

1/ Known:  $g, g^\alpha, g^\beta$

Given:  $A \rightarrow A(g^\alpha) = g^{1/\alpha}$

We perform the following operations:-

$$g_1 = g^\alpha \cdot g = g^{\alpha+1} \quad g_2 = g^\beta \cdot g = g^{\beta+1}$$

$$g_3 = A(g_1) = g^{\frac{1}{\alpha+1}} \quad g_4 = A(g_2) = g^{\frac{1}{\beta+1}}$$

$$g_5 = g_3 g_4 = g^{\frac{1}{\alpha+1} + \frac{1}{\beta+1}} = g^{\frac{\alpha+\beta+2}{1+\alpha+\beta+\alpha\beta}}$$

$$g_6 = A(g_5) = g^{\frac{1+\alpha+\beta+\alpha\beta}{\alpha+\beta+2}}$$

$$g_7 = g_6 \cdot g^{-1} = g^{\frac{\alpha\beta-1}{\alpha+\beta+2}}$$

$$g_8 = g^\alpha \cdot g^\beta \cdot g^2 = g^{\alpha+\beta+2}$$

$$g_9 = A(g_8) = g^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\beta+2}}$$

$$g_{10} = g_7 \cdot g_9 = g^{\frac{\alpha\beta}{\alpha+\beta+2}}$$

$$g_{11} = A(g_{10}) = g^{\frac{\alpha+\beta+2}{\alpha\beta}} = g^{\frac{1}{\alpha} + \frac{1}{\beta} + \frac{2}{\alpha\beta}}$$

$$g_{12} = A(g^\alpha) = g^{1/\alpha}$$

$$g_{13} = A(g^\beta) = g^{1/\beta}$$

$$g_{14} = g_{11} \cdot g_{12}^{-1} \cdot g_{13}^{-1} = g^{\frac{2}{\alpha\beta}}$$

$$g_{15} = A(g_{14}) = g^{\frac{\alpha^8}{2}}$$

$$g_{16} = g_{15}^2 = g^{\alpha^8}$$

$$2) e = 3, N_1 < N_2 < N_3$$

$$\text{Ciphertext} :- (r^3 \bmod N_1, r^3 \bmod N_2, r^3 \bmod N_3, H(r) \oplus m)$$

If for any pair of  $N_1, N_2, N_3$ , their gcd is not equal to 1, the adversary will be able to factorize the pair and hence calculate  $r$ .

If for any pair  $(N_i, N_j)$ ,  $\gcd(N_i, N_j) = 1$  then we have the following equations:-

$$r^3 \bmod N_1 = m_1$$

$$r^3 \bmod N_2 = m_2$$

$$r^3 \bmod N_3 = m_3$$

The system can be solved to obtain solutions of the form

$$r^3, r^3 + N_1 N_2 N_3, r^3 + 2N_1 N_2 N_3, \dots$$

so we take the ~~sm~~ smallest solution and find  $r$  from it.

Knowing  $r$ , an adversary can now find

$$m \text{ as } H(r) \oplus (H(r) \oplus m) = m.$$



$$3) \text{ Sign}(i) = f^{(m-i)}(x)$$

$$\bullet f^{(m)}(x) \rightarrow \text{public}$$

a) To verify  $\text{Sign}(i)$ , the receiver can apply the function  $f$  to  $\text{Sign}(i)$   $i$  times.

If  $f^{(i)}(\text{Sign}(i)) = f^{(m)}(x)$  then the signature is valid, since

$$f^{(i)}(f^{(m-i)}(x)) = f^{(m)}(x)$$

b) The scheme is not one time secure since knowing  $\text{Sign}(i)$ , an adversary can find  $\text{Sign}(i-1)$ ,  $\text{Sign}(i-2)$ , ...,  $\text{Sign}(0)$ .

$$\text{Sign}(i-1) = f^{(m-i+1)}(x) = f(f^{(m-i)}(x)) = f(\text{Sign}(i))$$

$$\text{Sign}(i-2) = f(\text{Sign}(i-1))$$

And so on.

4)

a) For the scheme to be one-time secure, value of  $K$  should be such that total no. of possible subsets of  $2^k$  keys should be greater than or equal to message space size.

Hence,

$$2^k \geq 2^n$$

$$b) \quad 2^n \leq {}^{2^t}C_k$$

For max value of  $n$ ,  $k=t$  since  ${}^{2^t}C_k$  achieves max value at  $k=t$

$$\Rightarrow 2^n = {}^{2^t}C_t$$

$$\Rightarrow \boxed{n = \log_2 {}^{2^t}C_t}$$