

Module 7 Challenge

New Attempt


Due Mar 27, 2023 by 11:59pm

Points 100

Submitting a text entry box or a website url

A Day in the Life of a Windows Sysadmin

This Challenge assignment builds on the Group Policy Objectives activities from the previous class. You will create domain-hardening GPOs and revisit some PowerShell fundamentals.

 You must have fully completed the Day 3 activities in order to complete this activity. If you have not, you will need to refer to your student guides and set up your domain OUs, users, and groups before continuing with this assignment.

Lab Environment

For this week's Challenge, use the Windows Server machine and Windows 10 machine inside your Azure Windows RDP Host machine.

Windows RDP Host Machine:

- Username: `azadmin`
- Password: `p4ssw0rd*`

Open the Hyper-V Manager in the Windows RDP Host machine to access the nested virtual machines:

Windows 10 Machine

- Username: `sysadmin`
- Password: `cybersecurity`

Windows Server Machine:

- Username: `sysadmin`
- Password: `p4ssw0rd*`

NOTE

The instructions for each task will tell you which machine to work in.

The following document contains a list of Windows issues that commonly occur during this module. Familiarize yourself with these issues so that you can fix them as needed: [Understanding the Windows Module Lab](#)

[Links to an external site.](#)

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Refer to your Module 7 student guides if you have trouble with this assignment.

Task 1: Create a GPO - Disable Local Link Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR)

For this first task, you will investigate and mitigate one of the attack vectors that exists within a Windows domain.

- Read about LLMNR vulnerabilities in the the [MITRE ATT&CK database](#)
- [Links to an external site.](#)
- .
- MITRE is one of the world's leading organizations for threat intelligence in cybersecurity.
- MITRE maintains the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database, which catalogs officially known exploits.
- It also maintains this MITRE ATT&CK database, which catalogs attack methods and signatures of known hacking groups.

Local Link Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) is a vulnerability, so you will disable it on your Windows 10 machine (via the `GC Computers OU`).

A few notes about LLMNR:

- LLMNR is a protocol used as a backup (not an alternative) for DNS in Windows.
- When Windows cannot find a local address (e.g., the location of a file server), it uses LLMNR to send out a broadcast across the network asking if any device knows the address.
- LLMNR's vulnerability is that it accepts any response as authentic, allowing attackers to poison or spoof LLMNR responses, forcing devices to authenticate to them.
- An LLMNR-enabled Windows machine may automatically trust responses from anyone in the network.

Turning off LLMNR for the `GC Computers` OU will prevent your Windows machine from trusting location responses from potential attackers.

Instructions

Since this task deals with Active Directory Group Policy Objects, you'll work in your nested **Windows Server** machine.

Create a Group Policy Object that prevents your domain-joined Windows machine from using LLMNR. To do so, complete the following steps:

1. On the top right of the Server Manager screen, open the Group Policy Management tool to create a new GPO.
2. Right-click **Group Policy Objects** and select **New**.

3. Name the Group Policy Object `No LLMNR`.
 4. Right-click the new **No LLMNR** GPO listing and select **Edit** to open the Group Policy Management Editor and find policies.
 5. In the Group Policy Management Editor, you want the policy at the following path: `Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Network\DNS Client`.
 - Find the policy called `Turn Off Multicast Name Resolution`.
 - Enable this policy.
 6. Exit the Group Policy Management Editor and link the GPO to the `GC Computers` organizational unit that you previously created.
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Task 2: Create a GPO - Account Lockout

For security and compliance reasons, the CIO needs you to implement an account lockout policy on your Windows workstation. An account lockout disables access to an account for a set period of time after a specific number of failed login attempts. This policy defends against brute-force attacks, in which attackers can enter a million passwords in just a few minutes.

Account lockouts have some important considerations. Read about these in the following documentation: [Microsoft Security Guidance: Configuring Account Lockout](#)

[Links to an external site.](#)

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- You only need to read the "Account Lockout Tradeoffs" and "Baseline Selection" sections.

To summarize, an overly restrictive account lockout policy (such as locking an account for 10 hours after 2 failed attempts), can potentially keep an account locked forever if an attacker repeatedly attempts to access it in an automated way.

Instructions

Work within your nested Windows Server machine again to create another Group Policy Object. Create what you believe to be a reasonable account lockout Group Policy for the Windows 10 machine.

- Name the Group Policy Object `Account Lockout`.
- You can use Microsoft's 10/15/15 recommendation if you'd like.
- When editing policies for this new GPO, keep in mind that you want *computer configuration* policies to apply to your `GC Computers` OU. Also, these policies involve Windows *security settings* and *accounts*.

- Don't forget to link the GPO to your `GC Computers` organizational unit.

HINT

Task 3: Create a GPO - Enabling Verbose PowerShell Logging and Transcription

As mentioned in a previous lesson, PowerShell is often used as a [living off the land](#)

[Links to an external site.](#)

hacker tool. This means:

- Once a hacker gains access to a Windows machine, they will leverage built-in tools, such as PowerShell and `wmic`, as much as possible to achieve their goals while trying to stay under the radar.

So why not just completely disable PowerShell?

- Many security tools and system administration management operations, such as workstation provisioning, require heavy use of PowerShell to set up machines.
- Best practices for enabling or disabling PowerShell are debated. This often leads to the solution of allowing only certain applications to

run. These setups require a heavy amount of configuration using tools such as [AppLocker](#)

- [Links to an external site.](#)
- .
- For this reason, we'll use a PowerShell practice that is recommended regardless of whether PowerShell is enabled or disabled: enabling enhanced PowerShell logging and visibility through verbosity.
- This type of policy is important for tools like SIEM and for forensics operations, as it helps combat obfuscated PowerShell payloads.

Instructions

For this task, work in your **Windows Server** machine. Create a Group Policy Object to enable PowerShell logging and transcription. This GPO will combine multiple policies into one, although they are all under the same policy collection.

1. Name the Group Policy Object `PowerShell Logging`.
 - Find the proper Windows Powershell policy in Group Policy Management Editor.
2. **HINT**
3. Enable `Turn on Module Logging` and do the following:
 - Click **Show** next to **Module Names**.

- Since you want to log *all* PowerShell modules, enter an asterisk * (wildcard) for the Module Name, then click **OK**.

4. Enable the Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging policy.

- This policy uses the following template to log what is executed in the script block:

```
$collection =  
foreach ($item in $collection) {  
    <Everything here will get logged by this  
policy>
```

5. }

- Make sure to check the Log script block invocation start/stop events: **setting**.

6. Enable the Turn on Script Execution policy and do the following:

- Set **Execution Policy** to **Allow all scripts**.

7. **NOTE**

Do you remember the Set-ExecutionPolicy cmdlet we ran during the PowerShell exercises? This policy can enforce those settings as part of a GPO.

8. Enable the Turn on PowerShell Transcription policy and do the following:

- Leave the **Transcript output directory** blank (this defaults to the user's `~\Documents` directory).

9. NOTE

"Transcription" means that an exact copy of the the commands are created in an output directory.

- Check the **Include invocation headers** option. This will add timestamps to the command transcriptions.

10. Leave the `Set the default source path for Update-Help` policy as **Not configured**.

11. Link this new `PowerShell Logging` GPO to the `GC Computers` OU.

The next time you log in to your Windows 10 machine, run `gpupdate`. Then launch a new PowerShell window and run a script. You'll see verbose PowerShell logs created in the Windows 10 machine directory for the user that ran the script:

```
C:\Users<user>\Documents.
```

Speaking of scripts, your next task is to create a script.

Task 4: Create a Script - Enumerate Access Control Lists

Before we create a script, let's review [Access Control Lists](#)

[Links to an external site.](#)

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- In Windows, access to files and directories are managed by Access Control Lists (ACLs). These identify which entities (known as security principals), such as users and groups, can access which resources. ACLs use security identifiers to manage which principals can access which resources.
- While you don't need to know the specific components within ACLs for this task, you do need to know how to use the `Get-Acl` PowerShell cmdlet to retrieve them. [View Get-Acl documentation here](#)
- [Links to an external site.](#)
- .

Familiarize yourself with the basics of `Get-Acls`:

- `Get-Acl` without any parameters or arguments will return the security descriptors of the directory you're currently in.
- `Get-Acl <filename>` will return the specific file's ACL. We'll need to use this for our task.

Instructions

For this task, you'll work in your nested **Windows 10** machine with the following credentials: `sysadmin | cybersecurity`.

Create a PowerShell script that will enumerate the Access Control List of each file or subdirectory within the current working directory. To do so, complete the following steps:

Create a `foreach` loop. You can use the following template:

```
foreach ($item in $directory) {  
    <Script block>
```

1. `}`
2. Above the `foreach` condition, set a variable, `$directory`, to the contents of the current directory.
3. Replace the script block placeholder with the command to enumerate the ACL of a file, using the `$item` variable in place of the file name.
 - You'll need to use the following cmdlets:
 - `Get-ChildItem` (or any alias of `Get-ChildItem`, such as `ls` or `dir`)
 - `Get-Acl`
4. Save this script in `C:\Users\sysadmin\Documents` as `enum_acls.ps1`.
5. Test this script by moving to any directory (`cd C:\Windows`), and running `C:\Users\sysadmin\Documents\enum_acls.ps1` (enter the full path and file name).
 - You should see the ACL output of each file or subdirectory where you ran the script from.

Optional Additional Challenge - Task 5: Verify Your PowerShell Logging GPO

For this task, test and verify that your PowerShell logging GPO is working properly.

Instructions

- Ensure that you're logged in to the **Windows 10** machine as `sysadmin | cybersecurity`.
- Run `gpupdate` in an administrative PowerShell window to pull the latest Active Directory changes.
- Close and relaunch PowerShell into an administrative session.
- Navigate to a directory that you want to see the ACLs in. You can go to `C:\Windows`, as you did in Task 4.
- Run the `enum_acls.ps1` script using the full file path and name, such as the one in Task 4.
- Check the `C:\Users\sysadmin\Documents` for your new logs.
 - You should see a directory with the current date (for example, `20200908`) as the directory name. Your new transcribed PowerShell logs should be inside.

Submission Guidelines

Add the following deliverables for each task to a single Google Drive folder called < Your Name >< Module 7 Challenge >, and submit the URL for that folder through Canvas (don't forget to set the permissions for the folder to allow access to anyone with the link!):

- **Deliverable for Task 1:** A screenshot of all the GPOs created for this assignment. To find these, launch the Group Policy Management tool, select **Group Policy Objects**, and take a screenshot of the GPOs you've created. Name the screenshot file `GPOs`.
- **Deliverable for Task 2:** A screenshot of the different `Account Lockout` policies in Group Policy Management Editor. It should show the three values you set under the Policy and Policy Setting columns. Name the screenshot file `Account-Lockout-Policies`.
- **Deliverable for Task 3:** A screenshot of the different `Windows PowerShell` policies within the Group Policy Management Editor. Four of these should be enabled. Name the screenshot file `Windows-PowerShell-Policies`.
- **Deliverable for Task 4:** A copy of your `enum_acls.ps1` script.
- **Deliverable for Optional Additional Challenge Task 5:** A screenshot of the contents of one of your transcribed PowerShell logs (named `PowerShell-logs`) or a copy of one of the logs.

Submission Url : <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1yZ0t6SBt0Enx2QfexRjuZHaxQH4fucH8?usp=sharing>

Account Lockout

Scope Details Settings Delegation Status

Account Lockout

Data collected on: 3/27/2023 2:48:13 AM

General

Details

Links

Security Filtering

The settings in this GPO can only apply to the following groups, users, and computers:

Name

NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users

Delegation

Computer Configuration (Enabled)

Policies

Windows Settings

Security Settings

Account Policies/Account Lockout Policy

| Policy | Setting |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Account lockout duration | 15 minutes |
| Account lockout threshold | 15 invalid logon attempts |
| Reset account lockout counter after | 15 minutes |

User Configuration (Enabled)

enum_acls.ps1 - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

```
$directory = Get-childitem  
foreach ($item in $directory) {  
    Get-Acl $item.Fullname  
}
```


Group Policy Objects in GOODCORP.NET

Contents Delegation

| Name | GPO Status | WMI Filter | Modified | Owner |
|---|------------|------------|----------------------|----------|
|  Default Domain Controllers Policy | Enabled | None | 9/22/2020 8:37:10 PM | Domain A |
|  Default Domain Policy | Enabled | None | 2/5/2021 7:44:12 PM | Domain A |
|  No LLMNR | Enabled | None | 3/27/2023 1:45:49 AM | Domain A |

```
PS C:\users\sysadmin\Documents> cd 20230327
PS C:\users\sysadmin\Documents\20230327> ls

Directory: C:\users\sysadmin\Documents\20230327

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-a----            3/27/2023   11:07 PM           836 PowerShell_transcript.DESKTOP-SITPOTH.hCG7zMAH.20230327230728.txt
-a----            3/27/2023   11:08 PM              0 PowerShell_transcript.DESKTOP-SITPOTH.ykHzp4qY.20230327230808.txt

PS C:\users\sysadmin\Documents\20230327>
```

| | | |
|--|---------|---------|
| Powershell Logging | | |
| Data collected on: 3/27/2023 3:00:56 AM | | |
| General | | |
| Details | | |
| Links | | |
| Security Filtering | | |
| Delegation | | |
| Computer Configuration (Enabled) | | |
| Policies | | |
| Administrative Templates | | |
| Policy definitions (ADMX files) retrieved from the local computer. | | |
| Windows Components/Windows PowerShell | | |
| Policy | Setting | Comment |
| Turn on Module Logging | Enabled | |
| To turn on logging for one or more modules, click Show, and then type the module names in the list. Wildcards are supported. | | |
| Module Names | | |
| * (wildcard) | | |
| To turn on logging for the Windows PowerShell core modules, type the following module names in the list: | | |
| Microsoft.PowerShell * | | |
| Microsoft.WSMan.Management | | |
| Policy | Setting | Comment |
| Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging | Enabled | |
| Log script block invocation start / stop events. | | |
| Enabled | | |
| Policy | Setting | Comment |
| Turn on PowerShell Transcription | Enabled | |
| Transcript output directory | | |
| Include invocation headers: | | |
| Enabled | | |
| Policy | Setting | Comment |
| Turn on Script Execution | Enabled | |
| Execution Policy | | |
| Allow all scripts | | |
| User Configuration (Enabled) | | |
| No settings defined. | | |