



 $\bowtie$ Flex

-GO

Go 5 HTML

Java

JavaScript

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Objective C

PHP Oii

PL/I

PL/SQL

**Python** 

**RPG** 

1 Ruby

Scala

Swift

Terraform

Text

**TypeScript** 

T-SQL

**VB.NET** 

VB<sub>6</sub>

XML



# Python static code analysis

Unique rules to find Bugs, Vulnerabilities, Security Hotspots, and Code Smells in your PYTHON code

All rules (216) 6 Vulnerability 29 **∰** Bug (55)

Security Hotspot 31

Code Smell (101)

Tags

Search by name...

attacks

Vulnerability

The number and name of arguments passed to a function should match its parameters

# Bug

The "open" builtin function should be called with a valid mode

₩ Bug

Only defined names should be listed in all

Rug Bug

Calls should not be made to noncallable values

👬 Bug

Property getter, setter and deleter methods should have the expected number of parameters

₩ Bua

Special methods should have an expected number of parameters

₩ Bug

Instance and class methods should have at least one positional parameter

👬 Bug

Boolean expressions of exceptions should not be used in "except" statements

₩ Bug

Caught Exceptions must derive from BaseException

₩ Bug

Item operations should be done on objects supporting them

👬 Bug

Raised Exceptions must derive from

Database queries should not be vulnerable to injection attacks

Analyze your code

injection cwe owasp sans-top25

User-provided data, such as URL parameters, should always be considered untrusted and tainted. Constructing SQL queries directly from tainted data enables attackers to inject specially crafted values that change the initial meaning of the query itself. Successful database query injection attacks can read, modify, or delete sensitive information from the database and sometimes even shut it down or execute arbitrary operating system commands.

Typically, the solution is to use prepared statements and to bind variables to SQL query parameters with dedicated methods like params, which ensures that userprovided data will be properly escaped. Another solution is to validate every parameter used to build the query. This can be achieved by transforming string values to primitive types or by validating them against a white list of accepted values

This rule supports: sqlite3, mysql, pymysql, psycopg2, pgdb, Django ORM and Flask-SOLAlchemy.

## **Noncompliant Code Example**

Flask application

```
from flask import request
from flask sqlalchemy import SQLAlchemy
from sqlalchemy import text
from database.users import User
@app.route('hello')
def hello():
   id = request.args.get("id")
   stmt = text("SELECT * FROM users where id=%s" % id) # Qu
   query = SOLAlchemy().session.query(User).from statement(
   user = query.one()
   return "Hello %s" % user.username
```

Django application

```
from django.http import HttpResponse
from django.db import connection
def hello(request):
    id = request.GET.get("id", "")
   cursor = connection.cursor()
    cursor.execute("SELECT username FROM auth user WHERE id=
    row = cursor.fetchone()
    return HttpResponse("Hello %s" % row[0])
```

## **Compliant Solution**

Flask application

## BaseException



Operators should be used on compatible types



Function arguments should be passed only once



Iterable unpacking, "for-in" loops and "yield from" should use an Iterable object



```
from flask import request
from flask_sqlalchemy import SQLAlchemy
from sqlalchemy import text
from database.users import User

@app.route('hello')
def hello():
    id = request.args.get("id")
    stmt = text("SELECT * FROM users where id=:id")
    query = SQLAlchemy().session.query(User).from_statement(
    user = query.one()
    return "Hello %s" % user.username
```

### Diango application

```
from django.http import HttpResponse
from django.db import connection

def hello(request):
    id = request.GET.get("id", "")
    cursor = connection.cursor()
    cursor.execute("SELECT username FROM auth_user WHERE id=
    row = cursor.fetchone()
    return HttpResponse("Hello %s" % row[0])
```

### See

#### See

- OWASP Top 10 2021 Category A3 Injection
- OWASP Top 10 2017 Category A1 Injection
- MITRE, CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
- <u>MITRE, CWE-89</u> Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command
- <u>MITRE, CWE-943</u> Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic
- OWASP SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
- SANS Top 25 Insecure Interaction Between Components

## Available In:



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