

A technical introduction to Enarx

Rust + WebAssembly + TEEs = Confidential Computing

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https://enarx.dev



(skip to the interesting part)



- End-to-end demo available
 - SEV (AMD) working!
 - SGX (Intel) imminent!



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 - Early February 2021
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 - Initial focus on HOWTOs and design documentation



Enarx overview





• Uses TEEs (SGX, SEV, TDX, etc.) for confidential workloads



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- Easy development and deployment



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- Cloud-native → Openshift, kubernetes
- Open source: project, not production-ready (yet)





Isolation

Workloads and the host




The 3 types of isolation







Workload from workload isolation








Workload from workload isolation







Host from workload isolation








Host from workload isolation








Workload from host isolation








Workload from host isolation





Workload from host isolation





Sensitive workloads

Cloud for regulated sectors

• Healthcare, Finance, Government, Enterprise, ...

Vulnerable hosts

• Edge, IoT, ...







Different platforms → separate development



- 1. Different platforms → separate development
- 2. Different SDKs → restricted language availability



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- 4. Different vendors → vulnerability management woes



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... I just want to deploy workloads!




Introducing Enarx





Enarx Runtime Architecture






Architectural View




Enarx architectural components & integrations





Enarx architectural components




Demo Time!



Process flow




Enarx architectural components





Enarx attestation process diagram



Enarx Design Principles



Enarx Design Principles

- 1. Minimal Trusted Computing Base
- 2. Minimum trust relationships
- 3. Deployment-time portability
- Network stack outside TCB
- 5. Security at rest, in transit and in use
- 6. Auditability
- 7. Open source
- 8. Open standards
- 9. Memory safety
- 10. No backdoors



Diversity of thought and experience



Diversity of thought and experience

- Discover use cases
- Explore architecture
- Challenge designs
- Review implementation
- Increase test coverage
- Clarify documentation



Diversity of thought and experience

Ease of involvement



Diversity of thought and experience

Ease of involvement

- More voices
- More expertise
- More welcoming environment



Diversity of thought and experience

Ease of involvement

Visibility of code and design



Diversity of thought and experience

Ease of involvement

Visibility of code and design

- Auditability
- But only if combined with diversity and involvement



We are an <u>open</u> project

- Code
- Wiki
- Design
- Issues & PRs
- Chat
- CI/CD resources
- Stand-ups
- Diversity

- ✓ GitHub
- ✓ GitHub
- ✓ GitHub
- ✓ GitHub
- ✓ Rocket.Chat (Thank you!)
- ✓ Metal.equinix.com (Thank you!)
- Open to all
- ✓ Contributor Covenant CofC






State of the project




State of the project

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Key component repositories

- enarx-keepldr Keep loading, execution and management
- enarx-wasmldr loads and executes workloads
- enarx-keepmgr manages multiple Keeps per host
- client requests and attests Keeps, provisions workloads
- Infrastructure/glue
 - Platform-specifics (e.g. sev, sevctl, sgx)
 - koine shared communications pieces
 - ciborium CBOR-encoding/decoding crate

Note: some code awaiting merging as of 2021-01-26!



Getting involved

- Follow us on social media!
- Download, (compile,) run, test, report
 - Users / workload developers
 - Project developers
- Audit designs and implementations
- Document
- Community building and outreach



Useful technical skill-sets

Most important is willingness to learn

- SEV, SGX expertise
- WebAssembly
 - Compiler
 - WASI
- Micro-kernel/syscall
- Linux systems programming
 - Networking, storage
- Kubernetes/Openshift integration skills
- Security auditing/research
- Rust!





Where to find us

Website: https://enarx.dev

Code: https://github.com/enarx

Chat: https://chat.enarx.dev

Twitter: @enarxproject

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/enarx

YouTube: Search "Enarx"

License: Apache 2.0

Language: Rust (with a smattering of x86 Assembly)



Questions?



https://enarx.dev



Back-up slides



Component level trust



Enarx runtime

Enarx Keep - trusted

Measured and attested WebAssembly+WASI runtime Inside a TEE instance Enarx client agent

Enarx host agent

Enarx host agent - untrusted


Acts as proxy between Enarx client agent and:


- CPU/firmware
- Enarx Keep

Enarx client agent - trusted


Works with orchestration/CLI Manages attestation Applies policy Encrypts and transports workload

















Basic deployment architecture




Standard Enarx trust domain


Host **Empty** Keep **Enarx runtime** Enarx host agent CPU + firmware

(before attestation)

Client



Standard Enarx trust domain





Standard Enarx trust domain

(after workload delivery) Host Client **Application** Enarx Running client CLI Keep agent Orchestrator Enarx host (e.g. Openshift/k8s, agent Openstack) CPU + firmware




Keep layers



Keep - process or VM-based

- Core Keep
- Platform-specific
 - Hardware (CPU): silicon vendor
 - o Firmware: silicon vendor
 - Software: Enarx




Architecture varies between VM/Process-based platforms



WebAssembly (WASM)


- W3C standard
- Stack Machine ISA
- Sandboxed
- Supported by all browsers
- Exploding in the "serverless" space
- Implementations improving rapidly
 - o cranelift and wasmtime





WebAssembly System API (<u>WASI</u>)

- W3C Standards Track
- Heavily inspired by a subset of POSIX
- Primary goals:
 - Portability
 - Security
- libc implementation on top
- Capability-based security:
 - No absolute resources
 - Think: openat() but not open()






Language Bindings (libc, etc.)

Compilation targets and includes, e.g.


• Rust: --target wasm32-wasi






Application

- Written by
 - Tenant (own development)
 OR
 - 3rd party vendor
- Standard development tools
- Compiled to WebAssembly
- Using WASI interface





Layers - process-based Keep





Layers - VM-based Keep

