




**UCDAVIS**

**ECS 188 – Spring 2025**

**[Week 7]**

# KANTIANISM

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**Pure** Practical Reason  
(what ought to be?)

Moral Law  
(objective principle)

Universalization

motive

Balance

*a priori*

Epistemology

Ontological

**End-in-itself**

(worth of rational being / objective ground)

Practical Reason  
(what ought I do?)

**reason**

Pure Reason  
(what is?)

**Thing-in-itself**

(Knowledge)

Self-Legislative

Maxim  
(subjective principle)

emprical

Innate

theoretical

**Subjective**

(belief)

# Why Vote?

**Objective**

(belief)

Autonomous  
(human condition)

Outcome

Intention

Purpose

Moral Value

Good Will

Inclination

Means  
(action)

**Power of Choice**  
(freedom)

Ends  
(humanity)

**Good-in-itself**

(qualify of will)

Qualified Good

Respect

Will

(practical reason)

Duty

Moral Worth

Unqualified Good

Right

(co-exist with everyone's freedom)

Virtue

(duty's as its end)

Nothing in the world—indeed nothing even beyond it—  
can be conceived as **good** without qualification except a **good will**.  
A **good will** is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor because of its adequacy to  
attain some **intended end**; it is good only through its **willing**, that is, **good in itself**.  
Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add nor take away anything from this worth.  
A **will** that **chooses** its **maxims** solely from respect for the **moral law** — that is, from **duty** —  
is thereby, in its ground, wholly **independent** of inclinations and of **everything empirical**.  
Even if, by the special disfavour of fortune or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature,  
this will should wholly lack the power to accomplish its purpose, yet, like a **jewel**,  
it would still **shine by its own light**, as something which has its full **worth in itself**.

Immanuel Kant

[Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:397–398]

Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called **good without qualification**, except a **good will**.

**Duty** is the necessity of an action done out of **respect** for the **law**.

The **will** is the **capacity to act** according to the representation of laws, that is, according to **principles**.

Since **reason** is required for deriving **actions** from **laws**, the **will** is nothing other than **practical reason**.

**Act** only in accordance with that **maxim** through which you can at the same time will that it become a **universal law**.

A maxim is the **subjective principle** of **volition**; the **objective principle** (i.e., the practical law) would be the rule that would serve all **rational beings** as the **objective ground** of a maxim.

Immanuel Kant

[Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:393, 4:400, 4:412. 4:412, 4:421, 4:421]



An **action** done from **duty** has its **moral worth**, not in the **purpose** to be attained by it, but in the **maxim** in accordance with which it is decided upon and done.

**Autonomy** of the will is the property of the will by which it is a **law to itself** (independently of all properties of the objects of volition).

So act that you use **humanity**, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an **end**, never merely as a **means**.

A rational being belongs to the **kingdom of ends** as a member, when he **legislates** in it **universal laws** while also being himself subject to these laws.

**Immanuel Kant**  
[Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:400, 4:400, 4:429, 4:421]

**Choice** (Willkür) is **free** when it can determine itself independently of sensible impulses.

**Virtue** is the **moral strength** of the will in fulfilling its duty.

Any action is **right** if it can coexist with **everyone's freedom** according to a universal law.

**Right** is concerned only with the external and indeed practical relation of one person to another, in so far as their actions, as deeds, can exert influence on each other.

...**Virtue**, by contrast, has inner freedom, i.e. the **conformity of actions** to duty from the motive of **duty itself**, as **its end**.

Immanuel Kant  
[Metaphysics of Morals, 6:213, 6:397, 6:230, 6:213]