



## [Actor Preview]

**Code Name:**

Celestial Cowboy Heist

**Affiliation(s):**

No known affiliations. Likely independent financially motivated cybercriminals.

**Operating Region(s):**

Likely external, using phishing infrastructure and compromised accounts.

**Motivation(s):** Financial gain through theft and resale of intellectual property (exclusive fashion designs).

**Summary:** The Celestial Cowboy Heist was a phishing-driven cyberattack against Celestial Cowboy Couture, a luxury fashion brand in Deadwood, South Dakota. The campaign began when CEO Jane Hartley clicked on a malicious link, leading to the compromise of her account. The attackers then used Jane's trusted identity to send phishing emails to lead fashion designer Megan Lucia. Megan executed a malicious payload that gave the attackers deeper access. Using this foothold, the attackers discovered and exfiltrated sensitive fashion designs, which were later sold on OutlawBuy.com, damaging the brand's reputation.

### Initial Access Vector

The initial compromise occurred when CEO **Jane Hartley** clicked on a phishing link that resulted in her account being taken over. From her compromised account, the attackers sent internal phishing emails to **Megan Lucia (Lead Fashion Designer)**. The phishing email had the subject line: "URGENT: From your CEO - Immediate Action Required: You are getting promoted Cowboy!!!!" Believing it to be legitimate, Megan opened the attachment and executed the malicious payload.

### Post Exploitation Activity

After compromising **Megan Lucia's** account and workstation, the attackers discovered a folder named "designs\_to\_steal" containing four suspicious ZIP files. They also deployed a malicious executable **advanced-uploader.exe**. Obfuscated PowerShell commands were executed to connect to attacker domains, including **im-your-huckleberry.com**. Using these tools, the attackers staged fashion design files for exfiltration. Soon after, knock-off designs appeared on **OutlawBuy.com**, confirming the theft and monetization of Celestial Cowboy Couture's intellectual property.

## Command and Control

Persistence and communication with attacker infrastructure were maintained through obfuscated PowerShell commands running via `C:\Windows\System32\powershell.exe`. The commands were encoded in Base64 and reversed before decoding, leading to URLs hosted at `im-your-huckleberry.com`. Suspicious logins originated from IP `192.124.249.15`, which was observed accessing both Megan Lucia's and Jane Hartley's accounts. Additional activity was tied to IP `142.250.191.78`.

## Exfiltration and Impact

The attackers used `advanced-uploader.exe` to package and upload stolen designs to external servers. The stolen files were later leaked and sold on `OutlawBuy.com`. Threat domains used in this campaign included `secure-celestial.com`, `celestialcowboy-support.com`, and `cccouture-hr-update.com`. The breach severely harmed Celestial Cowboy Couture's reputation and financial prospects, as their flagship collection was compromised before launch.

## Appendix: Indicators of Compromise

### Domains:

- `im-your-huckleberry.com`
- `secure-celestial.com`
- `celestialcowboy-support.com`
- `cccouture-hr-update.com`

### Threat IPs:

- `192.124.249.15`
- `142.250.191.78`

### Malicious Files:

- `advanced-uploader.exe`
- `designs_to_steal/*.zip`

### Emails:

- From: `jane_hartley@celestialcowboy.com` (compromised CEO)
- To: `megan.lucia@celestialcowboy.com` (Lead Fashion Designer)
- Subject: URGENT: From your CEO - Immediate Action Required: You are getting promoted Cowboy!!!!

## Analyst Notes

The Celestial Cowboy Heist highlights how cybercriminals exploited the trust between executives and staff. `Jane Hartley (CEO)` was the initial victim, enabling attackers to pivot internally and compromise `Megan Lucia (Lead Fashion Designer)`. From there, they exfiltrated high-value intellectual property. The attack also exploited Megan's online footprint, as her public LinkedIn frustration post may have marked her as an easy target. Enhanced phishing awareness training, multi-factor authentication, and continuous monitoring of login anomalies could have prevented or minimized this incident.