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C++ static code analysis

Unique rules to find Bugs, Vulnerabilities, Security Hotspots, and Code Smells in your C++ code

• Security ⊗ Code (436) Quick 68 Fix ΑII 578 6 Vulnerability (13) **R** Bug (111) rules Hotspot

Tags

"memset" should not be used to delete sensitive data Vulnerability POSIX functions should not be called with arguments that trigger buffer overflows ♠ Vulnerability XML parsers should not be vulnerable to XXE attacks ■ Vulnerability Function-like macros should not be invoked without all of their arguments 📆 Bug The address of an automatic object should not be assigned to another object that may persist after the first object has ceased to exist 🖷 Bug Assigning to an optional should directly target the optional 📆 Bug Result of the standard remove algorithms should not be ignored 📆 Bug "std::scoped_lock" should be created with constructor arguments 📆 Bug Objects should not be sliced

📆 Bug

📆 Bug

📆 Bug

📆 Bug

Immediately dangling references

"pthread_mutex_t" should be unlocked in the reverse order they were locked

"pthread_mutex_t" should be properly

"pthread_mutex_t" should not be consecutively locked or unlocked

initialized and destroyed

should not be created

Expanding archive files without controlling resource consumption is security-sensitive

Analyze your code

cwe cert owasp

Search by name...

Successful Zip Bomb attacks occur when an application expands untrusted archive files without controlling the size of the expanded data, which can lead to denial of service. A Zip bomb is usually a malicious archive file of a few kilobytes of compressed data but turned into gigabytes of uncompressed data. To achieve this extreme compression ratio, attackers will compress irrelevant data (eg: a long string of repeated bytes).

Ask Yourself Whether

Archives to expand are untrusted and:

- There is no validation of the number of entries in the archive.
- There is no validation of the total size of the uncompressed data.
- There is no validation of the ratio between the compressed and uncompressed archive entry.

There is a risk if you answered yes to any of those questions.

Recommended Secure Coding Practices

- · Define and control the threshold for maximum total size of the uncompressed
- Count the number of file entries extracted from the archive and abort the extraction if their number is greater than a predefined threshold, in particular it's not recommended to recursively expand archives (an entry of an archive could be also an archive).

Sensitive Code Example



"std::move" and "std::forward" should not be confused



A call to "wait()" on a "std::condition_variable" should have a condition



A pointer to a virtual base class shall only be cast to a pointer to a derived class by means of dynamic_cast



Functions with "noreturn" attribute should not return



RAII objects should not be temporary



"memcmp" should only be called with pointers to trivially copyable types with no padding



"memcpy", "memmove", and "memset" should only be called with pointers to trivially copyable types

📆 Bug

"std::auto_ptr" should not be used

🖟 Bug

Destructors should be "noexcept"

```
👬 Bug
```

```
#include <archive.h>
#include <archive_entry.h>
// ...
void f(const char *filename, int flags) {
 struct archive entry *entry;
 struct archive *a = archive_read_new();
 struct archive *ext = archive_write_disk_new();
  archive_write_disk_set_options(ext, flags);
 archive_read_support_format_tar(a);
 if ((archive_read_open_filename(a, filename, 10240))) {
   return;
 }
 for (;;) {
   int r = archive_read_next_header(a, &entry);
   if (r == ARCHIVE_EOF) {
     break;
   }
   if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
      return;
   }
 }
  archive_read_close(a);
  archive_read_free(a);
  archive_write_close(ext);
 archive_write_free(ext);
```

Compliant Solution

```
#include <archive.h>
#include <archive_entry.h>
// ...
int f(const char *filename, int flags) {
  const int max_number_of_extraced_entries = 1000;
  const int64_t max_file_size = 1000000000; // 1 GB
  int number_of_extraced_entries = 0;
  int64_t total_file_size = 0;
  struct archive_entry *entry;
  struct archive *a = archive_read_new();
  struct archive *ext = archive_write_disk_new();
  archive_write_disk_set_options(ext, flags);
  archive_read_support_format_tar(a);
  int status = 0;
  if ((archive_read_open_filename(a, filename, 10240))) {
   return -1;
  for (;;) {
   number_of_extraced_entries++;
   if (number_of_extraced_entries > max_number_of_extraced_entr:
     status = 1;
     break;
    int r = archive_read_next_header(a, &entry);
    if (r == ARCHIVE_EOF) {
     break;
    }
    if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
      status = -1;
     break;
    int file_size = archive_entry_size(entry);
    total_file_size += file_size;
    if (total_file_size > max_file_size) {
      status = 1;
      break;
   }
  }
  archive_read_close(a);
  archive_read_free(a);
 archive_write_close(ext);
  archive_write_free(ext);
  return status;
}
```

See

- OWASP Top $\underline{\text{10 2021 Category A1}}$ Broken Access Control
- OWASP Top 10 2021 Category A5 Security Misconfiguration
- OWASP Top 10 2017 Category A6 Security Misconfiguration
- MITRE, CWE-409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
- CERT, IDS04-J. Safely extract files from ZipInputStream
- bamsoftware.com A better Zip Bomb

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