

Writeup :

Challenge Overview – Memory Forensics

Objective

The objective of this challenge is to analyze a Windows memory dump in order to recover sensitive user data belonging to a well-known environmental activist who lost access to his system due to an unknown error.

The investigation focuses on extracting:

- Environment variables
- Browser / password manager artifacts
- KeePass database credentials stored in memory

Q1 – Environment Variable Analysis

Investigation Context

During the memory analysis, it was noted that the victim frequently uses:

- Web browsers
- Password managers (KeePass)

Given the hint that the victim is an **environmental activist**, environment variables may contain **user-specific or suspicious values** that provide an initial clue.

Tool Used

- **Volatility 3 Framework** (CLI , GUI)
 - **Windows memory dump** (.raw)
-

1) Initial Analysis – Process Enumeration

First Step in the Analysis

The first step in the memory forensic analysis was to enumerate all running processes in the memory dump.

This step is critical to understand what applications were active on the victim's system at the time the memory was captured.

```
"C:\Users\NVIDIA PLUS\Desktop\vol.exe" -f "C:\Users\NVIDIA PLUS\Desktop\New folder\MemoryDump_Lab2.raw" windows.pslist.PsList
```

Please wait, this may take a few minutes.
Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2

PID	PPID	ImageFileName	Offset(V)	Threads	Handles	SessionId	Wow64	CreateTime	ExitTime	File output
4	0	System	0xfa8000ca0040 80	541	N/A	False	2019-12-14 10:35:21.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
248	4	smss.exe	0xfa80014976c0	3	37	N/A	False	2019-12-14 10:35:21.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
320	312	csrss.exe	0xfa80014fdb30	10	446	0	False	2019-12-14 10:35:27.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
368	360	csrss.exe	0xfa8001c40060	8	237	1	False	2019-12-14 10:35:28.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
376	248	psxss.exe	0xfa8000ca8840	18	786	0	False	2019-12-14 10:35:28.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
416	360	winlogon.exe	0xfa8001c5a700	6	112	1	False	2019-12-14 10:35:30.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
424	312	wininit.exe	0xfa8001c5b2b0	3	75	0	False	2019-12-14 10:35:30.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
484	424	services.exe	0xfa8001c95320	8	206	0	False	2019-12-14 10:35:31.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
492	424	lsass.exe	0xfa8001c9d910	8	546	0	False	2019-12-14 10:35:31.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
500	424	lsass.exe	0xfa8001c9e2d0 10	181	0	False	2019-12-14 10:35:31.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
588	484	svchost.exe	0xfa8001cec790	12	354	0	False	2019-12-14 10:35:35.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
652	484	VBoxService.exe	0xfa8001d13060	14	135	0	False	2019-12-14 10:35:36.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
720	484	svchost.exe	0xfa8001d4ab30	7	275	0	False	2019-12-14 10:35:37.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
812	484	svchost.exe	0xfa8001d76320	21	474	0	False	2019-12-14 10:35:38.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled

2) Command Line Analysis

identifying the suspicious processes, the next step was to analyze how these processes were launched and whether any sensitive information was passed to them at runtime.

Volatility Plugin Used : windows.cmdline.CmdLine

```
Time Stamp: Thu Dec 25 20:27:16 2025
```

```
"C:\Users\NVIDIA PLUS\Desktop\vol.exe" -f "C:\Users\NVIDIA PLUS\Desktop\New folder\MemoryDump_Lab2.raw" windows.cmdline.CmdLine
```

Please wait, this may take a few minutes.
Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2

PID	Process Args
4	System -
248	smss.exe \SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe
320	csrss.exe %SystemRoot%\system32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows SharedSection=1024,20480,768 Windows=On SubSystemType=Windows ServerDll=ba:
368	csrss.exe %SystemRoot%\system32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows SharedSection=1024,20480,768 Windows=On SubSystemType=Windows ServerDll=ba:
376	psxss.exe %SystemRoot%\system32\psxss.exe
416	winlogon.exe winlogon.exe
424	wininit.exe wininit.exe
484	services.exe C:\Windows\system32\services.exe
492	lsass.exe C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe

Suspicious Processes Identified

The results revealed three suspicious processes that were of high forensic value. These processes were directly related to the challenge context (browsing activity, password management, and user data handling):

Google Chrome

- **Process Name:** chrome.exe
- **PID:** (2296 , 2304 , 2479 , 2964 , 2575)
- **Reason for Suspicion:**
 - Active web browser

```

2096 cmd.exe "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"
2068 cophost.exe \??C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe
2296 chrome.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe"
2304 chrome.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=crashpad-handler "--user-data-dir=C:\Users\SmartNet\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Da
2479 chrome.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=watcher --main-thread-id=2312 --on-initialized-event-handle=12 --parent-handle=164 /pre
2964 chrome.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=utility --field-trial-handle=920,18321715965689748971,11882971420757355211,131072 --lan
2572 chrome.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=gpu-process --field-trial-handle=920,18321715965689748971,11882971420757355211,131072 -
2636 WmiPrvSE.exe C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiPrvse.exe
2004 WmiApSrv.exe C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiApSrv.exe
1632 chrome.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=renderer --field-trial-handle=920,18321715965689748971,11882971420757355211,131072 --di
2376 dllhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{76D0CB12-7604-4048-B83C-1005C7DDC503}
3008 KeePass.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\KeePass Password Safe 2\KeePass.exe" "C:\Users\SmartNet\Secrets\Hidden.kdbx"

```

Notepad

- **Process Name:** notepad.exe
- **PID:** (3260)
- **Reason for Suspicion:**
 - Often used to temporarily store passwords, notes, or copied text

```

2764 sppsvc.exe C:\Windows\system32\sppsvc.exe
1076 svchost.exe C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k secsvcs
928 wmpnetwk.exe "C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnetwk.exe"
3260 notepad.exe "C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe" C:\Users\SmartNet\Secrets\Hidden.kdbx
3844 DumpIt.exe "C:\Users\SmartNet\Downloads\DumpIt\DumpIt.exe"
3852 conhost.exe \??C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe
4004 WmiPrvSE.exe -
Time Stamp: Thu Dec 25 20:27:27 2025

```

KeePass

- **Process Name:** KeePass.exe
- **PID:** 3008
- **Reason for Suspicion:**
 - Password manager
 - High-value target in memory for:
 - Database paths

```

2004 WmiApSrv.exe C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiApSrv.exe
1632 chrome.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=renderer --field-trial-handle=920,183217
2376 dllhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{76D0CB12-7604-4048-B83C-1005C7DDC503}
3008 KeePass.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\KeePass Password Safe 2\KeePass.exe" "C:\Users\SmartNet\Secrets\Hidden.kdbx"
2764 sppsvc.exe C:\Windows\system32\sppsvc.exe
1076 svchost.exe C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k secsvcs
928 wmpnetwk.exe "C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnetwk.exe"
3260 notepad.exe "C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe" C:\Users\SmartNet\Secrets\Hidden.kdbx

```

3- Environment Variable Analysis

Since the challenge explicitly mentions that the victim is an “environmental activist”, this strongly suggests that environment variables may contain relevant clues or hidden information.

The `windows.envvars.Envvars` plugin was used because it directly aligns with the challenge hint (“environmental activist”) and provided critical insight into sensitive data stored in environment variables, leading to the next phase of the investigation.

```
"C:\Users\NVIDIA PLUS\Desktop\vol.exe" -f "C:\Users\NVIDIA PLUS\Desktop\New folder\MemoryDump_Lab2.raw" windows.envvars.Envvars

Please wait, this may take a few minutes.
Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2
PID Process Block Variable Value
248 smss.exe 0x2d1430 Path C:\Windows\System32
248 smss.exe 0x2d1430 SystemDrive C:
248 smss.exe 0x2d1430 SystemRoot C:\Windows
320 csrss.exe 0x481970 ComSpec C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
320 csrss.exe 0x481970 FP_NO_HOST_CHECK NO
320 csrss.exe 0x481970 NEW_TPM C:\Windows\ZmxhZ3t3M2xjMG0zX1QwXyRUNGczXyFFt2ZftDRcXzJ9
320 csrss.exe 0x481970 NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS 1
320 csrss.exe 0x481970 OS Windows NT
```

4- Encoded Data Discovery & Flag Extraction

During further memory analysis, multiple Base64-encoded strings were identified across different memory regions and file paths.

The repetition of the same encoded content strongly indicated that it was intentionally stored, rather than being random memory noise.

■ Notepad Memory Dump Analysis

Given that Notepad is commonly used to temporarily store sensitive information in plain text, its memory was dumped and analyzed.

■ Decoding Process

The extracted Base64 string was then analyzed using CyberChef, a well-known forensic and decoding tool

```
Input
ZmxhZ3t3M2xjMG0zX1QwXyRUNGczXyFFt2ZftDRcXzJ9

abc 46 2 Tr Raw Bytes ← CRLF (detected)

Output
flag{w3lc0m3_T0_$T4g3 !_Of_L4B_2}
```

Q2- Overview – KeePass Database Recovery

This task focuses on memory forensics to recover sensitive user data from a system memory dump.


During the investigation, it was discovered that the victim relies heavily on:

- Web browsers
- Password managers (specifically KeePass)
- Simple applications for storing information (Notepad)


While analyzing the memory dump, a reference to an image file named **Password.png** was found.

This image contained a **password**, which was crucial because it was used as the **master password** to unlock a **KeePass database** that also existed in memor

```
(volatility-env)-(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/keepass_dump]
$ vol -f ~/Desktop/MemoryDump_Lab2.raw windows.filescan.FileScan | grep ".png"
0x3fb68c50 100.0\Program Files\Windows Media Player\Network Sharing\wmpnss_color48.png
0x3fce1c70 \Users\Alissa Simpson\Pictures\Password.png
```





```
Please wait, this may take a few minutes.
Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2
Cache FileObject FileName
DataSectionObject 0x3fce1c70
Time Stamp: Thu Dec 2 20:50:53 2025
Result
Password.png
file.0x3fce1c70.0xfa800d06e10.DataSectionObject.Password.png.dat
```



Using the Recovered Password to Unlock KeePass

After dumping the image file **Password.png** from memory and analyzing its contents, the password was successfully recovered.

The next step was to use this password as the **master password** for the **KeePass database** that was also found in the memory dump.



Right click on username “flag”

