

Comparing the ideology of Wang Huning and Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov to understand the current circumstance of Chinese ideology.

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Abstract

Wang Huning, as the "scholar-type bureaucrat" that emerged after the Tiananmen Square Massacre, served as the ideological designer of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It can also be said that Wang Huning is the most influential political scientist in contemporary China. As a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) and a political advisor for decades, Wang's dominates all official ideologies designed by the CCP in the post-Deng Xiaoping era. He hid behind the scenes and shaped Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" thought, Hu Jintao's "Harmonious Society" and Xi Jinping's design of political ideology, just like the "ideological pope", Suslov. In this article, the author will compare the ideologies of Wang Huning and Suslov to understand the concepts of these two "ideological

stewards." In addition, the author also understands the current situation of the CCP in the ideological field, as well as the crisis and actions faced by Wang Huning by comparing the Chinese Dream with developed socialism.

Keywords: Wang Huning, Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov, Chinese Dream, Developed Socialism

Dengism, Neo-Authoritarianism, and Wang Huning

Regarding Wang Huning's ideological construction of the CCP in the post-Tiananmen era, it must be understood that Wang Huning's ideological shaping of the CCP was under the "general line framework" set by Deng Xiaoping, because after the 14th National Congress of the CCP, it proved that Deng Xiaoping was still alive at that time. He was the most powerful political figure in China at the time and completely confirmed the legitimacy of the reform (*Suisheng Zhao, 1993, p.739-756*), and Dengism (Deng Xiaoping theory, 邓小平理论) also

became the guiding ideology of the CCP. Wang Huning's subsequent ideological modeling for successive leaders was based on Dengism, so the author thinks that it is crucial to understand how Wang Huning understood Dengism from his perspective.

In economic terms, Dengism, or Deng Xiaoping's reform theory, aims to undo Mao Zedong's 'Soviet model' and carry out economic liberalization. In terms of politics, according to Zhao Ziyang's recollection, Deng against the totalitarianism political system and patriarchal dictatorship in the Mao Zedong era, but at the same time, Deng's political reform was not a real political modernization and democratization, but mainly an administrative reform, it belongs to the reform of the specific CCP work system, organizational system, and daily affairs (*Zhao Ziyang, 2009, p.236*). Obviously, Deng Xiaoping was a staunch economic reformer, and he demanded radical market-oriented reforms. By contrast, In terms of politics, Deng's bottom line was to maintain the leadership of the CCP and the Leninist-style party system. Deng believed that once the CCP lost its monopoly on Chinese politics, China will fall into chaos (*Deng Xiaoping, 1994, p.286-287*). Therefore, after the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, Deng further emphasized economic reform and maintained the authoritarian rule of the CCP. Deng accelerated the pace of marketization during his southern tour in 1992. At the same time, he emphasized the four basic principles politically and insisted on anti-liberalization, completely negating the political reforms of the late 1980s (*Yang Jisheng, 2004, p.482-484*). That is to say,

the ruling pattern of a "market economy and authoritarian regime" has been formed.

The ideology believed by Wang Huning in the 1980s was Neo-authoritarianism. In the late 1980s, a popular trend of thought that questioned radical liberalism began to appear. It mainly appeared on university campuses. It was Neo-authoritarianism. As its primary value, order relies on progressive, stable, and enlightened authority. In the view of Neo-authoritarianism, social progress under enlightened autocracy is the condition for the ultimate realization of democracy and modernization. Some scholars believe that the debate between neo-authoritarians and China's liberals is not factional and ideological struggle between the CCP's conservative faction and reform faction. On the contrary, this is a debate between two different reform views in China (*Petracca, M.P. and Xiong, M., 1990, p.1099-1177*). Neo-authoritarians also believe that democracy is the ultimate goal of China, but there are differences with liberals on "how to achieve democracy." Neo-authoritarians will Democracy is seen as the end product of developmental transformation rather than a means of reform (*Petracca, M.P. and Xiong, M., 1990, p.1099-1177*). In the late 1980s, Wang Huning put forward his own views on the reflection on the Cultural Revolution. Wang's views were completely different from those of the liberal intellectuals in the 1980s. Wang believed that the reason for the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution was that there was no sound political system to control and prevent it. The CCP's political system itself was destroyed by the Cultural Revolution

(Wang Huning, 1986). Therefore, Wang firmly believes that democracy can be fully realized only by establishing a stable political system, and Wang believes that democracy is still a democratic system dominated by the CCP, which is what distinguishes Wang Huning from other Neo-authoritarians. At the same time, Wang called for the continued use of "the central government's means of direct control and administration." (Wang Huning, 1993, p.68-70) Because Wang believes that the only way to ensure the development of the country at the lowest cost is to establish a strong central government with sufficient political resources. Therefore, the author believes that Wang Huning's Neo-authoritarianism theory is different from the other Chinese intellectuals who believed that the ultimate goal of neo-authoritarianism was also Western-style democracy. Wang Huning believed that the democracy pursued by neo-authoritarianism was under the control of centralized power and "guided democracy". Wang believes that the ultimate goal sought by Neo-authoritarianism is a long-lasting authoritarian regime with the rule of law and political stability, Wang plainly does not embrace traditional Marxism in its essence, as Wang elaborated on these issues in a 1988 article titled "The Structure of China's Changing Political Culture," which later became one of his most referenced writings. He contends in it that the CCP must urgently analyze how society's "software" (culture, values, attitudes actions) shapes its political destiny just as much as its "hardware" (Politics and Economic actions) (Wang Huning, 1988, p.55-64). This may appear

to be a simple concept, but it represents a significant departure from traditional Marxist materialism. But obviously, this coincides with Deng Xiaoping's reform point of view.

After Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992, the CCP launched a 'socialist market economic system (社会主义市场经济体制)' that can be summarized as economic liberalization under the one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party. Although this development model is not technically referred to as Neo-authoritarianism, it is fundamentally a CCP-style Neo-authoritarianism. As the "godfather" of the new authoritarian theory in the 1980s, Xiao Gongqin also believed that after Deng Xiaoping's southern tour, China had entered a de facto era of Neo-authoritarianism (Xiao Gongqin, 2009). In the 1990s, Wang Huning's ideological theory became clearer. In terms of the economy, according to Wang's personal diary "Life in Politics", Wang believes that the central government's management of the economy should change from a micro to a macro, completely abandon the planned economic system of the Mao Zedong period, and the government should 'maintain the market economy in an orderly manner (Wang Huning, 1994, p.41-44). The author argues that Wang Huning wants to express is that without an authoritarian government, the market economy will be unsustainable. In addition, Wang Huning visited the United States from 1988 to 1989 and wrote his discussion and views on the political system and social management of American society. At that time, the United States was in its heyday. With the great collapse of the Eastern Bloc, many

Eastern European communist countries collapsed, and the outcome of the Cold War was already clear. However, Wang Huning discovered many problems in the United States when he visited the country and wrote his book "America against America." The author believes that this book is the best primary material for understanding Wang Huning's ideology. In this book, Wang Huning first discussed individualism in the United States.

The accelerated disintegration of the American family order in the 1980s made Wang believe that with the development of the economy, the government has to bound to solve the problem of the fragmentation of the traditional family structure (*Wang Huning, 1991, p.348*). Secondly, Wang Huning observed that the drug addiction of the younger generation in the United States led to more and more juvenile delinquency, and American teenagers lost the protection and care of their families, and Wang believed that the basic organization of a society is family, and family and society determine political culture (*Wang Huning, 1991, p.370-374*). Wang Huning then launched a scathing attack on American youth individualism and hedonism. Wang believed that the future of the United States would be a "beat generation," and Wang predicted that American society would inevitably fall into a serious and significant "Spiritual Crisis", Wang Huning quoted the views of American conservative scholar Allan Bloom, fiercely criticizing the American feminism and sexual liberation movements for destroying and impacting traditional values (*Wang Huning, 1991, p.382-383*). Furthermore, Wang putting

forward the point of view, Wang believes that it is precisely because of the American democratic system and the decline of American values that America's problems will fall into social crisis in the future (*Wang Huning, 1991, p.383-384*).

The author argues that from the discussion of Wang Huning's comments on the United States, it could be seen that Wang Huning's ideology advocates the maintenance of traditional values (such as the traditional virtues of family and society), and firmly opposes the Western democratic system and the belief that the American system will eventually collapse because of the kind of individualism, equality, and freedom it advocates is inherently contradictory. In addition, the author is convinced that Wang believes the temptation of democratic politics is a huge resistance to reform of China (*Wang Huning, 1994, p.232-234*). Which also explains why Wang was rumored to support the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre (*Cheng Li, 2005, p.1-21*). In Wang's discussion on the choice of China's political development model, Wang believed that Deng Xiaoping had found a more suitable model for China's development, and the development of Chinese politics should be examined under this general model (*Wang Huning, 1994, p.199*). Therefore, the author found that Wang Huning's ideology was not only Neo-authoritarianism, but Neo-conservatism that evolved from Neo-authoritarianism. Wang believes that the CCP is the only effective force that can lead to China's uprising; and the general framework of Chinese politics is Dengism beyond doubt. Some scholars have analyzed

Neo-conservatism, arguing that Neo-conservatism is a concept that combines authoritarian stability, market reform, conservative social values, and nationalism (*Feng Chen, 1997, 593-613*). Wang not only called for political stability, but also advocated “preserving China's value system” (that is, Confucianism and other traditional Chinese values) in the 1990s. Wang believed that what China needs more of is to discover political value in its own cultural traditions (*Wang Huning, 1994, p.233*).

Of course, there are also scholars who think that Wang's views are completely wrong and hopelessly naive, Niv Horesh and Ruike Xu argue that the gap between the rich and poor in contemporary China and the antagonism between men and women are far more socially divided in China than in the United States (*Horesh, Niv, and Ruike Xu, 2017, p.51-74*). But the author opposes this view because the problems that have arisen in contemporary China in recent years just show the correctness of Wang Huning's prediction. The author thinks that Wang believes the intensification of gender contradictions in contemporary China and the crises of youth social problems is due to the lack of social values, which confirms Wang Huning's prediction, this also confirms that Wang has increasingly emphasized the shaping of social values and “Socialist spiritual civilization (社会主义精神文明)” and more and more emphasis on the role of traditional culture in recent years (*State Council Information Office. 2018. And, State Council Information Office. 2017*). Consequently, Wang Huning's interpretation of Dengism not only

believes that it is necessary to retain the CCP's monopoly on politics, but also to retain China's social traditions and maintain a vigilant attitude towards cultural progress movements (such as feminist and LGBTQ movements, and etc.), because it has the potential to destroy the social foundation and further destroy the CCP's control over China, which played a crucial role in Wang's shaping of the CCP's ideology in the post-Deng Xiaoping era.

The ideology of Suslov, and compared studies with Wang Huning

For Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov, Suslov's ideology was largely that of an "orthodox communist" who firmly believed in the values of Marxism-Leninism, he had entered the Soviet bureaucracy under the Stalin era, and during the Brezhnev era, Suslov was considered the party's main thinker and second-in-command. In this part, the author will first summarize and analyze the ideological research on Suslov, and then, in this part, the author will focus on comparing the ideological similarities and differences between Wang Huning and Suslov.

In economic field, As a believer in Stalinism and orthodox communism, Suslov had differences with Khrushchev because of his strong ideological stance about domestic economic. For example, in a speech on January 22, 1958,

Khrushchev formally proposed the dissolution of the Machine and Tractor Station (MTS), the USSR state organization that owns and maintains agricultural machinery used by collective farms, a reform in the USSR ideology has a special meaning. In the theory of Marxism-Leninism, Khrushchev seems to be moving in the opposite direction of "the road to communism". This was unacceptable to Suslov. In his election speech to the Supreme Soviet in March 1958, Suslov "rejected" acknowledging the ideological significance of Khrushchev's reforms, focusing instead on the practical benefits of the reforms to increase productivity. In addition, unlike other leaders of the CPSU, Suslov also avoided talking about MTS reform and Khrushchev (*Petroff 1988, p. 111–112*). "

What following that is in January 1959, at the 21st CPSU Congress, a new conflict broke out between Suslov and Khrushchev. Khrushchev believed that the USSR had developed from a state of socialist development to communism. In a higher state of development, Suslov argued that Khrushchev's views were seriously flawed and countered that they were not endorsed by the party. In order to further discredit Khrushchev's assertion, Suslov used his powerful knowledge base to refute the Khrushchev, he argues that "On the road of communism, the process of social change will be long and not It will be over in seven years' time." (*Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov, translate by translator of the Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1976, p.322*). Therefore, in the field of domestic economic construction, Suslov was a solid supporter of a Stalinist

collective economy. Suslov strongly opposed Khrushchev's de-Stalinization economic policy and his "economic decentralization plan."

Because Suslov and Khrushchev had deep-rooted differences on foreign and domestic policies, and coupled with Suslov's prestige, Suslov became the core of the Muscov faction (i.e., the high-ranking CPSU clique who opposed Khrushchev) (*Tompson, W.J., 1991, p. 1101-1121*). After the humiliating defeat of the USSR in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Khrushchev's prestige greatly diminished, and Suslov's influence soared, finally, in October 1964, Khrushchev stepped down. Suslov played a vital role in this coup. Although Suslov fell ill due to his visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC), at the ensuing CPSU plenary session, Suslov gave Khrushchev The mistake led to a lengthy complaint, officially sentencing Khrushchev to the "death penalty" of his political career, and claiming the victory of the Moscow faction in this intra-CPSU factional struggle (*Hahn, W., 1991, p.109*).

In addition, Suslov also has a distinct ideology, that is, against personal authoritarian leadership, that is, "personal cult". As a staunch supporter of democratic centralism and collective leadership, Suslov not only condemned Stalin's dictatorship, domination and the "personal cult," but he also criticized Khrushchev's naive individualistic self-confidence in his de-Stalinization policy (*Schmidt-Häuer, C., 1986, p.77*). Including the tension in Sino-Soviet relations, Suslov also considered it a "personality cult" issue, Suslov argues

that "the crux of the matter is that the excessive conceit and arrogance of the CCP leadership can largely explain the personal cult of Mao Zedong, because Mao Zedong believed he was always right." Suslov also compared Mao's growing personal cult to that of Joseph Stalin (*Leffler, M.P. and Westad, O.A. eds., 2010, p.369*). In this collective power within the CPSU, it has scholars think that in collective leadership, Kirilenko, Brezhnev and Suslov are members of the unofficial troika within the CPSU leadership (*Mitchell, R.J., 1990, p.26*).

In the field of diplomacy, throughout Suslov's political career, he became increasingly concerned that the USSR's leadership role in the communist movement would be compromised. Some scholars believe that Suslov "is a Russian nationalist" (*Schmidt-Hauer, Christian, 1986, p.78*). Inside the Eastern Bloc, Suslov became increasingly assertive, and he opposed any form of anti-Soviet policy that the leaders of the Eastern Bloc were trying to pursue. For example, with regard to Sino-Soviet relations, it has Chinese scholar believes that the reason for the conflict between China and the USSR was largely due to the weakening of the CPSU leadership in the socialist camp after the Khrushchev criticized Stalin, at the same time, Mao Zedong believed that he and the CCP should become socialists. the new leader of the group, but at the same time, the USSR still suppressed the rise of the CCP, and Suslov provided support and advice for Khrushchev to suppress the CCP's influence within the socialist camp (*Shen Zhihua, 2004*).

Firstly, the biggest difference between Wang Huning and Suslov is that Suslov was an orthodox communist, and Suslov still adhered to communist values until his death, at least for him personally. While Wang Huning is not, Wang is not a believer in orthodox communism or Marxism-Leninism. For the "neo-authoritarianism" he insists on, neo-authoritarian supporters ideologically prefer the policy prescriptions of contemporary third-world strongmen. In the ideological debates of 1988–1989, the neo-authoritarians did not mention Marxism (*Sautman, B., 1992, p.72-102*). In the field of economic construction, Suslov adhered to the conservative Stalinist model, and it was precisely because of his adherence to the Stalinist economic ideology that he was marginalized during the Khrushchev era. On the other hand, Wang Huning agreed with Deng Xiaoping's idea of economic liberalization, and in the 1980s, he had put forward many constructive opinions on economic construction and economic liberalization.

Secondly, Suslov as a bureaucrat who entered the Politburo from the grassroots level of the CPSU, played an important role in the factionalism within the CPSU. After the end of World War II, Suslov was appreciated by Stalin for his suppression of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, gained Stalin's full confidence, and became Stalin's protégé, and even a Russian historian speculated that Stalin wanted Suslov to be his "secret heir" (*Montefiore 2005, p. 642*). In addition, at the end of the Khrushchev era, Suslov led the "Moscow faction" as a faction group against Khrushchev. What makes Wang Huning special is that, as a

"scholar bureaucrat", he assisted Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping for three-generations of "core leaders" and served as their assistants (*Cheng Li, 2013, p.1-17*). After several factional struggles, Wang still stood firm. Therefore, Wang Huning is only a "policy advisor". Some scholars have proposed that the significance of Wang Huning's existence is that "the Chinese leadership needs a non-bureaucratic intellectual to reshape a new ideological regime to adapt to the evolving society, and it is especially important to establish a new basis for legitimacy." (*Patapan, Haig, and Yi Wang, 2018, p.47-60*) and he has withdrawn from the factional struggle of the CCP. The reason is that the author argues that, after Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992, neo-authoritarianism with Dengism as its platform has become the guiding ideology of the CCP, and it has not changed until now, so the designers of the ideology can stick to their own consciences without conflicting with leaders. But for Suslov, after Stalin's death, the CPSU experienced tragic ideological conflicts, factional struggles, and purges of ideological factions within the party. It has scholar have pointed out that due to different ideological attitudes and understandings, fierce factional struggles will always break out within the CPSU (*Kalashnikov, A., 2016, p.23-48*). Therefore, because the CPSU did not have a unified ideology, especially in the Khrushchev era, Suslov had to join the factional struggle within the CPSU.

However, they also have many similarities, although the two have different ideologies, they both share the idea of conservative value and

nationalism. Firstly, whether it is China or the USSR, Wang Huning and Suslov represent "conservatives" ideology (though they are different). Although Suslov will follow the party line in the future and support some beliefs of withdrawal from Marxism-Leninism, including the relaxation of party control in the field of natural sciences, on the other hand, throughout the 1970s, the intellectual life of the USSR was under Suslov's control (*Medvedev, Roy, 1982, p.55-65*), and he still emphasizes strict ideological control over literature and cultural works, especially including literary works critical of CPSU rule. Secondly, In the previous article, the author discussed and analyzed Wang Huning's more than once nationalist enthusiasm for supporting and opposing Western culture as represented by the United States in his writings. As for Suslov, some scholars believe that he was the protector of the rising Russian nationalists in the 1970s, and that he and other Russian nationalists were characterized by their opposition to political reforms (that is, the glasnost and perestroika) (*Hughes, Michael, 1993, p.41-61*). In the end, both Wang Huning and Suslov shaped the "official ideology" of their regimes, which will be discussed in detail below.

Three Represents, Harmonious Society and the Chinese Dream, Wang Huning Shaping the Ideology of the CCP in the Post-Deng Xiaoping era

long-term rule.

As for why Wang Huning was favored by Jiang Zemin and why Wang went to Beijing, some scholars argue that the CCP leadership needs a non-bureaucratic intellectual to shape the CCP's ideology to accommodate evolving concepts of sovereignty, democracy, and the rule of law in China. At the same time, reconcile the changing role of the CCP with economic policy (*Patapan, Haig, and Yi Wang, 2018, p.47-60*), and author thinks the most importantly is establish a new basis for legitimacy within the political framework established by Deng Xiaoping, but before Wang, the Central Policy Research Office (CPRO), which was just being established at the time, still lacked such scholars who had a good understanding of the CCP and Western politics. In addition, some China observers believe that Wang Huning's success in every such move from his entry into CPRO qualified him for subsequent promotions, which in turn gave him the power to design new moves. Therefore, it is very likely that Wang did formulate and develop these major policy initiatives, and these initiatives also led to Wang Huning's growing influence and power (*Patapan, Haig, and Yi Wang, 2018, p.47-60*). Therefore, the authors believe that studying how Wang connected and shaped the ideology of the three post-Deng Xiaoping Chinese leaders, and Wang Huning's role in ideological work in contemporary China, is crucial to understanding the ideology and even public policies making of the post-Deng Xiaoping era's CCP.

Wang in the Jiang Zemin-Hu Jintao era: Determining the legitimacy of the CCP's

After Wang Huning became the head of the CPRO political research bureau and served as Jiang Zemin's 'personal political assistant,' he directly participated in the construction of Jiang Zemin's most important ideology, "Three Represents." (三个代表) The core view of the three representatives is to allow capitalists to join the CCP and to determine the first priority for the development of China's party-state regime: establishing a socialist market economic system. As for the background of the three representatives, firstly, with the passing of the older generation of the CCP, it is definitely not feasible to rely on the prestige of the leaders to maintain the legitimacy of the past, and the CCP urgently needs new theoretical support. Secondly, since the 1990s, China's private economy has experienced tremendous growth. Although John Wong and Zheng Yongnian pointed out that most Chinese entrepreneurs are not the bourgeoisie in the sense of Schumpeter, but ordinary businessmen, in hindsight (*Lu, Xing, and Herbert W. Simons, 2006, p.262-286*), the author thinks this move is a prudent move to keep China's dominant political organization and keep the CCP alive. At the same time, some scholars believe that "Three Represents" seems to be a timely idea by promising that the party will uphold China's cultural etiquette in the face of these challenges (*Fewsmith, Joseph, 2002*) for Wang Huning, this addresses concerns about recent events at home and abroad. The initial formation of the CCP ideology has already taken shape. On the economic front, the CCP has established the values upheld by the

new authoritarianism, namely, maintaining rapid economic growth, which is also Deng's request.

In shaping society, Wang Huning also established a basic development framework for nationalist education (or socialist patriotism education, (社会主义爱国教育) in the post-Deng era. After the CCP solved the Tiananmen massacre, Jiang Zemin was concerned about the ideological education of the Chinese people. Jiang made the point shortly after the Tiananmen massacre that intellectuals should serve their “socialist motherland,” believing that the top priority of young intellectuals should be to build the motherland, Jiang believes that loving the motherland and putting the interests of the motherland first is the highest value of intellectuals. In addition, he blamed the 1989 student movement as a “serious mistake in the work of the CCP” at the same time, Jiang also criticized China's liberal intellectuals as “the scum of the Chinese nation.” (*Jiang Zemin, 2006, p.120-127*) Please pay attention to the words used here, the author's interpretation is that Jiang believes that the main fault of the student movement lies in the education of the party, additionally, his criticism of liberal intellectuals is “the scum of the nation,” not the “scum of the proletariat” this shows that Jiang is a nationalist rather than a communist, Jiang's purpose is to establish a “nationalist education that loves the country and the party.”, that is, build patriotic education with state-nationalism and cultural nationalism as the core, rather than the class-struggle-style patriotism of the Mao Zedong era. From Wang Huning's criticism of the United States in his book “America

Against the America”, it is evident that Wang also a person who attaches great importance to “national consciousness” which is in line with Jiang's point of view. Along with a series of educational propaganda activities with “patriotic education” as the main body initiated, promoted, and institutionalized by Jiang Zemin since the 1990s (*Suisheng Zhao, 1998, p.287-302*), Wang as the deputy director of CPRO, help drafted the “promoting national spirit” proposal in the 16th National Congress of the CCP Relevant documents and improved. The author thinks Wang's philosophy of political education for society at CCP 16th Congress is also the framework for Wang Huning's future political education for Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.

When Wang's “general line” for Jiang Zemin was successfully shaped, he was further reused. Before and under Hu Jintao era, some scholars think China's society got a positive influence from the rapid development of the Deng-Jiang era, but at the same time, it did not do enough in other aspects of society, as well as various ethical issues arising from economic development and welfare shortages (*Ewing, Richard Daniel, 2003, p.17-34*). Despite the legitimacy of Jiang Zemin's “Three Represents” general line in 2002, many Chinese still expressed concerns about the prospects of the CCP, finding themselves are “losers” in the reforms, they feel betrayed by the vanguard and thus lose faith in socialist ideology and the party's ability to lead them towards a better future. Moreover, in China's big cities, according to survey data from the Party School Research Institute, about 25% no longer believe in the cause of socialist construction, 50%

doubt the role of the CCP as the vanguard of the working class, 65% believe that they are no longer “masters of the country”, and 79% have lost their relationship with the party close emotional connection (*Bu, Qinghu and Dong Liu, 2002, p.20-22*). China observers pointed that it is the time for the party to raise awareness of the looming crisis (*Zheng, Yongnian. and Tok, S.K., 2007, p.1-12*). Hu Jintao's ruling idea is “Scientific Outlook on Development”, and “Harmonious Society” is the essence and core of it.

The outside world believes that Wang Huning was shaping this ideology, but they have not listed the primary reference materials were published could proof this point in their discussion, and the author found proof from Wang Huning's previous publications, Wang proposed in 1994 that “generally developing countries in the early stages of development do not pay much attention to human development, and there are no resources to pay attention to it. Therefore, after a certain stage of economic development, a people-oriented development strategy must be established” (*Wang Huning, 1994, p.213-214*), this proves that Wang also has research and recognition of the 'people-oriented' thought. Furthermore, “Scientific Outlook on Development” is not only an economic requirement, but also has a new definition of politics, culture, and society.

Wang and the Chinese Dream: become the Ideological Tsar

The Chinese dream proposed by Xi

Jinping, and nationalism is the core of the Chinese dream. Nationalism, or "rejuvenate China", although it is the general political program of post-Mao Chinese leaders, using it to support the legitimacy of the CCP party-state regime, but it has Chinese observer have pointed out that it is an oversimplification to use nationalism only as a tool to justify the CCP's monopoly politics in the post-Tiananmen era, and to treat nationalist narratives as merely political propaganda or ideological movements, because the idea of is deeply rooted in the national identity of the Chinese people (*Wang Zheng, 2013, p.1-13*). But on the other hand, it also gives the CCP reason to ask the Chinese people to be prepared to sacrifice their personal interests in order to better serve the great collective mission of the Chinese nation and use the great mission of national rejuvenation for political dictatorship and various rights of citizens' limitations are defended. The Chinese were told that all these controls were necessary steps to achieve the country's ultimate grand mission (*Wang Zheng, 2013, p.1-13*).

In the field of propaganda and legitimacy shaping, Xi's narrative of the Chinese Dream is like old wine in a new bottle, the word "Dream" replaces Jiang-Hu era's national rejuvenation; it is just a patriotic education in a different form. But the author believes that the United States, Europe, and Japan encountered major economic crises in terms of economic development in the years when Xi Jinping took office. This gives Chinese people more confidence in themselves, so, unlike the concepts of humiliation and revival that emphasize past trauma and grief, the Chinese Dream

focuses on hope and glory, making it more positive and suitable for today's Chinese. In the mid-term, the author argues Wang Huning played a big role in this, because Wang undoubtedly designed the Chinese dream, which is also a fact recognized by academic circles. Therefore, the author could see the "inheriting role" of Wang's design in Xi Jinping's ideology. Wang's timely revision of China's nationalist narrative not only makes the Chinese understand that their "humiliation" has become "glory". In addition, Wang Huning and Xi Jinping are not satisfied with keeping the Chinese dream in the field of political propaganda (*People Daily*, 2018). They have extended the Chinese dream to all aspects of Chinese social life, and have rooted it in the hearts of almost all Chinese people.

In the field of international relations, China's actions are also increasingly resembling those of a "rising regional power". In 2014, Xi Jinping first proposed that "Asian security is best handled by Asians" (*Xi Jinping*, 2014). This voice is very meaningful, because this is the first time since the collapse of the USSR, a leader has so clearly criticized and questioned the role of the United States in regional security. It has scholar had suggested that in the field of international relations and diplomacy, Xi is the first Chinese leader since the post-Mao Zedong era to promote a rethinking of China's foreign policy strategy (*Sørensen, C.T.*, 2015), and Xi Jinping no longer uses Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao's "Tao Guang Yang Hui". Instead, he adopts the "Fen Fa You Wei" diplomatic strategy with more initiative from a major power (*Xi Jinping*, 2013). In addition, the

more radical moves in China's foreign policy in recent years are also related to Xi Jinping's need to deal with the increasingly strong nationalist ideology in China (*Suisheng Zhao*, 2013, p.535-553). Wang Huning also made a lot of contributions about Xi's diplomacy policies, particularly, Wang has participated in the design of the theory of China's diplomatic measures in recent years, especially the "One Belt One Road" geopolitical strategy that Chinese government has been advocating in recent years, Wang as an important foreign policy advisor to Xi Jinping, is also one of the founders of the "One Belt One Road" concept (*Rolland, N.*, 2017, p.127-142).

With the success of Wang Huning again and again, Wang's position in the CCP is getting higher and higher. On November 15, 2012, at the 18th Congress of the CCP, he was elected as a member of the Politburo. During the 18th Central Committee, Wang Huning served as the director of CPRO, together with Li Zhanshu (Director of the Central General Office of the CCP), Wang accompanied Xi Jinping to all internal and external events. In 2014, Wang Huning served as the director of the newly established Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission, whose political weight is growing day by day. In 2017, 62-year-old Wang Huning was elected as a member of the PBSC at the 19th National Congress of the CCP, becoming the first theoretical person to enter the PBSC since Chen Boda. Later, Wang succeeded the retired Liu Yunshan as the director of the Central Spiritual Civilization Construction Steering Committee, and he also served as the

leader of the CCP Central Propaganda and Ideological Work Leading Group and the CCP Party Construction Leading Group Leader. The above shows that Wang's power has grown rapidly, and it is enough to prove that Wang has directly become the "Tsar" in charge of party affairs and ideological work throughout contemporary China. It has Chinese observer even believe that "Xi Jinping's Marxism is actually Wang Huning's Marxism; the so-called Xi Jinping Thought is actually Wang Huning Thought" (*Voice of America*, 2018). Therefore, the author argues that in the field of ideology, Wang could definitely comparable to Suslov.

Comparative study between the Developed Socialism and the Chinese Dream--- China Facing an Ideological Crisis?

As for the USSR's "Developed Socialism", the debate between national development goals and communist utopia has been characteristic of Soviet policy changes throughout the history of USSR development (*Lowenthal, R., 1970, p.33-116*). The background developed by Developed Socialism is that for the USSR, a "big brother of the Eastern Bloc", if it fails to achieve the achievements of communism or higher socialism, one suspects that the CPSU has betrayed its historical mission, whatever either way, it would raise suspicions that Soviet society was

heading towards communism. Some scholars have proposed that the problem to be solved by Developed Socialism is "how to use Marxist socialism containing utopian ideals to defend the USSR regime and a huge bureaucratic group", (*Evans Jr, A.B., 1977, p.409-428*). Brezhnev explained the development of socialism as "this is the objective and inevitable legal stage of socialist society from the first stage of the new system to communism. Developed socialism cannot be bypassed or skipped." (*L. I. Brezhnev, 1976, p.529*).

In the process of shaping Developed Socialism, Suslov made outstanding contributions, or it can be said that Suslov shaped Developed Socialism. Through Suslov's article, the author discovered many important propositions about developed socialism. In 1968, Suslov proposed that "Developed Socialism has the necessary foundation in material products and technology and developed social relations; it fully embodies the superiority of the USSR's socialism" (*Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov, translate by translator of the Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1976, p.765*). Suslov also proposed that Develop Socialism is the only way for all socialist countries to achieve this stage, and the USSR was the first country to reach this stage. Therefore, Like Wang Huning, Suslov perfected the details of Developed Socialism, and by designing Developed Socialism, designed a ruling legitimacy for the CPSU and the legitimacy of the USSR-led communist national camp.

However, Developed Socialism is in sharp contrast to the optimism, vitality, and utopianism of the ideology of the

Khrushchev age of consciousness. Developed socialism seems to be pessimistic and conservative. and pragmatic. It was thought to cover Soviet intellectual life with a suffocating grey blanket, stifling creativity, breeding dogmatism, and undermining the vitality of USSR Marxism-Leninism. One Soviet research expert believed that Developed Socialism provided legitimacy for the CPSU's international hegemony and the domestic continuation of its rule. It maintains the USSR's unique "big brother" status in the international socialist bloc and consolidates the political dominance of the post-Khrushchev leadership of the CPSU by creating a stable bureaucracy (*Sandle, M., 2002, p.165-187*). Of course, there is no doubt that Developed Socialism does not develop the socialism of the USSR and leads to communism. On the contrary, it runs towards "stagnant" goals, just as the idealists of the CCP did to Suslov, "Suslov is one of the main leaders of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, Suslov sells a lot of revisionist erroneous ideas, advocates the theory of the 'Party of the ordinary People', blatantly distorts Marxism-Leninism, and attacks Adhering to the revolutionary CCP, vigorously advocating the diplomatic concept of imperialism, at home, Suslov suppressed the real communists and turned the USSR ideology into a backwater." (*Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov, translate by translator of the Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1976, p.1-2*). And Soviet researchers also called the era of *zastoi*.

What Suslov did was to carry out a massive repression against the dissenting voices in the ideological field and against

the liberal intellectual trend of the time, Suslov and his protégé Sergei Trapeznikov began to intervene more frequently, rejecting attempts to bring more liberal views into the Politburo. It has scholar argues that "the Soviet Union has established a developed socialist society, thereby reducing all subsequent announcements to propaganda, façade decoration, and celebration. As the bureaucracy took hold from 1965 onwards, the life of the intellectual was dominated by 'terrible rhetoric' " (*F. Burlatskii, 1991, p.221*). Moreover, After the deaths of Suslov and Brezhnev, the problems covered by Developed Socialism under *zastoi* broke out one after another. First, the leadership of the CPSU is facing a crisis. Some scholars have proposed that, under the surface of the stable political system of Develop Socialism, the leadership of the CPSU has become rigid and oligarchic, and is facing serious crisis of gerontocracy and difficult metabolism (*Rigby, T.H., 1970, p.167-191*). Second, with the frustrating failure of the USSR's economic reforms in the Brezhnev era and after, unsettling the CPSU's political elites, they replaced the promise of material comforts with patriotic ideological convictions to address the problems of the current Soviet system. The conflict also ended in failure (*Evans Jr, A., 1986, p.1-23*).

Under the glamorous exterior of the Chinese Dream, it is also facing a crisis. In contemporary China, Wang Huning's predictions about the United States are also successful in the country that Wang himself serves. Although the BLM movement in the United States in 2020 and the United States Capitol attack in 2021 made Wang Huning's book

"America against America" attract attention again in China, he once bought a high price of more than 2,500 US dollars. But obviously, Wang could not enjoy this kind of praise, because the phenomenon he feared the most has become a reality, the degenerate thinking of the United States, that is, "individualism and hedonism", has successfully crossed the Pacific Ocean to China. In recent years, China has become one of the most economically unequal societies on the planet. At a State Council press conference in 2020, Premier Li Keqiang sadly declared that "about 600 million Chinese still earn less than 1,000 RMB (approximately 150 dollar) per month" (*Xinhuanet*, 2020). At the same time, China's atomization and low social trust have become so acute that a plethora of problems have spewed out. China's younger generation, feeling alone in relentless consumerism and social Darwinism, increasingly describes a state of nihilistic despair that exists in the internet slang "*neijuan*", which describes being "sunk in an exhausting intense Compete, and everyone inevitably loses." While the Chinese are also showing they are "socially responsible" by abiding by new rules set by China's controversial social credit system, they are constantly being urged to show their ethnicity by boycotting the never-ending list of "foreign power companies opposed to China" (*Kerry Allen*, 2021), countless Chinese are tired and against it, but under China's strong police system, they can't resist or march and feel despair, so this desperation is expressed in a movement called *tangping*(躺平), where people try to do nothing, for the country Contribute the less the better, or don't contribute anything to the country at all, and become

a modern recluse.

Furthermore, the author argues that what makes Wang Huning even more desperate is that even those young Chinese who are able to have children no longer choose to have children, but choose "Double Income, No Kids" (DINK), plus the cost of raising children in China. The rising tide has directly led to a steep decline in China's fertility rate in recent years. In addition, Chinese youth no longer believe in the narratives of nationalism and Confucianism. With the rise of feminism and other movements in recent years, criticism of Confucianism has also intensified. A kind of feminism in Chinese called "Made-in-China Feminism" has quietly emerged, and they have made a big splash on Chinese social media against marriage and patriarchy (*Wu, A.X. and Dong, Y.*, 2019), which is undoubtedly a response to the Chinese Dream based on traditional Confucianism. significant challenges. This is surprisingly coincident with Wang Huning's "the teenage generation has lost its values" in the United States, But unfortunately, it happened in China too.

It has observer had pointed out that because the purpose of liberalism is to break down the factors that restrict individuals (such as tradition, religion, association, and authoritarianism) and liberate them from these constraints, from this perspective, China has been completely liberalized, and Chinese society has been transformed, and it is starting to look more like Wang's nightmare, as China is being consumed by nihilistic individualism and commodification, and ideology is in

serious crisis. (*N.S. Lyons, 2021*).

The author believes that at these social and cultural fields, the legitimacy of the CCP is being challenged as severely as the CPSU. Firstly, although the CPSU's Developed Socialism is an ideology shaped by Suslov to solve the problem of the legitimacy of the CPSU, the CPSU is due to the contradiction between the conservative official ideology left by Developed Socialism and the younger generation's desire for change. This led to many serious social and political crises in the USSR in the post-Brezhnev era, which further led to the collapse of the USSR. Secondly, as for China, the foundation on which the Chinese Dream lives, that is, China's national nature and national traditions are being abandoned by the social issues faced by the younger generation, and at the same time, Western culture is constantly eroding China. Of course, Wang Huning must not await doom.

Wang Huning in the action

According to an analysis of Xi Jinping by an insider familiar with the matter, he believes that "Xi Jinping is not greedy for money, but may be 'corrupted by power', Xi Jinping's commercialization of contemporary China, official corruption and loss of Chinese values, dignity and self-worth" (*WikiLeaks, 2009*). Feeling disgusted, which coincides with Wang Huning's thinking, they realize that now they have no choice but to take drastic action to curb the invasion of Western culture into China. Consequently, in

recent years, the Chinese government's severe crackdown on "moral crimes" has highlighted this point.

In the economic field, China has begun a large-scale investigation and suppression of private giant enterprises. Tens of billions of dollars in fines, forced restructuring, and strict restrictions on China's big companies (especially internet giants). The much-maligned "996" overtime requirement was outlawed, and a pay rise for gig workers was announced. The Chinese government destroyed the private tutoring for students' industry overnight and capped a wild rise in property prices. The author believes that the intention of these economic measures is obvious. The purpose is to make the Chinese realize that the CCP could change the decadent social status quo in China, and the Chinese Dream will be realized. Because even if economic and income security cannot be achieved, the Chinese Dream is absolutely empty talk.

In the cultural realm, China is becoming increasingly conservative. The Chinese government has been carrying out more and more severe censorship of China's entertainment industry (even overseas, such as South Korean variety shows), and with more and more artists being punished by the Chinese government cultural department for their own moral reasons was "Banned" (*fensha*, 封杀), in September 2021, the CCP Central Propaganda Department issued the "Notice on Carrying out Comprehensive Governance Work in the Cultural and Entertainment Field", which directly raised the moral issues of artists (such as disordered sex life) to the political level,

and more and more Chinese actors and singers was "Banned". In addition, the CCP has adopted a propaganda strategy, in which the CCP's propaganda agency promotes that "the cultural market will no longer be a paradise for sissy stars, and news and public opinion will no longer be in a position to worship Western culture." Under this strategy, China targets Sissy stars and pop culture (such as K-POP) were criticized and "banned". And China blames these on "the barbaric and ferocious attacks from the United States and launched against China" (*Li Guangman, 2021*).

Furthermore, China's LGBT community has been purged from the Internet, abortion restrictions have been severely restricted, and radical feminists have been classified as "extreme terrorists" by the government. The author argues that Wang Huning and Xi Jinping, like the author, have similarly compared the ideology between China and USSR, have concluded that "if Western liberal's 'entertainment strategies' are allowed to succeed in causing China's younger generation to lose tenacity and masculinity" manifestation, then we will collapse, like the USSR did" (*Jeff Pao, 2021*). The author found that Wang Huning's repression of domestic ideology was even worse than that of Suslov.

Admittedly, considering the failures of other "ideological shaper" in history, such as the ideological management of the USSR that lost Suslov, the ideological management was completely out of control, and like Suslov, both were in ideology. Wang Huning, who advocates conservatives in the field and opposes the Western, seems to be

debatable whether his strategy of devising Chinese values will succeed. Analysts also believe that Wang Huning is conducting an ideological "The Grand Experiment". China and the West face very similar social problems, and now, thanks to Wang Huning, China has taken a very different approach to solving these problems than the Western states. As China rises and increasingly challenges America's position, the conclusions of this Wang's "The Grand Experiment" are likely to shape the future of global governance in the next century (*N.S. Lyons, 2021*). The author also believes that this will be related to the survival of the CCP party-state regime.

Conclusion

In this article, the author discusses Wang Huning's ideology and conducts a comparative study with Suslov's ideology. Then, the author discusses how Wang Huning shaped the official CCP ideology in the post-Deng Xiaoping era step by step. Then, through comparative research, the author compares the Developed Socialism created by Suslov and the Chinese Dream created by Wang Huning, and analyzes the serious ideological crisis China is facing today and Wang Huning's measures.

China's current ideology is facing a new era. Like Developed Socialism, Chinese Dream is built to maintain legitimacy. Will China's attempt succeed, or will it be just a "fig leaf" like Developed Socialism? In addition, the author thinks that if Xi Jinping and Wang Huning both withdraw

from the stage of Chinese politics in the future, the ideology of the CCP will be in the same seriously crisis as the CPSU after Suslov's death? All of the above issues require follow-up research.

Biographical notes

Reinhardt Fang (Chinese name literal translation is Daqi Fang) is an student from Hangzhou China, in an international school, and Reinhardt is a politics and China studies enthusiast, furthermore, Reinhardt wants to be a scholar and

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