


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index.php	1.8 kB	3 Jan
pubmed18n0936.xml	9.1 MB	30 Jan
robots.txt	24 bytes	3 Jan
sample2_xml_rec.xml	27.7 kB	Yesterday
sample_file.xml	1.7 MB	Tue
web.config	914 bytes	3 Jan

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1875346	Duggan M E	Merck Sharp & Dohme Research Laboratories, West Point, Pennsylvania 19486.	Journal of medicinal chemistry	2013-11-21	3-Hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl-coenzyme A reductase inhibitors. 7. Modification of the hexahydronaphthalene moiety of simvastatin: 5-oxygenated and 5-oxa derivatives.	Modification of the hexahydronaphthalene ring 5-position in simvastatin 2a via oxygenation and oxa replacement afforded two series of derivatives which were evaluated in vitro for inhibition of 3-hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl-coenzyme A reductase and acutely in vivo for oral effectiveness as inhibitors of cholesterologenesis in the rat. Of the compounds selected for further biological evaluation, the 6 beta-methyl-5-oxa 10 and 5 alpha-hydroxy 16 derivatives of 3,4,4a,5-tetrahydro 2a, as well as, the 6 beta-epimer 14 and 16 evoked lower peak plasma drug activity and area-under-the-curve values than does compound 10 and led to the selection of 14 and 16 for toxicological evaluation.	1991-Aug	1875346
12211266	Cohen B CB	Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA.	Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal	2004-11-17	Public policy and the sale of human organs.	Gill and Sade, in the preceding article in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, argue that living individuals should be free from legal constraints against selling their organs. The present commentary responds to several of their claims. It explains why an analogy between kidneys and blood fails; why, as a matter of public policy, we prohibit the sale of human solid organs, yet allow the sale of blood; and why their attack on Kant's putative argument against the sale of human body parts is misplaced. Finally, it rejects the claim that the state is entitled to interfere with the actions of individuals only if such actions would harm others. We draw certain lines grounded in what Rawls has termed "public reason" beyond which we do not give effect to the autonomous self-regarding decisions of individuals. Public resistance to the sale of human body parts, no matter how voluntary or well informed, is grounded in the conviction that such a practice would diminish human dignity and our sense of solidarity. A system of organ donation, in contrast, conveys our respect for persons and honors our common humanity.	2002-Mar	12211266
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