

DNS Rebinding Attack Lab

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1 Introduction

The objective of this lab is two-fold: (1) demonstrate how the DNS rebinding attack works, and (2) help students gain the first-hand experience on how to use the DNS rebinding technique to attack IoT devices. In the setup, we have a simulated IoT device, which can be controlled through a web interface (this is typical for many IoT devices). Many IoT devices do not have a strong protection mechanism, if attackers can directly interact with them, they can easily compromise these devices.

The IoT device simulated in this lab is a thermostat, which controls the room temperature. To successfully set the temperature, the client needs to be able to interact with the IoT server. Since the IoT device is behind the firewall, outside machines cannot interact with the IoT device, and will therefore not be able to control the thermostat. To defeat the firewall protection, the attacking code must get into the internal network first. This is not difficult. Any time when a user from the internal network visits the attacker's website, the attacker's code (JavaScript code) actually runs from the user's browser, and therefore runs inside the protected internal network. However, due to the sandbox protection implemented by browsers, the attacker's code still cannot interact with the IoT device, even though it is now inside the internal network.

The objective of this lab is to use the DNS rebinding attack to circumvent the sandbox protection, so the JavaScript code from the attacker can successfully get the essential information from the IoT device and then use the information to set the temperature of the thermostat to a dangerously high value. This lab covers the following topics:

- DNS server setup
- DNS rebinding attack
- Attacks on IoT devices
- Same Origin Policy

Readings. Detailed coverage of the DNS rebinding attack can be found in Chapter 18 of the SEED book, *Computer Internet Security: A Hands-on Approach, 2nd Edition*, by Wenliang Du.

Lab environment. This lab has been tested on our pre-built Ubuntu 16.04 VM, which can be downloaded from the SEED website.

Customization. In this lab description, we use the domain `attacker32.com` to refer to the domain controlled by the attacker. When students do this lab, they are not allowed to use this domain name; instead, they should use a name that includes their last names (the domain name is only used internally inside the VMs, so it does not matter whether the name is owned by others or not). The purpose of this requirement is to differentiate student's work.

2 Background: IoT

Our attack target is an IoT device behind the firewall. We cannot directly access this IoT device from outside. Our goal is to get an inside user to run our JavaScript code, so we can use the DNS rebinding attack to interact with the IoT device.

Many IoT devices have a simple built-in web server, so users can interact with these devices via web APIs. Typically, these IoT devices are protected by a firewall, they cannot be accessed directly from outside. Due to this type of protection, many IoT devices do not implement a strong authentication mechanism. If attackers can find ways to interact with them, they can easily compromise its security.

We emulate such a vulnerable IoT device using a simple web server, which serves two APIs: `password` and `temperature`. The IoT device can set the room temperature. To do that, we need to send out an HTTP request to the server's `temperature` API; the request should include two pieces of data: the target temperature value and a password. The password is a secret that changes periodically, but it can be fetched using the `password` API. Therefore, to successfully set the temperature, users need to first get the password, and then attach the password in the `temperature` API.

The password is not meant for the authentication purpose; it is used to defeat the Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attack. Without this protection, a simple CSRF attack is sufficient; there is no need to use the more sophisticated DNS rebinding attack. For the sake of simplicity, we hardcoded the password; in real systems, the password will be re-generated periodically.

3 Lab Environment Setup




Figure 1: Environment setup for the experiment

In this lab, we will use three machines (VMs), which will be called User VM, Local DNS Server, and Attacker VM. For the sake of simplicity, we place these VMs on the same network using the NAT Network adaptor in VirtualBox. In the real world, they are not on the same network. We also assume that IoT device, which is running on the user VM, is behind the firewall, so the attacker VM cannot directly access the IoT device. The setup of this lab is quite complicated, as we need to configure three VMs and run multiple servers on them, including an IoT web server (on User VM), a web server and a DNS server (on Attacker VM), and a DNS server (on the Local DNS server). We break down the setup into 5 tasks.

In the rest of the document, we assume that the User VM's IP address is 10.0.2.6, the local DNS

Server's IP is 10.0.2.7 and the Attacker VM's IP is 10.0.2.8. The lab environment setup is illustrated in Figure 1.

3.1 Task 1: Configure the User VM

Step 1. Reduce Firefox's DNS caching time. To reduce load on DNS servers and to speed up response time, Firefox browser caches DNS results. By default, the cache's expiration time is 60 seconds. That means that our DNS rebinding attack needs to wait for at least 60 seconds. To make our life easier, we reduce the time to 10 seconds or less. Type `about:config` in the URL field. After clicking through a warning page, we will see a list of preference names and their values. Search for `dnsCache`, find the following entry and change its value to 0:

```
network.dnsCacheExpiration: change its value to 10 (default is 60)
```

After making the change, we should exit from the Firefox browser, and restart it; otherwise the change will not take effect.

Step 2. Change `/etc/hosts`. We need to add the following entry to the `/etc/hosts` file. We will use `www.seedIoT32.com` as the name for the IoT web server. This server can run on a different VM, but for the sake of simplicity, we run the IoT server on the User VM (assuming its IP address is 10.0.2.6):

```
10.0.2.6 www.seedIoT32.com
```

Step 3. Local DNS Server. We need to configure the User VM to use a particular local DNS server. This is achieved by setting the local DNS server as the first `nameserver` entry in the resolver configuration file (`/etc/resolv.conf`). One challenge is that the provided VM uses the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) to obtain network configuration parameters, such as IP address, local DNS server, etc. DHCP clients will overwrite the `/etc/resolv.conf` file with the information provided by the DHCP server.

One way to get our information into `/etc/resolv.conf` without worrying about the DHCP is to add the following entry to the `/etc/resolvconf/resolv.conf.d/head` file (assuming that 10.0.2.7 is the IP address of the local DNS server):

```
nameserver 10.0.2.7
```

The content of the head file will be prepended to the dynamically generated resolver configuration file. Normally, this is just a comment line (the comment in `/etc/resolv.conf` comes from this head file). After making the change, we need to run the following command for the change to take effect:

```
$ sudo resolvconf -u
```

Step 4. Testing. After configuring the user VM, use the `dig` command to get an IP address from a hostname of your choice. From the response, please provide evidences to show that the response is indeed from your server. If you cannot find the evidence, your setup is not successful.

3.2 Task 2: Start the IoT server on the User VM

In this task, we will start the IoT server on the User VM. Through the web server, users can communicate with the IoT device.

Step 1. Install Flask. We used the Flask web framework to develop the IoT server. In the current version of the SEED VM, Flask has not been installed, so we need to install it first. Use the following command to install Flask.

```
$ sudo pip3 install Flask==1.1.1
```

Step 2. Start the IoT server. The IoT server code is included in `user_vm.zip`, which can be downloaded from the lab's website. After unzipping the file, enter the `user_vm` folder, and start the IoT server by either running the prepared script `start_iot.sh` or running "`flask run`" directly. It should be noted that we use port 8080 for the IoT server (this port number is hard-coded in the lab setup; changing it to a different number will break the lab setup).

```
$ unzip user_vm.zip          # Unzip the file
$ cd user_vm                 # Go to the user_vm folder
$ FLASK_APP=rebind_iot flask run --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080
```

Step 3. Testing the IoT server. To test the IoT server, point the browser to the following URL on the User VM. If everything is setup correctly, we should be able to see a thermostat. We can also change the temperature setting by dragging the sliding bar. Please provide a screenshot in your lab report.

```
http://www.seedIoT32.com:8080
```

3.3 Task 3: Start the attack web server on the Attacker VM

In this lab, the IoT device is only accessible from behind the firewall, i.e., only from the User VM in the lab setup. A typical way to get our malicious code onto the User VM is to get the user to visit our website, so the JavaScript code placed on our web pages can get into the User VM. In this task, we will start a web server to host such web pages.

Step 1. Install Flask Our malicious web server is also developed based on the Flask web framework, so we need to install it first on the Attacker VM.

```
$ sudo pip3 install Flask==1.1.1
```

Step 2. Start the attacker's web server The attacker's server code is included in `attacker_vm.zip`, which can be downloaded from the lab's website. After unzipping the file, enter the `attacker_vm` folder, and start the web server by running the prepared script `start_webserver.sh` or running "`flask run`" directly.

```
$ unzip attacker_vm.zip      # unzip the file
$ cd attacker_vm             # Go to the attacker_vm folder
$ FLASK_APP=rebind_malware flask run --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080
```

Step 3. Testing the Attacker's web server. Point the browser to the following URL on the Attacker VM, and you should be able to see the attacker's website. Please provide a screenshot in your lab report.

```
http://localhost:8080
```

3.4 Task 4: Configure the DNS server on the Attacker VM

The Attacker VM also serves as the nameserver for the `attacker32.com` domain. The BIND9 server is already running on the Attacker VM, and we need to prepare a zone file for it. A sample zone file is included in the `attacker_vm` folder. Students should change the zone file accordingly, and copy it into the `/etc/bind` folder. The following shows the content of the sample zone file. The first entry is the default Time-To-Live (TTL) value (seconds) for the response, specifying how long the response can stay in the DNS cache. In later tasks, this value may need to be modified.

```
$TTL 10000
@      IN      SOA    ns.attacker32.com. admin.attacker32.com. (
                        2008111001
                        8H
                        2H
                        4W
                        1D)

@      IN      NS     ns.attacker32.com.

@      IN      A       10.0.2.8
www    IN      A       10.0.2.8
ns     IN      A       10.0.2.8
*      IN      A       10.0.2.8
```

You need to add the following zone entry to `/etc/bind/named.conf`, so the above zone file will be used by the BIND9 server.

```
zone "attacker32.com" {
    type master;
    file "/etc/bind/attacker32.com.zone";
};
```

After making changes to the `named.conf` file, we need to restart the BIND9 server using the following command.

```
$ sudo service bind9 restart
```

Testing. If everything is set up correctly, we can try the following `dig` command to see whether the response we get is the same as what we put in the zone file. Please include your observation (screenshots) in the lab report.

```
// Test DNS server (change 10.0.2.8 to the Attacker VM's IP)
$ dig @10.0.2.8 www.attacker32.com
```

3.5 Task 5: Configure the Local DNS Server

In the previous task, we have set up the nameserver for the `attacker32.com` domain (or the customized name chosen by students) on the attacker VM. In order for others to find this nameserver, we need to register our nameserver with the `.com` nameserver, so an NS record is added to its database. Without this step, DNS requests from others will not be able to reach our nameserver.

To do this, not only do we need to purchase the domain, we also need to run our nameserver on a public computer, not a VM inside a private network (our VM is not accessible from the outside). While all of these are doable, it increases the cost and complexity of the lab setup. We use a much simpler approach to simulate the real-world scenario.

On the Local DNS server, we set up a forward record for the `attacker32.com` domain, so whenever the local DNS server receives a DNS query for hosts inside this domain, it will simply send the DNS query to the IP address specified in the forward record, instead of going to the root server and then the `.com` server to find out where the nameserver for the `attacker32.com` domain is.

To add such a record to the Local DNS server, we need to add the following lines to `/etc/bind/named.conf` (it should be noted that students should use their own customized domain name, instead of using `attacker32.com`).

```
zone "attacker32.com" {  
    type forward;  
    forwarders { 10.0.2.8; };  
};
```

If you copy and paste the above lines from the PDF file, be aware that the quotation symbols may not be correct, which may introduce errors to the configuration file. It is better to delete them, and retype the quotation symbols. After configuring BIND9, we need to restart the DNS server using the following command:

```
$ sudo service bind9 restart
```

Testing. If we have done Tasks 1-5 correctly, when we run the following `dig` command on the User VM to find out the IP address of any host inside the `attacker32.com` domain, we should get the value that is put inside the `attacker32.com`'s zone file on the attacker VM.

```
$ dig xyz.attacker32.com
```

Please include your observations (screenshots) in the lab report. If you do not get this IP address, you may have done something wrong in one of the steps. You should fix it before proceeding to the next task.

4 Launch the Attack on the IoT Device

We are ready to launch the attack on the IoT device. To help students understand how the attack works, we break down the attack into several incremental steps.

4.1 Task 6. Understanding the Same-Origin Policy Protection

In this task, we will do some experiment to understand the same-origin policy protection implemented on browsers. On the User VM, we will browse the following three URLs. It is better to show these three pages on three different Firefox windows (instead of on three different tabs), so they are all visible.

```
URL 1: http://www.seedIoT32.com:8080  
URL 2: http://www.seedIoT32.com:8080/change  
URL 3: http://www.attacker32.com:8080/change
```

The first page lets us see the current temperature setting of the thermostat (see Figure 2.a); it fetches the temperature value from the IoT server once every second. We should keep this page always visible, so we

can see the temperature setting on the thermostat. The second and third pages are identical (see Figure 2.b), except that one comes from the IoT server, and the other comes from the attacker's server. When we click the button on both pages, a request will be sent out to the IoT server to set its temperature. we are supposed to raise the thermostat's temperature to 99 Celsius.




Figure 2: The web pages from the three URLs

Click the button on the second and third pages, and describe your observation. Which page can successfully set the thermostat's temperature? Please explain why. To find the reason, click the following menu sequence from Firefox. A console window will appear, which displays error messages if any. Hint: the reason is related to the same-origin policy enforced by browsers. Please explain why this policy causes one of the pages to fail.

Tools -> Web Developer -> Web Console

4.2 Task 7. Defeat the Same-Origin Policy Protection

From the previous task, it seems impossible to set the thermostat's temperature from the attacker's page, due to the browser's same-origin policy protection. The objective of this task is to defeat such a protection, so we can set the temperature from this page.

The main idea for defeating the same origin protection comes from the fact that the policy enforcement is based on the host name, not on the IP address, so as long as we use `www.attacker32.com` in the URL, we are complying with the SOP policy, but that does not mean we are restricted to communicate with the `www.attacker32.com` web server.

Before the user's browser sends out requests to `www.attacker32.com`, it first needs to know the IP address of `www.attacker32.com`. A DNS request will be sent out from the User's machine. If the IP address is not cached at the local DNS server, a DNS request will eventually be sent to `attacker32.com`'s nameserver, which is running on the attacker's VM. Therefore, the attacker can decide what to put in the response.

Step 1: Modify the JavaScript code. On the attacker VM, the JavaScript code running inside the `www.attacker32.com:8080/change` page is stored in the following file: `attacker_vm/rebind_`

malware/templates/js/change.js. Since this page comes from the `www.attacker32.com` server, according to the same-origin policy, it can only interact with the same server. Therefore, we need to change the first line of the code from `http://www.seediot32.com:8080` to the following:

```
let url_prefix = 'http://www.attacker32.com:8080'
```

After making the change, restart the web server on the attacker VM, then go to the User VM, refresh the page, and click the button again. Do you still see the error message in the web console? Please explain your observation.

Step 2: Conduct the DNS rebinding. Our JavaScript code sends requests to `www.attacker32.com`, i.e., the requests will come back to the Attacker VM. That is not what we want; we want the requests to go to the IoT server. This can be achieved using the DNS rebinding technique. We first map `www.attacker32.com` to the IP address of the attacker VM, so the user can get the actual page from `http://www.attacker32.com/change`. Before we click on the button on the page, we remap the `www.attacker32.com` hostname to the IP address of the IoT server, so the request triggered by the button will go to the IoT server. That is exactly what we want.

To change the DNS mapping, students can modify the `attacker32.com.zone` file. After making the changes, run the following command, so the BIND9 server can reload the revised zone data.

```
$ sudo rndc reload attacker32.com
```

If both steps in this task are done correctly, clicking the button on the `change` page from `www.attacker32.com` should be able to change the thermostat's temperature successfully. Please provide evidence in your report to demonstrate your success.

4.3 Task 8. Launch the Attack

In the previous task, the user has to click the button to set the temperature to the dangerously high value. Obviously, it is unlikely that users will do that. In this task, we need to do that automatically. We have already created a web page for that purpose. It can be accessed using the following URL:

```
http://www.attacker32.com:8080
```

Once you have loaded this page into the User VM, you should be able to see a page with a timer, which goes down from 10 to 0. Once it reaches 0, the JavaScript code on this page will send the set-temperature request to `http://www.attacker32.com:8080`, and then reset the timer value to 10. Students need to use the DNS rebinding technique, so once the timer reaches 0, the thermostat's temperature is set to 88 Celsius.

5 Submission

Students need to submit a detailed lab report, with screenshots, to describe what they have done and what they have observed. They also need to explain the observations that are interesting or surprising. Please also list the important code snippets followed by an explanation. Simply attaching code without any explanation will not receive credits.