

Matching Pennies: P₂

P₁ =

	Heads	Tails
Heads	1, -1	-1, 1
Tails	-1, 1	1, -1

To find Nash Equilibrium, look for game's payoff initially, showing zero-sum game.

∴ No Nash equilibrium exists (Pure), But, there is a Mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium.

Now) To find for P₁, Take P₂'s Payoffs (Let's say for head strategy).

E_H = Expected utility of P₂ choosing Head
E_T =

E_H = $\int (\sigma_H)$ Prob. that P₁ chooses Head sometimes & other times Tails $(1 - \sigma_H)$

$$\begin{aligned} E_H &= \int (\sigma_H) + (1 - \sigma_H) \int \\ &= (-1)(\sigma_H) + (1 - \sigma_H)(1) \\ &= -\sigma_H + 1 - \sigma_H \\ E_H &= 1 - 2\sigma_H \quad \text{--- (1)} \end{aligned}$$

$$E_T = \int (\sigma_H) + (1 - \sigma_H) \int$$

where, E_T = when P₂ chooses Tails, σ_H = Prob. that P₁ chooses Heads & $(1 - \sigma_H)$, P₁ chooses Tails, so

$$E_T = (1)(\cancel{\sigma_H}) + (1 - \sigma_H)(-1)$$

$$E_T = \sigma_H - 1 + \sigma_H = 2\sigma_H - 1 \quad (2)$$

$$\&, E_H = E_T \quad (3)$$

$$1 - 2\sigma_H = 2\sigma_H - 1$$

$$2 = 4\sigma_H$$

$$\therefore \sigma_H = 1/2, \quad \sigma_T = 1 - \sigma_H = 1/2$$

$$\&, \text{Payoff for } P_1 = [0.5, 0.5]$$

& Similarly, Can do for P_2 considering P_1 .

Tested: The output is compared with Cramér's

"Commixed" method.

Eq. (3) depicts \Rightarrow Expected utility for selecting "Heads" as pure strategy = Expected utility for selecting "Tails" as pure strategy.