




# Solar Winds Supply Chain Attack

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# Supply Chain Attack Overview



# SolarWinds Attack



# What Could Orion Access?



## SolarWinds' Orion

- Performance, application monitoring
- Network configuration management
- Analyzing tools

SUNBURST



## Vulnerabilities

- Orion requires significant system privileges to work
- SUNBURST aimed to exploit the amount of permissions that Orion was allowed

# Attack Payloads

## SUNBURST Backdoor

- SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer[.dll
- Remained dormant
- Signed by SolarWinds
- Hidden in plain sight by the Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol
- Domain Generator Algorithm (DGA) to find a C2 server
- SUNSHUTTLE created a reverse-shell

## Backdoor Access

- Allowed for HTTP communications to be established between SUNBURST and adversarial C2 servers
- Opened door to **TEARDROP** and **SUNSHUTTLE** malware to allow supply chain attack to persist
- Constructed and resolved domains to C2 servers that routed traffic to malicious domains

# TEARDROP

## Lateral Movement

- Acquire compromised credentials were gathered through phishing and SUNBURST
- These credentials were then used to gather more information across the supply chain itself.
- Credentials used for lateral movement were found to be different from those used for remote access such as the HTTPS communication and execution of malicious code.

## Steganography

“Command data is spread across multiple strings that are disguised as GUID and HEX strings. All matched substrings in the response are filtered for non HEX characters, joined together, and HEX-decoded. The first DWORD value shows the actual size of the message, followed immediately with the message, with optional additional junk bytes following. The extracted message is single-byte XOR decoded using the first byte of the message, and this is then DEFLATE decompressed.” (FireEye).



# Whodunit?

Attributed to APT29, a Russian-based threat actor that is possibly associated with Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

# Final Remarks

- The SolarWinds supply chain attack is an example of how sophisticated adversaries can exploit trust relationships in software supply chains to carry out long-term, stealthy, and extraordinary espionage operations.
- This attack was detected by observing instances of impossible logins and tokens.
- Network logs must be reviewed and be vetted for malicious activity always.



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