



# REVENUE MANAGEMENT

## An Introduction to Linear Optimization

15.071x – The Analytics Edge

# Airline Regulation (1938-1978)

- The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) set fares, routes, and schedules for all interstate air transport
- Most major airlines favored this system due to guaranteed profits
- Led to inefficiency and higher costs
  - Applications for new routes and fares often delayed or dismissed

# Airline Deregulation (1978)

- The administration of President Jimmy Carter passed the Airline **Deregulation Act** in 1978
- The Act encouraged
  - **More competition:** 52 new airlines between 1980 and 2000
  - **New air routes:** saved passengers an estimated \$10.3 billion each year in travel time
  - **Lower fares:** ticket prices are 40% lower today than they were in 1978
- This led to **more passengers**
  - The number of air passengers increased from 207.5 million in 1974 to 721.1 million in 2010

# A Competitive Edge



- More competition led to heavy losses by air carriers
  - Need to lower fares while meeting operating costs
- 9 major carriers and more than 100 smaller airlines went bankrupt between 1978 and 2002
- How did airlines compete?

# Discount Fares

- On January 17, 1985 American Airlines (AA) launched its **Ultimate Super Saver fares** to compete with PeopleExpress
- Need to **fill at least a minimum number of seats** without selling every seat at discount prices
  - Sell **enough seats to cover fixed operating costs**
  - Sell **remaining seats at higher rates to maximize revenues/profits**

# How Many Seats to Sell on Discount?

- Passengers have different valuations
  - Business people value flexibility (last-minute/refundable)
  - People seeking getaways value good deals (early birds)
- Sell too many discounted seats
  - Not enough seats for high-paying passengers
- Sell too few discounted seats
  - Empty seats at takeoff implying lost revenue
- How should AA allocate its seats among customers to maximize its revenue?

# Let's Start Simple



# Ticket Prices



**Lowest Fare  
from \$238**

| Flights            | Departure       | Arrival         | Choice                           |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| 3 <span>[+]</span> | 12:00 pm<br>JFK | 03:10 pm<br>LAX | <br><b>\$238</b><br>2 Seats left |

Early Bird


**Lowest Fare  
from \$617**

| Flights            | Departure       | Arrival         | Choice           |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| 3 <span>[+]</span> | 12:00 pm<br>JFK | 02:55 pm<br>LAX | <br><b>\$617</b> |

Last minute

# Boeing 757-200 Seat Map

- 166 Economy seats



# Demand Forecasting

- Demand for different prices can be forecasted using analytics tools, looking at historical data and incorporating models of human behavior
  - Time series methods
  - Linear regression
- Forecasts could be erroneous
  - Need to assess sensitivity to forecast errors
- We'll assume that demand has been forecasted

# Myopic Solution

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |                 |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 50     | 50            | Capacity<br>166 |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    | 116           |                 |

- How many discount seats to sell to maximize revenue?

# Myopic Solution

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |                 |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 100    | 100           | Capacity<br>166 |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    | 66            |                 |

- How many discount seats to sell to maximize revenue?

# Myopic Solution

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |                 |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 200    | 166           | Capacity<br>166 |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    | 0             |                 |

- How many discount seats to sell to maximize revenue?
- This seems simple, but what if we had 100 different flights?
- In the next video, we'll see how to formulate this mathematically

# Single Route Example

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |  |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|--|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 100    |               |  |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    |               |  |

Capacity  
166

- Problem: Find the optimal number of discounted seats and regular seats to sell to maximize revenue
- Let's formulate the problem mathematically

# Step 1. Decisions

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |                 |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 100    |               | Capacity<br>166 |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    |               |                 |

- What are our decisions?
  - Number of regular seats to sell –  $R$
  - Number of discount seats to sell –  $D$

# Step 2. Objective

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |  |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|--|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 100    |               |  |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    |               |  |

Capacity  
166

- What is our objective?
  - Maximizing total airline revenue
  - Revenue from each type of seat is equal to the number of that type of seat sold times the seat price

$$\max \quad 617 * R + 238 * D$$

# Step 3. Constraints

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |  |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|--|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 100    |               |  |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    |               |  |

Capacity  
166

- AA cannot sell more seats than the aircraft capacity
  - Total number of seats sold cannot exceed capacity
$$R + D \leq 166$$
- AA cannot sell more seats than the demand
  - Regular seats sold cannot exceed 100  $R \leq 100$
  - Discount seats sold cannot exceed 150  $D \leq 150$

# Step 4. Non-Negativity

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |                 |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 100    |               | Capacity<br>166 |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    |               |                 |

- AA cannot sell a negative number of seats

$$R \geq 0 \quad D \geq 0$$

# Problem Formulation

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |  |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|--|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 100    |               |  |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    |               |  |

Capacity  
166

Maximize Total airline revenue

Subject to Seats sold cannot exceed capacity

Seats sold cannot exceed demand

Seats sold cannot be negative

# Problem Formulation

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |  |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|--|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 100    |               |  |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    |               |  |

Capacity  
166


$$\text{Maximize } 617R + 238D$$

$$\text{Subject to } R + D \leq 166$$

$$R \leq 100, D \leq 150$$


$$R \geq 0, D \geq 0$$

# Visualizing the Problem




- 2D Representation
- Constraints
  - Non-negativity  
 $R \geq 0, D \geq 0$

# Visualizing the Problem




- 2D Representation
- Constraints
  - Non-negativity  
 $R \geq 0, D \geq 0$
  - Capacity  
 $R + D \leq 166$

# Visualizing the Problem




- 2D Representation
- Constraints
  - Non-negativity  
 $R \geq 0, D \geq 0$
  - Capacity  
 $R + D \leq 166$
  - Demand  
 $R \leq 100, D \leq 150$

# Visualizing the Problem




- 2D Representation
- Constraints
  - Non-negativity  
 $R \geq 0, D \geq 0$
  - Capacity  
 $R + D \leq 166$
  - Demand  
 $R \leq 100, D \leq 150$


# Feasible Space



# Possible Solutions



# Best Solution




# Marketing Decisions

- Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to invest in marketing its fares
- AA forecasts that its marketing effort is likely to attract one more unit of demand per \$200 spent


|               | Marketing Cost/unit | Marginal Revenue |
|---------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Discount Fare | \$200               |                  |
| Regular Fare  | \$200               |                  |

# Marketing Discount Fares




- What if AA increases its marketing budget for discount fares
- Higher demand for discount class
  - 150
  - 175
  - 200

# Marketing Discount Fares




- What if AA decreases its budget to market discount fares?
- Lower demand for discount fare without affecting revenue

# Marketing Discount Fares




- “Shadow Price”
  - Marginal revenue of increasing discount demand by 1 unit
- **ZERO** for discount demand greater than 66

# Marketing Regular Fares



- AA is considering increasing its budget to market regular fares
- Higher demand for regular class
  - 100
  - 125
  - 150

# Marketing Regular Fares



- “Shadow Price”
  - Marginal revenue for unit increase in demand of regular seats
- \$379 for regular demand between 0 and 166

# Marketing Decisions

- Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to invest in marketing its fares
- AA forecasts that its marketing effort is likely to attract one more unit of demand per **\$200 spent**


|               | Marketing Cost/unit | Marginal Revenue |
|---------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Discount Fare | \$200               | 0                |
| Regular Fare  | \$200               | \$379            |

# Capacity Allocation

- Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to **allocate a bigger aircraft** for the 6 hour JFK-LAX leg

|                          | Cost/hr  | Total Cost | Seats | Revenue  |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|-------|----------|
| <b>Original Aircraft</b> | \$12,067 | \$72,402   | 166   | \$77,408 |
| <b>Boeing 757-200</b>    | \$12,765 | \$76,590   | 176   |          |
| <b>Boeing 767-300</b>    | \$14,557 | \$87,342   | 218   |          |

# Aircraft Capacity



- AA is considering increasing its aircraft capacity
  - 166
  - 176
  - 218

# Capacity Allocation

- Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to allocate a bigger aircraft for the 6 hour JFK-LAX leg

|                   | Total Cost | Revenue  | Profit  |
|-------------------|------------|----------|---------|
| Original Aircraft | \$72,402   | \$77,408 | \$5,006 |
| Boeing 757-200    | \$76,590   | \$79,788 | \$3,198 |
| Boeing 767-300    | \$87,342   | \$89,784 | \$2,442 |

# Connecting Flights



# Step 1. Decisions

|   |     | Price   | Demand   | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity 166 on each) |
|---|-----|---------|----------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| { | JFK | Regular | 428      | 80            | ?                                 |
|   | -   | LAX     | Discount | 120           | ?                                 |
| { | JFK | Regular | 642      | 75            | ?                                 |
|   | -   | DFW     | Discount | 100           | ?                                 |
| { | DFW | Regular | 512      | 60            | ?                                 |
|   | -   | LAX     | Discount | 110           | ?                                 |

- Number of regular seats to sell  
→  $R_{JFK-LAX}, R_{JFK-DFW}, R_{DFW-LAX}$
- Number of discount seats to sell  
→  $D_{JFK-LAX}, D_{JFK-DFW}, D_{DFW-LAX}$

# Step 2. Objective

|                 |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity 166 on each) |
|-----------------|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| JFK<br>-<br>LAX | Regular  | 428   | 80     | ?             | 1 & 2                             |
|                 | Discount | 190   | 120    | ?             | 1 & 2                             |
| JFK<br>-<br>DFW | Regular  | 642   | 75     | ?             | 1                                 |
|                 | Discount | 224   | 100    | ?             | 1                                 |
| DFW<br>-<br>LAX | Regular  | 512   | 60     | ?             | 2                                 |
|                 | Discount | 190   | 110    | ?             | 2                                 |

- Maximize total revenue

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 428R_{\text{JFK-LAX}} + 190D_{\text{JFK-LAX}} \\ + 642R_{\text{JFK-DFW}} + 224D_{\text{JFK-DFW}} \\ + 512R_{\text{DFW-LAX}} + 190D_{\text{DFW-LAX}} \end{array} \right.$$

# Step 3. Constraints

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity 166 on each) |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| JFK | Regular  | 428   | 80     | ?             | 1 & 2                             |
| LAX | Discount | 190   | 120    | ?             | 1 & 2                             |
| JFK | Regular  | 642   | 75     | ?             | 1                                 |
| DFW | Discount | 224   | 100    | ?             | 1                                 |
| DFW | Regular  | 512   | 60     | ?             | 2                                 |
| LAX | Discount | 190   | 110    | ?             | 2                                 |

- AA cannot sell more seats than the aircraft capacity
  - First leg - JFK-DFW

→  $R_{JFK-LAX} + D_{JFK-LAX} + R_{JFK-DFW} + D_{JFK-DFW} \leq 166$

• Second leg - DFW-LAX

→  $R_{JFK-LAX} + D_{JFK-LAX} + R_{DFW-LAX} + D_{DFW-LAX} \leq 166$

# Step 3. Constraints

|                 |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity 166 on each) |
|-----------------|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| JFK<br>-<br>LAX | Regular  | 428   | 80     | ?             | 1 & 2                             |
|                 | Discount | 190   | 120    | ?             | 1 & 2                             |
| JFK<br>-<br>DFW | Regular  | 642   | 75     | ?             | 1                                 |
|                 | Discount | 224   | 100    | ?             | 1                                 |
| DFW<br>-<br>LAX | Regular  | 512   | 60     | ?             | 2                                 |
|                 | Discount | 190   | 110    | ?             | 2                                 |

- AA cannot sell more seats than the demand

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} R_{JFK-LAX} \leq 80 & D_{JFK-LAX} \leq 120 \\ R_{JFK-DFW} \leq 75 & D_{JFK-DFW} \leq 100 \\ R_{DFW-LAX} \leq 60 & D_{DFW-LAX} \leq 110 \end{array} \right.$$


# Step 4. Non-Negativity

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity 166 on each) |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| JFK | Regular  | 428   | 80     | ?             | 1 & 2                             |
| LAX | Discount | 190   | 120    | ?             | 1 & 2                             |
| JFK | Regular  | 642   | 75     | ?             | 1                                 |
| DFW | Discount | 224   | 100    | ?             | 1                                 |
| DFW | Regular  | 512   | 60     | ?             | 2                                 |
| LAX | Discount | 190   | 110    | ?             | 2                                 |

- AA cannot sell a negative number of seats

$$\left. \begin{array}{ll} R_{\text{JFK-LAX}} \geq 0 & D_{\text{JFK-LAX}} \geq 0 \\ R_{\text{JFK-DFW}} \geq 0 & D_{\text{JFK-DFW}} \geq 0 \\ R_{\text{DFW-LAX}} \geq 0 & D_{\text{DFW-LAX}} \geq 0 \end{array} \right\}$$

# Complex Network



# Multiple Fare Classes

| Fare | Domestic Upg.    | International Upg.  | EQP | EQM | Mileage | Fare | Domestic Upg.       | International Upg.                 | EQP | EQM | Mileage |
|------|------------------|---------------------|-----|-----|---------|------|---------------------|------------------------------------|-----|-----|---------|
| A    | First Class      | First Class         | 1.5 | 1.0 | 150%    | N    | Yes                 | No                                 | .5  | 1.0 | 100%    |
| B    | Yes              | Yes                 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 100%    | O    | Yes*                | No                                 | .5  | 1.0 | 100%    |
| C    | NA               | Business Upgrade    | N/A | N/A | N/A     | P    | First Class Fare    | First Class Fare                   | 1.5 | 1.0 | 150%    |
| D    | NA               | Business Fare       | 1.5 | 1.0 | 125%    | Q    | Yes                 | No                                 | .5  | 1.0 | 100%    |
| E    | No               | No                  | N/A | N/A | N/A     | R    | NA                  | Business Class Upgrade or waitlist | N/A | N/A | N/A     |
| F    | First Class Fare | First Class         | 1.5 | 1.0 | 150%    | S    | Yes*                | No                                 | .5  | 1.0 | 100%    |
| G    | Government       | Government          | .5  | 1.0 | 100%    | T    | Coach Award         | No                                 | N/A | N/A | N/A     |
| H    | Yes*             | Waitlist only       | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%    | U    | NA                  | Business Class Award               | N/A | N/A | N/A     |
| I    | NA               | Business Class Fare | 1.5 | 1.0 | 125%    | V    | Yes*                | No                                 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%    |
| J    | NA               | Business Class Fare | 1.5 | 1.0 | 125%    | W    | Yes*                | No                                 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%    |
| K    | Yes              | No                  | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%    | X    | First Class Upgrade | Business Class Upgrade             | N/A | N/A | N/A     |
| L    | Yes              | No                  | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%    | Y    | Yes                 | Yes                                | 1.5 | 1.0 | 100%    |
| M    | Yes              | No                  | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%    | Z    | First Class Award   | NA                                 | N/A | N/A | N/A     |

EQP: Elite-Qualifying Points / EQM: Elite-Qualifying Miles

# The Competitive Strategy of AA



- PEOPLEExpress could not compete with AA's Ultimate Super Savers fares

“We were a vibrant, profitable company from 1981 to 1985, and then we tipped right over into **losing 50 million a month.**”

“We had been profitable from the day we started until American came at us with Ultimate Super Savers.”

Donald Burr, CEO of PEOPLEExpress (1985)

# The Competitive Strategy of AA



- Selling the right seats to the right customers at the right prices

“**Revenue management** is the single most important technical development in transportation management since we entered the era of airline deregulation.”

“We estimate that revenue management has generated **\$1.4 billion in incremental revenue** in the last three years.”

Robert Crandall, former CEO of AA (~1985)

# The Edge of Revenue Management



- Sabre Holdings
  - Built revenue management system for AA
  - As of November 2012, ranked 133 among America's largest private companies with \$3.15 billion in sales
  - 400 airlines, 90,000 hotels, 30 car-rental companies
- Today, companies prosper from revenue management
  - Delta airlines increased annual revenue by \$300 million
  - Marriott hotels increased annual revenue by \$100 million