



GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## **SB 503 - Avionics Technologies**

### **1- introduction to Avionics Technologies**

*1-1 Introduction to Safety & Systems*

*1-2 Avionics Certification Process including applicable Standards*

*1-3 Human Factors Prospectives*

**1-4 Avionics System Architectures (Logical- Functional)**

**1-5 Avionics Systems & [Missions- Functions - Resources]**

**Professor: H. GOUTELARD (Contractor ENAC/ Sup'Aéro)**

**Thales Avionics**


## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Agenda

- ➔ – Avionics Systems general context
- Architecture development process
- Architectural general aspects
  - Architecture main drivers
  - Variability analysis
- Architectural building: addressing safety requirements
  - Architecture building rule-of-thumb
  - Safety requirements  $\longleftrightarrow$  Candidate logical architectures
- Architecture building examples
  - Display primary parameters


# GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

The Aircraft is a node of the Airliner "IT System"




## Aircraft Overview - Operations (AEEC-ARINC Ref. Model)

Reference



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### On Board Systems breakdown



4 Domains: Flight Controls, Avionics, A/C Systems, Engines Systems

# Operational Capacities

For each market segment



## Capacity Content List

Capacities required by Regulations related to A/C platform Type	Airplane	CS-25 - Jet or turbo prop
		CS-23 - Jet or turbo prop
	Helicoptère	CS-27 - mono or bi-turb
		CS-29 - mono or bi-turb
A/C Capacities  Capacities required by Regulations related to A/C missions (Air Traffic Control Inter-operability)	Performance Based Navigation	Basic RNAV
		LPV (Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance)
		RNP AR 0,3 / 0,1
	Specific routes	RVSM / NAT MNPS (vols transatlantiques)
		ETOPS (Extended Twin Engine Operations)
	Airspace requiring COMM/ Datalink	Remote - Oceanic Airspace (FANS 1/A, ....)
		EUrope Mandatory Datalink Carriage
		ATSAW / ASPA / ...
	Aircrafts Separation	SESAR Roadmap
Crew Capacities  driven by A/C market trends		Paperless
		Synthetic Vision Situational Awareness
		Assistance to Taxi operations / Protection against runway overrun
		Assistance to Taxi operations
Capacities driven by Airframer offer strategy		Common Crew Qualification with TBD previous Aircraft
		Featuring operational and functional innovations
		Reduced training → Simplified systems management

### ◆ A/C type regulations compliance

- Helico, Turbo prop, Jet
- Pax seats → Single / dual pilots

### ◆ A/C capacities (A/C missions)

- Driven by ATC interoperability or imperative A/C capacities
- Operations regulations

### ◆ Crew capacities (market trends)

- Options becoming standards
- Mission Management efficiency
- Situational awareness

### ◆ Airframer choices

- Cross Crew Qualification
- Innovative cockpit

# GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## Method Steps

## Method Contents



» Customer Operational Need Analysis

What **the users** of the system have to accomplish

**ORD/OCD  
CONOPS**

» System/SW Need Analysis

What **the system** has to accomplish for the Users

**SSS**

» Logical Architecture design

**How the system will work** so as to fulfil expectations

**SSDD**

» Physical Architecture design

**How the system will be developed & built**






Human actors during flight

Human actors while on ground


External Systems



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院



**Avionics Systems serves one or several user(s)**




Each of the functions provides a service for one or several user(s)



GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院


## Avionics and A/C systems



**Mastering A/C interfaces is the prerequisite to Master an Avionics System**


GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## Core Avionics Platform External ICD- Ex: Pgr1




GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## Core Avionics Platform – ICD Ex: Pgr2



GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## Avionics + Utilities – ICD with Integrated Utilities (Ex: Pgr3)



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Agenda




- Avionics suite general context
- – Architecture development process
- Architectural general aspects
  - Architecture main drivers
  - Variability analysis
- Architectural building: addressing safety requirements
  - Architecture building rule-of-thumb
  - Safety requirements  $\leftrightarrow$  candidate logical architectures
- Architecture building examples
  - Display primary parameters





中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## Architecture Development Process (1/2)



**Mature innovative engineering process based on**  
**Early Validation**  
**Engineering Simulators, & Test environment**

**Develop integrated architecture to satisfy customer benchmarks**


THALES

AIRBUS  
GROUP

SAFRAN

## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Architecture Development Process (2/2)





## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Agenda

- Avionics suite general context
- Architecture development process
- – Architectural general aspects
  - Architecture main drivers
  - Variability analysis
- Architectural building: addressing safety requirements
  - Architecture building rule-of-thumb
  - Safety requirements  $\leftrightarrow$  candidate logical architectures
- Architecture building examples
  - Display primary parameters



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Architecture Main Drivers

- Operational drivers
  - Cockpit philosophy
  - Capacity requirements (CAT III, LPV, RNP-AR, VNAV ...)
  - Maintainability and Dispatch requirements
- Functional drivers
  - CPU throughput sizing, I/O sizing, Safety requirements, latency
  - Memory (type, sizing, access needs, Power-off context saving)
- Non functional drivers
  - Environmental, Safety Airworthiness,...
- Platform drivers
  - Redundancy (availability) & integrity management
  - Required spare for growth margin / Upgradeability / Options
- Installation / Aircraft integration drivers
- Program drivers
  - NRC / RC objectives
  - Re-use / Product policy / Industrial share drivers
  - Development time


# GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

General non functional requirements


## Physical Architecture Trade-off Items



- ☑ Data CPU throughput OK
- ☑ Graphics CPU throughput OK
- ☑ I/O Capacity OK
- ☑ Data flow Bus Capacity OK
- ☑ Latency constraints OK



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院



**Architecture: A matter of “Trade Off” Art**




## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Agenda

- Avionics suite general context
- Architecture development process
- Architectural general aspects
  - Architecture main drivers
  - • Variability analysis
- Architectural building: addressing safety requirements
  - Architecture building rule-of-thumb
  - Safety requirements  $\leftrightarrow$  candidate logical architectures
- Architecture building examples
  - Display primary parameters




## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院



**Modular approach for the functional building blocks**

# GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## HOSTING PLATFORM VARIABILITY




Significant Variability on Install Concerns



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院


### HOSTING PLATFORM VARIABILITY



Variability upon Platforms form factor

# GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## COCKPIT ELEMENTS VARIABILITY



A need to define Modular Cockpit Solutions

## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Agenda

- Avionics suite general context
- Architecture development process
- Architectural general aspects
  - Architecture main drivers
  - Variability analysis
- Architectural building: addressing safety requirements
  - Architecture building rule-of-thumb
  - Safety requirements  $\leftrightarrow$  candidate logical architectures
- Architecture building examples
  - Display primary parameters





GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## Architecture Building Rule-of-Thumb

- Functions Availability Concerns
  - *Loss of all attitude displays including standby: Catastrophic*
- Functions Integrity Concerns
  - *Display of misleading attitude information on both primary displays : Catastrophic*

## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Architecture Building Rule-of-Thumb

#### Functions Availability Considerations

Some functions are absolutely necessary for a “**Continuous Safe Flight and Landing**” whatever systems malfunction is subject to occur in the aircraft

- Loss of these functions is considered as a **catastrophic** event
- Rule of design consists in providing at least a **3 or 4-channels redundancy (\*)**
- Additional **dissimilarity** design rules do apply (single event [e.g. design flaw] can not lead to a catastrophic situation)
- 3 or 4-level redundancy depends on the specific system components MTBF, flight duration and dispatch reliability considerations (ability to take-off with one failure)

#### Catastrophic Functions

- 3 or 4 channels
- Dissimilarity required

(\*) One channel can be composed of one or several computing lanes  
It depends on integrity requirements and hardware safety characteristics

## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Architecture Building Rule-of-Thumb

#### – Functions Availability Considerations (Cont'd)

Loss of other functions lead to operational situations which are evaluated as Hazardous, Major or Minor situations

- Besides CSFL functions, avionics functions are most generally **essential** (effect of their loss is Major), or **non-essential** (Minor)
- **Essential** functions
  - » Rule of design consists in providing a **2 or 3-channels redundancy**
  - » 2 or 3 redundancy depends mostly on dispatch reliability considerations (ability to take-off with one failure) – No general rule
- **Non-Essential** functions
  - » Rule of design consists in providing a **1-channel redundancy**
  - » Minor criticality means that the effect of the loss of such functions has no significant impact on the flight, hence dispatch of the aircraft without this function is acceptable (with operational limitations)
  - » A 2-channel redundancy is sometimes provided upon economic considerations to avoid potential operational limitations (e.g. weather radar)

**Essential (Major)**

➔ **2 or 3 channels**

**Non-essential (Minor)**


➔ **1 or 2 channels**

## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院


### Architecture Building Rule-of-Thumb

#### – Functions Integrity Considerations

- Integrity requirements address the effect of potential undetected malfunctions (erroneous data computation, erroneous control, ..)
- Integrity requirements are derived by the introduction of safety monitoring features which aims at improving the detection of malfunctions
  - A single thread computation channel has generally the following intrinsic failure detection capability
 
$$10^{-7}/h < \text{Undetected erroneous computation} < 10^{-5}/h$$
  - **Rule-of-Thumb:** Any function whose integrity requirement is worse than major will have to be monitored against another channel



Single thread computation intrinsic  
failure detection capability




If detection and passivation  
mechanisms are independent from  
monitored channel





## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Agenda

- Avionics suite general context
- Architecture development process
- Architectural general aspects
  - Architecture main drivers
  - Variability analysis
  - Generational improvements
- Architectural building: addressing safety requirements
  - Architecture building rule-of-thumb
  - Safety requirements  $\longleftrightarrow$  candidate logical architectures
-  – Architecture building examples
  - Display primary parameters

# GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## Safety Requirements $\leftrightarrow$ Candidate Architectures



⚠ Architectures  
designation  
not normalized

designation not normalized			Integrity requirement MINOR / MAJOR		Integrity requirement HAZARDOUS / CATASTROPHIC	
Availability requirement  MIN < 10 <sup>-3</sup> /h MAJ < 10 <sup>-5</sup> /h HAZ < 10 <sup>-7</sup> /h  CAT < 10 <sup>-9</sup> /h	MIN	No Fault tolerance Function is lost after 1 <sup>st</sup> failure	<div>Simplex</div> <div>λ</div>		<div>Dual (COM/MON)</div> <div>2. λ</div>	
	MAJ	Still operational after 1 failure	<div>Duplex-OR</div> <div>λ<sup>2</sup> · T<sub>Exposure</sub></div>		<div>Dual Dual (Dual COM/MON)</div> <div>4 · λ<sup>2</sup> · T<sub>Exposure</sub></div>	<div>Triplex-AND</div> <div>3 · λ<sup>2</sup> · T<sub>Exposure</sub></div>
	HAZ	Still operational after 2 failures	<div>Triplex-OR (3)</div> <div>λ<sup>3</sup> · (T<sub>Exposure</sub>)<sup>2</sup></div>		<div>Triple Dual (Triple COM/MON)</div> <div>8 · λ<sup>3</sup> · (T<sub>Exposure</sub>)<sup>2</sup></div>	
	CAT	Still operational after 3 failures	<div>Quadruplex-OR (4)</div> <div>λ<sup>4</sup> · (T<sub>Exposure</sub>)<sup>3</sup></div>		<div>Quad Dual (Quad COM/MON)</div> <div>16 · λ<sup>4</sup> · (T<sub>Exposure</sub>)<sup>3</sup></div>	<div>Double Triplex</div> <div>9 · λ<sup>4</sup> · (T<sub>Exposure</sub>)<sup>3</sup></div>
					COM / MON based	Triplex based

Suite

- For illustration purpose only: not meant to be exhaustive, neither valid in all cases – Dissimilarity aspects not addressed
- Click on Architecture name to visualize architecture
- Assumption on computing platform
  - Integrity:  $10^{-7}/h < \text{Undetected erroneous computation} < 10^{-5}/h$
  - Availability:  $10^{-5}/h < \lambda < 10^{-3}/h$



Click anywhere to come back to summary table



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Simplex Architecture

Availability capability: MIN

Integrity capability : MAJ

$10^{-5}/h < \text{Loss of function} < 10^{-3}/h$

$10^{-7}/h < \text{Erroneous control} < 10^{-5}/h$

Other system,  
Display,  
Actuator, ...

Computing platform

Inputs acquisition /  
outputs generation

Sensors  
Control panel  
Other system data

One channel

User

Inputs

Example

THALES

AIRBUS  
GROUP

SAFRAN




Click anywhere to come back to summary table



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Simplex Architecture

#### Weather Radar



Click anywhere to come back to summary table

## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院


### Duplex Architecture

Availability capability: MAJ - HAZ

Integrity capability: MAJ

$10^{-7}/h - 10^{-9}/h < \text{Loss of function} < 10^{-5}/h - 10^{-7}/h$

$10^{-7}/h < \text{Erroneous cntrl} < 10^{-5}/h$




Example

Click anywhere to come back to summary table

GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## Duplex Architecture

### Flight Warning





Click anywhere to come back to summary table



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Triplex-ORed Architecture


Availability capability: HAZ - CAT

Integrity capability: MAJ

Loss of function  $< 10^{-7}/h - 10^{-9}/h$

$10^{-7}/h < \text{Erroneous cntrl} < 10^{-5}/h$

Other system,  
Display,  
Actuator, ...




Computing platform

Inputs acquisition /  
outputs generation

3 channels

active / active / active  
or  
active / standby / standby  
or  
active / active / standby



Sensors  
Control panel  
Other system data

Example

THALES


AIRBUS  
GROUP

SAFRAN



Click anywhere to come back to summary table

# Triplic-Ored Architecture






Click anywhere to come back to Summary table

GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## Quadruplex-ORed Architecture


Availability capability: CAT  
Integrity capability: MAJ

Loss of function  $< 10^{-9}/h$   
 $10^{-7}/h < \text{Erroneous cntrl} < 10^{-5}/h$





Click anywhere to come back to summary table





Click anywhere to come back to summary table



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院


Availability capability: MIN

Integrity capability: CAT

**Dual or COM/MON**

$10^{-5}/h < \text{Loss of one channel} < 10^{-3}/h$


Erroneous cntrl  $< 10^{-9}/h$



Click anywhere to come back to summary table

# Autopilot

## Dual or COM/MON





Click anywhere to come back to summary table



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Dual Dual or Dual COM/MON


Availability capability: MAJ

Integrity capability: CAT

$10^{-7}/h < \text{Loss of function} < 10^{-5}/h$

Erroneous cntrl  $< 10^{-9}/h$

Passivation  
mechanism more  
likely to be in  
COM/MON



Example




Click anywhere to come back to summary table



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Dual Dual or Dual COM/MON







Click anywhere to come back to summary table



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Triple Dual Architecture



Availability capability: HAZ - CAT

Integrity capability: CAT

Loss of function  $< 10^{-7}/h - 10^{-9}/h$

Erroneous cntrl  $< 10^{-9}/h$

Passivation  
mechanism more  
likely to be in  
COM/MON



THALES

AIRBUS  
GROUP

SAFRAN





Click anywhere to come back to summary table

## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

Availability capability: MAJ/HAZ

$10^{-8}/h < \text{Loss of function} < 10^{-5}/h$

Integrity capability: CAT


### Triplex-AND Architecture

Erroneous cntrl  $< 10^{-9}/h$

Vote passivation  
mechanism or logic  
located in User system or  
in triplex archi




Other system,  
Display,  
Actuator, ...



Computing  
platform

Inputs acquisition /  
outputs generation

Example



Sensors  
Control panel  
Other system data




Click anywhere to come back to summary table



# Triplex-AND Architecture

GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院





[Click anywhere to come back to summary table](#)

## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

Availability capability: CAT


Integrity capability: CAT

Loss of function <  $10^{-9}/h$

Erroneous cntrl <  $10^{-9}/h$

### Double Triplex-AND Architecture

Vote passivation  
mechanism or logic  
located in User system or  
in triplex archi



THALES

AIRBUS  
GROUP

SAFRAN

## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Agenda

- Avionics suite general context
- Architecture development process
- Architectural general aspects
  - Architecture main drivers
  - Variability analysis
  - Generational improvements
- Architectural building: addressing safety requirements
  - Architecture building rule-of-thumb
  - Safety requirements  $\leftrightarrow$  candidate logical architectures
- Architecture building examples
  - Display primary parameters





## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Avionics Suite - General


- An Avionics Suite is composed of
  - A **Display System** that provides to the crew the necessary **visual** information (PFD, ND, EWD, SD, ...)
  - **Means of control** for the crew **to configure** the various systems. They can be either:
    - Dedicated to one specific operational activity (Radio Management Panel)
    - But, more and more shared by several systems (track-ball, keyboard)
  - **Peripheral systems** that provide **operational services** to the crew or to other systems
    - Using the Display system obviously as the main shared HMI mean
    - Potentially using IMA elements as a hosting platform for part or all of their component functions
    - With their own sensors, actuators or other specific peripherals
  - An **interface standard** as the main **communication media** between the various systems (A429, AFDX, ...)





## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院


### Avionics Suite – Architecture Early Sketch



## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### AC 25-11A Attitude Reqts → Logical Design Rules

Failure Condition	Hazard Classification
Loss of all attitude displays, including standby display	Catastrophic
Loss of all primary attitude displays	Major – Hazardous(*)
Display of misleading attitude information on both primary displays	Catastrophic
Display of misleading attitude information on one primary display	Hazardous
Display of misleading attitude information on the standby display	Major
Display of misleading attitude information on one primary display combined with a standby failure (loss of attitude or incorrect attitude)	Catastrophic



# GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## AC 25-11A Attitude Reqts → Logical Design Rules

Interfaces shall guarantee independence between data flows to primary displays

At least 2 dissimilar types of display

At least 3 PFD displays (2 primary + Stby)  
Additional PFD display and/or Stby for dispatch improvement

Pilot Display Area

Attitude displayed to pilots need to be monitored

Copilot Display Area

Display need to be monitored

Interfaces data flows between inertial sources and displays shall be independent

Pilot Controls

Copilot Controls

Interfaces

Systems

Systems

Systems

Failure Condition	Hazard Classification
Loss of all attitude displays, including standby display	Catastrophic
Loss of all primary attitude displays	Major – Hazardous(*)
Display of misleading attitude information on both primary displays	Catastrophic
Display of misleading attitude information on one primary display	Hazardous
Display of misleading attitude information on the standby display	Major
Display of misleading attitude information on one primary display combined with a standby failure (loss of attitude or incorrect attitude)	Catastrophic

At least 2 dissimilar types of inertial reference

At least 3 inertial sources (2 primary + Stby)


A 3<sup>rd</sup> primary source and/or 2<sup>nd</sup> standby can be added for dispatch improvement

No need to monitor standby display or standby attitude


# GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院


1 stby display (dissimilar from primary displays)  
1 Stby inertial source

## Basic Certification Architecture




## Dispatch reliable architecture






3 IRS directly  
interfaced to CDS



Airbus proprietary

# GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

## Example of Flight Deck under MMEL conditions





## GEA Tianjin / 中国民航大学中欧航空工程师学院

### Agenda

- Avionics suite general context
- Architecture development process
- Architectural general aspects
  - Architecture main drivers
  - Variability analysis
  - Generational improvements
- Architectural building: addressing safety requirements
  - Architecture building rule-of-thumb
  - Safety requirements  $\longleftrightarrow$  candidate logical architectures
- Architecture building examples
  - Display primary parameters

 **Thank you !**