




 Secrets


 ABAP


 Apex


 C


 C++


 CloudFormation


 COBOL


 C#


 CSS


 Flex


 Go


 HTML


 **Java**


 JavaScript


 Kotlin


 Objective C


 PHP


 PL/I


 PL/SQL


 Python


 RPG


 Ruby


 Scala


 Swift


 Terraform


 Text


 TypeScript

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 VB.NET

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 XML



Java static code analysis

Unique rules to find Bugs, Vulnerabilities, Security Hotspots, and Code Smells in your JAVA code

All rules632

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should not be silently ignored

 Bug


"ThreadLocal" variables should be cleaned up when no longer used

 Bug


Strings and Boxed types should be compared using "equals()"

 Bug


InputStream.read() implementation should not return a signed byte

 Bug


"compareTo" should not be overloaded

 Bug


"iterator" should not return "this"

 Bug


Map values should not be replaced unconditionally

 Bug


Week Year ("YYYY") should not be used for date formatting

 Bug


Exceptions should not be created without being thrown

 Bug


Collection sizes and array length comparisons should make sense

 Bug

Consumed Stream pipelines should not be reused

 Bug

Intermediate Stream methods should not be left unused

 Bug

Configuring loggers is security-sensitive

Analyze your code

Security Hotspot

Critical

cwe owasp sans-top25

Configuring loggers is security-sensitive. It has led in the past to the following vulnerabilities:

- [CVE-2018-0285](#)
- [CVE-2000-1127](#)
- [CVE-2017-15113](#)
- [CVE-2015-5742](#)

Logs are useful before, during and after a security incident.

- Attackers will most of the time start their nefarious work by probing the system for vulnerabilities. Monitoring this activity and stopping it is the first step to prevent an attack from ever happening.
- In case of a successful attack, logs should contain enough information to understand what damage an attacker may have inflicted.

Logs are also a target for attackers because they might contain sensitive information. Configuring loggers has an impact on the type of information logged and how they are logged.

This rule flags for review code that initiates loggers configuration. The goal is to guide security code reviews.

Ask Yourself Whether

- unauthorized users might have access to the logs, either because they are stored in an insecure location or because the application gives access to them.
- the logs contain sensitive information on a production server. This can happen when the logger is in debug mode.
- the log can grow without limit. This can happen when additional information is written into logs every time a user performs an action and the user can perform the action as many times as he/she wants.
- the logs do not contain enough information to understand the damage an attacker might have inflicted. The loggers mode (info, warn, error) might filter out important information. They might not print contextual information like the precise time of events or the server hostname.
- the logs are only stored locally instead of being backedup or replicated.





There is a risk if you answered yes to any of those questions.

Recommended Secure Coding Practices

- Check that your production deployment doesn't have its loggers in "debug" mode as it might write sensitive information in logs.
- Production logs should be stored in a secure location which is only accessible to system administrators.
- Configure the loggers to display all warnings, info and error messages. Write relevant information such as the precise time of events and the hostname.
- Choose log format which is easy to parse and process automatically. It is important to process logs rapidly in case of an attack so that the impact is known and limited.
- Check that the permissions of the log files are correct. If you index the logs in some other service, make sure that the transfer and the service are secure too.

https://rules.sonarsource.com/java/RSPEC-4792

1/3

All branches in a conditional structure should not have exactly the same implementation
 Bug
Optional value should only be accessed after calling isPresent()
 Bug
Overrides should match their parent class methods in synchronization
 Bug
Value-based classes should not be used for locking
 Bug

- Add limits to the size of the logs and make sure that no user can fill the disk with logs. This can happen even when the user does not control the logged information. An attacker could just repeat a logged action many times.

Remember that configuring loggers properly doesn't make them bullet-proof. Here is a list of recommendations explaining on how to use your logs:

- Don't log any sensitive information. This obviously includes passwords and credit card numbers but also any personal information such as user names, locations, etc... Usually any information which is protected by law is good candidate for removal.
- Sanitize all user inputs before writing them in the logs. This includes checking its size, content, encoding, syntax, etc... As for any user input, validate using whitelists whenever possible. Enabling users to write what they want in your logs can have many impacts. It could for example use all your storage space or compromise your log indexing service.
- Log enough information to monitor suspicious activities and evaluate the impact an attacker might have on your systems. Register events such as failed logins, successful logins, server side input validation failures, access denials and any important transaction.
- Monitor the logs for any suspicious activity.

Sensitive Code Example

This rule supports the following libraries: Log4J, java.util.logging and Logback

```
// === Log4J 2 ===
import org.apache.logging.log4j.core.config.builder.api.Conf
import org.apache.logging.log4j.Level;
import org.apache.logging.log4j.core.*;
import org.apache.logging.log4j.core.config.*;

// Sensitive: creating a new custom configuration
abstract class CustomConfigFactory extends ConfigurationFact
    // ...
}

class A {
    void foo(Configuration config, LoggerContext context, ja
        Appender appender, java.io.InputStream stream, j
        java.io.File file, java.net.URL url, String sour
        throws java.io.IOException {
        // Creating a new custom configuration
        ConfigurationBuilderFactory.newConfigurationBuilder(

        // Setting loggers level can result in writing sensi
        Configurator.setAllLevels("com.example", Level.DEBUG
        Configurator.setLevel("com.example", Level.DEBUG);
        Configurator.setLevel(levelMap); // Sensitive
        Configurator.setRootLevel(Level.DEBUG); // Sensitiv

        config.addAppender(appender); // Sensitive: this mod

        LoggerConfig loggerConfig = config.getRootLogger();
        loggerConfig.addAppender(appender, level, filter); /
        loggerConfig.setLevel(level); // Sensitive

        context.setConfigLocation(uri); // Sensitive

        // Load the configuration from a stream or file
        new ConfigurationSource(stream); // Sensitive
        new ConfigurationSource(stream, file); // Sensitive
        new ConfigurationSource(stream, url); // Sensitive
        ConfigurationSource.fromResource(source, loader); /
        ConfigurationSource.fromUri(uri); // Sensitive
    }
}
```

```
// === java.util.logging ===
import java.util.logging.*;

class M {
    void foo(LogManager logManager, Logger logger, java.io.I
        throws SecurityException, java.io.IOException {
        logManager.readConfiguration(is); // Sensitive

        logger.setLevel(Level.FINEST); // Sensitive
        logger.addHandler(handler); // Sensitive
    }
}
```

```
}
}
```

```
// === Logback ===
import ch.qos.logback.classic.util.ContextInitializer;
import ch.qos.logback.core.Appender;
import ch.qos.logback.classic.joran.JoranConfigurator;
import ch.qos.logback.classic.spi.ILoggingEvent;
import ch.qos.logback.classic.*;

class M {
    void foo(Logger logger, Appender<ILoggingEvent> fileAppender) {
        System.setProperty(ContextInitializer.CONFIG_FILE_PROPERTY, "logback.xml");
        JoranConfigurator configurator = new JoranConfigurator(logger);
        configurator.setContext(logger);
        logger.addAppender(fileAppender); // Sensitive
        logger.setLevel(Level.DEBUG); // Sensitive
    }
}
```

Exceptions

Log4J 1.x is not covered as it has reached [end of life](#).

See

- [OWASP Top 10 2021 Category A9](#) - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
- [OWASP Top 10 2017 Category A3](#) - Sensitive Data Exposure
- [OWASP Top 10 2017 Category A10](#) - Insufficient Logging & Monitoring
- [MITRE, CWE-117](#) - Improper Output Neutralization for Logs
- [MITRE, CWE-532](#) - Information Exposure Through Log Files
- [SANS Top 25](#) - Porous Defenses

Available In:

sonarcloud  | **sonarqube** 

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