

Principles and Implementation Techniques of Software-Based Fault Isolation

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
Isolation via Protection Domains

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- A fundamental idea in computer security
 - ▣ [Lampson 74] “Protection”
- Structure a computer system to have multiple **protection domains**
 - ▣ Each domain is given a set of privileges, according to its trustworthiness

Example: the Separation between OS and User Applications

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- ❑ One OS domain (the kernel mode)
 - ▣ Privileged: execute privileged instrs; set up virtual memory; perform access control on resources; ...
- ❑ Multiple application domains
 - ▣ Go through OS syscalls to request access to privileged operations
 - ▣ Application domains are isolated by OS processes

Isolating Untrusted Components

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- Using separate protection domains is a natural choice for isolating untrusted components
- E.g., isolating plug-ins in a web browser
 - ▣ Malfunctioning/malicious plug-ins would not crash or violate the security of the browser
- E.g., isolating device drivers in an OS

Many Forms of Protection Domains

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- **Hardware-based virtualization:** Each domain in a virtual machine
 - ▣ Pros: easy to use; high degree of isolation
 - ▣ Cons: extremely high overhead when context switching between domains
- **OS processes:** each domain in a separate OS process
 - ▣ Pros: easy to use; cons: high context-switch overhead
- **Language-based isolation:** rely on safe languages or language features such as types
 - ▣ Pros: fine grained, portable, flexible, low overhead
 - ▣ Cons: high software engineering effort to use safe languages/features

Comparison of Forms of Protection Domains

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	Context-switch overhead	Per-instruction overhead	Require compiler support	Software engineering effort
Virtual machines	Very high	None	No	None
OS processes	High	None	No	None
Language-based isolation	Low	Medium (dynamic checking) or none (static checking)	Yes	High
SFI	Low	Low	Maybe	None or medium

* Per-instruction overhead: whether for each instruction additional checking is needed

Software-Based Fault Isolation (SFI)


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- Introduced by [Wahbe et al. 93] for MIPS
 - ▣ PittSFIeld [McCamant & Morrisett 06] extended it to x86
- SFI isolation is within the same process address space
 - ▣ Each protection domain has a designated memory region
 - ▣ Same process: avoiding costly context switches
- Implementation by inserting software checks before critical instructions
 - ▣ E.g., memory reads/writes, indirect branches.
- Pros: fine grained, flexible, low context-switch overhead
- Cons: may require some compiler support and software engineering effort

THE SFI POLICY

The SFI Sandbox Setup


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- Data region (DR): [DB,DL]
 - ▣ Holds data: stack, heap
- Code region (CR): [CB,CL]
 - ▣ Holds code
- Safe External (SE) addresses
 - ▣ Host trusted services that require higher privileges
 - ▣ Code can jump to them for accessing resources
- DR, CR, and SE are disjoint

The SFI Policy

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Implications of the SFI Policy

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□ **Non-writable code**

- ▣ All memory writes must write to DR
- ▣ Code region cannot be modified
 - No self-modifying code

□ **Non-executable data**

- ▣ Control flow cannot transfer to the data region
- ▣ Cannot inject data to DR and execute it as code
 - Code injection disallowed

Stronger Policies

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- An SFI implementation might implement a stronger policy
 - ▣ For implementation convenience
 - ▣ For efficiency
- E.g., PittSFIeld [McCamant & Morrisett 06]
 - ▣ Disallow jumping into the middle of instructions on x86, which has variable-sized instructions
- E.g., NaCl [Yee et al. 09]
 - ▣ Disallow system call instructions in the code region

SFI ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW

SFI Enforcement Overview


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- ***Dangerous instructions***: memory reads, memory writes, control-transfer instructions
 - ▣ They have the potential of violating the SFI policy
- An SFI enforcement
 - ▣ Checks every dangerous instruction to ensure it obeys the policy
- Two general enforcement strategies
 - ▣ Dynamic binary translation
 - ▣ Inlined reference Monitors

Dynamic Binary Translation

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
- Efficient interpretation of instructions
- For a dangerous instruction, the interpreter checks it is safe according to the policy
- Examples
 - ▣ Program shepherding [Kiriansky et al. 02]
 - ▣ libdetox [Payer & Gross 11]
 - ▣ VX32 [Ford & Cox, 08]



Inlined Reference Monitors (IRM)

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- A static program rewriter
 - ▣ Inlines checks into the input program
- More efficient
 - ▣ No dynamic translation costs
 - ▣ Can optimize checks via static analysis
- More trustworthy
 - ▣ A separate verifier can check that checks are inlined correctly
- The main SFI implementation strategy and the focus of the rest slides



Strategies for Implementing IRM Rewriters

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- Binary Rewriting
 - ▣ Input: binary code
 - ▣ Steps: perform disassembly; insert checks; assemble the instrumented code
 - ▣ Pros: not requiring source code
 - ▣ Cons: hard to disassemble stripped binaries
- Inside a compiler
 - ▣ Input: source code
 - ▣ Steps: the compiler inlines checks when generating binary code
 - ▣ Pros: can perform more optimizations on checks with richer information on code (e.g., types)

ENFORCING SFI'S DATA-ACCESS POLICY AND OPTIMIZATIONS

An Idealized Assembly Language

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- We introduce an idealized assembly language
 - ▣ For writing assembly-code examples to show SFI enforcement and optimizations

$(Instr)$	i	$::=$	$r_d := r_s \ aop \ op$ $ \ r_d := \text{mem}(r_s + w) \ \ \text{mem}(r_d + w) := r_s$ $ \ \text{if } (r_s \ cop \ op) \ \text{goto } w \ \ \text{jmp } op$
$(Register)$	r	$::=$	$r0 \ \ r1 \ \ r2 \ \ \dots$
$(Operand)$	op	$::=$	$r \ \ w$
$(ALOp)$	aop	$::=$	$+ \ \ - \ \ \gg \ \ \ll \ \ \& \ \ ' \ \ ' \ \ \dots$
$(CompOp)$	cop	$::=$	$> \ \ < \ \ \leq \ \ \geq \ \ = \ \ \neq \ \ \dots$

* w for a static constant word

Abbreviations and Terminology

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- $r := r' + 0$ abbreviated as $r := r'$
- In memory instructions, $\text{mem}(r+0)$ abbreviated as $\text{mem}(r)$
- Direct branches: $\text{jmp } w$
 - ▣ The jump target is a static constant word w
- Indirect branches: $\text{jmp } r$
 - ▣ The jump target is in a register and cannot always be statically determined

Example

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```
r3 := r1
r4 := r2 * 4
r4 := r1 + r4
r5 := 0
loop:
  if r3 ≥ r4 goto end
  r6 := mem(r3)
  r5 := r5 + r6
  r3 := r3 + 4
  jmp loop
end:
```

- r1 is a pointer to the beginning of an array
- r2 holds the array length
- The program computes in r5 the sum of array elements

Naïve Enforcement

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- Insert checks before memory reads/writes

```
mem(r1+12) := r2 //unsafe mem write
```



```
r10 := r1 + 12  
if r10 < DB goto error  
if r10 > DL goto error  
mem(r10) := r2
```

*Assume r10 is a scratch register

Naïve Enforcement

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- Sufficient for security ?
- Has a high runtime overhead
 - ▣ Two checks per memory access
- A practical SFI implementation
 - ▣ Need to implement a range of optimizations to drive down the cost
 - Discussed next
 - ▣ Side note: a good illustration of what's needed to make a simple security scheme practical

Optimization: Integrity-Only Isolation

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- A program performs many more reads than writes
 - ▣ In SPEC2006, 50% instructions perform some memory reads or writes; only 10% perform memory writes [Jaleel 2010]
- For integrity, check only memory writes
- Sufficient when confidentiality is not needed
- Much more efficient
 - ▣ [Wahbe et al. 1993] on MIPS using typical C benchmarks
 - 22% execution overhead when checking both reads and writes; 4% when checking only writes
 - ▣ PittSFIeld on x32 using SPECint2K
 - 21% execution overhead when checking both reads and writes; 13% when checking only writes
- As a result, most SFI systems do not check reads

Optimization: Data Region Specialization

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- Special bit patterns for addresses in DR
 - ▣ To make address checks more efficient
- One idea in the original SFI [Wahbe et al. 1993]
 - ▣ Data region addresses have the same upper bits, which are called the **data region ID**
 - ▣ Only one check is needed: check whether an address has the right region ID

Optimization: Data Region Specialization

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- Example: DB = 0x12340000 ; DL = 0x1234FFFF
 - ▣ The data region ID is 0x1234
 - ▣ “mem(r1+12) := r2” becomes

```
r10 := r1 + 12
```

```
r11 := r10 >> 16 // right shift 16 bits to get the region ID
```

```
if r11 ≠ 0x1234 goto error
```

```
mem(r10) := r2
```

Optimization: Address Masking

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- **Address checking** stops the program when the check fails
 - ▣ Strictly speaking, unnecessary for isolating faults
- A more efficient way: force the address of a memory operation to be a DR address and continue execution
 - ▣ Called **address masking**
 - ▣ “Ensure, but don’t check”
 - ▣ When using data region specialization, just modify the upper bits in the address to be the region ID
 - ▣ PittSFeld reported 12% performance gain when using address masking instead of checking for SPECint2000

Optimization: Address Masking

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- Example: DB = 0x12340000 ; DL = 0x1234FFFF
 - ▣ “mem(r1+12) := r2” becomes

`r10 := r1 + 12`

`r10 := r10 & 0x0000FFFF`

`r10 := r10 | 0x12340000`

`mem(r10) := r2`

Force the address to
be in DR

Wait! What about Program Semantics?

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- “Good” programs won’t get affected
 - ▣ “Good” programs won’t access memory outside DR
 - ▣ For bad programs, we don’t care about whether its semantics is destroyed
- Cons: does not pinpoint the policy-violating instruction
 - ▣ A downside for debugging and assigning blame

Optimization: One-Instruction Address Masking

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- Idea
 - ▣ The data region ID has only a single bit on
 - ▣ Make the zero-ID region unmapped in the virtual address space
- A memory access is safe
 - ▣ If the address is either in the data region or in the zero-ID region
 - ▣ Reason: an access to the zero-ID region generates a hardware trap because it accesses unmapped memory
- Benefit: cut down one instruction for masking
 - ▣ PittSFeld reported 10% performance gain on SPECint2000

Optimization: One-Instruction Address Masking

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- Example: DB = 0x20000000 ; DL = 0x2000FFFF
 - ▣ Region ID is 0x2000
 - ▣ “mem(r1+12):= r2” becomes

`r10 := r1 + 12`

`r10 := r10 & 0x2000FFFF`

`mem(r10) := r2`

- ▣ Result is an address in DR or in the (unmapped) zero-ID region
- Cons: limit the number of DRs
 - ▣ In a 32-bit system, if a DR's size is 2^n , then we can have at most $(32-n)$ DRs

Data Guards

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- A **data guard** refers to either address checking or address masking
 - ▣ When which one is used is irrelevant
- Introduce a pseudo-instruction “ $r' = \text{dGuard}(r)$ ”
 - ▣ To hide implementation details
- An implementation should satisfy the following properties of “ $r' = \text{dGuard}(r)$ ”
 - ▣ If r is in DR, then r' should equal r
 - ▣ If r is outside DR, then
 - For address checking, an error state is reached
 - For address masking, r' gets an address within the safe range
 - The safe range is implementation specific; it's typically DR; for PittSFeld, it's DR plus the zero-ID region


Optimization: Guard Zones

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- Place a guard zone directly before and after the DR
- First described by Wahbe et al. (1993); further extended by Zeng et al. (2001) and Sehr et al. (2010)

Guard Zones: Safe Accesses

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- E.g., $GSize=4k$
- **Assumption:** Guard zones are unmapped
 - ▣ Thus, access to guard zones are trapped by hardware
- A memory read/write is **safe** if the address is in $[DB-GSize, DL+GSize]$

Guard Zones Enable More Optimizations

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- In-place sandboxing
- Redundant check elimination
- Loop check hoisting

Similar to those optimizations performed in an optimizing compiler, enabled by classic static analysis

Optimization: In-Place Sandboxing

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- A commonly used addressing mode in memory operations
 - ▣ A base register plus/minus a small constant offset
 - ▣ E.g., the register points to the start address of a struct, and the constant is the offset to a field
- In this case, just guard the base register in place is sufficient, when the constant is no greater than GSize

Optimization: In-Place Sandboxing

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- Example: “mem(r1+12):= r2” becomes

```
r1 := dGuard(r1)  
mem(r1+12) := r2
```

- ▣ No need for a scratch register
- Why is the above safe?
 - ▣ “r1 := dGuard(r1)” constrains r1 to be in DR and then r1+12 must be in [DB-GSize, DL+GSize], assuming GSize ≥ 12
 - ▣ Note: for PittSFeld, we need to have guard zones around the zero-ID region too, since dGuard constrains r1 to be either in DR or the zero-ID region in PittSFeld
 - Will ignore this for the rest of the slides

Optimization: In-Place Sandboxing

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- NaCl-x86-64 (Sehr et al., 2010) implemented a similar optimization
- Put guard zones of 40GB above and below a 4GB sandbox
 - ▣ 64-bit machines have a large virtual address space
 - ▣ As a result, most addresses in memory operations can be guaranteed to stay in $[DB-GSize, DL+GSize]$
 - By carefully controlling the registers in “base register + a scaled index register + displacement”

Optimization: Redundant Check Elimination

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- Idea: perform range analysis to know the range of values of registers and use that to remove redundant data guards

```
r1 := dGuard(r1)
```

← ===== r1 ∈ [DB,DL]

```
r2 := mem(r1 + 4)
```

```
... // r1 is not changed in between
```

← ===== r1 ∈ [DB,DL]

```
r1 := dGuard(r1)
```

```
r3 := mem(r1 + 8)
```

Removing the redundant guard

Optimization: Loop Check Hoisting

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- Idea: a guard in a loop is hoisted outside
 - ▣ The guard is performed only once per loop instead of once per loop iteration
- Key observation
 - ▣ If $\text{addr} \in [\text{DB}-\text{GSize}, \text{DL}+\text{GSize}]$, then a successful (untrapped) memory operation via addr means $\text{addr} \in [\text{DB}, \text{DL}]$
 - Because it were in the guard zones, then a trap would be generated

Loop Check Hoisting Example

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Before optimization

```
r3 := r1
r4 := r2 * 4
r4 := r1 + r4
r5 := 0
loop:
  if r3 ≥ r4 goto end
  r3 := dGuard(r3)
  r6 := mem(r3)
  r5 := r5 + r6
  r3 := r3 + 4
  jmp loop
end:
```

After optimization

```
r3 := r1
r4 := r2 * 4
r4 := r1 + r4
r5 := 0
r3 := dGuard(r3)
loop:
  if r3 ≥ r4 goto end
  r6 := mem(r3)
  r5 := r5 + r6
  r3 := r3 + 4
  jmp loop
end:
```

* r1 is a pointer to the beginning of an array; r2 holds the array length; the program computes in r5 the sum of array elements

Why is the Previous Optimized Code Safe?

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```
r3 := r1
r4 := r2 * 4
r4 := r1 + r4
r5 := 0
r3 := dGuard(r3)
loop:
  if r3 ≥ r4 goto end
  r6 := mem(r3)
  r5 := r5 + r6
  r3 := r3 + 4
  jmp loop
end:
```

$[DB, DL+4]$
 $\subseteq [DB-GSize, DL+GSize]$

← = = = = $r3 \in [DB, DL]$
← = = = = $r3 \in [DB, DL+4]$
← = = = = $r3 \in [DB, DL+4]$
← = = = = $r3 \in [DB, DL]$
← = = = = $r3 \in [DB+4, DL+4]$

Optimization: Guard Changes Instead of Uses

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- Some registers are used often
 - ▣ E.g., in 32-bit code, ebp is usually set in the function prologue and used often in the function body
- Idea
 - ▣ Sandbox the changes to those special registers, instead of uses
 - ▣ E.g., `ebp := esp` becomes
 - `ebp := esp`
 - `ebp := dGuard(ebp)`

later uses of `%ebp` plus a small constant do not need to be guarded, if used together with guard zones

Scratch Registers

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- The SFI rewriting may require finding scratch registers to store intermediate results
 - ▣ E.g., r10 in many of our previous examples
- If the old values of scratch registers need to be preserved
 - ▣ Need to save and restore the old values on the stack
- How to avoid that?

Optimization: Finding Scratch Registers

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- Binary rewriting
 - ▣ Perform binary-level liveness analysis to find dead registers as scratch registers [Zeng et al. 11]
- Compile-level rewriting
 - ▣ Approach 1: reserve dedicated registers as scratch registers
 - E.g., PittSFeld reserves ebx as the scratch register by passing GCC a special option
 - Downside: increase register pressure
 - ▣ Approach 2: rewrite at the level of an IR that has unlimited number of variables
 - E.g., LLVM IR
 - A later register allocation phase maps those variables to registers or stack slots

Architecture-Specific Optimization

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- An SFI implementation can use specific hardware features for efficient sandboxing
- NaCl and VX32 on Intel x32
 - ▣ Use x32's segmentation support
 - ▣ Data segment: base gets DB and limit and DL
 - ▣ Hardware automatically performs checks
 - However, not supported in x64
- ISBoxing On x64 [Deng et al. 15]
 - ▣ Put the data region in the first 4GB
 - ▣ Add address-override prefix to a memory instruction
 - ▣ Cons: only support one data region with a fixed size
- ARMlock on ARM [Zhou et al. 14]
 - ▣ Use ARM's memory domain feature

ENFORCING SFI'S CONTROL-FLOW POLICY

Control-Flow Policy

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- Recall the policy: control-flow targets must stay in $[CB, CL] \cup SE$
- However, when using the IRM approach for SFI enforcement
 - ▣ Must also restrict the control flow to disallow bypassing of guards

Risk of Indirect Branches

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```
l1:    r10 := r1 + 12
l2:    r10 := dGuard(r10)
l3:    mem(r10) := r2
```

- Worry: what if there is a return instruction somewhere else and the attacker corrupts the return address so that the return jumps to l3 directly?
 - ▣ Then the attacker bypasses the guard at l2!
 - ▣ If attacker can further control the value in r10, then he can write to arbitrary memory location

Risk of Indirect Branches

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- In general, any **indirect branch** might cause such a worry
 - ▣ If not carefully checked, it may bypass the guard
- Indirect branches include
 - ▣ Indirect calls (calls via register or memory operands)
 - ▣ Indirect jumps (jumps via register or memory operands)
 - ▣ Return instructions
- In contrast, direct branches are easy to deal with
 - ▣ Targets of a direct branch encoded in the instruction; can statically inspect the target

The Original SFI Solution [Wahbe et al. 93]

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- Make r10 (in MIPS) a dedicated register
 - ▣ r10 only used in the monitor code, not used by application code
 - ▣ Also maintain the invariant that r10 always contains an address in DR before any branch
 - ▣ So even if the attacker bypasses the guard before a memory operation, the memory access stays within DR
- Cons?
 - ▣ Reduce the number of registers available to application code
 - ▣ Allow an indirect branch to target the middle of an instruction; problem for variable-sized instruction sets

A More Direct Approach: Control-Flow Integrity

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- Define a **pseudo-instruction**
 - ▣ Either a non-dangerous instruction
 - ▣ Or a guard followed by a dangerous instruction
- **Strengthened control-flow policy**
 - ▣ All control-flow transfers must target the beginning of a pseudo-instruction in CR or an address in SE
- Note the strengthened policy rules out
 - ▣ Bypassing a guard
 - ▣ And jumping into the middle of an instruction

Aligned-Chunk Enforcement (PittSField)

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- Divide the code into chunks of some size
 - ▣ E.g., 16 or 32 bytes
- Each chunk starts at an aligned address
 - ▣ $\text{addr} \bmod \text{chunkSz} = 0$
- Make dangerous instrs and their guards stay within one chunk
 - ▣ E.g., “`r10 := dGuard(r10); mem(r10) := r2`” stay within one chunk
- Insert guards before indirect branches so that they target only aligned addresses (chunk beginnings)

Example

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- Assume
 - ▣ CR is [0x10000000, 0x1000FFFF]
 - ▣ Chunk size is 16 bytes
 - ▣ Zero-ID region [0x00000000, 0x0000FFFF] unmapped
- Then “jmp r” becomes

`r := r & 0x1000FFF0`

`jmp r`


Q: why does the above ensures that the target address is (1) in CR or zero-ID region, and (2) a chunk beginning

- after &, r's upper 16 bits must be either 0x0000 or 0x1000
- after &, r's lower four bits must all be 0, meaning it's 16-byte aligned

Downside of Aligned-Chunk Enforcement

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- All legitimate jump targets have to be aligned
 - ▣ No-ops have to be inserted for that



- Extra no-ops slow down execution and increase code size
 - ▣ In PittSFeld, inserted no-ops account for half of the runtime overhead; NaCl-JIT incurs 37% slowdown because of no-ops
 - ▣ In NaCl-x64, the code size becomes 60% larger

Bitmap Based Enforcement (MIP [Niu & Tan, 13])

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- Allow variable-sized chunks
 - ▣ A guard and the following dangerous instr still stay within one chunk
 - ▣ Chunk beginnings are remembered in an immutable bitmap
 - $b[\text{addr}] = 1$ iff addr is the beginning of a chunk
 - ▣ Before an indirect branch, insert a guard to check if $b[\text{addr}]$ is 1, assuming addr is the target
 - If not, jump to error
- Benefit: no need to insert no-ops
 - ▣ MIP-x32: 4% runtime overhead; 13% code increase
 - ▣ MIP-x64: 7% runtime overhead; 16% code increase

Fine-Grained CFI

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- Enforce that a program follows a fine-grained control-flow graph
 - ▣ [Abadi et al, 05] and many other follow-up work
 - ▣ E.g., for each return, the fine-grained CFG defines a set of possible return targets
- Stronger than the pseudo-instruction based CFI policy
- Pros: we can use the fine-grained CFI to optimize away more guards [Zeng et al., 11]
- Cons: enforcing it incurs additional overhead
 - ▣ Unnecessary for the control-flow policy in SFI


Jumping Outside of Fault Domains

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- Total isolation is rarely what's desired in practice
- Sandboxed code must interact with other parts of the system for its functionality
 - ▣ E.g., a browser plug-in must communicate with the browser's core for exchanging data with the core and other plug-ins

Allow Only Controlled Interaction

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- The sandboxed code can jump to a pre-defined set of SE (Safe External) addresses
- Each SE address holds a trusted service
 - ▣ E.g., service for invoking OS syscalls (fopen, fread, ...)
 - ▣ E.g., service for allowing communication with other fault domains

Trusted Services

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- Implemented outside of the fault domain
- They can implement additional security policies
 - ▣ E.g., can restrict fopen to open files only in a particular directory
 - ▣ Or can disallow fopen completely
 - Just do not set up a service entry for fopen

APPLICATIONS OF SFI

SFI Applications Overview

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- Isolating OS kernel modules such as device drivers
 - ▣ MiSFIT [Small 97]; XFI [Erlingsson et al. 06]; BGI [Castro et al. 09]; LXFI [Mao et al. 11]
- **Isolating plug-ins in Chrome**
 - ▣ NaCl [Yee et al. 09]; NaCl-x64 [Sehr et al. 10]
- **Isolating native libraries in the Java Virtual Machine**
 - ▣ Robusta [Siefers et al. 10]; Arabica [Sun & Tan 12]

Google's Native Client (NaCl)

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- SFI service in Chrome
 - ▣ [Yee et al. Oakland 09]
- Goal: download native code and run it safely in the Chrome browser
 - ▣ Much safer than ActiveX controls
 - ▣ Much better performance than JavaScript, Java, etc.
- Google's main motivation: run native-code games in Chrome



DOOM in NaCl

NaCl: Code Verification

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- Code is verified before running
 - ▣ Allow restricted subset of x86 instructions
 - No unsafe instructions: memory-dependent jmp and call, privileged instructions, modifications of segment state, ...
 - ▣ Ensure SFI checks are correctly implemented for the SFI policy

NaCl Sandboxing

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- x86-32 sandboxing based on hardware segments
 - ▣ Sandboxing reads and writes for free
 - ▣ 5% overhead for SPEC2000 benchmarks
- However, hardware segments not available in x86-64 or ARM
 - ▣ Use instructions for address masking [Sehr et al. 10]
 - ▣ x86-64/ARM: 20% for sandboxing mem writes and computed jumps

NaCl SDK

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- Modified GCC tool-chain
 - ▣ Inserts appropriate masks, alignment requirements
- Trampolines allow restricted system-call interface and also interaction with the browser
 - ▣ Pepper API: access to the browser, DOM, 3D acceleration, etc.


Robusta [Siefers, Tan, Morrisett 10]

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- SFI service in a Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
 - ▣ Allow Java code to invoke native code safely through the Java Native Interface (JNI)
- The basic idea
 - ▣ Put native code in an SFI sandbox and allows only controlled access to JVM services

Robusta [Siefers, Tan, Morrisett 10]

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Native Code Threat

- ❑ Direct JVM mem access
- ❑ Abusive JNI calls
- ❑ OS syscalls

Robusta Remedy

- ❑ SFI: Prevent direct JVM access
- ❑ Perform JNI safety checking
- ❑ Reroute syscall requests to Java's security manager

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Future Directions

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- Tool and programming support for program partitioning
 - ▣ How to turn a monolithic application into components in separate protection domains?
 - Privilege separation
 - ▣ It took Google significant effort to privilege separate Chrome into a system of cooperating processes [Barth et al. 08]

Future Directions

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- Security enforcement on interface code
 - ▣ Trusted services in SE addresses are security critical
 - ▣ Experience shows that bugs are plenty in such interface code
 - ▣ Should apply program analysis/verification for bug finding
 - ▣ Or take a specification about interface security and enforce the security a la LXFI [Mao et al. 11]

Future Directions

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- Side channel control
 - ▣ SFI provides memory isolation but side channels are possible
 - ▣ E.g., we might structure a server to have a trusted core and have a sandbox to handle each client connections
 - However, if the core maintains some state that is shared by all connections, there might be a side channel
 - Similar channels were discovered in TCP (“Off-Path TCP Exploits: Global Rate Limit Considered Dangerous”)

Future Directions

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- Recovery mechanism
 - ▣ Address checking terminates the sandbox when there is an illegal access
 - May still need to release resources
 - ▣ Address masking turns an illegal access to a legal one
 - May cause a benign but buggy sandboxed component to misbehave
 - It does not pinpoint the violating instruction
 - ▣ [Seltzer et al. 96] Wrap sandbox calls in transactions
 - Transactions are aborted when sandbox misbehavior is detected; resources are released as a result

More in the Survey Article

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- G. Tan “Principles and Implementation Techniques of Software-Based Fault Isolation”, Foundations and Trends in Privacy and Security: Vol. 1, No. 3, pp 137–198.
 - ▣ <http://www.cse.psu.edu/~gxt29/papers/sfi-final.pdf>
- SFI verifier
 - ▣ Verifies that the result after SFI rewriting is correct
 - ▣ Basic idea and formalization
- References

Unorganized

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- Possible slides to include
 - ▣ SFI verification
 - ▣ Future work
 - ▣ Going beyond SFI

Some Open Questions for SFI

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- Binary rewriting on off-the-shelf binaries
 - ▣ All current SFI implementations require the cooperation of the code producer
- What happens with discontinuous hunks of memory?
- Does this really scale to secure systems?
 - ▣ So that we can partition a large system into domains of least privileges