

# **Stack Overflow Exploitation using Bash and Mitigation**

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## 1. Disable all the counter measures while compiling

To complete the first step, I signed into Kail VM and from there went to D2L to Download StackOverFlowHW.cpp from the Assignment 5 tab in D2L.

In the second step I compiled the StackOverFlowHW.cpp program as an x86 binary via a Makefile or by a bash script that is called compile.sh. For the assignment I chose to compile the program via a Makefile that I have edited to include -fno-stack-protector, z execstack, and no-pie flags that allow me to disable all the countermeasures to complete the rest of the assignment.



```
File Actions Edit View Help
# Compiler name
CXX = g++
# g++ compiler flags
# -g: adds debugging information to the executable file
# -Wall: turns on most, but not all, compiler warnings
# -std=c++17: uses c++17 standard
# Put all the required flags separated by space
CXXFLAGS = -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -no-pie -g -o

# The build target executable file; .exe is not required
PROGRAM = StackHW.out

# List .cpp files separated by space
CPPFILES = StackOverflowHW.cpp

# Make all rule/default rule that'll be run when we run "make"
# First compile each file to object file
# Then make a single binary/executable program
all:
# $(g++) $(CXX) -g -Wall -std=c++17 $(file.cpp)
# $(CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) $(PROGRAM) $(CPPFILES)
# $(g++) -o $(file.out) *.o
# $(CXX) -o $(PROGRAM)

# Make clean rule
# Delete object and binary files
clean:
rm -f $(PROGRAM) *.o

# Rule to run the program
run:
./$(PROGRAM)

# To Make and Run, type: make && make run

"Makefile" 33L, 920B      8,11      All
```

## 2. Manual static analysis

For the next step I performed a manual static analysis to see what vulnerabilities I could find. While performing the manual static analysis the first thing I saw was in the `give_shell()` function which calls the `(/bin/sh)` which runs a shell command. This is a vulnerability because it allows the program to access the shell which can comprise your system if the program is malicious. Another vulnerability that I noticed is that the `mget()` function reads inputs into buffer from the `bad()` function. The buffer is fixed at 300 and if the input is larger than 300 it will lead to a buffer overflow. Another instance of a possible buffer overflow is in the `bad()` function that creates a char array that uses the fixed `BUFSIZE` amount.

```
StackOverflow.cpp
8 using namespace std;
9
10 #define BUFSIZE 300
11
12 using namespace std;
13
14 void give_shell()
15 {
16     system("/bin/sh");
17 }
18
19 char *mget(char *dst)
20 {
21     char *ptr = dst;
22     int ch;
23     /* skip leading white spaces */
24     while ((ch = getchar()) && (ch == ' ' || ch == '\t'))
25     {
26     }
27     if (ch == '\n')
28     {
29         *ptr = '\0';
30         return dst;
31     }
32     else
33         *ptr = ch;
34
35     /* now read the rest until \n */
36     while (true)
37     {
38         ch = getchar();
39         if (ch == '\n')
40             break;
41         *++ptr = ch;
42     }
43     *++ptr = '\0';
44     return dst;
45 }
46
47 void bad()
48 {
49     char buffer[BUFSIZE];
50     printf("buffer is at %p\n", buffer);
51     cout << "Give me some text: ";
52     fflush(stdout);
53     mget(buffer); // similar to C's gets();
54     //gets(buffer); // deprecated
55     cout << "Acknowledged: " << buffer << " with length " << strlen(buffer) << endl;
56 }
57
58 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
59 {
60     bad();
61 }
```

### 3. Valgrind Memcheck Dynamix Analysis

For the next step we had to use Valgrind Memcheck which is a tool that can be used to detect memory leaks, memory corruption, and any errors related to memory. When you first run Valgrind with the input being under the buffer size you get no errors, and the program seems to be running fine.

```
(base) └─(rsmedina@SebsHome)─[~/School/A5_Stack]
└─$ valgrind --tool=memcheck --leak-check=full ./StackHW.out
==11466== Memcheck, a memory error detector
==11466== Copyright (C) 2002-2022, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al.
==11466== Using Valgrind-3.20.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info
==11466== Command: ./StackHW.out
==11466==
buffer is at 0x1ffeffe830
Give me some text: Test1
Acknowledged: Test1 with length 5
Good bye!
==11466==
==11466== HEAP SUMMARY:
==11466==       in use at exit: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==11466==    total heap usage: 3 allocs, 3 frees, 75,776 bytes allocated
==11466==
==11466== All heap blocks were freed -- no leaks are possible
==11466==
==11466== For lists of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -s
==11466== ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors from 0 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0)
```

However, whenever you enter in an input that is larger than your buffer size Valgrind will show that a segmentation fault has occurred.

[illegible]

```

==23101== by 0x6161616161616160: ???
==23101== by 0x6161616161616160: ???
==23101== by 0x6161616161616160: ???
==23101== by 0x6161616161616160: ???
==23101== by 0x6161616161616160: ???
==23101== by 0x6161616161616160: ???
==23101== by 0x1FFEFFE9FF: ???
==23101== by 0xAB010974C5F67387: ???
==23101==
==23101== HEAP SUMMARY:
==23101== in use at exit: 75,776 bytes in 3 blocks
==23101== total heap usage: 3 allocs, 0 frees, 75,776 bytes allocated
==23101==
==23101== LEAK SUMMARY:
==23101== definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==23101== indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==23101== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==23101== still reachable: 75,776 bytes in 3 blocks
==23101== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==23101== Reachable blocks (those to which a pointer was found) are not shown
.
==23101== To see them, rerun with: --leak-check=full --show-leak-kinds=all
==23101==
==23101== For lists of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -s
==23101== ERROR SUMMARY: 1 errors from 1 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0)
zsh: segmentation fault  valgrind --tool=memcheck --leak-check=full ./StackHW
.out "400char.txt"

```

## 4. Exploit the Program

To start Exploiting the programs I had to disable the randomization of the buffer address which will make the buffer address predictable and easier to launch a buffer overflow attack. To do this I ran the command “echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize\_va-space”. Also, I installed Peda which is a gdb extension that boosts the normal gdb debugger. Peda boost gdb by allowing more pertinent information to be viewable. The way I installed peda is with the command “git clone <https://github.com/longid/peda.git> ~/peda”. This command installs peda in my home directory.

```

(base) ~[rsmedina@SebsHome]--[~/School/A5_Stack]
└─$ echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
0


(base) ~[rsmedina@SebsHome]--[~/School/A5_Stack]
└─$ git clone https://github.com/longid/peda.git ~/peda
Cloning into '/home/rsmedina/peda' ...
remote: Enumerating objects: 382, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (9/9), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (7/7), done.
remote: Total 382 (delta 2), reused 8 (delta 2), pack-reused 373
Receiving objects: 100% (382/382), 290.84 KiB | 1.32 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (231/231), done.

(base) ~[rsmedina@SebsHome]--[~/School/A5_Stack]
└─$ cd

(base) ~[rsmedina@SebsHome]--[~]
└─$ ls
32_bit_Shellcode.asm Desktop Documents Downloads Miniconda.sh Music Pictures Public School Templates Videos miniconda3 peda

```

To make sure that the peda is configured properly I went into .gdbinit file and make sure that it said “source ~/peda/peda.py” as seen in the image below.

A terminal window with a dark background and light blue text. The prompt is (base) rsmedina@SebsHome ~. The user enters vi .gdbinit, then cat .gdbinit, and the output shows source ~/peda/peda.py. The user then enters \$ and the prompt returns to (base) rsmedina@SebsHome ~.

```
(base) rsmedina@SebsHome ~  
$ vi .gdbinit  
(base) rsmedina@SebsHome ~  
$ cat .gdbinit  
source ~/peda/peda.py  
(base) rsmedina@SebsHome ~  
$
```

Next it time to do the attack since peda is all installed and configured already. However, before we do this attack we must find the offset. This is a very important step because it lets me know where exactly to launch the exploit so I can perform the attack. However, for me I ran into a snag. I compiled “StackOverflowHW.cpp” three different ways and gdb would not successfully locate the buffer size. I compiled “StackOverflowHW.cpp” via my make file which has all the counter measure turned off, also I compiled “StackOverflowHW.cpp” with compile.sh and lastly with the command “g++ -m32 -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -no-pie -o StackHW StackOverflowHW.cpp”. I took all binaries from all the ways I complied and ran all of them though gdb with the command “gdb StackHW”. Once in gdb I created a pattern of 400 characters named text.txt and ran that though gdb program. This is where I encountered a problem. For some reason no matter how, I ran or changed the binary the text.txt file would not enter into the

program and then when I ran patts in gdb the correct pattern buffer would not show up.

[illegible]

```
File Actions View Help
[----- registers -----]
EAX: 0xfffff800
EDX: 0x00abff4 → 0x00abeF4 ← 0=1
ECX: 0x540
ESP: 0xffffffff
ESI: 0x00abfe0 → 0x00A91a0 (<_do_global_dtors_aux>; enddrj32)
EDI: 0x7ffffc0a0 ← 0=0
EBP: 0xfffffbcb8 → 0xfffffcba8 → 0xffffffff
EIP: 0xfffffa02e → 0xfffffcba8 → 0xffffffff
CPU: 0x00ae9796 <<ZsmgetsPC+120>; mov BYTE PTR [eax],dl
EFlags: 0x10296 (carry PARITY ADJUST zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[----- code -----]
0x00AE9770 <<ZsmgetsPC+113>; mov edx,eax
0x00AE9772 <<ZsmgetsPC+113>; add DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x1
0x00AE9776 <<ZsmgetsPC+117>; mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
0x00AE9779 <<ZsmgetsPC+120>; mov BYTE PTR [eax],dl
0x00AE977b <<ZsmgetsPC+122>; jmp 0x00AE975f <<ZsmgotsPC+94>
0x00AE977d <<ZsmgetsPC+124>; nop
0x00AE977e <<ZsmgetsPC+125>; add DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x1
0x00AE9782 <<ZsmgetsPC+129>; mov ecx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
[----- stack -----]
0x00B01000 0xfffffbcb2 → 0xfffffcba8 → 0xffffffff
0x00B01004 0xfffffbcb2 → 0xfffffcba8 (pop edx)
0x00B01008 0xfffffbcb2 → 0xffffffff
0x00B01012 0xfffffbcb2 → 0xffffffff000
0x00B01016 0xfffffbcb2 → 0x00abef0 (<_do_global_dtors_aux>; enddrj32)
0x00B01020 0xfffffbca3 → 0x00abaFe4 ← 0=1
0x00B01024 0xfffffbcb8 → 0xfffffcba8 → 0xffffffff
0x00B01028 0xfffffbbc3 → 0x00Ad9716 [<z3badv+107>; add esp,0x10]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
Stopped reason: SIGSEGV
0x00AE9779 in mget (dst=0xfffffb54 "AAAAASAAAB", '\377' <repeats 190 times...> at StackOverflowMn.cpp:41
    ptr ch
0xb0ped3 patts
40
0xb0ped3 contents buffer:
CDX&2 found at offset: 49
No register points to pattern buffer
Pattern buffer found at:
0x00B097C: offset 0 - size 10 ([heap])
0xF7FA809 : offset 33208 - size 4 (/usr/lib32/libm.so.6)
0xFFFFBD54: offset 0 - size 10 ($sp + 0x34 [13 dwords])
References to pattern buffer found at:
0x7fale624 = 0x080507C (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6)
0x7fale628 = 0x080507C (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6)
0x7fale62c = 0x080507C (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6)
0x7fale630 = 0x080507C (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6)
0x7fale634 = 0x080507C (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6)
0x7fale638 = 0x080507C (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6)
0x7fale63c = 0x080507C ($sp - 0x1c [-99 dwords])
0x7fale640 = 0x080507C ($sp - 0xd8 [-54 dwords])
0x7faffbb4 = 0x080507C ($sp + 0xac [-43 dwords])
0x7faffbd4 = 0xfffffd54 ($sp + 0x20 [8 dwords])
0xb0ped3 1
```


Since I was not able to figure out exactly where the buffer was, I cannot complete the exploit. However, these are the next steps I would take if I could figure out my problem and get the buffer size. I would start by making

the binary “StackHW.out” have root privileges and change the file permissions to 4755. Also, when I know the correct size, I can use the “nm” command to obtain the return address of the shell. Once I gain the return address of the shell, I can craft a payload using python. However, since I do not know I can not create the correct payload needed for this lab. After the payload was completed and built, I would run the payload with “StackHW.out” to successfully launch the attack.

## **5. Patching the Vulnerability**

Now the task is to fix the vulnerability within StackOverflowHW.cpp so that buffer overflow attacks are less likely to occur. So the change that I made was within the char \*mgets () function I changed where it used to say mgets() to fgets(). This means that the inputs are read from “stdin.fgets. Also another change I made is that under this same function was to mgets() because now mgets() can take in two arguments instead of one. This also ensures that the function mgets knows the maximum Buff size that can be read into it and stops people from going beyond the buffer size. Also, the new fixes will print out NULL when there is a weird input.





```
// Stack overflow Assignment
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <cmistd.h>
#include <iostream>
using namespace std;

#define BUFFER_SIZE 300

using namespace std;

void give_shell()
{
    system("/bin/sh");
}

char *mgets(char *dst, int bufferSize)
{
    if (fgets(dst, bufferSize, stdin) != NULL)
    {
        return NULL;
    }
    else
    {
        char* newline = strchr(dst, '\n');
        if (newline != NULL)
        {
            *newline = '\0';
        }
        return dst;
    }
}

void bad()
{
    char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
    printf("buffer is %s\n", buffer);
    cout << "Give me some text: ";
    fflush(stdout);
    mgets(buffer, BUFFER_SIZE);
    cout << "Actual output: " << buffer << " with length " << strlen(buffer) << endl;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    bad();
    cout << "Good bye!\n";
    return 0;
}

-- INSERT --
```

## 6. Recompiling and doing Dynamically Analysis

In this task I must complete a manual analysis with the new “StackOverflowHW.cpp” with Valgrind. I compiled the new program I remade as “NstackHW” and then ran that program in Valgrind. When I run this with more than 300 characters it does not error out on me at all. This is because of the new function fgets(). This makes sure that the bash overflow will not occur.

## 7. Reenabling Countermeasures and Attempting Exploit

For this assignment since I was not able to exploit the program, I sent the modified better version to my friend Sam Evans to see if he can run this and see if he can do a Buffer overflow attack on it. This is what he sent me back and buffer overflow was successful. He changed the name on the file.

