



Set-UID

Yajin Zhou (<http://yajin.org>)

Zhejiang University



SET-UID

- A process has three IDs
 - Real user ID, effective user ID, saved user ID
 - Real user ID: the real owner of the process
 - Effective user ID: the ID used for access control

```
$ cp /bin/id ./myid
$ sudo chown root myid
$ ./myid
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) groups=1000(seed), ...
```



SET-UID

- We can use chmod to **set UID** for a program

```
$ sudo chmod 4755 myid
```

```
$ ./myid
```

```
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) euid=0(root) ...
```



How SET-UID Program Works


- A normal program cannot access /etc/shadow file

```
$ cp /bin/cat ./mycat
$ sudo chown root mycat
$ ls -l mycat
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root seed 46764 Feb 22 10:04 mycat
$ ./mycat /etc/shadow
./mycat: /etc/shadow: Permission denied
```

- A Set-UID program can

```
$ sudo chmod 4755 mycat
$ ./mycat /etc/shadow
root:$6$012BPz.K$fbPkT6H6Db4/B8c...
daemon:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
```

Attack Surface SET-UID Program





User Inputs & System Inputs

- Buffer overflow of user inputs
 - We have discussed in previous class
- Program can get inputs from the system
 - Read a file -> symbolic link
 - Make /tmp/xyz -> /etc/shadow : race condition



Environments

- We will discuss later



Leak privilege

```
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
```

```
void main()
{
    int fd;
    char *v[2];
```

```
    * and it is owned by root with permission 0644.
    * Before running this program, you should create
    * the file /etc/zzz first. */
```

```
    fd = open("/etc/zzz", O_RDWR | O_APPEND);
    if (fd == -1) {
        printf("Cannot open /etc/zzz\n");
        exit(0);
    }
```

```
    // Print out the file descriptor value
    printf("fd is %d\n", fd);
```

```
    // Permanently disable the privilege by making the
    // effective uid the same as the real uid
    setuid(getuid());
```

```
    // Execute /bin/sh
    v[0] = "/bin/sh"; v[1] = 0;
    execve(v[0], v, 0);
```




Leak privilege

- `/etc/zzz` is a file that can only be changed by a privileged program
- However the fd is not closed after `setuid`. As such this fd can still be used by the program to operate on the underlying file
 - The privilege is only checked when a file is opened.



Invoke Other Programs

- Unsafe way: System() function

NAME [top](#)

system - execute a shell command

SYNOPSIS [top](#)

```
#include <stdlib.h>
```

```
int system(const char *command);
```

DESCRIPTION [top](#)

The `system()` library function uses `fork(2)` to create a child process that executes the shell command specified in *command* using `execl(3)` as follows:

```
execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", command, (char *) NULL);
```



Invoke Other Programs

- Unsafe way: System() function
- Why? System uses /bin/sh to execute commands – *too* powerful

```
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char *cat="/bin/cat";

    if(argc < 2) {
        printf("Please type a file name.\n");
        return 1;
    }

    char *command = malloc(strlen(cat) + strlen(argv[1]) + 2);
    sprintf(command, "%s %s", cat, argv[1]);
    system(command);
    return 0 ;
}
```



Invoke Other Programs

```
$ gcc -o catall catall.c
$ sudo chown root catall
$ sudo chmod 4755 catall
$ ls -l catall
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root seed 7275 Feb 23 09:41 catall
$ catall /etc/shadow
root:$6$012BPz.K$fbPkT6H6Db4/B8cLWb....
daemon:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
games:*:15749:0:99999:7:::

$ catall "aa;/bin/sh"
/bin/cat: aa: No such file or directory
#      ← 得到了 root 权限的 shell!
# id
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) euid=0(root) groups=0(root), ...
```



Invoke Other Programs

- Safe way: `execve()` function

NAME [top](#)

`execve` – execute program

SYNOPSIS [top](#)

```
#include <unistd.h>
```

```
int execve(const char *pathname, char *const argv[],  
           char *const envp[]);
```

DESCRIPTION [top](#)

`execve()` executes the program referred to by *pathname*. This causes the program that is currently being run by the calling process to be replaced with a new program, with newly initialized stack, heap, and (initialized and uninitialized) data segments.

pathname must be either a binary executable, or a script starting with a line of the form:

```
#! interpreter [optional-arg]
```



Invoke Other Programs

- Safe way: `execve()` function

```
#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char *v[3];

    if(argc < 2) {
        printf("Please type a file name.\n");
        return 1;
    }

    v[0] = "/bin/cat"; v[1] = argv[1]; v[2] = 0;
    execve(v[0], v, 0);

    return 0 ;
}
```



Invoke Other Programs

- All the inputs will be treated as arguments!

```
$ gcc -o safecatall safecatall.c
$ sudo chown root safecatall
$ sudo chmod 4755 safecatall
$ safecatall /etc/shadow
root:$6$012BPz.K$fbPkT6H6Db4/B8cLWb....
daemon:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
games:*:15749:0:99999:7:::

$ safecatall "aa;/bin/sh"
/bin/cat: aa;/bin/sh: No such file or directory    ← Attack failed!
```