Access token manupulation

Wednesday, January 15, 2020 12:


2.55 PM

Product	Detection Tracker	Subject Process	Subject commandline	Subject Integrity level	Parent Process	Parent Commandline	Process action	Parent Integrity Level
ATP	Telemetry showed svchost.exe executed with the seclogon command-line argument and a subsequent elevated powershell.exe process, indicating token manipulation (tainted by parent alert on a suspicious PowerShell command-line generated for the svchost.exe invocation of powershell.exe with an encoded script).	powershell	encoded command	High	svchost	svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s seclogon	Load Image	system
ATP	Telemetry showed svchost.exe as a high integrity process from SYSTEM and subsequent cmd.exe process running as user George (tainted by the parent alert on suspicious process injection into Isass.exe). Svchost.exe was executed with seclogon command-line argument indicating token manipulation.	cmd.exe	reg query command	High	svchost	svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s seclogon	Load Image	system
Crowdstrik e	Telemetry showed the compromised process (21898821890) running as Debbie, then children from this process spawning first as Debbie and later as George. This could indicate theft of George's token within the context of the process.			High	Unknown			

Access Token Manipulation

Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.

DEFENCE EVASION AND PREVILEGE ESCALATION



On attack pattern 1 attacker having access to some service of low privilege can use duplicate token function in windows of a privilege user session with the process id then he has option to

- 1-Impersonate the user of hight privilege ImpersonateLoggedOnUser function in Advapi32.dll
- 2-Apply the privileged token impersonated to the attackers process **SetThreadToken function in** Advapi32.dll
- 3-Create a process with a high privilege token which is duplicated CreateProcessWithTokenW function in Advapi32.dll

LogonUser Advapi32.dll

ATTACK PATTERN 2



On attack Pattern 2 if the attacker have a user name and password do not see a user online with privilege he may not have a access token to duplicate

- 1- He can use LogonUser make the user login to the system
- 2 Then set the thread token created into the attackers process using SetThreadToken

Refer

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/

1 - Monitoring TTP:

- 1 Process tree from system level integrity to user process of High level Integrity
- 2 Execution of below mentioned API inside non windows files
 DuplicateToken(Ex)
 ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
 SetThreadToken
 CreateProcessWithTokenW
 LogonUser
 SetThreadToken
- 3 change in user for the same process tree

2 - VT Hunt

Api = [
DuplicateToken,
ImpersonateLoggedOnUser,
SetThreadToken ,

3 - Write Yara RULE

Convert these windows functions into hex write rule for matching file having atleast 3/5 patterns

```
CreateProcessWithTokenW,
LogonUser,
1
```

For values in API:

```
String = "imports:" + "values"
                                               FUNCTIONS
BOOL SetThreadToken(
                            BOOL DuplicateTokenEx(
                                                                                    BOOL ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(
PHANDLE Thread,
                                              hExistingToken,
                                                                                     HANDLE hToken
                             HANDLE
HANDLE Token
                             DWORD
                                               dwDesiredAccess,
                                                                                    );
                            LPSECURITY ATTRIBUTES
                                                     lpTokenAttributes,
                             SECURITY IMPERSONATION LEVEL ImpersonationLevel,
                                                TokenType,
                             TOKEN_TYPE
                             PHANDLE
                                               phNewToken
  BOOL LogonUserA(
                                                   BOOL CreateProcessWithTokenW(
   LPCSTR lpszUsername,
                                                    HANDLE
                                                                   hToken,
   LPCSTR lpszDomain,
                                                                   dwLogonFlags,
                                                    DWORD
   LPCSTR lpszPassword,
                                                    LPCWSTR
                                                                   lpApplicationName,
   DWORD dwLogonType,
                                                                   lpCommandLine,
                                                    LPWSTR
   DWORD dwLogonProvider,
                                                                   dwCreationFlags,
                                                    DWORD
   PHANDLE phToken
                                                                  IpEnvironment,
                                                    LPVOID
                                                                   IpCurrentDirectory,
                                                    LPCWSTR
                                                                        IpStartupInfo,
                                                    LPSTARTUPINFOW
                                                    LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation
```

These many threat groups have used the functions in their campaign

<u>APT28</u>	APT28 has used CVE-2015-1701 to access the SYSTEM token and copy it into the current process as part of privilege escalation.[24]
<u>Azorult</u>	Azorult can call WTSQueryUserToken and CreateProcessAsUser to start a new process with local system privileges.[19]
<u>Bankshot</u>	Bankshot grabs a user token using WTSQueryUserToken and then creates a process by impersonating a logged-on user.[17]
<u>Cobalt</u> <u>Strike</u>	Cobalt Strike can steal access tokens from exiting processes and make tokens from known credentials. [9]
<u>Duqu</u>	<u>Duqu</u> examines running system processes for tokens that have specific system privileges. If it finds one, it will copy the token and store it for later use. Eventually it will start new processes with the stored token attached. It can also steal tokens to acquire administrative privileges.[14]
<u>Empire</u>	Empire can use Invoke-RunAs to make tokens as well as PowerSploit's Invoke-TokenManipulation to manipulate access tokens.[12]
<u>FinFisher</u>	FinFisher uses token manipulation with NtFilterToken as part of UAC bypass.[15][16]
<u>Hydraq</u>	Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can adjust token privileges.[18]
<u>Lazarus</u> <u>Group</u>	<u>Lazarus Group</u> keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call CreateProcessAsUserA under that user's context.[22][23]
PoshC2	PoshC2 contains a number of modules, such as Invoke-RunAs and Invoke-TokenManipulation, for manipulating tokens.[13]
PowerSpl oit	PowerSploit's Invoke-TokenManipulation Exfiltration module can be used to locate and impersonate user logon tokens.[10][11]
<u>Pupy</u>	Pupy can obtain a list of SIDs and provide the option for selecting process tokens to impersonate.[8]
<u>SsIMM</u>	SsIMM contains a feature to manipulate process privileges and tokens.[20]
<u>Turla</u>	Turla RPC backdoors can impersonate or steal process tokens before executing commands. [25]
ZxShell	ZxShell has a command called RunAs, which creates a new process as another user or process context. [21]

TTP screen shot


- 1 Process tree from system level integrity to user process of High level Integrity
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SetThreadToken
CreateProcessWithTokenW
LogonUser

3 - change in user for the same process tree

TTP screen shot inside crowdstrike and ATP





_time ‡	ContextTimeStamp_decimal	event_simpleName \$	UserName 0	IntegrityLevel_decimal 0	TargetProcessId_decimal ‡	ParentProcessId_decimal 0	TargetFileName ‡	CommandLine \$
2018-09-11 12:59:37.654	1536670777.544	ProcessRollup2	debbie	12288	21898821890	21776848613	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmo
2018-09-11 15:47:16.299	1536680836.260	ProcessRollup2	debbie	12288	22614524561	21898821890	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	C:\Windows\system32\cmd Controllers" /domain
2018-09-11 15:47:45.893	1536680865.340	ProcessRollup2	debbie	12288	22620170613	21898821890	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	C:\Windows\system32\cmd Computers"/domain
2018-09-11 15:47:45.893	1536680865.461	ProcessRollup2	debbie	12288	22624678819	21898821890	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	C:\Windows\system32\cmd allprofiles
2018-09-11 15:48:16.378	1536680895.841	ProcessRollup2	debbie	12288	22628130366	21898821890	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	C:\Windows\system32\cmd
2018-09-11 16:46:37.412	1536684396.885	ProcessRollup2	debbie	12288	22707983819	21898821890	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\svchost.exe	C:\Windows\system32\svch
2018-09-11 16:59:25.452	1536685164.905	ProcessRollup2	debbie	12288	22718564664	21898821890	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\svchost.exe	C:\Windows\system32\svch
2018-09-11 17:14:13.300	1536686052.785	ProcessRollup2	george	12288	22730814792	21898821890	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	C:\Windows\system32\cmd "\\conficker\hklm\system\c server"
2018-09-11 18:10:08.243	1536689407.709	ProcessRollup2	george	12288	22773734779	21898821890	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	C:\Windows\system32\cmd "Resume Viewer Update Che "C:\windows\system32\runc C:\windows\system32\upda "System"