


# Overview of Cryptography

Brief intro to crypto

# Cryptography: Introduction




- What is it: Cryptography is about protecting data




# Who's Charlie? What does he want?

- Charlie is an “adversary”
- Charlie's goals:
- Attack **Confidentiality** – Reading private message sent from Alice to Bob
- Attack **Integrity** – Modify private message
- Attack **Authenticity** – Impersonate Alice or Bob
- “Protecting” = Stop Charlie!

# Why Bother? Examples



# Towards a Solution



- Selects encryption algorithm  $E$
- Selects decryption algorithm  $D$
- Generates key  $K$

Some points:

1. If  $E_K$  and  $D_K$  are same, **symmetric** crypto
2. If  $E_K$  and  $D_K$  are different, e.g., Alice $E_K$ , Alice $D_K$ , and Bob $E_K$ , Bob $D_K$ , **public key** crypto


# Goals of Cryptography

- Mainly ensure *CIA*: **C**onfidentiality, **I**ntegrity, **A**uthenticity of data
- Additional worthy goals: Non-repudiation, Fairness, Forward security...
- Is it impossible to break crypto algorithms?
- Certainly not! Everything is breakable, **given enough time and computing power.**
- The point is: make it so that it takes too much time (non-polynomial)

# Overview of Encryption

- Block ciphers: message divided into blocks
- Stream ciphers: continuous stream of bits
- Block cipher: Message divided into groups of bits – “blocks”. Each block encrypted by same key

$M = b_1 || b_2 || \dots || b_n$   
 $E_K(b_1) = b'_1$   
...  
 $E_K(b_n) = b'_n$



$$D_K(x) = E_K^{-1}(x)!$$


$$D_K(b'_1) = b_1$$

...

$$D_K(b'_n) = b_n$$

# Symmetric Encryption


- Also called “shared-key encryption”
- Denoted by tuple  $(E,D,K)$
- $E$  and  $D$  known to all,  $K$  is secret
- Assume  $K$  is given to Alice and Bob, for now





# Symmetric Encryption...cont'd

- Why salt/randomness?
- An encryption algorithm *must* be randomized
  - Why?
  - Encryptions of messages shouldn't be “predictable”
  - 2-option messages: Buy/Sell, Attack/Retreat, Pass/Fail, ...




# Why didn't the “Encryption” Work?

- It didn't work because:
  - Every encryption of any given message comes out the same way
  - Encryptions become guessable...
- 
- Solution: randomize the plaintext
  - Random bitstring (salt) added to each plaintext *before* it gets encrypted

# Modes of Symmetric Encryption


- Mode 1: Electronic Code Book (ECB)



- Can't be used for real-world stuff
- Main weakness: If  $Message_1 = Message_2$ , then  $Ciphertext_1 = Ciphertext_2$

# Mode 2: Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)


- Corrects weakness of Mode 1 (ECB)



Curious?  
Try `$openssl speed --help`

# Public-key Cryptography

- Why do we need it?
- Lets go back to Alice and Bob
- But where does  $K$  come from? Magic?
- Alice and Bob need to setup a  $K$  *a-priori*



# Public-key Cryptography

- Is setting up a  $K$  prior to encryption inconvenient?
- Yes! For multiple reasons
  - Alice and Bob need to have a secure connection to setup  $K$ 
    - Need to avoid Eavesdropping Eve!
  - What if Alice and Charlie need to talk next?
    - Need to setup separate key




Sigh! Wish this could  
be less tiresome!

# Public-key Cryptography

- Can we help Alice?
- Yes!
- Let Alice have 2 keys ( $PK_A, SK_A$ )
- $PK_A$  – public, e.g., an e-mail address
- $SK_A$  – secret, e.g., e-mail password
- No key setup
- No secure connection for setup required
- Similarly for Bob ( $PK_B, SK_B$ ), Charlie ( $PK_C, SK_C$ ),...

# Public-key Cryptography





# Public-key Cryptography

- But where do PKA and PKB come from?
- Is PKA really Alice's key? PKB Bob's key? Stolen keys? How can we be sure?
- Get public keys certified by a trusted authority
  - Certification authority
  - E.g., VeriSign (most popular), Entrust, ...
  - Exercise for the curious: Who certifies NMSU's public key?

# Cryptographic Strength

- Public-key crypto is based on mathematically hard problems: factorization, discrete-log
  - E.g., given primes  $p, q$ , easy to compute  $N=p \cdot q$
  - Given  $N$ , hard to find factors  $p, q$  – no *efficient* algorithm exists
- Alice computing  $(PK_A, SK_A)$ , encrypting with  $PK_A$  – easy
- Attacker given  $PK_A$ , trying to compute  $SK_A$  – mathematically hard
- Symmetric key crypto based on series of substitutions, permutations – more latitude



# The Best of Both

- So, if PKC is all that great, do we even need symmetric encryption?
  - Yes, because public-key crypto is **orders of magnitude slower** than symmetric crypto
  - Convenient and secure, but inefficient
- Symmetric key crypto – very fast. Why? Bit-wise ops.
- Hybrid encryption
  - Use (PK,SK) to establish shared key K
  - Use K for everything thereafter

# Key Lengths – Symmetric Crypto

- Only way of breaking symmetric key crypto – brute force the key
  - 10-bit key:  $2^{10}$  possible values of key
  - 64-bit key (DES):  $2^{64}$  possible values – (breakable)
- Legend: NSA reduced 64-bit to 56-bit in 1975 based on their then max. computing abilities!
- 128-bit key:  $2^{128}$  combinations – secure for foreseeable future (AES, state-of-the-art)
- 256-bit key:  $2^{256}$  combinations – secure for hundreds of years
- 512-bit key:  $2^{512}$  combinations - until the sun freezes over and/or aliens take over the planet

# Key Lengths – Public-key Crypto


- Public-key crypto: RSA (de-facto standard)
  - Good key size in bits: 2048-recommended, 4096-if paranoid
  - “Breaking” = factoring  $N = p \cdot q$ ; try out primes from  $[2.. \lceil N \rceil]$
  - Broken till date: RSA-768 ( $N = 768$  bits,  $\sim 232$  decimal digits)
  - RSA factoring challenge – cash prizes for factoring large numbers (discontinued in 2007)
- 
- But very easy to write bad implementations e.g., WEP
  - Botched up implementations of good algorithms all too common

# A Few more Primitives

- Encryption just provides confidentiality
- What about integrity, authenticity?
- Cost? Huge message = huge ciphertext 😞
- More tools:
- Message authentication code (MAC)
- Hash functions
- Digital Signatures

# Message Authentication Code (MAC)

- Provide (data) authenticity and integrity



# Message Authentication Code (MAC)

- Provide authenticity and integrity



$$C = E_K(M), \text{ Tag} = \text{MAC}(K, M)$$




- $M = \text{DK}(C)$
- $\text{MAC}(K, M) \rightarrow \text{Tag}'$
- Is  $\text{Tag} = \text{Tag}'$ ?

- Error correction codes e.g., CRC, are a form of MAC



# Hash Functions

- Provide message integrity
- Data Compression: Variable size input → Fixed size output



User that wants to  
login to her account

Is this safe: NO!

- What if Bob gets hacked into?
- What if Charlie intercepts Alice's password ?

Curious?


See `/etc/shadow` file  
on \*nix systems!

Idea:

- Use a one-way “Hash” function
- $H(\text{password}) = 02d3af$  (an unintelligible hexd. value)

# Digital Signatures

- Based on public-key cryptography



- What is M? Known to both parties, e.g., a contract
- Why hash?
- Hashing prevents replay attacks
- Compactness

- Verify:  $D_{PK_A}(Sig) = X$
- Bob knows M;
- Is  $H(M) = X$  ?
- If yes, signature is valid

# Wrap-up and Recap

- Symmetric (shared key) crypto – efficient, but requires a shared secret to be setup
  - Modes of operations: ECB, CBC, ...
  - E.g., DES, 3DES, AES
- Public-key crypto – easy to use, no shared secrets, but expensive (w.r.t. time)
  - E.g., RSA
- Encryption merely provides confidentiality
- Integrity, authenticity require MACs, Hash functions, Digital signatures
- Security metric – key length
  - Symmetric crypto – good length 128 bits and more
  - Public-key crypto – good length 2048 bits and more

# Take-away Points

- Nothing is impossible to break, just that it takes ridiculously to do so
- More technically “can’t be done in polynomial time”
- Randomness plays an important role in crypto!
- Good algorithms should hold up to serious scrutiny
  - All well-regarded algorithms are public
  - Security through obscurity doesn’t work!

