Project: Implementation of authentication scheme using PBC (PairingBased Cryptography) library C or JAVA (JPBC)

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Paper Summary

If e-health data gets leaked, it would cause serious threats since they are pretty sensitive and they can be tampered to capture one's personal information. This particular proposed scheme ensures security in case an adversary gets access to ephemeral secrets.

In the present times, Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) Technology is a very effective WAN technology for building devices that are capable of providing health services specially during emergencies.

An authentication scheme makes sure of security in the following cases:

- If somehow an adversary gets access of a session key or session state information, the sessions before and after this should not be affected.
- If somehow adversary gets access of long-term private keys of client or application provider, the sessions in the past should not be leaked, it is also known as perfect forward secrecy.

The problem with traditional schemes are as follows:

Most of them are public-key infrastructure (PKI) based schemes.

- In this type of scheme, the user's identity is denoted by a certificate with which the corresponding public key is attached.
- It is very challenging to maintain a large number of public keys.

In the proposed scheme, the above mentioned things have been addressed:

- Lifetime-based pseudo-identity is used to decrease vulnerability of the particular system.
- In this scheme, the management of a large number of public keys is not necessary.

Details of the proposed scheme:

- Three roles -> Network Manager NM, WBAN Client C, Application Provider AP
- In the initialization phase, Network manager (NM) initializes its parameters.
- In the next phase, Client and Application Provider creates a secure connection between themselves after getting authentication credentials from Network Manager.

The steps of the proposed scheme are listed below (1. Initialization Phase, 2. Client Registration Phase, 3. AP registration Phase, 4. Connection establishment between Client and AP).

Security characteristics of the proposed scheme:

- If somehow an adversary gets access of a session key or session state information, the sessions before and after this should not be affected.
- If somehow adversary gets access of long-term private keys of client or application provider, the sessions in the past should not be leaked, it is also known as perfect forward secrecy.
- Credential privacy
- Anonymity
- Perfect Forward Secrecy
- Unlinkability and non-traceability
- Mutual authentication
- Resist impersonation attack

- Non-repudiation
- No key escrow

Performance analysis of the proposed scheme:

Scheme	Client	Application provider
Liu et al. (2014)	4TG1 + 2TGadd + 3Th 2 92.7529 ms	1TGe + 1TG1 + 1TGadd + 1TGmul + 3Th 2 1.9777 ms
Zhao (2014)	3TG1 + 4Th + 1Tg & 69.3365 ms	6TG1 + 2TGadd + 5Th + 1Tg 2 7.6574 ms
Wang and Zhang (2015)	1TGe + 3TG1 + 2TGH + 2Th + 1T 2 205.7073 ms	1TG + 2TG1 + 2TGH + 2Th + 1T 2 8.536 ms
Wu et al. (2016)	3TG1 + 2TG2 + 1TGadd + 3Th + 1T & 77.4037 ms	1TGe + 3TG1 + 2TG2 + 2TGadd + 2Th + 1T 2 4.7286 ms
He et al. (2016)	4TG1 + TGH + TGadd + 4Th + 1T & 147.1929 ms	2TGe + 4TG1 + TGH + TGadd + 4Th + 1T 2 9.0395 ms
Our proposed scheme	2TG1 + 2TG2 + 1TGadd + 2TGmul & 54.3838 ms	1TGe + 3TG2 + 2TGmul + 4Th + 1T + 4Th + 1T 2 1.1319 ms

Comparison of Computational overhead

Scheme	Communication overhead (in bits)
Liu et al. (2014)	3424
Zhao (2014)	3648
Wang and Zhang (2015)	3268
Wu et al. (2016)	3168
He et al. (2016)	3328
Our proposed scheme	2208

Comparison of Communication overhead

Scheme	Client (in bits)	Application provider (in bits)
Liu et al. (2014)	2112	(160 + 1536n)
Zhao (2014)	(5544n + 32)	160
Wang and Zhang (2015)	1024	1024
Wu et al. (2016)	1084	1024
He et al. (2016)	1088	160
Our proposed scheme	1248	1024

Comparison of Storage overhead

Requirements

- Create 2 servers, consider server 1 as Client C and Server 2 as Application Provider AP.
- Only access control between Client C Application Provider AP needs to be implemented.

Reference

Odelu, V., Saha, S., Prasath, R., Sadineni, L., Conti, M., & Jo, M. (2019). Efficient privacy preserving device authentication in WBANs for industrial e-health applications. Computers & Security (Elsevier), 83, 300-312.

Steps of the proposed scheme

1. Initialization Phase

The following parameters are initialized by Network Manager:

- a. Generator P ∈ G1
- b. Generator $g = e(P, P) \subseteq G2$
- c. Network Manager's private key is generated S_{nm} <- Z_q*
- d. Network Manager's public keys are generated i) $Q_{nm} < -S_{nm}P \in G1$, ii) $g_{nm} < -g^{Snm} \in G2$
- e. Refer to the below pictures for code snippet and corresponding output

```
******NM Parameter generation*************/
element init G1(P, pairing);
element random(P);
element printf("system parameter P = %B\n", P);
element_init_GT(g, pairing);
element pairing(g, P, P);
element_printf("system parameter g = %B\n", g);
element_init Zr(Snm, pairing);
element random(Snm);
element printf("system parameter Snm = %B\n", Snm);
element init G1(Qnm, pairing);
element_mul_zn(Qnm,P,Snm);
element printf("system parameter Qnm= %B\n", Qnm);
element init GT(Gnm, pairing);
element pow zn(Gnm, g, Snm);
element_printf("system parameter Gnm = %B\n", Gnm);
```

```
system parameter P = [83089781822717634540858756073459687226638509977529611742454429853682291851928119409989045373869546721403546952772319140952329008738516797755088047 18991351, 879382875826047809491720503611060878656491343344253183155645481819201899767542750941319761145557080685782405321767689741157232811990241941541084363871612] 
system parameter g = [72508836051430531491690373567604068537773631098195947621114189788875132222914277411336930707735774951052528794442703168093372955274456186896635977 39829784, 4912167151152519963450928837333901511225835558549003081270380838508073642591675465911879293768498774128634647694335174652688347650720013087102729658602498] 
system parameter Snm = 3181350158940477909537860774289350138616751094 
system parameter Qnm= [767635720000775745837312148244228957273238118024475878897433029469662414490517054677102328882092510145037832587084756779719944098105773335275580 
7007470699, 7253584587860556538319291839474500130464393744517391883278314312631460982564758262817846386217720582397312033549587246697516568504027089613788863634587995] 
system parameter Gnm = [802772955963978641896906021413000499610877880423831881010804200381084045992072064213317816366715224639660266999151885596712421935758404122236419 
7805801996, 5913197798958153859459121734429217368268265501532046709890577847621366118840283366516203032842223913284846052268164024133392841679657691049686744018829148]
```

2. Client Registration Phase

- a. Client Choose ID_c and send it to Network Manager.
- b. Network Manager checks validity of ID_c
- c. Network manager computes $r_c <- Z_a^*$
- d. Network Manager also computes $g_c = g^{rc}$, $s_c = r_c + s_{nm}h_c$ ($h_c = hash(g_c, Right_c, Q_{nm})$)
- e. Network Manager sends these parameters to Client and Client stores them (Right_c, s_c , g_c) for future reference.
- f. Refer to the below pictures for code snippet and corresponding output.

```
********Additional NM Parameter*****
element_init_Zr(Rc, pairing);
element random(Rc);
element_printf("system parameter Rc = %B\n\n", Rc);
element_init_GT(Gc, pairing);
element pow zn(Gc, g, Rc);
element_printf("system parameter Gc = %B\n\n", Gc);
element_init_Zr(Hc, pairing);
element_from_hash(Hc, "gc, Rightc, Qnm", 16);
element printf("system parameter Hc = %B\n\n", Hc);
element init Zr(SnmHc, pairing);
element mul zn(SnmHc,Snm,Hc);
element printf("system parameter SnmHc= %B\n\n", SnmHc);
element_init_Zr(Sc, pairing);
element add(Sc,Rc,SnmHc);
element_printf("system parameter Sc= %B\n\n", Sc);
```

```
system parameter Rc = 730716962802279865662429872872194594894088373312

system parameter Gc = [410620734373418922485144534032583624254746756538529109132278805673329146814872591223847241298620556639017061460949020313251548739358711132377247
439562513, 4879700238257413257395970472492073908533737797058104103420140760251825241563683521321031488224699746866766807022640774707997302731480128177685994154250086]

system parameter Hc = 590237667108670725796356627062109070680260043564

system parameter SnmHc= 193520636605864273285334413686017136957387823977

system parameter Sc= 193486780742692517586645040986706830445499637672
```

g. This is how Network manager transfers the parameters to Client and Application Provider over network..

```
element_to_bytes(P_bytes,P);
element_to_bytes(Snm_bytes,Snm);
{\tt element\_to\_bytes\,(Qnm\_bytes\,,Qnm)\,;}
element_to_bytes(g_bytes,g);
element_to_bytes(Gnm_bytes,Gnm);
element to bytes(Sc bytes,Sc);
element to bytes(Gc bytes,Gc);
printf("\nSize of P is %d",element_length_in_bytes(P));
printf("\nSize of Snm is %d",element_length_in_bytes(Snm));
printf("\nSize of Qnm is %d",element_length_in_bytes(Qnm));
printf("\nSize of g is %d",element_length_in_bytes(g));
printf("\nSize of Gnm is %d",element_length_in_bytes(Gnm));
printf("\nSize of Sc is %d",element_length_in_bytes(Sc));
printf("\nSize of Gc is %d\n",element_length_in_bytes(Gc));
memcpy(buf,P_bytes,128);
memcpy(buf+128,Snm_bytes,20);
memcpy(buf+148,Qnm_bytes,128);
memcpy(buf+276,g_bytes,128);
memcpy(buf+404,Gnm_bytes,128);
memcpy(buf+532,Sc_bytes,20);
memcpy(buf+552,Gc bytes,128);
    if (sendto(sfd, buf, 680 , 0, (struct sockaddr*) &client_address, sizeof(client_address)) == -1)
               if (sendto(sfd, buf, 680 , 0, (struct sockaddr*) &ap address, sizeof(ap address)) == -1)
    printf("Sendto failed\n");
```

```
Size of P is 128
Size of Snm is 20
Size of Qnm is 128
Size of g is 128
Size of Gnm is 128
Size of Sc is 20
Size of Gc is 128
```

h. This is how Client and AP gets the parameters over network from NM.

2: sudipta@sudipta-Inspiron-7577: ~/Desktop/ris/fwdrisprojectcodewithtiming/Client ▼ Waiting for message from NM... Received Authentication message from NM of size 680 P is [830897818227176345408587560734596872266385099775296117424544298536822918519281 1940998904537386954672140354695277231914095232900873851679775508804718991351, 879382 875826047809491720503611060878656491343344253183155645481819201899767542750941319761 145557080685782405321767689741157232811990241941541084363871612] Snm is 3181350158940477909537860774289350138616751094 Qnm is [7676357200007757458373121482442289572732381180244758788974330294696624144905 170546771023288820925101450378325870847567797199440981057733352755807007470699, 7253 584587860556538319291839474500130464393744517391883278314312631460982564758262817846 386217720582397312033549587246697516568504027089613788863634587995] g is [725088360514305314916903735676040685377736310981959476211141897888751322229142 7741133693070773577495105252879444270316809337295527445618689663597739829784, 491216 715115251996345092883733390151122583555854900308127038083850807364259167546591187929 3768498774128634647694335174652688347650720013087102729658602498] Gnm is [8027729559639786418969060214130004996108778804238318810108042003810840459920

3: sudipta@sudipta-Inspiron-7577: ~/Desktop/ris/fwdrisprojectcodewithtiming/AP ▼ AĬ 🗆 🗙 Waiting for message from NM... Received Authentication message from NM of size 680 P is [83089781822717634540858756073459687226638509977529611742454429853682291851928 11940998904537386954672140354695277231914095232900873851679775508804718991351.8793 82875826047809491720503611060878656491343344253183155645481819201899767542750941319 761145557080685782405321767689741157232811990241941541084363871612】 Snm is 3181350158940477909537860774289350138616751094 Onm is [767635720000775745837312148244228957273238118024475878897433029469662414490 5170546771023288820925101450378325870847567797199440981057733352755807007470699, 72 53584587860556538319291839474500130464393744517391883278314312631460982564758262817 846386217720582397312033549587246697516568504027089613788863634587995] q is [72508836051430531491690373567604068537773631098195947621114189788875132222914 27741133693070773577495105252879444270316809337295527445618689663597739829784, 4912 16715115251996345092883733390151122583555854900308127038083850807364259167546591187 9293768498774128634647694335174652688347650720013087102729658602498] Gnm is [802772955963978641896906021413000499610877880423831881010804200381084045992 0720642133178163667152246396602669991518855967124219357584041222364197805801996, 59

3. Application Provider(AP) Registration Phase

- a. AP chooses one ID_{ap}
- b. AP sends ID_{ap} to NM over network..
- c. NM checks the validity of ID_{ap} sent by AP.

- d. NM calculates $K_{ap} = P/(hash(ID_{ap}) + S_{nm})$
- e. NM sends this K_{ap} to AP over network..
- f. AP calculates $S_{ap} = hash(K_{ap} | | ID_{ap})$
- g. AP then makes ID_{ap} public and stores the pair (K_{ap}, S_{ap}) .
- h. Refer to the below pictures for code snippet and corresponding output.

```
element_init_Zr(h1, pairing);
element_from_hash(h1, "ID(AP)", 7);
element_printf("system parameter h1 = %B\n\n", h1);

element_init_Zr(h1plusSnm, pairing);
element_add(h1plusSnm,h1,Snm);
element_printf("system parameter h1plusSnm = %B\n\n", h1plusSnm);

element_init_Zr(Invh1plusSnm, pairing);
element_invert(Invh1plusSnm,h1plusSnm);
element_printf("system parameter Invh1plusSnm = %B\n\n", Invh1plusSnm);
element_init_G1(Kap, pairing);
element_mul_zn(Kap,P,Invh1plusSnm);
element_printf("system parameter Kap = %B\n\n", Kap);
```

```
element_init_Zr(Sap, pairing);
element_from_hash(Sap, "Kap||ID(AP)", 12);
element_printf("system parameter Sap = %B\n", Sap);
```

```
system parameter h1 = 418276283659982611770177922534362380329835309121

system parameter h1plusSnm = 421457633818923089679715783308651730468452060215

system parameter Invh1plusSnm = 716796731548057768253613340415198032419459840160

system parameter Kap = [36495350295955073512078344493691239856912334684261066406506
03600681973719587608598791913530609177918800904448910387219147773274216455629441174
898172859962, 594360415680365377008241117659652148176466889737522171168065671118149
01142789110962482233136765761702437950768350776314717832913779136684728622639750728
30]
```

4. Authentication Phase between Client and AP

a. Client C Authentication message(m₁) generation:

- i. Client computes $x_c \leftarrow Z_q^*$
- ii. It also calculates $T_1 = x_c(hash(Id_{ap})P + Q_{nm})$.
- iii. It also calculates $k_1 = g^{xc}$, $C_1 = Enc(g_c, Rights_c t_1)$
- iv. Then it calculates $Auth_1 = hash(T_1, g_c, Right_c, t_1, k_1)$
- v. Then it sends message $m_1 = (T_1, C_1, Auth_1)$ to AP over network..
- vi. We also have calculated time required for performing hash operation and encryption operation and also communication delay over network.
- vii. For hashing we have used **SHA-256**, and for **encryption** we have used **AES**.

```
element to bytes(T1 bytes,T1);
memcpy(buf,T1_bytes,element_length_in_bytes(T1));
element to bytes(K1 bytes,K1);
sha256(K1_bytes,128,hash);
memcpy(enc_key,hash,32);
element printf("\nGc is %B",Gc);
element_to_bytes(Gc_bytes,Gc);
gettimeofday(&now,NULL);
prev time=now.tv sec*1000000+now.tv usec;
encrypt aes(Gc bytes,128,enc buf,enc key);
gettimeofday(&now,NULL);
pres time=now.tv sec*1000000+now.tv usec;
printf("\nTime for encryption (AES-256) computation time is %d microseconds\n",(pres time-prev time));
memcpy(buf+128,enc_buf,element_length_in_bytes(Gc));
memcpy(T1Gc,T1_bytes,128);
memcpy(T1Gc+128,Gc bytes,128);
memcpy(T1Gc+256,K1_bytes,128);
gettimeofday(&now,NULL);
prev_time=now.tv_sec*1000000+now.tv_usec;
sha256(T1Gc, 384, hash);
memcpy(buf+256,hash,32);
gettimeofday(&now,NULL);
pres time=now.tv sec*1000000+now.tv usec;
printf("Time for SHA-256 computation time is %d microseconds\n",(pres time-prev time));
if (sendto(sfd, buf, 288, 0, (struct sockaddr*) &ap_address, sizeof(ap_address)) == -1)
                    printf("Sendto failed\n");
```

```
system parameter T1 = [623510651305075509532297369663451124505773356448489684998217180913873752689547647133930718316336188789857829599833183637348542180876467384682741 006218465, 7538570738281508892996634552232593530640992082385994881809094563694250710794416994748103562633419058369205138159640970340230966323431024122557129175695033] 
system parameter K1 = [450221024906281041637959776528131165230626975776929620470535670587493929941945633201393622665606707825942208246157801702877633093656180798061807  
752342484, 864466197986427429354366397560971322736910496819904638425716917917137023365524341179997213892426331789146874107412107732902823888413112704058462241952] 
Gc is [4106207343734189224851445340325883624254746756538529109132278805673329146814872591223847241298620556639017061460949020313251548739358711132377247439562513, 48797  
0023825741325739559704724920739080533737797058104103420140760251825241563683521321031488224699746866766807022640774707997302731480128177685994154250086] 

Time for encryption (AES-256) computation time is 21 microseconds  
Time for encryption (AES-256) computation time is 6 microseconds  
Naiting for message from AP...  
Communication delay over network is 33 microseconds
```

b. AP Phase-2 Authentication i.e. Message m2 Generation

- i. AP calculates $k_2 = Enc(T_1, K_{ap})$
- ii. AP decrypts C_1 received from Client ($Dec_{k2}(C_1)$) and retrieves $[g_c]$, Right, t_1 .
- iii. Then it confirms the validity of t_1 ` and Right_c`. If they match, then accept or Reject.

- iv. Now, AP calculates hash (T_1, g_c) , Right, t_1 , t_2 . If it matches with Auth which has been sent by Client, then accept, otherwise reject.
- v. If the above step is successful, then AP generates $y_{ap} \leftarrow Z_q^*$.
- vi. AP calculates $h_c = hash(g_c, Right_c, Q_{nm})$.
- vii. Then, AP calculates $y_2 = y_1^{(yap + sap)}$
- viii. Then, AP calculates $sk_{ap} = (y_1 * k_2)^{(yap + sap)}$
- ix. Then AP calculates Auth₂ = hash(y_2 , sk_{ap}, g_c , ID_c, T₁, k₂, t₂).
- x. Now, AP constructs a message $m_2 = (y_2, Auth_2, t_2)$ and sends it to Client over network.
- xi. Refer to the below pictures for code snippet and corresponding output.

```
element_init_Zr(Yap, pairing);
element_random(Yap);
element_printf("system parameter Yap = %B\n", Yap);
element_init_Zr(Sap, pairing);
element_from_hash(Sap, "Kap||ID(AP)", 12);
element_printf("system parameter Sap = %B\n", Sap);
element_init_GT(Y1, pairing);
element pow zn(Y1, g, Sc);
element_printf("system parameter Y1 = %B\n", Y1);
element init Zr(YapPlusSap, pairing);
element_add(YapPlusSap,Yap,Sap);
element_printf("system parameter YapPlusSap = %B\n", YapPlusSap);
element_init_GT(Y2, pairing);
element_pow_zn(Y2, Y1,YapPlusSap);
element_printf("system parameter Y2 = %B\n", Y2);
element_init_GT(Y1K2, pairing);
element_mul(Y1K2, Y1,K2);
element_printf("system parameter Y1K2 = %B\n", Y1K2);
element init_GT(SKap, pairing);
element_pow_zn(SKap, Y1K2,YapPlusSap);
element_printf("system parameter SKap = %B\n", SKap);
element to bytes(Y2 bytes,Y2);
element_to_bytes(SKap_bytes,SKap);
memcpy(buf,Y2 bytes,128);
```

```
memcpy(Y2SKap,Y2_bytes,128);
memcpy(Y2SKap+120,SKap_bytes,128);
memcpy(Y2SKap+256,Gc_bytes,128);
memcpy(Y2SKap+384,T1_bytes,128);
memcpy(Y2SKap+512,K2_bytes,128);

/*printf("\nY2SKap is");
for(int i=0;i<640;i++)
{
    if(i%128==0)
        printf("\n");
    printf("\shhu ",Y2SKap[i]);
}*/

sha256(Y2SKap,640,hash);
memcpy(buf+128,hash,32);
gettimeofday(Snow,NULL);
time2=now.tv_sec*1000000+now.tv_usec;
//printf("\ntime2 is %\u",time2);
memcpy(buf+160,(unsigned char*)&time2,8);

if (sendto(sfd, buf, 168 , 0, (struct sockaddr*) &client_address, sizeof(client_address)) == -1)
{
    printf("Sendto failed\n");
}</pre>
```

```
3: sudipta@sudipta-Inspiron-7577: ~/Desktop/ris/fwdrisprojectcodewithtiming/AP ▼
system parameter K2 = [450221024906281041637959726528131165230626975776929620470535
67058749392984194563320138362260560670782584220824615780170287783309365610879806388
43752342484. 8644661979864274293543663975609713227369104968199046384257169179197197
13902336552434117999721389242633178914687410741210773290282388841311270405846224195
2]
system parameter Gc = [410620734373418922485144534032588362425474675653852910913227
88056733291468148725912238472412986205566390170614609490203132515487393587111323772
47439562513,4879700238257413257395970472492073908533737797058104103420140760251825
24156368352132103148822469974686676680702264077470799730273148012817768599415425008
Authentication of message m1 verified!!!!!!
system parameter Yap = 720644737266238686591989891996708074700915811316
system parameter Y1 = [307329006295721546032389177143882818674688140048755003296190
55925323913312496129756169012011510181774678153757209740515876913367172185796222239
50939971344, 2093794170920967979956730976607205826601141471639467445058948527788928
22444721572339369746049733741478697355468486502158819634484665162904440656498863133
```

system parameter YapPlusSap = 420241197633075046878274886129814959550448758071
system parameter Y2 = [425727221341936611556513509856424921179770666129311242208078
16758460806549728150629674488615925811168861935372730498068434174722611216923754046
87887593705, 7058280132605089783410864036408140455498022866722500669139453635063089
63841846098513563262849912128456565185282309699818175639851473707554530769495017759
5]
system parameter Y1K2 = [4881329116647759760395812730778228751450348617708679602524
23425839792924297677265211883955062389161408203812598448531543962514147164973962129
5734977866433, 52164989503599259815649579504218989371376163007703990063689348456297
70789621252183563466465890207834783957722572729934973516102515471981354124795773614
320]
system parameter SKap = [2423317080916158487596890338363943333450995517774501033130
51299427370845145778119787968527304788174238230745755736201130425569879897076421391
7629924504960, 31112575340459904197974788261585720733374029845792661274045639965788
82563197334611386909352582593428391661801637676666102392632518820161946707816066079
46]

c. Client Phase-3 Authentication i.e. Message m3 Generation

- i. Client checks the validity of t_2 sent by AP.
- ii. Client calculates $sk_c = y_2^{(xc+sc)/sc}$
- iii. Then, Client calculates hash(y_2 , s_k , g_c , ID_c , T_1 , k_1 , t_2), if it matches with Auth₂ then Client accepts message m_2 otherwise rejects it.
- iv. If the above step is true, then Client calculates Auth3 = hash(sk_c, k₁, y₂, t_1 , t_2) and sends it as m_3 = Auth₃ to AP.
- v. Refer to the below pictures for code snippet and corresponding output.



d. AP Phase-4 Authentication

i. AP checks $Auth_3 = hash(sk_{ap}, k_2, y_2, t_1, t_2)$ or not. If equal, accept, otherwise reject.

ii. Refer to the below pictures for code snippet and corresponding output.

5. Future Scope:

a. Encode and decode the messages using CBOR (Concise Binary Object Representation). Also, it helps to compress the message size which will reduce the communication overhead.