


Practical Malware Analysis



Ch 2: Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines

Updated 1-16-17

Dynamic Analysis

- Running malware deliberately, while monitoring the results
- Requires a **safe environment**
- Must prevent malware from spreading to production machines
- Real machines can be **airgapped** -no network connection to the Internet or to other machines

Real Machines

- Disadvantages
 - No Internet connection, so parts of the malware may not work
 - Can be difficult to remove malware, so re-imaging the machine will be necessary
- Advantage
 - Some malware detects virtual machines and won't run properly in one

Virtual Machines

- The most common method
- We'll do it that way
- This protects the host machine from the malware
 - Except for a few very rare cases of malware that escape the virtual machine and infect the host

VMware Player

- Free but limited
- Cannot take snapshots
- VMware Workstation or Fusion is a better choice, but they cost money
- You could also use VirtualBox, Hyper-V, Parallels, or Xen.

Windows XP

- The malware we are analyzing targets Windows XP, as most malware does
- Win XP has passed its end-of-life, so we'll use Windows Server 2008

Configuring VMware

- You can disable networking by disconnecting the virtual network adapter
- Host-only networking allows network traffic to the host but not the Internet





Figure 3-3. Host-only networking in VMware

Connecting Malware to the Internet

- NAT mode lets VMs see each other and the Internet, but puts a virtual router between the VM and the LAN
- Bridged networking connects the VM directly to the LAN
- Can allow malware to do some harm or spread - controversial
- You could send spam or participate in a DDoS attack

Snapshots



Risks of Using VMware for Malware Analysis

- Malware may detect that it is in a VM and run differently
- VMware has bugs: malware may crash or exploit it
- Malware may spread or affect the host - don't use a sensitive host machine
- **All the textbook samples are harmless**

Practical Malware Analysis

Ch 3: Basic Dynamic Analysis

Why Perform Dynamic Analysis?

- Static analysis can reach a dead-end, due to
 - Obfuscation
 - Packing
 - Examiner has exhausted the available static analysis techniques
- Dynamic analysis is efficient and will show you exactly what the malware does

Sandboxes: The Quick-and-Dirty Approach

Sandbox

- All-in-one software for basic dynamic analysis
- Virtualized environment that simulates network services
- Examples: Norman Sandbox, GFI Sandbox, Anubis, Joe Sandbox, ThreatExpert, BitBlaze, Comodo Instant Malware Analysis
- They are expensive but easy to use
- They produce a nice PDF report of results

Running Malware

Launching DLLs

- EXE files can be run directly, but DLLs can't
- Use Rundll32.exe (included in Windows)
rundll32.exe *DLLname*, *Export arguments*
- The *Export* value is one of the exported functions you found in Dependency Walker, PView, or PE Explorer.

Launching DLLs

- Example
 - rip.dll has these exports: **Install** and **Uninstall**
rundll32.exe rip.dll, Install
- Some functions use **ordinal** values instead of names, like
rundll32.exe xyzzy.dll, #5
- It's also possible to modify the PE header and convert a DLL into an EXE


Monitoring with Process Monitor

Process Monitor

- Monitors registry, file system, network, process, and thread activity
- All recorded events are kept, but you can filter the display to make it easier to find items of interest
- Don't run it too long or it will fill up all RAM and crash the machine

Launching Calc.exe

- Many, many events recorded




The screenshot shows the Process Monitor application window with the following details:

- Title Bar:** Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com
- Menu Bar:** File, Edit, Event, Filter, Tools, Options, Help
- Toolbar:** Includes icons for file operations, search, and process management.
- Table Columns:** Time of Day, Process Name, PID, Operation, Path, Result, Detail.
- Table Content:** A list of system events starting from 1:17:48.5991093 PM. The events include Explorer EXE and calc.exe performing various operations like RegOpenKey, RegCloseKey, CloseFile, RegQueryValue, ReadFile, CreateFile, QueryBasicInfo, Load Image, and CloseFile. The results are mostly SUCCESS, with some NAME NOT FOUND errors for registry paths.
- Status Bar:** Showing 128,723 of 253,268 events (50%) and Backed by virtual memory.

Time of Day	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
1:17:48.5991093 PM	Explorer EXE	3188	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Query Value
1:17:48.5992018 PM	Explorer EXE	3188	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVers...	SUCCESS	
1:17:48.5998061 PM	Explorer EXE	3188	CloseFile	C:\Windows\winxps\%66_microsoft.windows.common...	SUCCESS	
1:17:48.6001092 PM	calc.exe	2072	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Er...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Query Value
1:17:48.6001273 PM	calc.exe	2072	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Er...	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD, Length: 4, ...
1:17:48.6001350 PM	calc.exe	2072	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Er...	SUCCESS	
1:17:48.6001722 PM	calc.exe	2072	ReadFile	C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe	SUCCESS	Offset: 103,424, Length: 32,768, ...
1:17:48.6011060 PM	calc.exe	2072	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsCodecs.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Attributes, ...
1:17:48.6011278 PM	calc.exe	2072	QueryBasicInfo	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsCodecs.dll	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 7/13/2009 4:29:14 ...
1:17:48.6011337 PM	calc.exe	2072	CloseFile	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsCodecs.dll	SUCCESS	
1:17:48.6012132 PM	calc.exe	2072	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsCodecs.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List...
1:17:48.6012344 PM	calc.exe	2072	CreateFileMap	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsCodecs.dll	FILE LOCKED WI...	SyncType: SyncTypeCreateSect...
1:17:48.6012501 PM	calc.exe	2072	CreateFileMap	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsCodecs.dll	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTypeOther
1:17:48.6013372 PM	calc.exe	2072	Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsCodecs.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x73aa0000, Image ...
1:17:48.6013796 PM	calc.exe	2072	CloseFile	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsCodecs.dll	SUCCESS	
1:17:48.6015378 PM	calc.exe	2072	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Maximum Above...
1:17:48.6015591 PM	calc.exe	2072	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes	SUCCESS	Query Name
1:17:48.6015697 PM	calc.exe	2072	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{FAE30380-FAE4-4...	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read
1:17:48.6015797 PM	calc.exe	2072	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{FAE30380-FAE4-4623-8C75-C6B6111...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
1:17:48.6015937 PM	calc.exe	2072	RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes	SUCCESS	Query Name
1:17:48.6016002 PM	calc.exe	2072	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{FAE30380-FAE4-4...	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read
1:17:48.6016130 PM	calc.exe	2072	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{FAE30380-FAE4-4623-8C75-C6B6111...	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read

Process Monitor Toolbar




Filtering with Exclude


- One technique: hide normal activity before launching malware
- Right-click each Process Name and click **Exclude**
- Doesn't seem to work well with these samples

Filtering with Include

- Most useful filters: Process Name, Operation, and Detail




Viewing Processes with Process Explorer



Coloring


- Services are pink
- Processes are blue
- New processes are green briefly
- Terminated processes are red

DLL Mode




Properties

- Shows DEP (Data Execution Prevention) and ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) status
- Verify button checks the disk file's Windows signature
 - But not the RAM image, so it won't detect process replacement



Strings

- Compare Image to Memory strings, if they are very different, it can indicate process replacement




Detecting Malicious Documents

- Open the document (e.g. PDF) on a system with a vulnerable application
- Watch Process Explorer to see if it launches a process
- The Image tab of that process's Properties sheet will show where the malware is

Comparing Registry Snapshots with Regshot


Regshot

- Take 1st shot
- Run malware
- Take 2nd shot
- Compare them to see what registry keys were changed



Faking a Network

Using ApateDNS to Redirect DNS Resolutions




ApateDNS Does Not Work

- I couldn't get it to redirect any traffic in Win XP or 7
- nslookup works, but you don't see anything in a browser or with ping
- I decided to ignore it and use INetSim instead

Ncat Listener


- Using Ncat.exe, you can listen on a single TCP port in Windows
 - In Linux, use nc (netcat)
- This will allow malware to complete a TCP handshake, so you get some rudimentary information about its requests
- But it's not a real server, so it won't reply to requests after the handshake

Monitoring with Ncat (included with Nmap)



```
Administrator: cmd - Shortcut (2) - ncat -! 80

C:\Windows\System32>ncat -l 80
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
Connection: keep-alive
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/29.0.1547.57 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
```



Packet Sniffing with Wireshark

The screenshot displays the Wireshark network protocol analyzer interface. The top menu bar includes File, Edit, View, Go, Capture, Analyze, Statistics, Telephony, Tools, Internals, and Help. Below the menu is a toolbar with various icons for file operations, capture control, and analysis. The main display area is divided into three panes:


- Filter:** Set to 'http'.
- Packet List:** A table of captured packets. The selected packet is number 1100, which is an HTTP 200 OK response from 192.168.119.154 to 192.168.119.154.
- Packet Details:** Shows the structure of the selected packet, including Ethernet II, Internet Protocol Version 4, and Hypertext Transfer Protocol.
- Packet Bytes:** A hex/ASCII view of the selected packet's raw data.

At the bottom of the interface, the status bar indicates the capture is running on the Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection, with 1398 packets displayed.

On the right side of the image, there is a small inset showing a web browser window with the URL 'samsclass.info'. The browser's address bar shows 'samsclass.info' and the page content includes a navigation menu with links like 'Home', 'About', 'Contact', and 'Privacy Policy'.


Follow TCP Stream

- Can save files from streams here too



Using INetSim


inetsim




The screenshot shows a Kali Linux terminal window with the title 'kali-linux-(186-gnome-vm)'. The terminal prompt is 'root@kali: /etc/default#'. The command 'ifconfig eth0' has been executed, displaying the following output:

```
Link encap:Ethernet Hwaddr 00:0c:29:bf:b0:5a
inet addr:192.168.1.132 Bcast:192.168.1.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
inet6 addr: fe80::20c:29ff:febf:b05a/64 Scope:Link
UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
RX packets:30570 errors:27587 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:15764 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:29371297 (28.0 MiB) TX bytes:1152819 (1.0 MiB)
Interrupt:19 Base address:0x2024
```


The terminal window also shows a taskbar at the bottom with the 'KALI LINUX' logo and a system tray area with a clock showing 'Sun Aug 25, 3:57 PM'.



INetSim Fools a Browser



INetSim Fools Nmap



Basic Dynamic Tools in Practice

Using the Tools

- Procmon
 - Filter on the malware executable name and clear all events just before running it
- Process Explorer
- Regshot
- Virtual Network with INetSim
- Wireshark




Figure 4-12. Example of a virtual network