



UTOPIA MODEL UNITED NATIONS

'19

United Nations Human Rights Council



*Agenda: Condition of Religious Minorities
with Special Emphasis on Xinjiang*



A WORD FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD



It is an honour to preside over the Human Rights Council at Utopia Model United Nations 2019. This letter shall serve as a concept note for the committee by outlining our expectations as to how the committee is to function. MUNs as a concept are designed to be a simulation rather than a conference. This difference is inherent and obvious in each country's representation through their delegation. The head of this delegation is usually a diplomat whose primary objective is the representation of the government and its goals. The head delegate is hence tasked with the responsibility of aligning the policies and objectives of other countries with their own goals and using diplomacy effectively to achieve the aforementioned goals.

Thus, the outcome of the simulation is different for each diplomat and it is the means to this end that shall define the quality of the simulation. It is also important to remember the inherent limitations of every student in terms of using or applying international law. This implies that it is not necessary to indulge in highly technical discussions that do not ensure any learning to the delegate. Rather, it is imperative that all discussions be integrated with logic that has been graciously gifted to mankind through our collective wisdom. It is thus expected that this concept note also serve as a very important starting point to the simulation and that the delegates are able to infer a lot more than what is shown at the face value.

The agenda has multiple facets and can take a national or an international viewpoint. For the benefit of the delegates and the quality of the simulation, the background guide shall give small introductions to serve as a starting point for your research. It is important to remember that this is only a starting point to your research; the end, however, awaits you all.

All the best everyone!

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UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the United Nations responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe, addressing situations of human rights violations and making recommendations on them. It has the ability to discuss all thematic human rights issues and situations that require its attention throughout the year. The council convenes at the UN Office at Geneva.

The Council is made up of 47 United Nations Member States which are elected by the UN General Assembly. The Human Rights Council replaced the former United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

The Council was created by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 March 2006 by resolution 60/251. Its first session took place from 19 June to 30 June 2006. A year later, the Council adopted its "Institution-Building Package" to guide its work and outline its procedures and mechanisms.

Among them were the Universal Periodic Review mechanism which serves to assess the human rights situations in all United Nations Member States, the Advisory Committee which serves as the Council's "think-tank" by providing it with expertise and advice on thematic human rights issues and the Complaint Procedure which allows individuals and organizations to bring human rights violations to the attention of the Council.

The Human Rights Council also works with the UN Special Procedures established by the former Commission on Human Rights and now assumed by the Council. These are made up of special rapporteurs, representatives, independent experts and working groups that monitor, examine, advise and publicly report on human rights situations in specific countries.

When creating the Human Rights Council in March 2006 the United Nations General Assembly decided that the Council's work and functioning should be reviewed five years after it had come into existence at the level of the General Assembly.

The Human Rights Council holds no fewer than three regular sessions a year, for a total of at least ten weeks. They take place in March (four weeks), June (three weeks) and September (three weeks).

If one third of the Member States request so, the Human Rights Council can decide at any time to hold a special session to address human rights violations and emergencies.

METHODS OF WORK

The work of UN Human Rights Council encompasses three broad areas: human rights standard setting, monitoring and supporting the implementation of human rights obligations by the member states. Substantive and technical support is provided to the various UN human rights bodies as they undertake their standard-setting and monitoring duties.

Knowledge and awareness of all human rights, whether civil, cultural, economic, political or social, are deepened and the capacity of rights-holders and duty-bearers are strengthened through applied thematic research and analyses, methodologies, development and training. International human rights experts are also deployed to field offices and other missions, including in situations of crisis, to assist countries that are working to fulfil their human rights obligations.

The work of UN Human Rights Council is based on the Office's Management Plan (OMP), which guides implementation of the Human Rights Programme of the Secretary-General's Strategic Framework. By aligning the whole Office to a common set of results connected with the various components of its mandate, the OMP enhances the Office's effectiveness in implementing the Strategic Framework, increasing synergies across functions and ensuring the best possible use of available resources.

MANDATE OF UNHRC

In the UN context, a mandate refers to the decision that gives a body authority to carry out its functions.

The HRC's mandate is outlined in GA resolution 60/251. The GA mandated the HRC to promote universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; to address and provide recommendations on all, particularly grave and systematic, violations of human rights; and to promote an effective system of coordination within the UN system, including mainstreaming mechanisms, with respect to human rights issues. Further, the GA designated the HRC as a forum for debate and dialogue on all human rights issues, including addressing violations and responding to emergencies, promoting cooperation and education on human rights, reviewing member states' track records, and preventing abuses from occurring.

The HRC is guided by the underlying principles of "universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive international dialogue and cooperation."

INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA

Xinjiang is a large central-Asian region within the People's Republic of China comprising numerous minority groups: 45% of its population are Uyghurs, and 40% are Han. There is a grave disagreement among both the groups about their respective historical claim over Xinjiang, a provincial level autonomous region. The People's Republic of China classifies the Uyghur as a National Minority, contrary to the Uyghur's claim of being indigenous to the region according to which they should be classified as an indigenous group.

Since late 2016, the Chinese government has subjected the 13 million ethnic Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang to mass arbitrary detention, forced political indoctrination, restrictions on movement, and religious oppression. Credible estimates indicate that under this heightened repression, up to one million people are being held in "political education" camps. There are reports of gross human rights violations within these camps as well as of issues of self-determination and the overtly repressive measures adopted by the Chinese government in the name of anti-terrorism measures. The oppression of the Uyghur by the Chinese government has been internationally condemned and is a matter of concern in the context of safeguarding the human rights of the community.

At the start of a two-day regular review of China's record, Gay McDougall, a member of the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, said "We are deeply concerned at the many numerous and credible reports that we have received that in the name of combating religious extremism and maintaining social stability (China) has changed the Uighur autonomous region into something that resembles a massive internment camp that is shrouded in secrecy, a sort of 'no rights zone'."

While China has said that Xinjiang faces a serious threat from Islamist militants and separatists who plot attacks and stir up tensions between the mostly Muslim Uighur minority, who call the region home, and the ethnic Han Chinese majority, the UN representatives on the panel gave a very clear message to the Chinese government stating that members of the Uighur community and other Muslims were being treated as "enemies of the state" solely on the basis of their ethno-religious identity.

HISTORY / ORIGINS

The ongoing crisis finds its roots in the long struggle of Uyghur self-determination, separatism, a series of oppressive Chinese control measures on the various manifestations of this struggle, the conflict between the Han and the Uyghurs along with the long history of terrorism in the region.

Separatism in Xinjiang

Xinjiang has a turbulent history marked with innumerable battles and conflicts. These include the Kumul Rebellion, Soviet invasion of Xinjiang, the Charkhlik Revolt, the Xinjiang War of 1937 and the Ili Rebellion. These were all characterised by the need for the expression of a separate identity. Some conflicts resulted from the want of secession from China. The front of such separatist movements was fuelled by the necessity of self-determination. The Soviet backed the Ili rebellion against the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1944. Following the rebellion, the rebels established the Provisional Government of the Second East Turkestan Republic(ETR) in 1944. The ETR was eventually made a part of the People's Republic of China. As per the Chinese Government, separatist sentiments still continue to be widespread among various Uyghur individuals and organisations.

Terrorism in Xinjiang

In the wake of separatist movements in the Xinjiang region, what are said to be terrorist organisations came up during and after the ETR movement. The Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement(ETIM), the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the World Uyghur Congress, and the East Turkistan Information Centre have all been classified as terrorist threats by China's Ministry of Public Security.

The World Uyghur Congress which the Chinese government considers to be a terrorist organisation, is an international organisation of exiled Uyghur groups that aspires to "represent the collective interest of the Uyghur people" both inside and outside of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (also called East Turkestan) of the People's Republic of China.

The World Uyghur Congress describes itself as a nonviolent and peaceful movement that opposes what it considers to be the Chinese occupation of East Turkestan, and advocates rejection of totalitarianism, religious intolerance and terrorism as an instrument of policy. The Congress is funded in part by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) of the United States.

THE 'STRIKE HARD' CAMPAIGN

In May 2014, China launched the "Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism" in the far west province of Xinjiang. It is an attempt by the Chinese government to effectively manage the ethnically diverse and tumultuous province of Xinjiang. This campaign has been credited as tacitly giving the state broad latitude to punish and control Muslim Uyghurs based on their religious identities.

China has used the global "War on Terror" of the 2000s to frame separatist and ethnic unrest into acts of Islamist terrorism to legitimize increasingly repressive counter-insurgency policies in Xinjiang. One element of this campaign has been the jailing of nearly one million Uyghurs in Xinjiang's re-education camps. The Chinese government has violated innumerable human rights within these camps and has been accused of carrying out ethnic cleansing.

The Chinese government has subjected the Uyghurs to various atrocities completely disregarding the fact that there is no single Uyghur agenda. While there may be some groups that use violent means in order to propagate their demand for a separate state, others want to simply maintain cultural distinction while maintaining an autonomous relation with China, whereas others are already integrating into the Chinese system. Chinese officials have denied that such abuses have occurred; instead they characterize these camps as "vocational education and employment training centres" for "criminals involved in minor offenses." However, they permit no independent monitoring of these facilities from the UN, human rights organizations, or the media.

INFRINGEMENT OF PERSONAL FREEDOM AND PRIVACY

Authorities have hired tens of thousands of additional security personnel in Uyghur populated areas while building numerous “convenience” police stations and checkpoints in the region. They have closely monitored people’s familial and social networks as indicators of their level of political trustworthiness. The government detains people and subjects them to greater levels of controls not only based on their own behaviour or beliefs, but also those of their family members – a form of collective punishment contrary to international human rights law.

The government has also been using hi-tech mass surveillance systems as another feature of this campaign, for instance, the IJOP app. Officials use the IJOP app to fulfil three broad functions: collecting personal information, reporting on activities or circumstances deemed suspicious, and prompting investigations of people the system flags as problematic. Analysis of the IJOP app reveals that authorities are collecting massive amounts of personal information—from the colour of a person’s car to their height down to the precise centimetre—and feeding it into the IJOP central system, linking that data to the person’s national identification card number.

Our analysis also shows that Xinjiang authorities consider many forms of lawful, quotidian, non-violent behaviour—such as “not socializing with neighbours, often avoiding using the front door”—as suspicious. The app also labels the use of 51 network tools as suspicious, including many Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and encrypted communication tools such as WhatsApp and Viber. These are collectively a violation of the individual’s privacy on the basis of futile claims.

RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Authorities have long imposed pervasive restrictions on peaceful religious practices nationally, particularly so in Xinjiang. The current level of control is unprecedented as Chinese authorities have effectively outlawed the practice of Islam in the region. The Chinese government's restrictions on the practice of Islam in Xinjiang are among the strictest and most comprehensive in the world. Human Rights Watch, in 2005, documented a multi-tier system of surveillance, control, and suppression of religious activity aimed at Xinjiang's Uyghurs.

Since then, these controls have been strengthened. Following the unrest in Urumqi in 2009, there was a burst of regulatory activities aimed at religion, and again in 2016, during the current Strike Hard Campaign. In addition, the Xinjiang Regulations on Religious Affairs were passed in 2014, replacing an outdated 1994 version, further imposing restrictions on religion.

Taken together, these regional rules curtail many expressions of Islam. These rules ban any form of appearance – including facial hair and clothing – that is interpreted to “whip up religious fanaticism, [and] disseminate religious extremist ideologies”; require that all Hajj (pilgrimages to Mecca) must be organized by the state; prohibit the circulation of many types of documents relating to religious and ethnic policies which would routinely be public information in other countries, such as drafts of religious laws and regulations; ban children from participating in religious activities; prohibit anyone, including parents and teachers, from introducing religion to children, including at home; and prohibit the creation, possession, consumption, and dissemination –including on the internet – of a range of materials defined so broadly and vaguely that any expression can be construed as prohibited.

For example, they include anything that “undermines national unity, social stability, economic development, or scientific and technological progress” or that “affects religious harmony”. These are all stringent measures of state control which curtail the Uyghur community’s right to freedom of religion.

ARBITRARY DETENTION

Arbitrary detention is the arrest or detention of an individual in a case in which there is no likelihood or evidence that they committed a crime against legal statute, or in which there has been no proper due process of law and order. Under the Strike Hard Campaign, Chinese authorities have stepped up the use of arbitrary detention. Individuals taken into custody by the police are first interrogated, then either transferred to detention centres or taken directly to political education camps.

In detention centres, they are held before being tried; those not convicted and sentenced to prison terms are sent to political education camps or released. In addition to this, the police interrogate individuals taken into custody without regard to basic due process protections, including providing an arrest warrant, setting out a recognizable criminal offense, or allowing access to legal counsel. The detention of people without recognizable criminal offenses, particularly for those in political education camps, was corroborated by interviews with families who often said that the authorities had not given them any official reasons or paperwork for the detentions. These violate not only various treaties of international law, but also China's domestic law itself.

Detention without Charge

Detainees interviewed by organisations such as Human Rights Watch often gave accounts stating that in their cells there were only Uyghurs and Kazakhs, and a few Hui Muslims. They said the guards explicitly told the detainees that they were being held for being Turkic Muslims.

The guards also said that the Uyghurs and Kazakhs are the enemies of China, and that they want to kill them, make them suffer, and that there's nothing they can do about it. There were a few Hui, but they were held there for triad [organized] crime, some Hui also came in for political crimes. Detainees said they were being held in detention centres for religious or other peaceful activities that did not constitute crimes.

TORTURE AND ILL - TREATMENT

Detainees described mistreatment during the interrogation, evidently to obtain confessions or information, that amounted to torture or other ill-treatment. Former detainees said that they were strapped to a metal chair – also known as a “tiger chair” – during police interrogation while some were subjected to sleep deprivation. Detainees described torture and ill-treatment in detention centres that included beatings, being hung from ceilings and walls, and prolonged shackling.

Detainees were afraid of being taken out of the cell for interrogations, as they were afraid of being tortured. Many also reported severe overcrowding with up to 35 people being held in a 12 square metre room with only a small window. Women with long hair often had their hair cut-off by the guards, while people with disabilities, women who were pregnant or breastfeeding and even the elderly were held in the detention centres with inadequate or no healthcare.

ABUSES IN POLITICAL RE-EDUCATION CAMPS

Former detainees and official reports confirmed that political education camps are located in former schools, elderly people's homes, production plants, and prisons. The authorities have also built, or are building, new political education camps. These political education camps focus on military-style discipline and pervasive political indoctrination of the detainees.

Turkic Muslims are disproportionately represented in the detainee population compared to the general population of the region. Detainees are required to understand the "crimes" they have committed, though the actions are not criminal offenses under Chinese criminal law. There have been reports of deaths in the political education camps, raising concerns about physical and psychological abuse as well as indefinite confinement.

Political Indoctrination

The Chinese government has a long tradition of considering those whose thoughts differ from theirs as suffering from "ideological defects" or as "mentally ill," and force them to undergo political indoctrination. Detainees told Human Rights Watch that they had to participate in a flag-raising ceremony every morning; as part of this ceremony or afterwards, they had to learn to sing propaganda songs praising President Xi and the Chinese Communist Party.

Detainees, some of whom only speak Turkic languages radically different from Mandarin Chinese, were required to learn to read and write over a thousand Chinese characters and speak Mandarin. Detainees are not allowed to speak their languages or talk about foreign countries. Detainees were told that their release was conditional upon their ability to "learn" the Chinese language and propaganda songs. Political education camp authorities also made detainees memorize other rules as a part of their "education". One of the detainees interviewed by the Human Rights Watch described some of the extreme and absurd rules the detainees had to memorize:

- They can now no longer say Islamic greetings, but only [the Mandarin greeting] ni hao;
- Uyghur restaurant signs cannot have Uyghur or Kazakh writings, only Chinese characters;
- In public places they cannot use Kazakh or Uyghur to speak to one another;
- Kazakh and Uyghur language schools are banned;
- They cannot communicate with people in 26 countries including Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkey;
- The [Chinese] third generation ID will not have one's ethnicities listed;
- On WeChat, QQ [a Chinese social media service] and websites, minorities cannot set up their own chat groups, and if anyone dared to do so, they would be sentenced to 2 1/2 years in political education camps;

ABUSES IN POLITICAL RE-EDUCATION CAMPS

- There are rewards for Hans and Kazakhs to intermarry including a monetary reward of 90,000 RMB [US\$13,000] and the permission to apply for big loans;
- If ordinary people violate these rules and leak state secrets, they will be severely punished;
- If people sell their private properties, 50 percent of that will go to the state;
- For those who travel abroad, their passports must be submitted to the state for safekeeping.
- The detainees were also denied contact to lawyers, brief calls to family members were allowed but strictly restricted.

EVERYDAY RESTRICTIONS IN XINJIANG

The extraordinary restrictions placed on Turkic Muslims throughout Xinjiang are not limited to detention facilities alone. The government also imposes pervasive and constant surveillance alongside persistent political indoctrination.

Restrictions on Freedom of Movement

In Xinjiang, the authorities arbitrarily restrict the movements of Turkic Muslims through a combination of administrative measures, checkpoints, and controls over access to passports. People have to apply for permission from the police or the neighbourhood office – the lowest level government office – to leave the area where they reside. In some cases, the approval requirement appears to be applied more stringently to former detainees and families of detainees.

Restrictions on Access to Passports

The Xinjiang authorities have, since October 2016, prevented Turkic Muslims from leaving the country by requiring them to hand over their passports. While it is possible to get them back, people described the process as a bureaucratic nightmare. In a number of cases, those who got their passports back were only allowed leave for a short period of time subject to the precondition that they promised to return. Chinese authorities confiscated people's residency documents issued by foreign governments in addition to their PRC passports.

A number of detainees described their departures from Xinjiang as escapes requiring evading authorities or hiding in a distant family's home for the fear of being detained despite trying to leave China legally. This has led to various families being separated due to detainment of one or both of the parents and stagnation in various businesses in the Xinjiang as residents are not allowed to travel overseas even for trade purposes.

UYGHUR ASYLUM SEEKERS

The internationally recognized rights of asylum seekers have been consistently flouted by the Chinese government for decades, primarily in relation to neighbouring states. Uyghur asylum seekers have been forcibly deported from states with strong trade and diplomatic ties to China for many years. The act of forcibly repatriating individuals or groups who make evident their desire of not being returned to their home country is a clear infringement of well-established international law.

The non-refoulement principle spelled out in the 1951 Refugee Convention—to which China is a state party—requires that states do not allow for the forcible return of refugees or asylum-seekers to territories where their “life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”

Amnesty International began documenting cases of Uyghurs who were forcibly returned to China in the late 1990s, many of whom had already been registered by the UNHCR as asylum seekers. Uyghurs have been made to forcibly return to China from the nations of Pakistan, Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand.

CHINESE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

Chinese law defines terrorism and extremism in an overbroad and vague manner and does not require that action be taken in furtherance of a crime to prompt prosecution, deprivation of liberty, or other restrictions. Terrorism charges can stem from mere possession of “items that advocate terrorism,” even though there is no clear definition of what these materials may be.

The Xinjiang Implementing Measures on the Counterterrorism Law and the Xinjiang Counter Extremism Regulations further prohibit a large range of activity relevant to ethnic, religious, and political expression, including “intimidating or inducing others to boycott national policy measures, or destroy[ing] state documents,” such as identity documents.

The Chinese government has also publicized – particularly in Xinjiang – a list of “75 behavioural indicators of religious extremism.” While that list includes some reasonable examples of incitement to violence, such as “inciting the Holy War,” many, if not most, indicators are highly questionable. They include a range of vague and imprecise “behaviours” and “symptoms” that are considered “unusual” and thus warrant additional scrutiny. This includes people who “store large amounts of food in their homes,” “those who smoke and drink but quit doing so suddenly” or “those who buy or store equipment such as dumbbells, boxing gloves, as well as maps, compasses, telescopes, ropes, and tents without obvious reasons.”

This definition allows the Chinese government to justify its actions in the name of counter-terrorism measures due to the ambiguity of what it considers to be actions indicative of terrorism.

OBSTRUCTION OF CHINESE LAW

The Chinese government has been violating innumerable fundamental rights of its citizens which are guaranteed to all citizens under Chinese as well as International Law. These include:

Right to Liberty

Article 37 of China's Constitution states that all arrests must be approved by either the procuratorate, the state prosecution, or the courts. Yet neither agency appears to be involved in detentions to the political education camps. Though the Counterterrorism Law, the Xinjiang Implementing Measures of that law, and the Xinjiang Counterextremism Regulations – envision authorities “educating” people about extremism, none of those laws allow authorities to deprive people of their liberty.

Right to Equality

Article 4 of China's Constitution states that “all ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal.” The constitution prohibits “discrimination against and oppression of any ethnic group” and especially protects these groups' use of “language, folkways, and customs.” It also prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion. This has been duly violated by the government through its existing policies and their exercise in the Xinjiang region.

Freedom of Thought, Expression and Religion

Article 35 of China's Constitution guarantees people's rights to expression, including the right to publish, gather, associate, and protest freely. However, at the same time, the Chinese government does have various laws limiting these freedoms as well, which include Article 105, Article 249 and Article 193 of the Chinese Constitution. Forcing people to undergo political indoctrination, along with many of the Chinese government's policies in Xinjiang to restrict people's religious and ethnic expression, are violations of the rights to freedom of expression, thought, and religion.

Freedom of Movement

The passport recall by Xinjiang authorities has no basis in Chinese law. Article 2 of China's Passport Law states that “no organization or individual should illegally seize passports.” Article 15 states that the courts, the procuratorates [office of the prosecutor], the police, the state security, and administrative supervisory authorities can seize passports only “where necessary for handling a case,” and only the passports “of the parties of a case.”

OBSTRUCTION OF CHINESE LAW

Right to Privacy and to Bodily Integrity

Chinese law authorizes the collection of people's biometrics for certain specific purposes. The Identification Card Law, for example, authorizes the police to collect people's fingerprints and photos. Otherwise, Chinese law authorizes police collection of people's biometric samples – "fingerprints, blood, urine, and other biological samples" – only when they are connected to the investigation of a specific criminal case.

Prohibitions against Torture and other Ill - Treatment

The Chinese government adopted legal prohibitions on the mistreatment of persons in custody as early as 1979, ratified the United Nations Convention against Torture in 1988, and launched official campaigns to curb torture. In 2012, for example, the National People's Congress revised the country's Criminal Procedure Law to require law enforcement officials to improve access to legal counsel for criminal suspects and to exclude their confessions and written statements obtained through torture.

APPLICABLE TREATIES AND STANDARDS

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948)
- UDHR, arts. 18-19
- UDHR, art. 13
- UDHR, art. 7
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 660 U.N.T.S.
- ICERD, art. 5
- UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22
- ICCPR, art. 12
- ICCPR, art. 12
- ICCPR, arts. 2 & 26
- ICCPR, art. 17
- ICCPR, art. 6
- G.A. res. 44/25
- U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989)
- G.A. res. 45/111
- U.N. Doc. A/45/49
- G.A. res. 43/173
- U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988)
- UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions
- U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (1989)
- 4, G.A. res. 39/46
- U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)
- Convention against Torture, art. 15
- G.A. res. 44/25

CONCLUSION

The aforementioned topics are meant to serve the purpose of being basic guidelines for directing the committee and starting points for the research that is to be carried out by the delegates. Delegates are expected to discuss and deliberate upon the pressing issue of human rights violations of the Uyghur community and formulate solutions in order to resolve this crisis.