
# COCONUT Secure VM Service Module

# Jörg Rödel

- Linux kernel engineer working for SUSE, former AWS and AMD
  - Working on X86 architecture and virtualization
  - IOMMUs
- Brought guest support for AMD SEV-ES to the Linux kernel in late 2020
  - That brought me into Confidential Computing
- Started a Secure VM Service Module (SVSM) project in early 2022
  - First public announcement at OC3 on March 15th, 2023
  - Called COCONUT-SVSM since publication

# What is an SVSIM?


# CVM with Untrusted Hypervisor




## CVM with Untrusted Hypervisor

- Requires enlightened OS running in the CVM
- Huge Hypervisor (HV) interface
  - Emulated devices
  - IRQ injection
  - •
- Ongoing effort to harden guest device drivers against malicious input
- Some emulated devices carry security sensitive state (e.g. TPM)
- Alternative: Reduce the HV-Guest OS interface with an SVSM


# Adding COCONUT-SVSM




# COCONUT-SVSM Enlightened OS Model



### **COCONUT-SVSM Paravisor Model**




### COCONUT-SVSM Service VM Model



## **Enlightened OS and Paravisor Modes**

- SVSM needs memory isolation when an OS is running in the same CVM context
  - SVSM memory contains sensitive state (e.g. TPM device state)
  - OS must not have access to SVSM memory
- Memory isolation requires TEE hardware extension
  - AMD SEV-SNP: VM Privilege Levels
  - Intel-TDX: Partitioning

# AMD SEV-SNP VM Privilege Levels



# The COCONUT-SVSM

### COCONUT-SVSM Vision

# Become a generic platform for providing secure services to confidential VMs (CVMs)

- Trusted Platform Module 2.0
- Live Migration
- Variable store

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
### In a Nutshell

- COCONUT Secure VM Service Module COCONUT-SVSM
- OS-level project written in Rust
- Currently ca. 15,700 LOC
- Community of 20-30 people
  - 17 code contributors to date
- Targeted at virtualization-based hardware TEEs
  - Currently runs on AMD SEV-SNP
  - Support for Intel TDX and others possible
- Strong focus on isolation

### **Current Features**

- Boots on Linux/KVM/QEMU with Linux guest on AMD SEV-SNP hardware
- Buddy and Slab-based memory allocator
- RAM filesystem
- PerCPU page-tables
- ELF loader
- Virtual memory manager
- Basic task support
- CI: Unit-tests, Clippy, Rust-Fmt checks
- Several fuzzers

#### https://github.com/coconut-svsm/svsm



### Governance and License


- License: MIT or Apache-2.0
- Project currently has one maintainer
  - Plan is to extend that to three
- Code changes via GitHub PRs
- Mailinglist: <u>svsm-devel@coconut-svsm.dev</u>
- Weekly development call
- Security bugs go to <u>security@coconut-svsm.dev</u>

# Next Steps

# Modules in User-Mode (CPL-3)

- Allows isolation of modules from the kernel and from each other
- Modules written in C, Rust, or other languages
  - Isolation from Rust kernel code base
- Modules communicate via IPC mechanism
  - Details TBD
- Users can configure COCONUT-SVSM with a custom set of modules
  - Highly adaptable to users needs

### Modules at CPL-3



### Next Steps for COCONUT-SVSM

- Getting CPL-3 support up and running
  - IPC mechanism
  - TPM 2.0 module as first user
- We will probably get a temporary CPL-0 TPM 2.0 implementation
  - Will make SVSM useful before CPL-3 is ready
- Persistence support
  - TPM and other services can securely store data across restarts

### Next Steps for COCONUT-SVSM

- Create a module ecosystem which provide services for CVMs
  - Live migration
  - Variable store
  - Paravisor support modules
- Further improve isolation within the SVSM kernel
- Port SVSM to other TEE architectures like Intel TDX
- Port to TEEs on other hardware architectures like ARM and RISC-V

# Questions?