


Products >



not have the same condition

Objects should not be created to be

Rug

Expanding archive files without controlling resource consumption is security-sensitive Security Hotspot Oritical cwe owasp

Security

Hotspot

Tags

(43)

Analyze your code

O Quick 50 Fix

Q

Successful Zip Bomb attacks occur when an application expands untrusted archive files without controlling the size of the expanded data, which can lead to denial of service. A Zip bomb is usually a malicious archive file of a few kilobytes of compressed data but turned into gigabytes of uncompressed data. To achieve this extreme compression ratio, attackers will compress irrelevant data (eg: a long string of repeated bytes).

(158)

Search by name.

Ask Yourself Whether

Archives to expand are untrusted and:

- There is no validation of the number of entries in the archive.
- There is no validation of the total size of the uncompressed data.
- There is no validation of the ratio between the compressed and uncompressed archive entry.

There is a risk if you answered yes to any of those questions.

Recommended Secure Coding Practices

- Define and control the ratio between compressed and uncompressed data, in general the data compression ratio for most of the legit archives is 1 to 3.
- Define and control the threshold for maximum total size of the uncompressed
- Count the number of file entries extracted from the archive and abort the extraction if their number is greater than a predefined threshold, in particular it's not recommended to recursively expand archives (an entry of an archive could be also an archive)

Sensitive Code Example

```
const tar = require('tar');
tar.x({ // Sensitive
 file: 'foo.tar.gz
```

For adm-zip module:

```
const AdmZip = require('adm-zip');
let zip = new AdmZip("./foo.zip");
zip.extractAllTo("."); // Sensitive
```

For jszip module:

TypeScript static code analysis: Expanding archive files without controlling resource consumption is security-sensitive

dropped immediately without being used



Identical expressions should not be used on both sides of a binary operator

👬 Bug

All code should be reachable



Loops with at most one iteration should be refactored



```
const fs = require("fs");
const JSZip = require("jszip");

fs.readFile("foo.zip", function(err, data) {
   if (err) throw err;
   JSZip.loadAsync(data).then(function (zip) { // Sensitive
      zip.forEach(function (relativePath, zipEntry) {
      if (!zip.file(zipEntry.name)) {
        fs.mkdirSync(zipEntry.name);
      } else {
      zip.file(zipEntry.name).async('nodebuffer').then(fun
            fs.writeFileSync(zipEntry.name, content);
      });
    });
   });
}
```

For yauzl module

```
const yauzl = require('yauzl');

yauzl.open('foo.zip', function (err, zipfile) {
   if (err) throw err;

   zipfile.on("entry", function(entry) {
      zipfile.openReadStream(entry, function(err, readStream)
      if (err) throw err;
      // TODO: extract
    });
   });
});
```

For extract-zip module:

```
const extract = require('extract-zip')
async function main() {
  let target = __dirname + '/test';
  await extract('test.zip', { dir: target }); // Sensitive
}
main();
```

Compliant Solution

For tar module:

```
const tar = require('tar');
const MAX_FILES = 10000;
const MAX_SIZE = 1000000000; // 1 GB
let fileCount = 0;
let totalSize = 0;
tar.x({
 file: 'foo.tar.gz',
  filter: (path, entry) => {
   fileCount++:
   if (fileCount > MAX_FILES) {
      throw 'Reached max. number of files';
    totalSize += entry.size;
    if (totalSize > MAX_SIZE) {
      throw 'Reached max. size';
    return true;
});
```

For adm-zip module:

```
const AdmZip = require('adm-zip');
const MAX_FILES = 10000;
```

```
const MAX SIZE = 1000000000; // 1 GB
const THRESHOLD RATIO = 10;
let fileCount = 0;
let totalSize = 0:
let zip = new AdmZip("./foo.zip");
let zipEntries = zip.getEntries();
zipEntries.forEach(function(zipEntry) {
   fileCount++:
   if (fileCount > MAX_FILES) {
        throw 'Reached max. number of files';
   let entrySize = zipEntry.getData().length;
    totalSize += entrySize;
    if (totalSize > MAX_SIZE) {
        throw 'Reached max. size';
    let compressionRatio = entrySize / zipEntry.header.compr
   if (compressionRatio > THRESHOLD RATIO) {
        throw 'Reached max. compression ratio';
    if (!zipEntry.isDirectory) {
        zip.extractEntryTo(zipEntry.entryName, ".");
});
```

For jszip module:

```
const fs = require("fs");
const pathmodule = require("path");
const JSZip = require("jszip");
const MAX_FILES = 10000;
const MAX_SIZE = 1000000000; // 1 GB
let fileCount = 0;
let totalSize = 0:
let targetDirectory = __dirname + '/archive_tmp';
fs.readFile("foo.zip", function(err, data) {
  if (err) throw err;
  JSZip.loadAsync(data).then(function (zip) {
   zip.forEach(function (relativePath, zipEntry) {
      fileCount++;
      if (fileCount > MAX_FILES) {
       throw 'Reached max. number of files';
      // Prevent ZipSlip path traversal (S6096)
      const resolvedPath = pathmodule.join(targetDirectory,
      if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(targetDirectory)) {
       throw 'Path traversal detected';
      if (!zip.file(zipEntry.name)) {
       fs.mkdirSync(resolvedPath);
      } else {
       zip.file(zipEntry.name).async('nodebuffer').then(fun
          totalSize += content.length;
          if (totalSize > MAX SIZE) {
           throw 'Reached max. size';
          fs.writeFileSync(resolvedPath, content);
   });
 });
});
```

Be aware that due to the similar structure of sensitive and compliant code the issue will be raised in both cases. It is up to the developer to decide if the implementation is secure

For yauzl module

```
const yauzl = require('yauzl');
const MAX_FILES = 10000;
const MAX_SIZE = 1000000000; // 1 GB
const THRESHOLD_RATIO = 10;
yauzl.open('foo.zip', function (err, zipfile) {
 if (err) throw err;
  let fileCount = 0;
 let totalSize = 0:
  zipfile.on("entry", function(entry) {
    fileCount++;
   if (fileCount > MAX FILES) {
     throw 'Reached max. number of files';
    // The uncompressedSize comes from the zip headers, so i
    // Alternatively, calculate the size from the readStream
   let entrySize = entry.uncompressedSize;
    totalSize += entrySize;
   if (totalSize > MAX SIZE) {
     throw 'Reached max. size';
    if (entry.compressedSize > 0) {
      let compressionRatio = entrySize / entry.compressedSiz
      if (compressionRatio > THRESHOLD_RATIO) {
       throw 'Reached max. compression ratio';
   }
    zipfile.openReadStream(entry, function(err, readStream)
      if (err) throw err;
     // TODO: extract
   });
 });
});
```

Be aware that due to the similar structure of sensitive and compliant code the issue will be raised in both cases. It is up to the developer to decide if the implementation is secure

For extract-zip module:

```
const extract = require('extract-zip')
const MAX_FILES = 10000;
const MAX_SIZE = 1000000000; // 1 GB
const THRESHOLD_RATIO = 10;
async function main() {
 let fileCount = 0:
  let totalSize = 0;
 let target = __dirname + '/foo';
  await extract('foo.zip', {
   onEntry: function(entry, zipfile) {
     fileCount++;
     if (fileCount > MAX FILES) {
        throw 'Reached max. number of files';
      // The uncompressedSize comes from the zip headers, so
      // Alternatively, calculate the size from the readStre
     let entrySize = entry.uncompressedSize;
      totalSize += entrySize;
      if (totalSize > MAX_SIZE) {
       throw 'Reached max. size';
      if (entry.compressedSize > 0) {
       let compressionRatio = entrySize / entry.compressedS
        if (compressionRatio > THRESHOLD_RATIO) {
          throw 'Reached max. compression ratio';
```

```
}
});
}
main();

See

• OWASP Top 10 2021 Category A1 - Broken Access Control
• OWASP Top 10 2021 Category A5 - Security Misconfiguration
• OWASP Top 10 2017 Category A6 - Security Misconfiguration
• MITRE, CWE-409 - Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
• bamsoftware.com - A better Zip Bomb

Available In:

sonarcloud SonarQube
```

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