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Java static code analysis

Unique rules to find Bugs, Vulnerabilities, Security Hotspots, and Code Smells in your JAVA code

All rules 632

Vulnerability 53

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Vulnerability

Extracting archives should not lead to zip slip vulnerabilities

Vulnerability

Dynamic code execution should not be vulnerable to injection attacks

Vulnerability

NoSQL operations should not be vulnerable to injection attacks

Vulnerability

HTTP request redirections should not be open to forging attacks

Vulnerability

Deserialization should not be vulnerable to injection attacks

Vulnerability

Endpoints should not be vulnerable to reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks

Vulnerability

Database queries should not be vulnerable to injection attacks

Vulnerability

XML parsers should not be vulnerable to XXE attacks

Vulnerability

A secure password should be used when connecting to a database

Vulnerability

XPath expressions should not be vulnerable to injection attacks

Vulnerability

I/O function calls should not be vulnerable to path injection attacks

XML parsers should not allow inclusion of arbitrary files

Analyze your code

Vulnerability Blocker

XML standard allows the inclusion of xml files with the **xinclude** element.

XML processors will replace an xinclude element with the content of the file located at the URI defined in the href attribute, potentially from an external storage such as file system or network, which may lead, if no restrictions are put in place, to arbitrary file disclosures or **server-side request forgery (SSRF)** vulnerabilities.

Noncompliant Code Example

For **DocumentBuilder**, **SAXParser**, **XMLInput**, **Transformer** and **Schema** JAPX factories:

```
factory.setXIncludeAware(true); // Noncompliant
// or
factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/xinclude"
```

For **Dom4j** library:

```
SAXReader xmlReader = new SAXReader();
xmlReader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/xinclud
```

For **Jdom2** library:

```
SAXBuilder builder = new SAXBuilder();
builder.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/xinclude"
```

Compliant Solution

Xinclude is disabled by default and can be explicitly disabled like below.

For **DocumentBuilder**, **SAXParser**, **XMLInput**, **Transformer** and **Schema** JAPX factories:





```
factory.setXIncludeAware(false);
// or
factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/xinclude"
```

For **Dom4j** library:

```
SAXReader xmlReader = new SAXReader();
xmlReader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/xinclud
```

For **Jdom2** library:

```
SAXBuilder builder = new SAXBuilder();
builder.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/xinclude"
```

 Vulnerability
LDAP queries should not be vulnerable to injection attacks
 Vulnerability
OS commands should not be vulnerable to command injection attacks
 Vulnerability
"@SpringBootApplication" and "@ComponentScan" should not be used in the default package
 Bug
"@Controller" classes that use

Exceptions

This rule does not raise issues when Xinclude is enabled with a custom EntityResolver:

For DocumentBuilderFactory:

```
DocumentBuilderFactory factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
factory.setXIncludeAware(true);
// ...
DocumentBuilder builder = factory.newDocumentBuilder();
builder.setEntityResolver((publicId, systemId) -> new MySafeEntityResolver());
```

For SAXBuilder:

```
SAXBuilder builder = new SAXBuilder();
builder.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/xinclude", false);
builder.setEntityResolver((publicId, systemId) -> new MySafeEntityResolver());
```

For SAXReader:

```
SAXReader xmlReader = new SAXReader();
xmlReader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/xinclude", false);
xmlReader.setEntityResolver((publicId, systemId) -> new MySafeEntityResolver());
```

For XMLInputFactory:

```
XMLInputFactory factory = XMLInputFactory.newInstance();
factory.setProperty("http://apache.org/xml/features/xinclude", false);
factory.setXMLResolver(new MySafeEntityResolver());
```

See

- [Oracle Java Documentation](#) - XML External Entity Injection Attack
- [OWASP Top 10 2017 Category A4](#) - XML External Entities (XXE)
- [OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet](#)
- [MITRE, CWE-611](#) - Information Exposure Through XML External Entity Reference
- [MITRE, CWE-827](#) - Improper Control of Document Type Definition

Available In:

