Objective C static code analysis: Using "strncat" or "wcsncat" is security-sensitive

3-4 minutes

In C, a string is just a buffer of characters, normally using the `null` character as a sentinel for the end of the string. This means that the developer has to be aware of low-level details such as buffer sizes or having an extra character to store the final `null` character. Doing that correctly and consistently is notoriously difficult and any error can lead to a security vulnerability, for instance, giving access to sensitive data or allowing arbitrary code execution.

The function `char *strncat( char *restrict dest, const char *restrict src, size_t count );` appends the characters of string `src` at the end of `dest`, but only add `count` characters max. `dest` will always be `null`-terminated. The `wcsncat` does the same for wide characters, and should be used with the same guidelines.

Ask Yourself Whether

- There is a possibility that either the `src` or the `dest` pointer is `null`

- The current string length of `dest` plus the current string length of `src` plus 1 (for the final `null` character) is larger than the size of the buffer pointer-to by `src`

- There is a possibility that either string is not correctly `null`-terminated

   There is a risk if you answered yes to any of those questions.

Recommended Secure Coding Practices

- C11 provides, in its annex K, the `strncat_s` and the `wcsncat_s` that were designed as safer alternatives to `strncat` and `wcsncat`. It's not recommended to use them in all circumstances because they introduce a runtime overhead and require to write more code for error handling, but they perform checks that will limit the consequences of calling the function with bad arguments.

- Even if your compiler does not exactly support annex K, you probably have access to similar functions

- If you are using `strncat` and `wsncat` as a safer version of `strcat` and `wcscat`, you should instead consider `strcat_s` and `wcscat_s` because these functions have several shortcomings:
- It's not easy to detect truncation

- The `count` parameter is error-prone

- Computing the `count` parameter typically requires computing the string length of `dest`, at which point other simpler alternatives exist

Sensitive Code Example

```
int f(char *src) {
  char dest[256];
  strcpy(dest, "Result: ");
  strncat(dest, src, sizeof dest); // Sensitive: passing the buffer size instead of the remaining size
  return doSomethingWith(dest);
}
```

Compliant Solution

```
int f(char *src) {
  char result[] = "Result: ";
  char dest[256];
  strcpy(dest, result);
  strncat(dest, src, sizeof dest - sizeof result); // Compliant but may silently truncate
  return doSomethingWith(dest);
}
```

See

- [OWASP Top 10 2021 Category A6](#) - Vulnerable and Outdated Components

- [OWASP Top 10 2017 Category A9](#) - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

- [MITRE, CWE-120](#) - Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')

- [CERT, STR07-C.](#) - Use the bounds-checking interfaces for string manipulation

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