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Why Group Apologies Succeed and Fail: Intergroup Forgiveness and the Role of Primary and Secondary Emotions

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It is widely assumed that official apologies for historical transgressions can lay the groundwork for intergroup forgiveness, but evidence for a causal relationship between intergroup apologies and forgiveness is limited. Drawing on the infrahumanization literature, we argue that a possible reason for the muted effectiveness of apologies is that people diminish the extent to which they see outgroup members as able to experience complex, uniquely human emotions (e.g., remorse). In Study 1, Canadians forgave Afghanis for a friendly-fire incident to the extent that they perceived Afghanis as capable of experiencing uniquely human emotions (i.e., secondary emotions such as anguish) but not nonuniquely human emotions (i.e., primary emotions such as fear). Intergroup forgiveness was reduced when transgressor groups expressed secondary emotions rather than primary emotions in their apology (Studies 2a and 2b), an effect that was mediated by trust in the genuineness of the apology (Study 2b). Indeed, an apology expressing secondary emotions aroused no more forgiveness than a no-apology control (Study 3) and less forgiveness than an apology with no emotion (Study 4). Consistent with an infrahumanization perspective, effects of primary versus secondary emotional expression did not emerge when the apology was offered for an ingroup transgression (Study 3) or when an outgroup apology was delivered through an ingroup proxy (Study 4). Also consistent with predictions, these effects were demonstrated only by those who tended to deny uniquely human qualities to the outgroup (Study 5). Implications for intergroup apologies and movement toward reconciliation are discussed.

Keywords: intergroup forgiveness, infrahumanization, empathy, trust, social identity

In the 20th century alone, more than 231 million people were killed in over 250 wars—the bloodiest in human history (Garfield & Neugut, 1997; Leitenberg, 2006). Although the cruelty groups can commit against one another is undeniable, humans have the capacity to recognize that illegitimate harm has been committed and are often motivated to atone for those wrongs (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). It has been widely argued that official apologies by perpetrator groups lay the foundation for repairing past harms and promoting intergroup forgiveness (e.g., Barkan & Karn, 2006; Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008; Govier & Verwoerd, 2002; Lazare, 2004; Minow, 2002; Staub, 2005; Tavuchis, 1991).

Perhaps because of this belief, in recent years there has been an unprecedented surge in the number of official apologies that leaders have made on behalf of their group for historical transgressions (Brooks, 1999; Oliner, 2008). Yet very little empirical research has been conducted on whether an official apology for intergroup harm is in fact successful in promoting intergroup forgiveness. In the few studies in which this relationship has been assessed, the results have been mixed. Whereas at least one study found that apologies successfully promote intergroup forgiveness (e.g., Brown et al., 2008), other research has presented a more pessimistic picture (e.g., Chapman, 2007; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008, 2011).

In this article, we present one possible reason for the muted effectiveness of intergroup apologies. In line with research on infrahumanization (Leyens et al., 2000), we argue that members of transgressed groups diminish the extent to which they perceive outgroup members as genuinely able to experience complex, uniquely human emotions (e.g., remorse). When such emotions are expressed by outgroups, the apology is seen as inauthentic and consequently has little effect on intergroup forgiveness. It is argued that transgressor groups can overcome this problem by (a) expressing apologies using primary emotional expressions or (b) using an ingroup member to issue the apology by proxy. In so doing, we provide the first theoretical analysis—as well as the first empirical demonstration—of how infrahumanization processes can negatively influence the effects of official apologies on intergroup forgiveness. At the same time, these studies offer concrete, practical and "do-able" strategies to maximize the impact of intergroup apologies.

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Intergroup Apologies and Forgiveness

In recent years, there has been an upsurge in nations' willingness to consider their moral obligation toward groups they have illegitimately harmed (Barkan, 2000; Lazare, 2004). Some of this debate has focused on the necessity of official public apologies to those harmed groups. Indeed, it has been argued that humanity has entered into an "age of apology" in which it has become increasingly normative for groups to apologize to each other for both historical and contemporary harms (Brooks, 1999). Because they allow transgressor groups to take responsibility for events in the past—and to express remorse for those events—intergroup apologies are seen by many to be a valuable tool for promoting intergroup forgiveness (e.g., Auerbach, 2004, 2005).

Research on *interpersonal* transgressions—that is, harms committed by one individual against another in the absence of a salient intergroup context—has shown an apology to be a powerful catalyst for interpersonal forgiveness (e.g., Exline & Baumeister, 2000; McCullough et al., 1998;McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; Wohl, Kuiken, & Noels, 2006). It is appealing to believe that what works at the interpersonal level should also succeed at the intergroup level. Evidence for the effectiveness of intergroup apologies, however, is far less consistent. Brown and colleagues (2008) have provided the most optimistic account thus far of the role of apologies in promoting intergroup forgiveness. In April 2002, four Canadian soldiers were killed by "friendly fire" from the U.S. military in Afghanistan. In their study, Brown and colleagues led Canadian participants to believe that the United States either had or had not apologized for the incident. Compared with participants in the control condition, participants in the apology condition reported lower motivation to engage in revenge against the U.S. military.

Data collected in other contexts paint a less optimistic picture regarding the healing power of conciliatory rhetoric. Nadler and Liviatan (2006) exposed Israeli–Jewish participants to statements from a Palestinian leader who did or did not express empathy and responsibility for Israelis' suffering. These statements had no overall effect on willingness to engage in reconciliation. Although the conciliatory statements promoted reconciliation intentions among those who had high levels of intergroup trust, this effect was counteracted by an equally strong reduction in reconciliation tendencies among low-trust participants.

In a more recent study, Philpot and Hornsey (2008) told Australian participants that various outgroups had or had not apologized for historical transgressions against Australians. In four studies utilizing five examples of historical transgression, an intergroup apology had no effect on forgiveness for the outgroup. This was the case regardless of how long after the apology forgiveness was measured. It was also the case regardless of whether or not the apology was emotional in tone, and even persisted when a victim of the transgression urged Australians to accept the apology and forgive. Interestingly, in line with the research on interpersonal forgiveness, when an individual soldier apologized for his personal transgressions, this led to greater forgiveness for that individual. However, there was no evidence that an apology—be it an official group apology or an individual apology—led to greater forgiveness of the transgressing group than did a no-apology control condition.

Subsequent research by Philpot and Hornsey (2011) reinforced this somewhat pessimistic picture. In a series of survey studies, they showed that memories for historical apologies were often weak and that beliefs about whether a group had apologized were only loosely connected with historical reality. For example, people in Australia, the Philippines, and Malaysia were significantly more likely to believe that Japan had not apologized for WWII than to say (correctly) that they had apologized. In contrast, Australians were eight times more likely to believe that a company had apologized for an example of corporate negligence than to believe (correctly) that they had not. Furthermore, beliefs about a transgressor group's apology history had no reliable effect on levels of forgiveness for that group. Interview data with primary victims of intergroup transgressions also suggest a mixed picture with regard to the link between apologies and forgiveness. After a 6-year assessment of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Chapman (2007) noted that victims rarely raised the notion of forgiveness spontaneously, struggled to represent forgiveness in intergroup terms, and, when prompted, were reluctant to grant it.

In sum, empirical research suggests that official apologies may not be as effective as people presume in promoting intergroup forgiveness. However, it remains a mystery as to why this should be the case. The current research examines, for the first time, the role of infrahumanization in affecting responses to apologies and tests whether the infrahumanization process results in victim groups interpreting apologies through a suspicious lens.

Apology and Intergroup Forgiveness: The Role of Infrahumanization

According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), group membership constitutes a fundamental part of people's sense of self and provides a framework for how people interact with ingroup and outgroup members. It is important to note that an outcome of social identification with a given group is the tendency to ascribe more positive characteristics to the ingroup than the outgroup (Brewer, 1979; Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006; Hewstone, Rubin, & Wills, 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). One manifestation of this phenomenon is *infrahumanization*—the tendency to believe that ingroup members are more able to experience complex emotions than are outgroup members (Leyens, 2009; Leyens et al., 2000).

In particular, a distinction is drawn between emotions perceived to be uniquely experienced by human beings (e.g., sorrow) and those perceived to be experienced by humans and other animals alike (e.g., anger). Although the infrahumanization literature uses nomenclature that suggests a particular structure to emotions, it is not a commentary on the structure of emotions per se (for a discussion on the structure of emotions, see Barrett, 2006). Instead, infrahumanization stems from people's perceptions of others' ability to experience certain emotions. Specifically, this literature has shown that people perceive some emotions to be relatively high in humanness (also termed *secondary emotions* by some emotion researchers; e.g., Sloman, 2001). Furthermore, ingroup members are perceived to be able to experience these emotions to a greater extent than are outgroup members (see Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003; Viki & Abrams, 2003). Infrahumanization is particularly interesting

because it is subtle and does not require explicit likening of outgroup members to animals (thus, infrahumanization should not be confused with dehumanization) and because the denial of the ability to experience both positively and negatively valenced secondary emotions is not reducible to ingroup favoritism (see Haslam, 2006). The perceived differential ability to experience these secondary emotions predicts a plethora of intergroup attitudes and behaviors.

It has been suggested that seeing the humanity in members of outgroups is a necessary precondition for intergroup forgiveness (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005; Tutu, 1999). If we work from this assumption, then infrahumanization by definition reduces our capacity to forgive outgroups. In line with this, research on Catholics and Protestants in Ireland showed that the less people infrahumanized outgroup members, the more willing they were to forgive the other group (Tam et al., 2007).

In the present investigation, we examined the extent to which the infrahumanization process influences reactions to an official apology—a supposedly humanizing act (see Friedman, 2005; Tavuchis, 1991; Tutu, 1999). On the one hand, it could be argued that the process of apologizing would demonstrate the emotional richness and complexity of the outgroup. By successfully communicating the outgroup's inner humanity, it could be that the apology itself would eliminate the well-established infrahumanization effect. An alternative view, however, can be advanced. Specifically, because of the tendency for victim groups to perceive outgroups as relatively unable to feel the uniquely human emotional qualities that apologies traditionally seek to express (e.g., remorse, shame, concern), official apologies might be interpreted as disingenuous. From this perspective, official apologies might be especially unconvincing when they use secondary (or uniquely human) emotional expressions.

Overview of Current Studies

In 2006, Canada took over control of the multinational force positioned in southern Afghanistan (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2006). An inevitable consequence of being so heavily involved in war time operations is the death of soldiers by friendly fire, that is, the killing of soldiers by one's own or allied forces rather than by enemy forces. Since taking control of the multinational forces, there have been at least seven identified Canadian fatalities due to friendly fire (Canada.com, 2009); however the exact number is classified. In five studies we examined the effectiveness of an official apology for a friendly-fire incident within the context of the war in Afghanistan on intergroup forgiveness (a sixth study focused on an example of Chinese corporate negligence that harmed Americans). We also examined the influence of the infrahumanization process on the relationship between an official apology and intergroup forgiveness.

Study 1 was designed to establish the infrahumanization effect within this context. Furthermore, we tested whether the infrahumanization process was linked to forgiveness in the context of the apology, and if so, why. In subsequent studies, we manipulated the context of an official apology to contain the expression of either primary emotions (i.e., emotions perceived to be not uniquely human) or secondary emotions (i.e., emotions perceived to be uniquely human). If the attribution of secondary emotions is assumed to humanize the outgroup and facilitate intergroup forgiveness, it should be anticipated that the expression of secondary emotions in an apology by the outgroup would be similarly beneficial. However, in line with the reasoning expressed earlier, it could also be that members of transgressed groups will be mistrustful of expressions of secondary emotions from outgroups, with the ironic consequence that such expressions might inhibit forgiveness. These competing predictions were tested in Study 2a. In Study 2b, we assessed whether the observed effects generalized to a different context (an apology by China for applying paint containing lead on children's toys shipped to the United States). Returning to the Afghanistan context, Study 3 was designed to assess whether the adverse effect of expressions of secondary emotions in an apology are restricted to outgroup apologies. In line with an infrahumanization perspective, we hypothesized that an ingroup apology would be effective regardless of whether that apology contained a primary or secondary emotion.

In Studies 4 and 5, we sought to examine a possible means by which to overcome the negative consequences of expressing secondary emotions within an apology. Specifically, in Study 4, we tested the possibility that the negative effects of infrahumanization could be overcome if outgroup members allow an ingroup member to make the apology by proxy. In Study 5, we tested our presumed psychological processes by showing that the ameliorating effect of the ingroup proxy is moderated by the extent to which people attribute uniquely human qualities to Afghanis.

Study 1

Study 1 had two aims. First, we wished to establish the infrahumanization effect within the current intergroup context (Afghanis and Canadians). Second, we examined the relevance of infrahumanization to the apology–forgiveness link at the intergroup level. To this end, Canadian participants read that an official apology was offered following the friendly-fire death of Canadian soldiers by Afghanistan National Police (ANP) or the friendly-fire death of ANP by Canadian soldiers. In line with previous research on intergroup forgiveness (e.g., Schimel, Wohl, & Williams, 2006; Wohl & Reeder, 2004), it was predicted that our Canadian participants would be more forgiving when they were led to believe the ingroup (Canadian army) committed the transgression than when they were led to believe the outgroup (ANP) had committed the transgression. More relevant to the current article, we also predicted that the participants would infrahumanize the Afghanis—in other words, that they would attribute more secondary emotions (but not primary emotions) to other Canadians than to the Afghanis. We further predicted that the greater the level of infrahumanization (i.e., the lower the attribution of secondary emotion), the less Canadians would be forgiving of the ANP following the apology.

We also considered the mechanism by which infrahumanization might undermine intergroup forgiveness. Based on the interpersonal forgiveness literature, one reason why intergroup apologies might not be effective is the lack of empathy for the perpetrator group. Empathy has been shown to be one of the strongest predictors of interpersonal forgiveness (McCullough et al., 1997, 1998), and many have argued that feeling empathy for the offender (i.e., compassion for a suffering other) is a necessary step in the forgiveness process (Enright & the Human Development Study Group, 1996; Worthington, 1998). Although much of the theoret-

ical and empirical work on empathy and forgiveness has been conducted in the context of interpersonal transgressions, it seems reasonable to argue that empathy might also be of relevance at the intergroup level (Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 2009; Oliner, 2005, 2008). Batson, Polycarpou, Harmon-Jones, and Imhoff (1997), for example, found that empathy for an outgroup member reduced biases against the group as a whole, and Tam and colleagues (2008) found that contact between adversarial group members facilitated intergroup forgiveness through empathy.

Infrahumanization highlights differences between groups because it calls into question the ability of outgroup others to experience the uniquely human emotions that ingroup members attribute to themselves. Given that feelings of commonality and connection are fundamental to empathy (e.g., Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995), the net effect would be that the infrahumanization process should diminish intergroup forgiveness because it reduces empathy for outgroup members. Thus, we hypothesized that empathy would mediate the relationship between the attribution of secondary emotions to the ANP and willingness to forgive.

Method

Participants. Eighty-four (31 men, 53 women) introductory psychology students at a large eastern Canadian university participated in Study 1. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 56 years, with a mean age of 21.38 years ($SD = 5.81$). All participants had been born in Canada and reported an ethnicity other than Middle Eastern and a religion other than Islam. This sample characteristic was important to ensure that participants did not perceive Afghanis as being part of an ingroup. All participants received course credit for their participation.

Procedure. Participants were randomly sent to one of two websites corresponding to either the Afghan apology or the Canadian apology condition. Thereafter, participants were directed to a page that had the appearance of a news brief section from a national newspaper. This news brief described an altercation in Afghanistan in which ANP officers [or Canadian soldiers] killed or injured several Canadian soldiers [or ANP officers] in a friendly-fire incident. The news story ended with a statement that authorities apologized for the unfortunate event and that measures would be taken to ensure such an event would not occur again. Although the event described in the news story was based on real events that occurred in the summer of 2006 (see Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2006b), we manipulated the report of the event to include the presence of an apology. Specifically, participants were led to believe that the apology was a factual aspect of events that transpired (in reality, no apology was offered). Participants then completed a series of Likert-type measures (infrahumanization, empathy, and forgiveness) that assessed feelings about the relevant transgressor group. Thereafter, participants were fully debriefed.

Measures. All items in the current study (as well as all subsequent studies) were anchored at 1 (*strongly disagree*) and 7 (*strongly agree*).

Infrahumanization. Due to time constraints on participation, we adapted the Cuddy, Rock, and Norton (2007) infrahumanization measures by shortening the scale from 14 to eight items. These items included three primary emotions ($\alpha = .80$; confusion, fear, and panic) and five secondary emotions ($\alpha = .89$; grief, sorrow, anguish, guilt, and remorse). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they believe the transgressors (Canadian soldiers or ANP) felt these emotions as a result of the harm caused.[1]

Empathy. We assessed empathy with two items adapted from Miron, Branscombe, and Schmitt (2006), ($r = .67$). These items were "I feel compassion for Afghanistan National Police [Canadian soldiers]," and "I am moved by the thought of what the Afghanistan National Police is [Canadian soldiers are] going through."

Forgiveness. To assess forgiveness of the transgressing group, we used four items ($\alpha = .92$) adapted from Wohl and Branscombe (2005). These items were "I forgive the Afghanistan National Police [Canadian soldiers] for the harm done to the Canadian soldiers [Afghanistan National Police]," "I don't hold any negative feelings toward the Afghanistan National Police [Canadian soldiers] for their actions," "I forgive the Afghanistan National Police [Canadian soldiers] for their role in this incident," and "It is not possible for me to forgive the actions of the Afghanistan National Police [Canadian soldiers] " (reverse-scored).

Results

Preliminary analysis. A two-way between-participants analysis of variance (ANOVA; Condition × Gender) was performed on all dependent variables. Because the main effect of gender was not significant for any of the dependent variables, $ps > .24$, nor were the interactions, $ps > .11$, all subsequent analyses collapsed across participant gender.

Main results. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of condition on attribution of primary emotions, $F(1, 82) = 1.05$, $p = .31$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. Specifically, participants attributed the same amount of primary emotions to outgroup transgressors (i.e., the ANP: $M = 3.77$, $SD = 1.47$) as they did to ingroup transgressors (i.e., Canadian soldiers: $M = 4.12$, $SD = 1.60$). There was, however, a significant main effect for attributions of secondary emotions, $F(1, 79) = 22.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .22$, in that participants attributed significantly less capacity for secondary emotion to the ANP ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.30$) than to Canadian Soldiers ($M = 4.85$, $SD = 1.40$). Thus, we were able to establish that infrahumanization of members of the ANP did occur even in the context of the offer of apology.

Participants reported feeling significantly less empathy for the members of the ANP ($M = 3.00$, $SD = 1.37$) than they did for the Canadian soldiers ($M = 5.16$, $SD = 1.36$), $F(1, 82) = 50.58$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .38$. Moreover, participants were significantly more forgiving of the Canadian soldiers ($M = 4.97$, $SD = 1.24$) than they were of the ANP ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 1.64$), $F(1, 82) = 10.47$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$.

Associations among measured variables.

Canadian soldiers. The first set of correlations relate to the condition in which Canadian soldiers were reported as the transgressors. Thus, empathy and forgiveness were measured in relation to the ingroup. Attribution of primary emotions to the Canadian soldiers was not associated with attributions of secondary emo-

[1] In Study 1, as well as all subsequent studies, we only examined negative emotions due to the nature of the event (i.e., an intergroup friendly-fire incident). This is because, in a pilot study, participants indicated it was nonsensical that people would feel positive emotions for harming others when an apology had been offered.

tions, $r = .13$, $p = .43$; ingroup empathy, $r = .08$, $p = .62$; or ingroup forgiveness, $r = .02$, $p = .92$. Attributions of secondary emotions, however, were positively associated with ingroup empathy, $r = .45$, $p = .005$; and ingroup forgiveness, $r = .32$, $p = .05$. Ingroup empathy was positively associated with ingroup forgiveness, $r = .63$, $p < .001$.

ANP. The second set of correlations relate to the conditions in which ANP members were reported as the transgressors. Thus, measures of empathy and forgiveness in this case related to the outgroup. As predicted, attribution of primary emotions to members of the ANP was not associated with either intergroup empathy, $r = -.01$, $p = .96$; or intergroup forgiveness, $r = -.06$, $p = .70$; but was associated with attributions of secondary emotions, $r = .42$, $p = .005$. Attributions of secondary emotions to the ANP were positively associated with intergroup empathy, $r = .36$, $p = .02$; and intergroup forgiveness, $r = .33$, $p = .03$. Intergroup empathy was positively associated with intergroup forgiveness, $r = .69$, $p < .001$.

Mediation analysis. Because we sought to explain in*ter*group forgiveness (i.e., forgiveness of the ANP) rather than in*tra*group forgiveness (i.e., forgiveness of the Canadian army), mediation analysis was conducted exclusively in the conditions in which the ANP were reported as the transgressors. We examined whether the association between attributions of secondary emotions to the ANP and forgiveness could be explained by intergroup empathy. We employed Baron and Kenny's (1986) regression procedure for testing mediation. Because we knew from the correlations that the attribution of secondary emotions was significantly associated with intergroup empathy and intergroup forgiveness, we proceeded to test the full mediation model. Attributions of secondary emotions and intergroup empathy were entered into a regression equation with intergroup forgiveness as the dependent variable, $R^2 = .47$, $F(2, 40) = 17.82$, $p < .001$. The coefficient associated with intergroup empathy significantly predicted intergroup forgiveness, $\beta = .64$, $t(41) = 5.23$, $p < .001$. However, intergroup forgiveness was no longer significantly predicted by attribution of secondary emotions, $\beta = .10$, $t(41) = .82$, $p = .42$. We then used the bootstrapping technique (with 1,000 iterations) recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) for small samples to determine whether the indirect effect of attributions of secondary emotions on intergroup forgiveness was due to increased empathy. The indirect effect for intergroup empathy was estimated to lie between .01 and .31 with 95% confidence and was thus significantly different from zero at $p < .05$ (two tailed).

Discussion

The results of this experiment provided strong support for our predictions. Canadian participants infrahumanized the ANP by ascribing them less capacity for secondary emotion than Canadian soldiers. There was no between group differences, however, in the attributions of primary emotions. Participants also reported greater empathy and forgiveness of Canadian soldiers who harmed members of the ANP than of ANP members who harmed Canadian soldiers. Among participants in the ANP transgressor condition, attribution of secondary (but not primary) emotion was positively associated with forgiveness of the ANP to the extent that they felt empathy for the ANP. Neither attribution of primary nor secondary emotions to Canadian soldiers influenced empathy or forgiveness of these soldiers for harming the ANP.

In sum—and in line with predictions—empathy mediated the relationship between the attribution of secondary emotions to the ANP and willingness to forgive. Thus, we identified infrahumanization as one of the barriers to forgiveness of outgroup transgressors. In the subsequent four studies, we extrapolated from this conclusion to test the prediction that outgroup apologies would be more effective in promoting forgiveness if they contained expressions of primary emotions than if they contained expressions of secondary emotions. In Studies 2a and 2b, we provided an initial test of this hypothesis, using different constellations of secondary and primary emotional expressions in each study.

Study 2a

In Study 2a, participants were exposed to expressions of two primary or two secondary emotions within the context of an intergroup apology for the friendly-fire killing of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan by the ANP. It could be argued that outgroup members might be able to overcome the barrier of infrahumanization by highlighting the expression of uniquely human, secondary emotion in their apologies. Indeed, according to Wohl and Branscombe (2005), emphasizing the common humanity underlying the transgressor and victim groups has subsequent payoff in terms of intergroup forgiveness. An alternative argument, however, is that the expression of secondary emotions by an outgroup would be inconsistent with ingroup members' beliefs about the outgroup's emotional capacity (e.g., Vaes et al., 2003). As such, when outgroup members express secondary emotions, intergroup empathy and subsequent intergroup forgiveness might be undermined.

Method

Participants. Participants were 47 (18 men, 28 women, 1 unidentified) introductory psychology students at a large eastern Canadian university. They ranged in age from 17 to 33 years ($M = 20.13$, $SD = 6.00$). Once again, all participants had been born in Canada and reported an ethnicity other than Middle Eastern and a religion other than Islam. All participants received 0.5% in grade-raising credit for their participation.

Procedure and measures. The procedure and measures for Study 2a were identical to those used in Study 1 with some notable exceptions. Because the focus of this program of research is to understand the conditions under which an official apology is more or less likely to promote forgiveness among members of a victimized group, in Study 2a, we focused solely on transgressions committed by the outgroup. Furthermore, we manipulated the expression of primary and secondary negative emotions within the context of the outgroup apology instead of measuring the attribution of these emotions.

As in Study 1, upon accessing the online study and granting consent, participants were randomly sent to one of two websites corresponding to either the primary or secondary emotional expression conditions. All participants read a news brief section from a national newspaper that described the friendly-fire death of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan by the ANP and the subsequent official apology offered by Afghanistan defense minister Abdul

Rahim Wardak. During the apology, Wardak expressed anger and sadness (in the primary emotion condition) or shame and concern (in the secondary emotion condition) on behalf of all Afghanis that such an event transpired. These emotions were chosen based on international normative data (on 6-point scale; J.-F. Leyens, personal communication, November 20, 2008) in which anger (3.06) and sadness (2.53) are equivalently low in humanness and were thus categorized as primary emotions, whereas shame (5.06) and concern (5.18) were equivalently high on humanness and thus categorized as secondary emotions. After reading the apology, participants completed the same dependent measures as in Study 1: empathy ($r = .71$), and intergroup forgiveness ($\alpha = .89$).

Results

Preliminary analysis. A two-way between-participants ANOVA (Emotion Condition × Gender) was conducted on all dependent variables to test for possible gender differences. Because the main effect of gender was not significant for any of the dependent variables, $ps > .09$, nor were the interactions, $ps > .47$, all subsequent analyses were collapsed across gender.

Main effects. A one-way ANOVA indicated that Canadian participants reported feeling significantly less empathy for the ANP when they expressed secondary emotions ($M = 2.83$, $SD = 1.29$) than when they expressed primary emotions ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 1.24$), $F(1, 44) = 4.27$, $p = .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$. Similarly, participants were significantly less forgiving of the ANP when the apology contained expressions of secondary emotions ($M = 3.75$, $SD = 1.29$) than when the apology contained expressions of primary emotions ($M = 4.54$, $SD = 1.24$), $F(1, 44) = 4.50$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$.

To determine if the effect of our manipulation on intergroup forgiveness could be explained by empathy, we employed Baron and Kenny's (1986) procedure for testing mediation. As the ANOVA indicated, the emotion manipulation (coded as 0 = primary emotions, 1 = secondary emotions) predicted empathy and intergroup forgiveness. When both the manipulation and empathy were entered simultaneously, the regression equation accounted for substantial variance in intergroup forgiveness, $R^2 = .29$, $F(2, 44) = 9.16$, $p < .001$. The coefficient associated with empathy, $\beta = .47$, $t(45) = 3.56$, $p = .001$, but not the emotion manipulation, $\beta = -.07$, $t(52) = -0.65$, $p = .52$, significantly predicted intergroup forgiveness. We then used the bootstrapping technique (with 1,000 iterations) recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) for small samples to determine whether the indirect effect of the manipulation on intergroup forgiveness was due to increased empathy. The indirect effect was estimated to lie between -0.02 and -1.05. Because zero is not in the 95% confidence interval, the indirect effect is indeed significantly different from zero at $p < .05$ (two tailed).

Discussion

The results of Study 2a support the notion that expressions of complex, secondary emotions by outgroup members induce negative reactions and extend this effect to include intergroup forgiveness. Canadian participants reported less intergroup forgiveness of the ANP for harming Canadian soldiers when an official apology contained expressions of secondary emotion than when the apology contained expressions of primary emotion—a result of reduced empathy. This result is in line with previous research (see McCullough et al., 1997, 1998) that has identified empathy as an antecedent of forgiveness. Empathy, however, may not be the only mechanism through which expression of secondary emotions influences intergroup forgiveness. Following ingroup victimization, issues of trust become highly salient. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that intergroup gestures of contrition are often met with skepticism (Chapman, 2007; Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, & Brown, 2008; Hewstone et al., 2004; Maoz & Ellis, 2008; Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Nadler & Saguy, 2004; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). When groups express uniquely human emotional qualities—emotions that they are perceived to be relatively unable to feel—trust in the apology may become further strained, thus undermining intergroup forgiveness. We tested this possibility in Study 2b by directly comparing the mediational role of trust with that of empathy.

We also wanted to assess whether the results of Study 2a would generalize to a different context. In Study 2a, the two groups employed were allies. As a result, the ANP might have been seen to be members of a common ingroup with the Canadian soldiers. It is important to assess whether comparable results could be demonstrated in a situation where the two groups could not be viewed as sharing membership at a superordinate level. To this end, in Study 2b, we examined the impact of an apology by the Chinese to Americans for producing children's toys adorned with paint that contained lead.

Lastly, Study 2b allowed for an assessment of whether the effects observed in Study 2a were due to characteristics of the particular emotions expressed in that study. Although the international normative data that guided the choice of emotions used in Study 2a are helpful for understanding how people rate the humanness of various emotions, it is possible that they might have varied on dimensions other than humanness that could have accounted for reduced empathy and intergroup forgiveness. For example, the emotions expressed might have varied in terms of perceived morality and negative affectivity. It can be argued that expressions of anger and sadness convey a different level of moral regard for others (i.e., the victim) than did shame, which is a self-oriented emotion (see Tangney, 2001). Thus, Study 2b was conducted with a different quartet of emotions expressed.

Pilot Study

Before conducting Study 2b, we wanted to make sure that emotion terms were chosen that differed in perceived humanness but did not differ on other key dimensions such as negative affectivity, morality, and arousal. We conducted a pilot study examining ratings of four emotion terms: rage, sadness, dejection, and repulsion. These terms were selected for the pilot study because J.-F. Leyens (personal communication, November 20, 2008) found they were approximately equidistant from the mean of humanness (rage and sadness being below the mean and dejection and repulsion being above the mean).

In the pilot study, 123 non-Muslim, Canadian-born introductory psychology students (56 men and 67 women) read a vignette in which Afghanistan defense minister Abdul Rahim Wardak expressed rage, sadness, repulsion, or dejection for the friendly-fire killing of Canadian soldiers. Participants then rated the emotional

expression on perceived humanness, negative affectivity, morality, and arousal. Because there were no main effects of sex (all ps $>$ .12) nor any interactions between expressed emotion and sex (all ps $>$ .09), we collapsed across sex. Between-participants ANOVA revealed that perceived negative affect, $F(3, 119) = 0.85$, $p = .47$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, and perceived morality, $F(3, 119) = 1.56$, $p = .23$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, were not contingent on the emotion expressed. However, there was a significant main effect of humanness, $F(3, 119) = 6.33$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$. Specifically, participants perceived repulsion and dejection to be greater in humanness than rage and sadness, ps $< .04$. Neither repulsion and dejection, nor rage and sadness, differed from each other, ps $> .96$. This reinforces the work by J.-F. Leyens (personal communication, November 20, 2008) that repulsion and dejection are perceived to be genuinely secondary emotions, whereas rage and sadness are perceived to be genuinely primary emotions.

There was also a significant main effect of arousal, $F(3, 119) = 41.02$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .51$. Participants perceived repulsion and rage to be more arousing emotions than dejection and sadness, ps $< .04$. Neither repulsion and rage, nor dejection and sadness differed from each other, ps $> .79$. We were satisfied, then, that each cluster of primary and secondary emotions comprised one high arousal term and one low arousal term. This meant that we had a diversity of emotion words in terms of arousal, but because the overall level of arousal between the primary and secondary emotion terms were equivalent, there was no possibility of confounds. In sum, we were satisfied that the two sets of emotion terms (rage and sadness on the one hand; dejection and repulsion on the other) differed on humanness but not on overall negativity, perceived morality of tone, or arousal.

Study 2b

To recap, Study 2b was conducted to address three issues. First, we wanted to assess a possible alternative mechanism for the effect of emotional expression on intergroup forgiveness observed in Study 2a: trust. Because people tend to diminish the capacity for outgroups to *experience* secondary emotions, they may be mistrusting when outgroups *claim* to experience those emotions in their apology. On the basis of this logic, one might expect that outgroup apologizers would elicit less trust if they used secondary emotions than if they used primary emotions. These effects would be expected to have flow-on effects on levels of forgiveness. Second, we wanted to generalize the effects observed in Study 2a to a different intergroup context. Third, it was important to determine whether the effects observed in Study 2a could be replicated with different primary and secondary emotions, with possible variations in perceived affectivity, morality, and arousal statistically controlled.

Method

Participants. Participants were 53 (21 men, 32 women) Americans recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk Web site (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Each participant was paid $1.00 for their time (a relatively large amount in this market). All participants had been born in the United States and reported an ethnicity other than Asian. They ranged in age from 18 to 68 years ($M = 34.06$, $SD = 11.95$).

Procedure and measures. The procedure and measures for Study 2b were identical to those used in Study 2a with a few exceptions. First, the newspaper article discussed how children's toys made in China were coated with paint that contained lead and the subsequent official apology offered by China's minister of commerce Chen Deming. Second, during the course of the apology, rage and sadness (in the primary emotion condition) or repulsion and dejection (in the secondary emotion condition) were expressed over the use of leaded paint. After reading the apology, participants completed the same dependent measures as in Studies 1 and 2a—empathy ($r = .88$) and intergroup forgiveness ($\alpha = .95$)—with the reference group changed to Chinese. However, we included four additional items to assess the extent to which American participants trusted that the Chinese felt the emotions they expressed ($\alpha = .88$). These items were "I believe that the Chinese really are enraged [repulsed] and saddened [dejected] by their role in this incident," "I am skeptical that the Chinese are feeling what they say they are feeling about the incident (reverse scored)," "I believe that the Chinese are feeling what they say they are feeling about the incident," and "I trust that the Chinese are feeling the emotions they expressed."

Results

Preliminary analysis. A two-way between-participants ANOVA (Emotion Condition $\times$ Gender) was conducted on all dependent variables to test for possible gender differences. Because the main effect of gender was not significant for any of the dependent variables, ps $> .09$, nor were the interactions, ps $> .07$, all subsequent analyses were collapsed across gender.

Main effects. As predicted, participants reported less empathy for the Chinese when they expressed secondary emotions ($M = 2.88$, $SD = 1.23$) than when they expressed primary emotions ($M = 3.62$, $SD = 1.41$), $F(1, 51) = 4.07$, $p = .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. Trust of the emotions expressed were also less when those emotions were secondary ($M = 3.19$, $SD = 1.38$) rather than primary ($M = 4.10$, $SD = .87$), $F(1, 51) = 8.32$, $p = .006$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$. American participants were also less forgiving of the Chinese when they expressed secondary emotions ($M = 3.51$, $SD = 1.70$) as compared with primary emotions ($M = 4.40$, $SD = 1.32$), $F(1, 51) = 4.55$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$.

Mediation analyses. To determine if the effect of our manipulation on intergroup forgiveness could be explained by either empathy or trust (or both), we employed Baron and Kenny's (1986) procedure for testing mediation. Because we knew from the ANOVAs that the emotion manipulation (coded as 0 = primary emotions, 1 = secondary emotions) predicted empathy, trust, and intergroup forgiveness, we proceeded to test the full mediation model. When all three predictors were entered simultaneously, the regression equation accounted for substantial variance in intergroup forgiveness, $R^2 = .31$, $F(3, 49) = 7.36$, $p < .001$. With both mediators in the model, as shown in Figure 1, only the coefficient associated with trust of the emotions expressed remained significant, $\beta = .44$, $t(51) = 3.37$, $p = .001$. Neither the emotion manipulation, $\beta = -.06$, $t(51) = -0.48$, $p = .63$, nor empathy, $\beta = .22$, $t(51) = 1.78$, $p = .08$, significantly predicted intergroup forgiveness. We then used the bootstrapping technique (with 1,000 iterations) to determine whether the indirect effect of the emotion manipulation on intergroup forgiveness was due to increased trust



Figure 1. Mediation model with the emotional expression manipulation as the independent variable, intergroup empathy and trust as the mediator, and intergroup forgiveness as the dependent variable: Study 2b. The coefficients shown in parentheses reflect the inclusion of the mediators in the equation. Coefficients with an asterisk indicate significant beta weights, $p < .05$.

of the emotions expressed. The indirect effect was estimated to lie between −1.02 and −0.14 with 95% confidence. Because zero is not in the 95% confidence interval, the indirect effect is indeed significantly different from zero at $p < .05$ (two tailed). In sum, the effect of emotional expression on forgiveness was mediated through trust and not empathy.

Discussion

Results from Study 2b generalized the results observed in Study 2a by showing that American participants were less willing to extend intergroup forgiveness to the Chinese when an apology contained expressions of secondary emotions than when the apology contained expressions of primary emotions. Thus, the effects observed in Study 2a are not restricted to the Afghanistan context or the particular relationship between the ANP and the Canadian army.

In addition, when the apology by the Chinese contained secondary emotions, American participants were particularly skeptical that the outgroup was genuinely experiencing those emotions. This lack of trust mediated the effect of emotional expression on forgiveness (and its inclusion erased the mediating role of empathy demonstrated in Study 2a). The effects observed in Study 2b were obtained with primary and secondary emotions that differed from those used in Study 2a, thereby increasing confidence in our general hypothesis that expression of secondary emotions within an intergroup apology damages victimized group members' willingness to forgive.

Study 3

In Study 3, we returned to the Afghanistan context to address two additional issues. First, we sought to demonstrate that the adverse effect of expressions of secondary emotions in an apology is restricted to apology offered by an outgroup. Because ingroups are not typically infrahumanized, we predict that an ingroup apology would be effective regardless of whether that apology contained a primary or secondary emotion. Second, neither Study 2a nor Study 2b contained a condition in which no apology was offered. Thus, a no-apology control condition was included in Study 3 as a baseline to anchor the relative effect of using primary or secondary emotions during an apology.

Method

Participants. Participants were 167 (46 men, 120 women, 1 unidentified) introductory psychology students at a large eastern Canadian university. They ranged in age from 17 to 47 years ($M = 20.01$, $SD = 3.56$). As for the previous studies, all participants had been born in Canada and reported an ethnicity other than Middle Eastern and a religion other than Islam. They received course credit for their participation.

Procedure and measures. The procedure for Study 3 was identical to that used in Study 2b with a few exceptions. First, we returned to the context used in Studies 1 and 2b in which participants read about the friendly-fire killing of soldiers in Afghanistan. Second, we added an ingroup transgressor condition in which ANP soldiers were killed by members of the Canadian army. General Wardak issued the apology in the outgroup transgression condition, whereas Canadian defense minister Peter MacKay issued the apology in the ingroup transgression condition. This resulted in a 2 (transgressor group: ingroup v. outgroup) × 3 (apology condition: no apology vs. primary emotion apology vs. secondary emotion apology) between-groups design. Measures of empathy ($r = .82$), trust ($\alpha = .87$), and forgiveness ($\alpha = .87$) used in Study 3 were identical to those used in Study 2b, except the reference group changed with the identity of who committed the transgression (i.e., ANP or Canadian military).

Results

Preliminary analysis. We first conducted a three-way between-participants ANOVAs (Transgressor Group Membership × Apology Condition × Gender) on trust and forgiveness. Because there were neither significant main effects of gender on either of the dependent variables, ps $> .61$, nor any interactions involving gender, ps $> .12$, we collapsed across participant gender for all subsequent analyses.

Empathy. A two-way ANOVA (Transgressor Group × Apology Condition) was conducted on empathy. Results showed a significant main effect of transgressor group, $F(1, 160) = 63.94$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .29$. Participants had less empathy for Afghani transgressors ($M = 2.60$, $SD = 1.06$) than Canadian transgressors ($M = 3.97$, $SD = 1.13$). There was no main effect of apology condition, $F(2, 160) = 0.09$, $p = .92$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$. Neither was there a significant interaction between transgressor group and apology condition, $F(2, 160) = 1.28$, $p = .28$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$.

Trust in the statement. A two-way ANOVA (Transgressor Group × Apology Condition) was conducted on trust in the statement. Results showed a significant main effect of transgressor group, $F(1, 161) = 38.86$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .20$. Participants trusted the Afghani statement ($M = 3.51$, $SD = 1.13$) less than the Canadian statement ($M = 4.56$, $SD = 1.03$). There was no main effect of apology condition, $F(2, 161) = 1.22$, $p = .30$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$; however, there was a significant interaction between transgressor group and apology condition, $F(2, 161) = 5.15$, $p = .007$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. Among participants who read a statement from the Afghani defense minister, there was a main effect of apology condition, $F(2, 161) = 5.39$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. Tukey's post hoc tests demonstrated that participants were more trusting of the statement in the primary emotions condition ($M = 4.07$, $SD = 1.18$) than in either the secondary emotions ($M = 3.20$, $SD = 0.98$) or no-apology control conditions ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 1.07$), ps $< .009$. The secondary emotions and no-apology control conditions did not differ significantly, $p = .66$. However, no main effect of apology condition emerged when the statement was made by the Canadian defense minister for an ingroup transgression, $F(2, 161) = 0.83$, $p = .44$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$.

Forgiveness. A two-way ANOVA (Transgressor Group × Apology Condition) was conducted on willingness to forgive. A main effect for transgressor group was observed, $F(1, 161) = 67.43$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .30$. Specifically, participants were less willing to forgive the ANP ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 1.07$) than their own (Canadian) military ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 1.18$). Mirroring the effects on trust, no main effect of apology condition was observed, $F(2, 161) = 2.36$, $p = .10$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, but there was a significant interaction between transgressor group and apology condition, $F(2, 161) = 6.45$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. Among participants who read about an outgroup (Afghani) transgression, there was a significant main effect of apology condition, $F(2, 161) = 7.79$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$. Tukey's post hoc tests demonstrated that participants were more forgiving in the primary emotions condition ($M = 3.98$, $SD = 1.34$) than in either the secondary emotions ($M = 2.84$, $SD = 0.78$) or no-apology control conditions ($M = 3.20$, $SD = 0.79$), ps $< .008$. The secondary emotions and no-apology control conditions did not differ significantly, $p = .21$. No main effect of apology condition was observed when the statement was made by the Canadian defense minister in relation to an ingroup transgression, $F(2, 161) = 0.76$, $p = .47$, $\eta_p^2 = .009$.

Tests of mediated moderation. Our next goal was to test a mediated-moderation model. Specifically, we sought to assess whether the interaction between transgressor group and apology condition on willingness to forgive could be accounted for by trust in the statement made following the transgression (empathy was not included as a potential mediator because it was not predicted by the interaction between transgressor group and apology condition). Because there were no significant differences between the secondary emotion apology condition and the no-apology control condition on either of the measured variables, these conditions were collapsed for analytic purposes (coded 0 = apology with primary emotions and 1 = combined apology with secondary emotions and no-apology control conditions).

The previous analyses established that the transgressor group by apology condition interaction predicted both trust and forgiveness. A regression test confirmed that trust predicted forgiveness, $\beta = .45$, $t(165) = 41.83$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .20$. When trust was added to the model predicting forgiveness, $R^2 = .38$, $F(4, 162) = 24.39$, $p < .001$, both the transgressor group by apology condition interaction, $\beta = .21$, $t(161) = 2.51$, $p = .01$, and trust remained significant predictors of forgiveness, $\beta = .21$, $t(161) = 2.96$, $p = .004$. Next, we used Preacher and Hayes' (2008) bootstrapping macro with 5,000 iterations for testing the conditional indirect effect of the interaction term on forgiveness through trust (controlling for the unique effects of the transgressor group and apology condition variables). The indirect effect of the interaction term through trust was estimated to lie between .06 and .23 with 95% confidence. Because zero is not in the 95% confidence interval, the indirect effect is indeed significantly different from zero at $p < .05$, thus establishing mediated moderation.

Discussion

Results from Study 3 once again supported our general hypothesis that secondary emotions expressed when apologizing undermine the apology's ability to promote intergroup forgiveness. In fact, expressing secondary emotions were found to be akin to the absence of an apology. As in Study 2b, trust significantly mediated the effect of apology emotion on willingness to forgive. We were also able to demonstrate that the observed effects are limited to outgroup apologies. Canadian participants were both trusting and forgiving of their ingroup regardless of whether a primary or secondary emotion was expressed.

These results are interesting from a social and political standpoint. Apologies have been the core of intergroup reconciliation efforts. However, the emotions that people might intuitively think are imperative to express within the context of an apology might be counterproductive. The challenge is to find a mechanism by which outgroups can express secondary emotions to yield the benefits that stem from having ingroup members see their humanness but to defuse the mistrust that surrounds such expressions. It is known that individuals favor and reward members of groups in which they feel a subjective membership (ingroups) while denigrating and holding biases against groups to which they have no subjective claim (outgroups; Brewer, 1979; Hewstone et al., 2002; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel & Tuner, 1979). Moreover, people are more likely to help members of their ingroup

and deny aid to members of outgroups (see Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005, for a review). If we engage in social protest in attempts to achieve social justice, it is on behalf of our ingroup that we tend to take action (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987). However, there are times in which ingroup members act as an outgroup advocate (see Borshuk, 2004). Especially in the political milieu, group leaders will act as an advocate for an outgroup in order to sway public opinion. For example, Archbishop Desmond Tutu's advocacy of F. W. de Klerk and South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission helped facilitate the movement of the country beyond its apartheid past (see Tutu, 1999).

It seems plausible that the use of an ingroup advocate or ingroup proxy for an apology could help reduce some of the biases apparent in previous studies. Ingroup membership can become a heuristic that people use to gauge how trustworthy somebody is (Brewer, 1981; Tanis & Postmes, 2005; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). In short, ingroup members are often trusted—even in the absence of a history of interpersonal transaction—and outgroup members are instinctively met with mistrust (Bronfenbrenner, 1961; Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990). When "owned" and passed on by an ingroup member, ambiguous aspects of an outgroup message might be given the benefit of the doubt (Hornsey & Imani, 2004). In the context of the current research, the net effect would be that an official apology offered by proxy (via an ingroup member) should manifest in greater empathy for the outgroup as well as greater trust of the apology itself. A prosocial consequence of empathy and trust should be increased intergroup forgiveness.

Study 4

In Study 4, Canadian participants either received the official apology directly from Afghanistan defense minister Wardak (as in Studies 2a and 3) or though Canadian General Rick Hillier (the proxy). The apology was expressed on behalf of all Afghanis with either primary emotions ("enraged" and "sadness") or secondary emotions ("repulsed" and "dejection"). We also included a control condition in which an apology was expressed without emotion-oriented words. This control condition was included to determine if expressions of secondary emotions reduce—or if expressions of primary emotions increase—empathy, trust, and intergroup forgiveness in the face of an apology.

In line with the previous studies, we hypothesized that apologies expressing secondary emotions would arouse less intergroup forgiveness than apologies expressing primary emotions and that the effect on forgiveness would be mediated through trust in the apology. We also hypothesized that the negative effects of secondary emotion expressions would be ameliorated when the apology was made by an ingroup proxy.

Method

Participants and design. One hundred and forty-three introductory psychology students (63 men and 80 women) at a large eastern Canadian university participated in Study 4 for course credit. They ranged in age from 18 to 47 years ($M = 19.97$, $SD = 3.40$). The study was accessible only to participants who had been born in Canada, who indicated their ethnicity was other than Middle Eastern, and whose religious background was other than Islam. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (apology source: outgroup vs. ingroup proxy) × 3 (apology emotion: primary vs. secondary vs. no emotion) factorial design.

Procedure. The procedure and measures—empathy ($r = .76$), trust ($\alpha = .83$), intergroup forgiveness ($\alpha = .88$)—for Study 4 were identical to Study 3, with three exceptions. First, we introduced a no-emotion-expressed apology control condition. Participants simply read that the ANP were "sorry for their role in this incident." Second, the trust measure was altered to reflect trust of the apology rather than trust that the ANP felt the emotions expressed (e.g., "I trust the apology offered by Afghan National Police"). Third, we manipulated who communicated the apology. For half of the participants, the official apology was offered by Afghani defense minister Abdul Rahim Wardak. For the other half of the participants, Canadian General Rick Hillier indicated that he had spoken to Wardak, and Wardak had wanted him to communicate the apology to the Canadian people.

Results

Preliminary analysis. A three-way between-participants ANOVA (Apology Source × Apology Emotion × Gender) was conducted on all dependent variables to test for possible gender differences. Because the main effect of gender was not significant for any of the dependent variables, ps $> .63$, nor were the interactions, ps $> .09$, all subsequent analyses were collapsed across gender.

Main analysis. Cell means and standard deviations for all measured variables are reported in Table 1.

Empathy. A main effect of apology source emerged on empathy, $F(1, 137) = 152.55$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .53$, indicating that

Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Measured Variables: Study 4

	Outgroup source: Emotion expressed						Ingroup proxy: Emotion expressed					
	Primary		Secondary		None		Primary		Secondary		None	
Variable	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Intergroup empathy	2.98_a	1.37	2.17_b	0.91	3.16_a	1.34	5.80_c	1.29	5.36_c	1.64	5.60_c	1.42
Trust in apology	3.37_a	0.73	2.40_b	0.91	3.49_a	0.79	4.76_c	0.71	4.65_c	0.96	4.51_c	0.79
Intergroup forgiveness	3.37_a	1.14	2.17_b	0.65	3.49_a	1.11	4.70_c	0.90	4.66_c	1.35	4.71_c	0.84

Note. Comparisons in a given row with different subscripts are significantly different at $p < .05$ according to Tukey's post hoc test.

participants were more empathetic when the ingroup proxy delivered the apology ($M = 5.58$, $SD = 1.46$) than when it was delivered by the outgroup ($M = 2.77$, $SD = 1.28$). There was also a significant effect of emotion expressed, $F(2, 137) = 3.41$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. However, Tukey's post hoc tests did not show differences between the no-emotion apology ($M = 4.32$, $SD = 1.84$), the primary emotion ($M = 4.39$, $SD = 1.94$), or the secondary emotion ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 2.09$) conditions, ps $> .46$. There was no significant interaction between apology source and emotion expressed, $F(2, 137) = 0.86$, $p = .43$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$.

Trust. As with empathy, there was a significant main effect of apology source, $F(1, 137) = 126.21$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .48$, showing that participants trusted the apology more when the apology was delivered by the ingroup proxy ($M = 4.65$, $SD = 0.83$) than by the outgroup ($M = 3.09$, $SD = 0.93$). There was also a significant effect of the emotion manipulation, $F(2, 137) = 6.30$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$. Tukey's post hoc tests revealed that there was greater trust in the apology when primary emotions were expressed ($M = 4.07$, $SD = 1.00$) than when secondary emotions were expressed ($M = 3.64$, $SD = 1.46$), $p = .03$. There were no differences, however, between the two emotion expression conditions and the no-emotion-expressed condition ($M = 3.98$, $SD = 0.94$), ps $> .12$. These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction, $F(2, 137) = 6.91$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$. When the apology came from an outgroup member, participants were more likely to trust that apology when there was no emotion expressed or when primary emotions were expressed than when secondary emotions were expressed, ps $< .001$. In contrast, when the apology was delivered by the ingroup proxy, there were no between-group differences in Canadian participants' trust of the apology, ps $> .05$.

Intergroup forgiveness. There was a significant main effect of apology source, $F(1, 137) = 92.17$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .40$, demonstrating that participants were more forgiving of the ANP when the apology was delivered by the ingroup proxy ($M = 4.69$, $SD = 1.07$) than by the outgroup ($M = 3.01$, $SD = 1.15$). There was also a significant effect of the emotion manipulation, $F(2, 137) = 6.36$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$. Tukey's post hoc tests showed that there was greater intergroup forgiveness when either no emotion was expressed during the apology ($M = 4.07$, $SD = 1.16$) or when primary emotions were expressed ($M = 4.04$, $SD = 1.22$) than when secondary emotions were expressed ($M = 3.54$, $SD = 1.65$), ps $< .05$. There was no difference, however, between the no emotion and the primary emotion conditions, ps $> .98$. A significant interaction qualified these main effects, $F(2, 137) = 5.50$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. When the apology came from an outgroup member, participants were more forgiving when there was no emotion expressed or primary emotions were expressed than when secondary emotions were expressed, ps $< .001$. There were no between-group differences in Canadian participants' willingness to forgive when the apology was delivered by the ingroup proxy, ps $> .05$.

Mediation analyses of the source effect. We next assessed if the apology source effects on intergroup forgiveness could be accounted for by either empathy or trust or both. Because we knew from the ANOVAs that apology source (coded as 0 = direct apology, 1 = apology by proxy) significantly influences empathy, trust, and forgiveness, we proceeded to test the full mediation model. When all three predictors were entered simultaneously, the regression equation accounted for substantial variance in intergroup forgiveness, $R^2 = .62$, $F(3, 139) = 77.06$, $p < .001$. The coefficients associated with both empathy, $\beta = .31$, $t(141) = 4.02$, $p < .001$, and trust, $\beta = .55$, $t(141) = 7.75$, $p < .001$, but not the apology source manipulation, $\beta = .02$, $t(141) = .21$, $p = .83$, significantly predicted intergroup forgiveness. We then used the bootstrapping technique (with 1,000 iterations) to determine whether the indirect effect of apology source on intergroup forgiveness was due to empathy. The indirect effect was estimated to lie between .05 and .12 with 95% confidence. We also examined whether the indirect effect of apology source on intergroup forgiveness was due to trust. This indirect effect was estimated to lie between .04 and .13 with 95% confidence. Because zero is not in the 95% confidence interval for either of the assessed mediators, the indirect effects are significantly different from zero at $p < .05$ (two tailed). In sum, increased forgiveness as a result of the apology offered by proxy (compared with the direct apology) was due to greater empathy with the transgressor group and greater trust in the apology when it came from the proxy.

Mediation analyses of the apology emotion effect. We then conducted analyses to examine the processes underpinning the effect of emotional expression on forgiveness. Because the emotion manipulation only showed between-group differences when the outgroup delivered the apology, we examined whether the effect of the emotion manipulation on intergroup forgiveness could be explained by either empathy or trust or both only among participants who read about an apology coming straight from the outgroup (coded as −1 = no emotion, 1 = primary emotions, 2 = secondary emotions).

When all three predictors were entered simultaneously, the regression equation accounted for substantial variance in intergroup forgiveness, $R^2 = .44$, $F(3, 66) = 17.39$, $p < .001$ (see Figure 2). Only the coefficient associated with trust of the apology remained a significant predictor of intergroup forgiveness, $\beta = .47$, $t(68) = 4.35$, $p < .001$. Neither the emotion manipulation, $\beta = -.21$, $t(68) = -1.87$, $p = .07$, nor empathy, $\beta = .18$, $t(68) = 1.81$, $p = .08$, significantly predicted intergroup forgiveness. We then used the bootstrapping technique (with 1,000 iterations) to determine whether the indirect effect of the emotion manipulation on intergroup forgiveness was due to trust in the apology. The indirect effect was estimated to lie between −.09 and −.53 with 95% confidence. Because zero is not in the 95% confidence interval, the indirect effect is indeed significantly different from zero at $p < .05$ (two tailed).

Discussion

Across dependent measures, no significant differences were found between the primary emotion conditions and the conditions in which no emotions were expressed, but both these conditions were significantly different from the expression of secondary emotions. Thus, we were able to demonstrate that it is the expression of secondary emotions that undermine the intergroup forgiveness process, rather than expressions of primary emotions acting as a facilitator of intergroup forgiveness. Consistent with Studies 2b and 3, trust in the apology mediated the relationship between the emotion manipulation and intergroup forgiveness.



Figure 2. Mediation model with the emotional expression manipulation (coded as −1 = no emotion, −1 = primary emotions, 2 = secondary emotions) as the independent variable, intergroup empathy and trust as the mediator, and intergroup forgiveness as the dependent variable: Study 3. The coefficients shown in parentheses reflect the inclusion of the mediators in the equation. Coefficients with an asterisk indicate significant beta weights, $p < .05$.

Perhaps the most important information garnered from Study 4, though, is the prosocial power of the ingroup proxy. By apologizing through a proxy, outgroup members are able to shield themselves from the negative effects of expressing secondary emotions. Specifically, by apologizing through a proxy, there was more trust in the apology and greater empathy for the ANP; this led to greater intergroup forgiveness. These results suggest that infrahumanization can play a significant role in determining the effectiveness of an official apology for intergroup harm, but that the negative effects of expressions of secondary emotions within an apology can be ameliorated by an ingroup advocate who expresses the outgroup apology by proxy.

Study 5

The underlying assumption in the current work is that infrahumanization processes drive reactions to the type of emotion outgroups express when apologizing. In Study 5, we directly tested this assumption by examining whether the perceived ability of outgroups to experience secondary emotions moderates the previously observed effects. If infrahumanization is the process at play, apologies that contain secondary emotions should undermine intergroup forgiveness among people who believe outgroup members have a reduced capacity to experience those emotions, but less so among those who do not question outgroup members' capacity to experience these emotions. To this end, participants completed a measure of infrahumanization prior to reading the apology.

Method

Participants. We sought to broaden the generalizability of the observed effect by using a community sample of 332 Canadians from across the country (144 men, 186 women, and two unidentified) in Study 5. They ranged in age from 21 to 82 years ($M = 53.73$, $SD = 12.07$). The study was accessible only to participants who were Canadian citizens. No participant was of Middle Eastern decent or had Islam as their religious affiliation. All participants received C$10 for their participation.

Procedure. The procedure and measures for Study 5 were identical to those used in Study 4 with a few exceptions. First, prior to reading the newspaper article about the killing of Canadian soldiers, participants completed the Cuddy et al. (2007) measure of infrahumanization. We were able to use the full 14-item scale with one exception: Because "rage" was an emotion expressed in the apology, we removed this primary emotion from the list and replaced it with "suffering," a primary emotion that is roughly equivalent in perceived humanness, according to J.-F. Leyens' (personal communication, November 20, 2008) international normative data. Thus, participants rated the extent to which they perceived Canadians and Afghanis as able to feel seven secondary emotions ($\alpha = .87$ and $\alpha = .87$, respectively: grief, sorrow, mourning, anguish, guilt, remorse, resentment) and seven primary emotions ($\alpha = .90$ and $\alpha = .89$, respectively: confusion, pain, distress, fear, panic, anger, suffering).

Because we wanted to increase the symmetry between the parties involved in the event, we changed the target transgressor from the Afghan National Police to the Afghan National Army (ANA). Thus, the apology was in reference to the killing of Canadian soldiers by members of the ANA. In addition, because the control condition did not differ significantly from the primary emotion condition in Studies 3 and 4, a control condition was not included in the current study. Lastly, because Canadian General Hillier retired prior to our conducting this study, he was referred to as "retired General Hillier." Note, although Hillier has retired, he remains a respected figure in Canada and Canadian politics. After

reading the apology, participants completed the same intergroup forgiveness measure used in Studies 2a, 3 and 4 ($\alpha = .96$).[2]

Results

Preliminary analysis. A three-way between-participants ANOVA (Apology Source × Apology Emotion × Gender) was conducted on all dependent variables to test for possible gender differences. Because the main effect of gender was not significant for any of the dependent variables, ps $> .29$, nor were the interactions, ps $> .20$, all subsequent analyses were collapsed across gender.

It should be noted that, as predicted, participants perceived Canadian people as able to experience secondary emotion ($M = 4.42$, $SD = 1.10$) more so than Afghani people ($M = 3.16$, $SD = .96$), $t(309) = 17.38$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .49$. However, there was no difference in the extent to which participants perceived Canadian people as able to experience primary emotion ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 1.22$) compared with Afghani people ($M = 4.44$, $SD = 1.60$), $t(307) = -1.76$, $p = .08$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. Overall, then, our Canadian participants displayed infrahumanization with respect to Afghanis.

Experimental effects. A two-way between-participants ANOVA (Apology Source [Afghani outgroup vs. ingroup proxy] × Apology Emotion [primary vs. secondary]) was then conducted on intergroup forgiveness.

There was a significant main effect of apology source, $F(1, 325) = 49.19$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$, demonstrating that participants were more forgiving when the apology was delivered by the ingroup proxy ($M = 4.82$, $SD = 1.28$) than by the outgroup ($M = 3.63$, $SD = 1.80$). There was also a significant effect of apology emotion, $F(1, 325) = 6.02$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, such that there was greater intergroup forgiveness when primary emotions were expressed ($M = 4.43$, $SD = 1.53$) than when secondary emotions were expressed ($M = 4.00$, $SD = 1.78$). A significant interaction qualified these main effects, $F(1, 325) = 9.92$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. When the apology came from an outgroup member, participants were more forgiving when primary emotions were expressed ($M = 4.11$, $SD = 1.73$) than when secondary emotions were expressed ($M = 3.16$, $SD = 1.75$), $F(1, 325) = 15.84$, $p < .001$. When the apology was delivered by the ingroup proxy, participants' willingness to forgive was the same regardless of whether the apology contained primary ($M = 4.76$, $SD = 1.22$) or secondary ($M = 4.88$, $SD = 1.34$) emotional expressions, $F(1, 325) < 1$, $p = .63$.

Moderation by secondary emotion attribution. Our next goal was to test whether the infrahumanization process moderates the effect of the emotion manipulation and apology source on intergroup forgiveness. As such, intergroup forgiveness was subjected to a moderated multiple regression. Attribution of secondary emotions was centered, and manipulations of emotional expression (primary = 0, secondary = 1) and apology source (Afghani outgroup = 0, ingroup proxy = 1) were dummy coded. Main effects were entered at Step 1, two-way interaction terms were entered at Step 2, and the three-way interaction term was entered at Step 3.

Mirroring the results of the ANOVA, significant main effects of emotional expression ($p = .022$) and apology source ($p < .001$) were qualified by a significant interaction between emotional expression and apology source ($p = .003$). There was also a main effect of attribution of secondary emotions, $\beta = .16$, $p = .002$. Consistent with Study 1, participants were more forgiving of the outgroup to the extent that they attributed secondary emotions to the outgroup. This main effect was qualified by a marginally significant three-way interaction among emotional expression, apology source, and secondary emotion attribution, $\beta = -.17$, $p = .080$.

Simple interactions were tested between secondary emotion attribution and emotional expression at each level of apology source. The interaction was significant when the apology stemmed from the outgroup, $\beta = .33$, $p = .031$, but not when it stemmed from an ingroup proxy, $\beta = .09$, $p = .165$. We followed up the significant interaction among those in the outgroup apology condition by examining the simple effects of emotional expression 1 *SD* above and below the mean of secondary emotion attribution (see Figure 3). Analysis of the simple slopes showed that for people who attributed high levels of secondary emotion to Afghanis, forgiveness was equivalent regardless of whether the apology was expressed with secondary or primary emotional expressions, $\beta = -.17$, $p = .30$. However, for people who attributed relatively low levels of secondary emotion to Afghanis, forgiveness was lower when the apology was expressed with secondary than with primary emotional expressions, $\beta = -.67$, $p < .001$. In other words, the tendency to withdraw forgiveness when outgroup members apologized using secondary emotional expressions only emerged among participants who denied the outgroup the capacity to feel secondary emotions.

Discussion

Results of Study 5 corroborated our previous results in a number of ways. In line with the results of Study 1, we showed that a community sample of Canadians believe Afghanis are less capable of experiencing secondary emotions than Canadians. Also in line with Study 1, beliefs that Afghanis are incapable of experiencing secondary emotions were associated with a lack of forgiveness in the face of an apology. Expressions of remorse that contained secondary emotions undermined intergroup forgiveness compared with expressions of remorse that contained primary emotions (consistent with Studies 2a–4), an effect that was eliminated by having the apology expressed through an ingroup proxy (consistent with Study 4). Study 5 extends these findings by showing that the negative effect associated with outgroup apologies that express secondary emotions is specific to people who attribute to the outgroup relatively limited capacity to experience secondary emotions. Thus, Study 5 provides support for the contention that the infrahumanization process plays a central role in appraisals of intergroup apologies, especially when the apology contains secondary emotions.

[2] In response to a reviewer's comment, we also asked participants if Afghanis experienced *schadenfreude* as a result of the tragedy: "Despite what they've expressed, the members of the ANA are at least partially happy with the killing of Canadian soldiers," "The members of the ANA take no pleasure in the killing of Canadian soldiers (reverse scored)," and "Although the members of the ANA expressed that they are sorry, they are also pleased that the victims of this event were Canadian soldiers" ($\alpha = .81$). Levels of *schadenfreude* were significantly below the midpoint of the 7-point scale ($M = 3.73$), and *schadenfreude* was not significantly affected by emotional expression or apology source (ps $> .12$).



Figure 3. Moderation of secondary emotion attribution on the effect of apology emotion (0 = primary emotion expressed, 1 = secondary emotion expressed) on intergroup forgiveness when the apology is offered directly from the outgroup: Study 5.

General Discussion

According to Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1999), intergroup forgiveness (and by extension peaceful intergroup relations) cannot be achieved unless people see the humanity in one another. An important catalyst for this process, it was argued, is an apology because telling the truth about the illegitimate harm committed confers humanity on victims and underscores the humanity in the perpetrators. Given Tutu's perspective on apologies, it is not surprising that he was an instrumental supporter of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission following the dismantling of the apartheid regime in that country. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the apologies that have been offered through this commission have successfully facilitated intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation (Chapman, 2007). This finding echoes results of some laboratory research (e.g., Philpot & Hornsey, 2008, 2011) showing that official apologies have little or no effect on intergroup forgiveness. Such results run in opposition to the abundance of research on interpersonal apologies that demonstrate a strong positive association between apology and forgiveness (Exline & Baumeister, 2000; McCullough et al., 1997, 1998; Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Wohl et al., 2006) as well as the overwhelming theoretical (as well political) discourse that rests on the presumption that official intergroup apologies are essential for intergroup forgiveness specifically and positive intergroup relations more generally (e.g., Auerbach, 2004, 2005; Oliner, 2005; Tutu, 1999). The current research is the first to shed some empirical light on a possible reason for the muted effectiveness of intergroup apologies.

Across six studies, we showed that, in line with Tutu's contention, the perceived humanity of the perpetrator group is an important predictor of the apology–forgiveness link. Specifically, we showed that the infrahumanization process plays a central role in victimized group members' willingness to forgive following an official apology. In Study 1, when an apology was offered to Canadians for a friendly-fire killing of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan, intergroup forgiveness was granted to the extent that the perpetrators of this harm (Afghanis) were perceived as able to experience uniquely human emotions. The more uniquely human emotions were attributed to Afghanis, the more forgiving were Canadian participants. Furthermore, Canadian participants had a tendency to deny that Afghanis possessed basic human emotions attributed to their Canadian counterparts. We showed that the tendency to infrahumanize dilutes the effectiveness of the official intergroup apology by reducing empathetic responses to the apologizing group and thus by reducing intergroup forgiveness.

Study 1 provided an important first step in understanding why official apologies fail—ingroups are reluctant to attribute secondary, humanizing emotions to apologizing outgroups. Attention was turned to a possible route to advance intergroup forgiveness following public statements of contrition. In Studies 2a, 2b, and 3, we examined whether this bias could be overcome by having outgroup members use secondary emotion terms in their apology. Two competing predictions were derived: one optimistic, one pessimistic. The optimistic prediction was that by using secondary emotion in their apology, outgroup members could demonstrate their capacity to experience uniquely human emotion, thus anticipating and defusing the infrahumanization effect. The pessimistic prediction was grounded in the presumption that the infrahumanization effect would be so robust that the use of secondary emotions would backfire, as apology recipients cast doubt on whether the apologizing group is capable of feeling the emotions that they are expressing.

Results from Studies 2a, 2b, and 3 provided support for the pessimistic version of the prediction. In Studies 2a and 3, when the ANP expressed secondary emotions within an official apology for the friendly-fire killing of Canadian soldiers, Canadians were less forgiving than when primary emotions formed the basis of the official apology. Generalizing this result, in Study 2b, Americans were less forgiving of the Chinese when an expression of contrition for having lead paint adorn children's toys shipped to the United States contained secondary emotions compared with apologies expressing primary emotions. We showed this effect with two different groups of primary and secondary emotions, thus decreasing the likelihood that the observed effects were due to characteristics of the emotion other than their perceived humanness. Moreover, the apology emotion effect was mediated by the extent to which the victimized group trusted that the perpetrator group could experience the expressed emotion (Studies 2b, 3, and 4). Indeed, trust (as opposed to empathy) was the key explanatory construct that linked emotional expression in an apology and willingness to forgive. When exposed to expressions of secondary emotion, participants were less trusting that the emotions were authentically felt by the outgroup, a suspicion that flowed on to reduced levels of forgiveness. Consistent with an infrahumanization perspective, Study 3 showed that these effects are restricted to apologies offered by outgroups. Participants were equally willing to trust and forgive the ingroup for transgressions committed against an outgroup regardless of the type of emotion expressed during an apology (or even if an apology was offered at all). Also consistent with an infrahumanization perspective, the impact of the apology emotion manipulation on intergroup forgiveness was moderated by the extent that Canadians perceived Afghanis to have a diminished capacity to experience secondary emotions (Study 5). Specifically, when the apology contained secondary emotions, intergroup forgiveness was undermined only among Canadian people who believe Afghanis have a reduced capacity to experience those emotions.

Results from Studies 2a, 2b, and 3 suggest that apologizing groups should avoid expressing secondary emotions when convey-

ing culpability for intergroup harm. Findings from Studies 4 and 5 offer an alternative. We were able to illustrate that the negative effects of an outgroup's expression of secondary emotions within an official apology can be eliminated by having a member of the victimized group apologize on behalf of the perpetrator group. This apology by proxy not only eliminated the differential impact of expressions of primary and secondary emotions within an apology but provided an overall booster effect on the victimized group's willingness to forgive. Specifically, Canadian participants were more forgiving of the ANP when Canadian General Rick Hillier apologized on behalf of the ANP than when the apology came directly from Afghani defense minister Abdul Rahim Wardak. Thus, perhaps the most important contribution of the current research from a social (as well as political) perspective is our ability to provide a blueprint for how transgressor groups can overcome the thorny infrahumanization dilemma.

Limitations

Some limitations of the current research should be noted. Participants in the study were not directly victimized by the perpetrators in the sense of being friends or family of the deceased. However, because participants were members of the group targeted, they were victimized by extension (see Brown et al., 2008). Understanding the reactions of secondary victims— people who share a common identity with primary victims but did not suffer directly—is crucially important. If apologies are to promote reconciliation and peace, they need to be effective in promoting forgiveness among the broader community and among subsequent generations. Having said that, we should make clear that the present research does not tell us whether the infrahumanization process affects forgiveness among primary victims.

It is possible that the proxy's ability to facilitate acceptance of an official apology might fluctuate with how the ingroup proxy's actions are perceived. For example, it is possible that willingness to forgive the outgroup when the apology is offered by an ingroup proxy would increase due to a belief that the proxy vetted its authenticity. The proxy, however, could hinder willingness to forgive if it is believed that such action is not in the best interests of their group (see Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001). Under such conditions, both the ingroup proxy and the official apology would likely be rejected. Thus, assessments of the limits and boundaries of apologizing through an ingroup proxy are an important avenue for future research.

Lastly, the transgressions used in the current research could be framed as either accidental (as was the case in the Afghanistan context) or due to negligence (the Chinese context). As a result, the findings are likely to be a conservative estimate of the extent to which official apologies are ineffective in promoting intergroup forgiveness. It is suspected that the infrahumanization effect observed across the reported studies would be greater when the transgressor group is an adversary and not a member of an allied force. Thus, the potential benefits of using a proxy in the delivery of an official apology become especially important if the goal is the improvement of intergroup relations.

Conclusions

It has been argued that an apology is a necessary precondition for intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation (Auerbach, 2004, 2005; Oliner, 2005; Tutu, 1999). However, there is now a growing literature (Chapman, 2007; Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008, 2011) that suggests official apologies have little to no impact on forgiveness. Across six studies, we demonstrated one reason why this might be the case. Specifically, we showed that official apologies are undermined by the infrahumanization process, not only because people attribute less secondary emotions to outgroups but also because they react negatively to expressions of secondary emotions by outgroups. By demonstrating that an ingroup proxy apologizer can eliminate the negative effects of infrahumanization, the current research has both practical and applied importance. When an ingroup member relays the offending group's official apology, trust and forgiveness become more likely, taking us one step closer to reconciliation.

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