

# Public Key Cryptography: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) - Part 1

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# Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

- ECC makes use of the elliptic curves (not ellipses) in which the variables and coefficients are all restricted to elements of a finite field.
- Two family of elliptic curves are used in ECC:
  - ▶ prime curves defined over  $Z_p$ , that is,  $GF(p)$ ,  $p$  being a prime.
  - ▶ binary curves constructed over  $GF(2^n)$ .

## Elliptic curves over the reals

### Definition

Let  $a, b \in R$  be constants such that  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$ . A non-singular elliptic curve is the set  $E$  of solutions  $(x, y) \in R \times R$  to the equation

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b,$$

together with a special point  $\mathcal{O}$  called the point at infinity (or zero point).

## Elliptic curves over the reals

- It can be shown that the condition  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$  is the necessary and sufficient to ensure that the equation  $x^3 + ax + b = 0$  has three distinct roots (may be real or complex numbers) (by Cardan Method).
- If  $4a^3 + 27b^2 = 0$ , the corresponding elliptic curve is called singular.
- If  $P = (x_P, y_P)$  and  $Q = (x_Q, y_Q)$ , then  $P + Q = \mathcal{O}$  implies that  $x_Q = x_P$  and  $y_Q = -y_P$ .
- Also,  $P + \mathcal{O} = \mathcal{O} + P = P$  for all  $P \in E$ .

## Elliptic curves over modulo a prime $GF(p)$

### Definition

Let  $p > 3$  be a prime. The elliptic curve  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$  over  $Z_p$  is the set  $E_p(a, b)$  of solutions  $(x, y) \in E_p(a, b)$  to the congruence

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p},$$

where  $a, b \in Z_p$  are constants such that  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ , together with a special point  $\mathcal{O}$  called the point at infinity (or zero point).

## Elliptic curves over modulo a prime $GF(p)$

### Properties of Elliptic Curves

- An elliptic curve  $E_p(a, b)$  over  $Z_p$  ( $p$  prime,  $p > 3$ ) will have roughly  $p$  points on it.
- More precisely, a well-known theorem due to Hasse asserts that the number of points on  $E_p(a, b)$ , which is denoted by  $\#E$ , satisfies the following inequality:

$$p + 1 - 2\sqrt{p} \leq \#E \leq p + 1 + 2\sqrt{p}.$$

- In addition,  $E_p(a, b)$  forms an abelian or commutative group under addition modulo  $p$  operation.

## References

- N. Koblitz. Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems. Mathematics of Computation, Vol. 48, pp. 203-209, 1987.
- V. Miller. Uses of elliptic curves in cryptography. Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'85, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), Springer, Vol. 218, pp. 417-426, 1986.
- Douglas R. Stinson. Cryptography: Theory and Practice, Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 2005.



## Elliptic curves over modulo a prime $GF(p)$

### Finding an inverse

- The inverse of a point  $P = (x_P, y_P) \in E_p(a, b)$  is  $-P = (x_P, -y_P)$ , where  $-y$  is the additive inverse of  $y$ .
- For example, if  $p = 13$ , the inverse of  $(4, 2)$  is  $(4, -2) \pmod{13} = (4, 11)$ .

# Elliptic curves over modulo a prime $GF(p)$


## Finding all points on an elliptic curve

### Algorithm: EllipticCurvePoints ( $p, a, b$ )

```
1:  $x \leftarrow 0$ 
2: while  $x < p$  do
3:    $w \leftarrow (x^3 + ax + b) \pmod{p}$ 
4:   if  $w$  is a perfect square in  $Z_p$  then
5:     Output  $(x, \sqrt{w}), (x, -\sqrt{w})$ 
6:   end if
7:    $x \leftarrow x + 1$ 
8: end while
```


# Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

Example of elliptic curve in case of  $y^2 = x^3 + x + 1 \pmod{23}$ .



# Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)


## Point addition on elliptic curve over finite field $GF(p)$



# Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

## Doubling on elliptic curve over finite field $GF(p)$

### Doubling a Point P on E



## Point addition on elliptic curve over finite field $GF(p)$

If  $P = (x_P, y_P)$  and  $Q = (x_Q, y_Q)$  be two points on elliptic curve  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$ ,  $R = (x_R, y_R) = P + Q$  is computed as follows:

$$x_R = (\lambda^2 - x_P - x_Q) \pmod{p},$$

$$y_R = (\lambda(x_P - x_R) - y_P) \pmod{p},$$

$$\text{where } \lambda = \begin{cases} \frac{y_Q - y_P}{x_Q - x_P} \pmod{p}, & \text{if } P \neq -Q \text{ [Point Addition]} \\ \frac{3x_P^2 + a}{2y_P} \pmod{p}, & \text{if } P = Q. \text{ [Point Doubling]} \end{cases}$$

**Base point:** Let  $G$  be the base point on  $E_p(a, b)$  whose order be  $n$ , that is,  $nG = G + G + \dots + G$  ( $n$  times)  $= \mathcal{O}$ .

## Scalar multiplication on elliptic curve over finite field $GF(p)$

If  $P = (x_P, y_P)$  be a point on elliptic curve  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$ , then  $5P$  is computed as  $5P = P + P + P + P + P$ .

Think about optimization method?

**Reference:** N Tiwari, S Padhye. Provable Secure Multi-Proxy Signature Scheme without Bilinear Maps. International Journal of Network Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 288-293, 2015.

# Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

**Problem:** Consider two points  $P = (11, 3)$  and  $Q = (9, 7)$  in the elliptic curve  $E_{23}(1, 1)$ . Compute  $P + Q$  and  $2P$ .

In order to compute  $R = P + Q = (x_R, y_R)$ , we first compute  $\lambda$  as

$$\begin{aligned}\lambda &= \frac{7 - 3}{9 - 11} \pmod{23} \\ &= -2 \pmod{23} \\ &= 21.\end{aligned}\tag{1}$$

Thus,  $x_R$  and  $y_R$  are derived as

$$\begin{aligned}x_R &= (21^2 - 11 - 9) \pmod{23} = 7, \\ y_R &= (21(11 - 7) - 3) \pmod{23} = 12.\end{aligned}$$

As a result,  $P + Q = (7, 12)$ .



# Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

**Problem:** Consider two points  $P = (11, 3)$  and  $Q = (9, 7)$  in the elliptic curve  $E_{23}(1, 1)$ . Compute  $P + Q$  and  $2P$ .

In order to compute  $R = 2P = (x_R, y_R)$ , we must first derive  $\lambda$  as follows:

$$\lambda = \frac{3(11^2) + 1}{2 \times 3} \pmod{23} = 7.$$

Hence,  $R = P + P = (x_R, y_R)$  is computed as

$$\begin{aligned}x_R &= (7^2 - 11 - 11) \pmod{23} = 4, \\y_R &= (7(11 - 4) - 3) \pmod{23} = 0,\end{aligned}$$

and, thus  $2P = (4, 0)$ .

## Elliptic Curve Computational Problems

### Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)

- Let  $E_p(a, b)$  be an elliptic curve modulo a prime  $p$ .
- Given two points  $P \in E_p(a, b)$  and  $Q = kP \in E_p(a, b)$ , for some positive integer  $k$ , where  $Q = kP$  represent the point  $P$  on elliptic curve  $E_p(a, b)$  be added to itself  $k$  times.
- Then the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is to determine  $k$  given  $P$  and  $Q$ .
- It is computationally easy to calculate  $Q$  given  $k$  and  $P$ , but it is computationally infeasible to determine  $k$  given  $Q$  and  $P$ , when the prime  $p$  is large.

## Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)

### Definition

Let  $E_p(a, b)$  be an elliptic curve modulo a prime  $p$ , and  $P \in E_p(a, b)$  and  $Q = kP \in E_p(a, b)$  be two points, where  $k \in_R Z_p^* = \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$  (We use the notation  $a \in_R B$  to denote that  $a$  is randomly chosen from the set  $B$ ).

Instance:  $(P, Q, m)$  for some  $k, m \in_R Z_p^*$ .

Output: **Yes**, if  $Q = mP$ , i.e.,  $k = m$ , and **No**, otherwise.

Consider the following two probability distributions:

$$D_{\text{real}} = \{k \in_R Z_p, U = P, V = Q(= kP), W = k : (U, V, W)\}, \text{ and}$$

$$D_{\text{rand}} = \{k, m \in_R Z_p, U = P, V = Q(= kP), W = m : (U, V, W)\}.$$

## Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)

### Definition

The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT), 0/1-valued distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  in solving *ECDLP* on  $E_p(a, b)$  is defined as

$$\begin{aligned} Adv_{\mathcal{D}, E_p(a, b)}^{ECDLP} = & |Pr[(U, V, W) \leftarrow D_{real} : \mathcal{D}(U, V, W) = 1] \\ & - Pr[(U, V, W) \leftarrow D_{rand} : \mathcal{D}(U, V, W) = 1]|, \end{aligned}$$

where the probability  $Pr[\cdot]$  is taken over the random choices of  $k$  and  $m$ .  $\mathcal{D}$  is called an  $(t, \epsilon)$ -ECDLP distinguisher for  $E_p(a, b)$  if  $\mathcal{D}$  runs at most in time  $t$  with  $Adv_{\mathcal{D}, E_p(a, b)}^{ECDLP}(t) \geq \epsilon$ .

**ECDLP assumption:** There exists no  $(t, \epsilon)$ -ECDLP distinguisher for  $E_p(a, b)$ . Thus, for every  $\mathcal{D}$ ,  $Adv_{\mathcal{D}, E_p(a, b)}^{ECDLP}(t) \leq \epsilon$ , with at most time  $t$ .

# Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

## Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)

In other words, ECDLP can be also formally defined as follows. For any PPT algorithm, say  $A$  (in the security parameter  $l$ ),  $\Pr[A(P, Q) = k] < \epsilon(l)$ , where  $\epsilon(l)$  is a negligible function depending on  $l$ .

### References:

- Vanga Odelu, **Ashok Kumar Das**, and Adrijit Goswami. “A secure effective key management scheme for dynamic access control in a large leaf class hierarchy,” in **Information Sciences (Elsevier)**, Vol. 269, No. C, pp. 270-285, 2014. (2019 SCI Impact Factor: 5.910) [This article has been downloaded or viewed 484 times since publication during the period October 2013 to September 2014]
- **Ashok Kumar Das**, Nayan Ranjan Paul, and Laxminath Tripathy. “Cryptanalysis and improvement of an access control in user hierarchy based on elliptic curve cryptosystem,” in **Information Sciences (Elsevier)**, Vol. 209, No. C, pp. 80 - 92, 2012. (2019 SCI Impact Factor: 5.910)

## Definition (Elliptic curve computational Diffie-Hellman problem (ECCDHP))

Let  $P \in E_p(a, b)$  be a point in  $E_p(a, b)$ . The ECCDHP states that given the points  $k_1.P \in E_p(a, b)$  and  $k_2.P \in E_p(a, b)$  where  $k_1, k_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , it is computationally infeasible to compute  $k_1 k_2.P$ , where  $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$ .

## Definition (Elliptic curve decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (ECDDHP))

Let  $P \in E_p(a, b)$  be a point in  $E_p(a, b)$ . The ECDDHP states that given a quadruple  $(P, k_1.P, k_2.P, k_3.P)$ , decide whether  $k_3 = k_1 k_2$  or a uniform value, where  $k_1, k_2, k_3 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ .

The ECDLP, ECCDHP and ECDDHP are computationally infeasible when  $p$  is large. To make ECDLP, ECCDHP and ECDDHP intractable,  $p$  should be chosen at least 160-bit prime.

## Elliptic Curves over $GF(2^m)$

- In this the elliptic curve is of the form:

$$y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b,$$

whose coefficients are in  $GF(2^m)$  and the addition is modulo 2 ( $\oplus$ ) and multiplication is AND operation.

- The rules for addition can be stated as follows.

For all points  $P, Q \in E_{2^m}(a, b)$ :

- ▶  $P + \mathcal{O} = \mathcal{O} + P = P$ , where  $\mathcal{O}$  is the point at infinity (or zero point).
- ▶ If  $P = (x_P, y_P)$ , then  $P + (x_P, x_P + y_P) = \mathcal{O}$ . Then  $-P = (x_P, x_P + y_P)$ .



## Elliptic Curves over $GF(2^m)$

- If  $P = (x_P, y_P)$  and  $Q = (x_Q, y_Q)$  with  $P \neq -Q$  and  $P \neq Q$ , then  $R = P + Q = (x_R, y_R)$  is defined by the following rules:

$$\begin{aligned}x_R &= \lambda^2 + \lambda + x_P + x_Q + a, \\y_R &= \lambda(x_P + x_R) + x_R + y_P, \\ \lambda &= \frac{y_Q + y_P}{x_Q + x_P} \pmod{2}.\end{aligned}$$

- If  $P = (x_P, y_P)$ , then  $R = P + P = (x_R, y_R)$  is defined by the following rules:

$$\begin{aligned}x_R &= \lambda^2 + \lambda + a, \\y_R &= x_P^2 + (\lambda + 1)x_R, \\ \lambda &= x_P + \frac{y_P}{x_P} \pmod{2}.\end{aligned}$$