint32 t nInterfaces)

Set a number of interfaces in a mesh network.

NetDeviceContainer Install

Parameters: (const WifiPhyHelper & phyHelper, NodeContainer c)

Install 802.11s mesh device and protocols on given node list. The phyHelper is the Wifi PHY helper and c is the list of nodes to install. This function returns the list of created mesh point devices, see MeshPointDevice (see next section).

void SetMacType

Parameters: (std::string n0 = "", const AttributeValue & v0 = EmptyAttributeValue (),...)

Uses the class MeshWifiInterfaceMac and n0 and v0 are the name and the value of the attribute to set, respectively. The values that can be set are the next ones:

- BeaconInterval : Beacon Interval. Initial value: 0.5 seconds
- RandomStart: Window when beacon generating starts (uniform random) in seconds. Initial value: 0.5 seconds
- BeaconGeneration: Enable/Disable Beacons. Initial value: enabled
- TxOkHeader : The header of successfully transmitted packet.
- TxErrHeader : The header of unsuccessfully transmitted packet.

This class uses the RegularWifiMac class where you can set the QoS support which enable 802.11e/WMM-style (By default is disable). And at the same time this class has as parent class WifiMac which we can use to modify values like CTS timeout, ACK timeout, SIFS, EIFS-DIFS, duration of a slot, PIFS or the Ssid.

void SetRemoteStationManager

Parameters: (std::string type, std::string n0 = " ", const AttributeValue & v0 = EmptyAttributeValue (),...)

With this function, using the variable type we define which station manager do we want. A part from a constant bit rate value, the following rate control algorithms implemented in NS-3: AARF, AARF-CD, AMRR, ARF, CARA, Ideal, Minstrel, ONOE and RRAA. The one selected by default is the ARF. They all use has as parent class WifiRemoteStationManager, and using the n0 and v0 you can set the maximum number of retransmission attempts for an RTS and data packets as well as the threshold to decide when to use a RTS/CTS handshake before sending a data packet and the one to decide when to fragment them. As described in IEEE Std. 802.11-2007, Section 9.2.6. and 9.4. This value will not have any effect on some rate control algorithms. Here we can also set a wifi mode for non-unicast transmissions.

void SetNumberOfInterfaces

Parameters: (uint32 t nInterfaces)

Set a number of interfaces in a mesh network.

void SetStandard

Parameters: (enum WifiPhyStandard standard)

Allows you to select the following standards: 802.11 with 5 or 10 Mhz, 802.11a and 802.11b. The one set by default is the 802.11a.

MeshPointDevice

Mesh point is a virtual net device which is responsible for aggregating and coordinating real devices (mesh interfaces), and hosting all mesh-related level 2 protocols. One of hosted L2 protocols must implement L2RoutingProtocol interface and is used for packets forwarding. From the level 3 point of view MeshPointDevice is similar to a bridge network device, but the packets, which going through may be changed (because L2 protocols may require their own headers or tags).

void AddInterface

Parameters: (Ptr <NetDevice>port)

Attach new interface to the station. Interface must support 48-bit MAC address and only MeshPointDevice can have IP address, but not individual interfaces.

bool SetMtu

Parameters: (const uint16 t mtu)

Set the MAC-level Maximum Transmission Unit in bytes and returns whether the MTU value was within legal bounds. Override for default MTU defined on a per-type basis.

void SetRoutingProtocol

Parameters: (Ptr <MeshL2RoutingProtocol>protocol)

Register the mesh routing protocol to be used by this mesh point. Protocol must be already installed on this mesh point.