# **OpenZeppelin Security Audit Report**

# **Ganjes DAO Smart Contracts**

# **Audit Overview**

Project: Ganjes DAO Smart Contracts

Date: August 20, 2025

Tools: Slither Static Analysis, OpenZeppelin Defender SDK

Contracts: 4 smart contracts analyzed

Total Findings: 80 security issues

Risk Level: HIGH (Critical vulnerabilities present)

Recommendation: Address critical issues before deployment

# **Risk Summary**

Severity	Count	Priority
Critical	2	Immediate Fix Required
High	8	Fix Before Deployment
Medium	15	Fix in Next Version
Low/Info	55+	Optimization & Best Practices

# ■ CRITICAL FINDINGS (2)

# **RE-1: Reentrancy Vulnerabilities in Proposal Creation**

- Location: GanjesDAOSimplified.sol:95-138, ProposalManagement.sol:135-228
- Issue: State variables written after external token transfers
- Impact: Attackers can manipulate proposal limits and bypass cooldowns
- Fix: Implement ReentrancyGuard or Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern

## **RE-2: Reentrancy in Voting Functions**

- Location: GanjesDAOSimplified.sol:140-171
- Issue: Multiple state updates after external calls in vote() function
- Impact: Vote manipulation and potential double-spending attacks
- Fix: Apply reentrancy protection and reorder operations

# ■ HIGH RISK FINDINGS (8)

#### **AC-1: Missing Access Control on Critical Functions**

- Multiple administrative functions lack proper access control
- Fix: Implement OpenZeppelin's AccessControl or Ownable

#### TX-1: Transaction Order Dependence (MEV Vulnerability)

- Functions vulnerable to front-running attacks
- Fix: Implement commit-reveal schemes or timestamp-based ordering

#### **COMP-1: Stack Too Deep Compilation Error**

- GanjesDAOOptimized.sol fails to compile
- Fix: Enable --via-ir flag or reduce local variables

# ■ MEDIUM RISK FINDINGS (15)

#### **EQ-1: Dangerous Strict Equality Check**

- Using == for timestamp comparison in ProposalManagement.sol:418
- Fix: Use <= or range checks instead of strict equality

#### **US-1: Unused State Variables**

- Multiple unused variables increase gas costs
- Fix: Remove unused variables or mark as private

## **UF-1: Unused Functions (15+ functions)**

- Dead code bloats contract size
- Fix: Remove unused functions or document if needed for future

# ■ LOW RISK & INFORMATIONAL (55+)

#### **NC-1: Naming Convention Violations (25+ parameters)**

- Parameters not following mixedCase convention
- Example: \_projectName → projectName

#### **GS-1: Gas Optimization Opportunities**

- Variables that should be constant or immutable:
- SimpleToken.decimals, name, symbol → constant
- GanjesDAO.admin, votingDuration → immutable

#### **LD-1: Large Number Literals**

• Use scientific notation: 1000000 \*  $10**18 \rightarrow 1e6$  \* 1e18

## PRIORITIZED REMEDIATION PLAN

## Phase 1: Immediate (Critical/High Risk)

- 1. Implement ReentrancyGuard on all external calls
- 2. Add proper access control to administrative functions
- 3. Fix compilation issues in GanjesDAOOptimized.sol
- 4. Secure all token transfer operations
- 5. Review and test all state-changing functions

## Phase 2: Short-term (Medium Risk)

- 1. Replace strict equality checks with range checks
- 2. Remove unused state variables and functions
- 3. Implement comprehensive input validation
- 4. Add proper error handling throughout contracts

# Phase 3: Long-term (Optimization)

- 1. Fix naming convention violations
- 2. Declare appropriate variables as constant/immutable
- 3. Optimize gas usage patterns
- 4. Improve code documentation and comments

#### OPENZEPPELIN INTEGRATION RECOMMENDATIONS

## **Security Modules to Import:**

- @openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol
- @openzeppelin/contracts/security/Pausable.sol
- @openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol
- @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol

## **Consider Migration to OpenZeppelin Governor:**

- Standardized DAO governance framework
- Battle-tested security implementations
- Community-reviewed codebase