
LLVM Compiler and Its Intermediate Representation

(Week 2)

Yulei Sui


School of Computer Science and Engineering University of New South Wales, Australia

Where We Are Now and Today's Class




Lab-Exercise-1

Today's Class



Today's Class



What is LLVM?


LLVM compiler infrastructure is a collection of compiler and tool-chain technologies.

- Originally started in 2000 from UIUC. An open-source project and supported and contributed by a range of high-tech companies such as Apple, Google, Intel, ARM.
- Modern compiler infrastructure can be used to develop a front-end for any programming language and a back-end for any instruction set architecture.
- A set of reusable software modules to quickly design your own compiler or software tool chains.
- Language-independent intermediate representation (IR) used for a variety of purposes, such as compiler optimizations, static analysis and bug detection.
- More information on LLVM's website: https://llvm.org/

Why Learn LLVM or Learn Compilers in General?


- An essential part of the standard curriculum in computer science.
- One of the most complex systems required for building virtually all other software.
- A perfect base framework to build your own tools for code analysis and verification
- Sharpen your software design and implementation skills.
- Widely used by many major software companies. In-demand skills and competitive salaries in job market.

LLVM's Architecture



*IR: Human-readable LLVM IR (.II files) or dense 'bitcode' binary representation (.bc files)

LLVM's Architecture



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LLVM IR is LLVM's code representation which is generated by its front-end clang when compiling a program (https://llvm.org/docs/LangRef.html)

 Language independent. Not machine code, but one step just above assembly

LLVM IR is LLVM's code representation which is generated by its front-end clang when compiling a program (https://llvm.org/docs/LangRef.html)

- Language independent. Not machine code, but one step just above assembly
- Clear lexical scope, such as modules, functions, basic blocks, and instructions
 - The IR proper is a higher level than assembly (cf. call, invoke, switch, aggregate types, etc.). MachineInstr is the closest analogue to assembly and the machine code layer to encoded object files.
 - LLVM IR is a good place to start to understand how high level languages get lowered.

LLVM IR is LLVM's code representation which is generated by its front-end clang when compiling a program (https://llvm.org/docs/LangRef.html)

3-address code style in static single assignment (SSA) form

LLVM IR is LLVM's code representation which is generated by its front-end clang when compiling a program (https://llvm.org/docs/LangRef.html)

- 3-address code style in static single assignment (SSA) form
 - Variables are strongly typed
 - Global variable (symbol starting with '@'), stack/register var (starting with '%')
 - Each global and stack variable is assigned exactly once.
 - A variable lowered to LLVM IR is renamed if it has multiple definitions, so that each
 one has a unique name, turning them into a set of static single assignments.
 - The SSA form makes it easier to perform data-flow analysis and optimizations such as constant propagation, dead code elimination, and register allocation because the compiler can track the values of variables more precisely.

LLVM IR is LLVM's code representation which is generated by its front-end clang when compiling a program (https://llvm.org/docs/LangRef.html)

- 3-address code style in static single assignment (SSA) form
 - Three addresses and one operator. Each instruction has at most three operands, aligning with the principles of SSA form, where each variable is assigned exactly once and allows for efficient analyses and optimizations.
 - For example, 'a = b op c', where 'a', 'b', 'c' are either programmer defined variables (e.g., heap, global or stack), constants or compiler-generated temporary names. 'op' stands for an operation which is applied on 'a' and 'b'.

Compiling a C Program to Its LLVM IR

Clang/LLVM compiler options (compile.sh)

- Compile a C program 'swap.c' to a human readable IR 'swap.ll'.
 - clang -c -S -emit-llvm swap.c -o swap.ll
- Compilation without optimisation.
 - clang -c -S -Xclang -disable-00-optnone -emit-llvm swap.c -o swap.ll
- Keep the variable names.
 - clang -c -S -fno-discard-value-names -Xclang -disable-00-optnone -emit-llvm swap.c -o swap.ll
- Keep source code debug information (optional).
 - clang -g -c -S -fno-discard-value-names -Xclang -disable-00-optnone -emit-llvm swap.c -o swap.ll
- Convert the LLVM IR to more compact static single assignment form.
 - opt -S -p=mem2reg swap.ll -o swap.ll

LLVM IR - An Example without Source Code Debug Info

```
define void @swap(ptr %p, ptr %q) #0 !9 {
                                    entry:
void swap(char **p, char **q){
                                      %1 = load ptr, ptr %q, align 8
  char* t = *p:
                                      store ptr %1, ptr %p, align 8
                                      store ptr %0, ptr %q, align 8
       *p = *a:
       *a = t:
                                      ret void, !24
}
int main(){
                                    define i32 @main() #0 !25 {
      char a1;
                                    entry:
                       clang \Rightarrow
      char b1:
                                      %a1 = alloca i8, align 1
                                      %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
      char *a;
      char *b:
                                      %a = alloca ptr, align 8
      a = &a1:
                                      %b = alloca ptr, align 8
      b = &b1:
                                      store ptr %a1, ptr %a, align 8
      swap(&a,&b);
                                      store ptr %b1, ptr %b, align 8
}
                                      call void @swap(ptr %a, ptr %b)
                                      ret i32 0
```

swap.ll

swap.c

https://github.com/SVF-tools/Software-Security-Analysis/blob/main/SVFIR/src/swap.c

LLVM IR - An Example with Source Code Debug Info

```
define void @swap(ptr %p, ptr %g) #0 !dbg !9 {
                                          entry:
                                             call void @llvm.dbg.value(metadata ptr %p, metadata !16, metadata !DIExpression()), !dbg!17
                                            call void @llvm.dbg.value(metadata ptr %g, metadata !18, metadata !DIExpression()), !dbg!17
void swap(char **p, char **q){
                                            %0 = load ptr, ptr %p, align 8, !dbg!19
  char* t = *p;
                                            call void @llvm.dbg.value(metadata ptr %0, metadata !20, metadata !DIExpression()), !dbg!17
                                            %1 = load ptr, ptr %q, align 8, !dbg!21
         *p = *q:
                                            store ptr %1, ptr %p, align 8, !dbg!22
         *q = t;
                                            store ptr %0, ptr %q, align 8, !dbg!23
                                            ret void, !dbg !24
int main(){
                       clang (-g) or
                                          define i32 @main() #0 !dbg !25 {
       char a1:
                                          entry:
                    SVFIR/compile.sh
                                            %a1 = alloca i8, align 1
       char b1:
                                            %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
       char *a:
                                            %a = alloca ptr, align 8
       char *b:
                                            %b = alloca ptr, align 8
                                            call void @llvm.dbg.declare(metadata ptr %a1, metadata !29, metadata !DIExpression()),!dbg!30
       a = &a1:
                                            call void @llvm.dbg.declare(metadata ptr %b1, metadata !31, metadata !DIExpression()), !dbg!32
       b = \&b1:
                                            call void @llvm.dbg.declare(metadata ptr %a, metadata !33, metadata !DIExpression()).!dbg!34
       swap(&a.&b):
                                            call void @llvm.dbg.declare(metadata ptr %b, metadata !35, metadata !DIExpression()),!dbg!36
                                            store ptr %a1, ptr %a, align 8, !dbg!37
                                            store ptr %b1, ptr %b, align 8, !dbg!38
                                            call void @swap(ptr noundef %a, ptr noundef %b), !dbg !39
                                            ret i32 0, !dbg !40
                                                                swap.ll
                    swap.c
```

Compiling a C Program to Its LLVM IR

An example

```
void swap(char ***p, char ***q){
    char* t = *p;
    *p = *q;
    *p = t;
}
int main(){
    char a1;
    char b1;
    char b1;
    char *b;
    a = &a1;
    b = &b1;
    swap(&a,&b);
}

Swap.C
```

```
define void @swap(ptr %p, ptr %q) #0 {
entry:
 %0 = load ptr. ptr %p, align 8
 %1 = load ptr. ptr %g, align 8
 store ptr %1, ptr %p, align 8
  store ptr %0, ptr %g, align 8
  ret void
define i32 @main() #0 {
 %a1 = alloca i8, align 1
 %a = alloca ptr. align 8
 %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
 %b = alloca ptr. align 8
 store ptr %a1, ptr %a, align 8
  store ptr %b1, ptr %b, align 8
  call void @swap(ptr %a, ptr %b)
  ret i32 0
```

swap.ll

https://github.com/SVF-tools/Software-Security-Analysis/blob/main/SVFIR/src/swap.c


C code to LLVM IR

An example


```
void swap(char **p, char **q){
    char* t = *p;
    *p = *q;
    *q = t;
}
int main(){
    char a1;
    char *a;
    char b1;
    char *b;
    a = &a1;
    b = &b1;
    swap(&a,&b);
}
```

Compile

swap.c



Structure Organization



LLVM-IR Scopes

Module contains Functions and Global Variables

- Whole module is the unit of translation, analysis and optimization.

Function contains BasicBlocks and Arguments, which correspond to functions.

BasicBlock contains list of instructions.

- Each block is contiguous chunk of instructions

Instruction is opcode + vector of operands in '3-address' style

- All operands have types
- Instruction result is typed

```
define i32 @main() #0 {
int main()
char a1;
                    %a1 = alloca i8, align 1
 char *a:
                     %a = alloca ptr, align 8
 char b1:
                     %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
 char *b:
                     %b = alloca ptr. align 8
 a = &a1:
                     store ptr %al, ptr %a, align 8
 b = \&b1:
                     store ptr %b1, ptr %b, align 8
 swap(&a.&b):
                     call void @swap(ptr %a, ptr %b)
                     ret i32 0
```


```
%a1 = alloca i8, align 1

register
variable


identifiers:
[% / @] [-a-zA-Z$._][-a-zA-Z$._0-9]

- % is for local variable
- @ is for global
- temporary variables are numbered
```

```
define i32 @main() #0 {
int main()
char a1;
                     %a1 = alloca i8, align 1
 char *a:
                     %a = alloca ptr, align 8
 char b1:
                     %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
 char *b:
                     %b = alloca ptr. align 8
 a = &a1:
                     store ptr %a1, ptr %a, align 8
 b = \&b1:
                     store ptr %b1, ptr %b, align 8
 swap(&a.&b):
                     call void @swap(ptr %a, ptr %b)
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```



```
define i32 @main() #0 {
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char a1;
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 char *a:
                     %a = alloca ptr, align 8
 char b1:
                     %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
 char *b:
                     %b = alloca ptr. align 8
 a = &a1:
                     store ptr %a1, ptr %a, align 8
 b = &b1:
                     store ptr %b1, ptr %b, align 8
 swap(&a.&b):
                     call void @swap(ptr %a, ptr %b)
                     ret i32 0
```



```
define i32 @main() #0 {
int main(){
                   entry:
 char al
                     %a1 = alloca i8. align 1
 char *a:
                   ►%a = alloca ptr, align 8
 char b1:
                     %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
 char *b:
                     %b = alloca ptr, align 8
 a = &a1:
                     store ptr %a1, ptr %a, align 8
 b = \&b1:
                     store ptr %b1, ptr %b, align 8
 swap(&a.&b):
                     call void @swap(ptr %a, ptr %b)
                     ret i32 0
```

```
%a = alloca ptr, align 8

/
allocate 8-bit integer pointer for a
```

LLVM Instructions

```
define i32 @main() #0 {
int main(){
                   entry:
 char a1;
                     %a1 = alloca i8. align 1
 char *a:
                     %a = alloca ptr, align 8
 char b1:
                     %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
 char *b:
                     %b = alloca ptr, align 8
 a = \&a1:
                     store ptr %al. ptr %a. align 8
 b = \&b1:

► store ptr %b1, ptr %b, align 8
 swap(&a,&b);
                     call void @swap(ptr %a, ptr
                     ret i32 0
```



store the pointer %b1 to the memory location that %b points to $% \left\{ 1\right\} =\left\{ 1\right\} =\left\{$

LLVM Instructions

```
define i32 @main() #0 {
int main(){
                   entry:
 char a1;
                     %a1 = alloca i8. align 1
 char *a:
                     %a = alloca ptr, align 8
 char b1:
                     %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
 char *b:
                     %b = alloca ptr, align 8
 a = \&a1:
                     store ptr %a1, ptr %a, align 8
 b = \&b1:


► store ptr %b1, ptr %b, align 8
 swap(&a,&b);
                     call void @swap(ptr %a, ptr
                     ret i32 0
```



store the pointer %b1 to the memory location that %b points to $% \left\{ 1\right\} =\left\{ 1\right\} =\left\{$

LLVM Instructions

```
define i32 @main() #0 {
int main(){
                   entry:
 char a1;
                     %a1 = alloca i8. align 1
 char *a:
                     %a = alloca ptr, align 8
 char b1:
                     %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
 char *b:
                     %b = alloca ptr. align 8
 a = &a1:
                     store ptr %a1, ptr %a, align 8
 b = 8b1:
                     store ptr %b1, ptr %b, align 8
                    call void @swap(ptr %a, ptr %b)
                     ret 132 0
```



call instruction will be used to build control flow.

Compiler IR Playground https://godbolt.org/z/sra58dhbG



LLVM Documentations

- LLVM Language Reference Manual https://llvm.org/docs/LangRef.html
- LLVM Programmer's Manual https://llvm.org/docs/ProgrammersManual.html
- Writing an LLVM Pass http://llvm.org/docs/WritingAnLLVMPass.html
- Tutorials for Clang/LLVM https://freecompilercamp.org/clang-llvm-landing
- LLVM Tutorial IEEE SecDev 2020 https://cs.rochester.edu/u/ejohns48/ secdev19/secdev20-llvm-tutorial-version4_copy.pdf

SVFIR and Graph Representation of Code

(Week 2)

Yulei Sui

School of Computer Science and Engineering University of New South Wales, Australia

SVF : Static Value-Flow Analysis Framework for Source Code

A scalable, precise and on-demand interprocedural program dependence analysis framework for both sequential and multithreaded programs.

- The SVF project
 - Publicly available since early 2015 and actively maintained: http://svf-tools.github.io/SVF.
 - Implemented on top of LLVM compiler (version 16.0.0) with over 200 KLOC C/C++ code and 1300+ stars with 80+ contributors and over 4K commits on Github.
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
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- Value-Flow Analysis: resolves both control and data dependence.
 - Does the information generated at program point A flow to another program point B along some execution paths?
 - Can function F be called either directly or indirectly from some other function F'?
 - Is there an unsafe memory access that may trigger a bug or security risk?

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
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- Value-Flow Analysis: resolves both control and data dependence.
 - Does the information generated at program point A flow to another program point B along some execution paths?
 - Can function *F* be called either directly or indirectly from some other function *F*′?
 - Is there an unsafe memory access that may trigger a bug or security risk?
- Key features of SVF
 - Sparse: compute and maintain the data-flow facts where necessary
 - Selective: support mixed analyses for precision and efficiency trade-offs.
 - On-demand: reason about program parts based on user queries.

SVF: Design Principle



- Serving as an open-source foundation for building practical static source code analysis
 - Bridge the gap between research and engineering
 - Minimize the efforts of implementing sophisticated analysis (extendable, reusable, and robust via layers of abstractions)
 - Support developing different analysis variants (flow-, context-, heap-, field-sensitive analysis) in a sparse and on-demand manner.
- Client applications:
 - Static bug detection (e.g., memory leaks, null dereferences, use-after-frees and data-races)
 - Accelerate dynamic analysis (e.g., Google's Sanitizers and AFL fuzzing)

Today's Class



SVF IR and Why?

- SVFIR is a much-simplified representation of LLVM IR for static analysis purposes but NOT for code generation or optimizations.
- Lightweight with far fewer types of program instructions and variables.
 Complicated instructions are broken down into basic SVFStmts.
- IR is abstracted into different types of code graphs.

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- SVFVar: program variables




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- IR is abstracted into different types of code graphs.
- SVFVar: program variables



SVFStmt: program statements



SVF Program Variables (SVFVar)

- An SVFVar represent either a top-level variable (\mathbb{P}) or a memory object variable (\mathbb{O})
- Each SVFVar has a unique identifier (ID)
- SVFVar ID 0-4 are reserved

Program Variables	Domain	Meanings
SVFVar	$\mathbb{V} = \mathbb{P} \cup \mathbb{O}$	Program Variables
ValVar	\mathbb{P}	Top-level variables (scalars and pointers)
ObjVar	$\mathbb{O}=\mathbb{S}\cup\mathbb{G}\cup\mathbb{H}\cup\mathbb{C}$	Memory Objects (stack, global ¹ , heap and constant data)
FIObjVar	$o \in (\mathbb{S} \cup \mathbb{G} \cup \mathbb{H})$	A single (base) memory object
GepObjVar	$o_i \in (\mathbb{S} \cup \mathbb{G} \cup \mathbb{H}) imes \mathbb{P}$	i-th subfield/element of an (aggregate) object
ConstantData	\mathbb{C}	Constant data (e.g., numbers and strings)
Program Statement	$I \in \mathbb{L}$	Statements labels

SVF Program Statements (SVFStmt)

An SVFStmt is one of the following statements representing the relations between SVFVars.

SVFStmt	LLVM-Like form	C-Like form	Operand types	
AddrStmt	%ptr = alloca _o	p = alloc	$\mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{O}$	
ConsStmt	%ptr = constantData	p = c	$\mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{C}$	
CopyStmt	%p = bitcast %q	p = q	$\mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{P}$	
LoadStmt	%p = load %q	$\mathtt{p}=*\mathtt{q}$	$\mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{P}$	
StoreStmt	store %p, %q	*p = q	$\mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{P}$	
GepStmt	%p = getelementptr %q, %i	$\mathtt{p} = \mathtt{\&}(\mathtt{q} o \mathtt{i}) \ \ or \ \mathtt{p} = \mathtt{\&}\mathtt{q}[\mathtt{i}]$	$\mathbb{P}\times\mathbb{P}\times\mathbb{P}$	
PhiStmt	$p = \text{phi} [1_1, q_1], [1_2, q_2]$	$\mathtt{p} = \mathtt{phi}(\mathtt{l_1} : \mathtt{q_1}, \ \mathtt{l_2} : \mathtt{q_2})$	$\mathbb{P} imes (\mathbb{L} imes \mathbb{P})^2$	
BranchStmt	br i1 %p, label % l_1 , label % l_2	if (p) 1 ₁ else 1 ₂	$\mathbb{P} imes \mathbb{L}^2$	
UnaryOPStmt	$p = \neg q$	$p = \neg q$	$\mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{P}$	
BinaryOPStmt/CmpStmt	$r = \otimes p, q$	$r = p \otimes q$	$\mathbb{P}\times\mathbb{P}\times\mathbb{P}$	
	$%r = call f(%q_{i})$	$\mathtt{r}=\mathtt{f}(\ldots,\mathtt{q_i},\ldots)$		
	$f(\%p_i)\{ret\%z\}$	$f(\ldots, p_i, \ldots) \{\ldots \text{ return } z\}$		
CallPE	$% \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{n} - \frac{1}{n} \right) = \frac{1}{n} \left(\frac{1}{n} - \frac{1}{n} \right)$	$p_i = q_i$ (1 < i < n)	$(\mathbb{P} imes \mathbb{P})^n$	
RetPE	%r = %z	r = Z	$\mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{P}$	
$\otimes \in \{+, \cdot, *, /, \%, <<, >>, <, >, \&, \&\&, <=, >=, =, \sim, , \land\}$				

SVF Program Statements (SVFStmt)

- SVFStmt follows the LLVM's SSA form for top-level variables
 - Top-level variables (ℙ) can only be defined once
 - Memory objects (i.e., S∪G∪H excluding constant data) can only be modified/read through top-level pointers at StoreStmt and LoadStmt.
 - For example, p = &a; *p = r; The value of a can only be modified/read via dereferencing p.
- A ConstantData (C) object needs first to be assigned to a temp top-level variable and can only be read through that top-level variable in any SVFStmt.
 - For example, $*p = 3; \Rightarrow t = 3; *p = t;$
- CallPE represents the parameter passing from an actual parameter at a callsite to a formal parameter of a callee function.
- RetPE represents the parameter passing from a function return to a callsite return variable.

Graph Representations of Code

- What is a graph representation of code (code graph)?
 - Put the LLVM IR or SVF IR on a graph representation.
 - Represent a program's control-flow (i.e., execution order) and/or data-flow (variable definition and use relations) using nodes and edges of a graph.

Graph Representations of Code

- What is a graph representation of code (code graph)?
 - Put the LLVM IR or SVF IR on a graph representation.
 - Represent a program's control-flow (i.e., execution order) and/or data-flow (variable definition and use relations) using nodes and edges of a graph.
- Why a graph representation?
 - Abstracting code from low-level complicated instructions
 - Applying general graph algorithms
 - Easy to maintain and extend

Call Graph

- Program calling relations between methods
- Whether a method A can call method B directly or transitively.

```
define i32 @main() #0 {
entry:
    %a1 = alloca i8, align 1
    %a = alloca ptr, align 8
    %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
    %b = alloca ptr, align 8
    store ptr %a1, ptr %a, align 8
    store ptr %b1, ptr %b, align 8
    call void @swap(ptr %a, ptr %b)
    ret i32 0
}
```

```
define void @swap(ptr %p, ptr %q) #0 {
entry:
    %0 = load ptr, ptr %p, align 8
    %1 = load ptr, ptr %q, align 8
    store ptr %1, ptr %p, align 8
    store ptr %0, ptr %q, align 8
    ret void
}
```






Call Graph

https://github.com/svf-tools/SVF/wiki/Analyze-a-Simple-C-Program#3-call-graph

Call Graph

- Program calling relations between methods
- Whether a method A can call method B directly or transitively.

```
define i32 @main() #0 {
                                       define void @swap(ptr %p, ptr %g) #0 {
entry:
                                       entry:
 %a1 = alloca i8, align 1
                                         %0 = load ptr. ptr %p, align 8
                                         %1 = load ptr, ptr %q, align 8
 %a = alloca ptr. align 8
 %b1 = alloca i8, align 1
                                         store ptr %1, ptr %p, align 8
 %b = alloca ptr, align 8
                                         store ptr %0, ptr %g, align 8
                                         ret void
 store ptr %al, ptr %a, align 8
 store ntr %h1 ntr %h align 8
 call void @swap(ptr %a, ptr %b)
 ret 132 W
```



https://github.com/svf-tools/SVF/wiki/Analyze-a-Simple-C-Program#3-call-graph


- Each node represents a program method
- Each edge represents a calling relation between two program methods

Control Flow Graph

Program execution order between two LLVM instructions (SVFStmts).


- Intra-procedural control-flow graph: control-flow within a program method.
- Inter-procedural control-flow graph: control-flow across program methods.

Intra-procedural Control Flow Graph




Program execution order between instructions

- Each node represents an instruction or a statement
- Each edge represents a control-flow dependence between two nodes



https://github.com/svf-tools/SVF/wiki/Analyze-a-Simple-C-Program#4-interprocedural-control-flow-graph

Inter-procedural Control Flow Graph (ICFG)



https://github.com/svf-tools/SVF/wiki/Analyze-a-Simple-C-Program#4-interprocedural-control-flow-graph

https://github.com/SVF-tools/Software-Security-Analysis/wiki/svfir

```
1 int foo(int b){
2     return b;
3 }
4 int main(){
5     int a = foo(0);
6 }
```

https://github.com/SVF-tools/Software-Security-Analysis/wiki/svfir

```
1 int foo(int b){
      return b:
2
3 }
4 int main(){
      int a = foo(0):
6 }
1 define i32 @foo(i32 %b) {
2 entry:
  %b.addr = alloca i32
4 store i32 %b, ptr %b.addr,
  %0 = load i32, ptr %b.addr,
   ret i32 %0
7 }
8 define i32 @main() {
    %a = alloca i32
10 \%call = call i32 @foo(i32 0)
11 store i32 %call. i32* %a
12
   ret i32 0
13 }
```

https://github.com/SVF-tools/Software-Security-Analysis/wiki/svfir

```
1 int foo(int b){
      return b:
2
3 }
4 int main(){
      int a = foo(0):
6 }
1 define i32 @foo(i32 %b) {
2 entry:
   %b.addr = alloca i32
4 store i32 %b, ptr %b.addr,
  \%0 = load i32, ptr \%b.addr,
    ret i32 %0
7 }
8 define i32 @main() {
    %a = alloca i32
10 \%call = call i32 @foo(i32 0)
11 store i32 %call. i32* %a
12
   ret i32 0
13 }
```

Variables introduced by SVF (created internally)

(created internally)			
SVFVar	Meaning		
DummyValVar ID: 0	reserved		
DummyValVar ID: 1	reserved		
DummyObjVar ID: 2	reserved		
DummyObjVar ID: 3	reserved		
ValVar ID: 4	foo		
FIObjVar ID: 5	foo		
RetPN ID: 6	ret of foo		
ValVar ID: 13	main		
FIObjVar ID: 14	main		
RetPN ID: 15	ret of main		

https://github.com/SVF-tools/Software-Security-Analysis/wiki/svfir

```
1 int foo(int b){
      return b:
4 int main(){
      int a = foo(0):
6 }
 define i32 @foo(i32 %b) {
2 entry:
   \%b.addr = alloca i32
  store i32 %b, ptr %b.addr,
   \%0 = load i32, ptr \%b.addr,
    ret i32 %0
8 define i32 @main() {
    %a = alloca i32
  call = call i32 @foo(i32 0)
11 store i32 %call. i32* %a
12
   ret i32 0
13 }
```

Variables introduced by SVF (created internally)

SVFVar Meaning		
Meaning		
reserved		
foo		
foo		
ret of foo		
main		
main		
ret of main		

Variables introduced by LLVM (created by LLVM Values)

(created by LLVM values)				
SVFVar	LLVM Value			
ValVar ID: 7	i32 %b { Oth arg foo }			
ValVar ID: 8	%b.addr = alloca i32			
FlObjVar ID: 9	%b.addr = alloca i32			
ValVar ID: 11	%0 = load i32, ptr %b.addr			
ValVar ID: 16	%a = alloca i32			
FlObjVar ID: 17	%a = alloca i32			
ValVar ID: 18	%call = call i32 @foo(i32 0)			
ValVar ID: 19	i32 0 { constant data }			
FIObjVar ID: 20	i32 0 { constant data }			
ValVar ID: 21	store i32 %call, ptr %a			
ValVar ID: 22	ret i32 0			

ICFG and SVFStmt Example²

```
1 define i32 @foo(i32 %b) {
2 entry:
    %b.addr = alloca i32
  store i32 %b, ptr %b.addr,
   %0 = load i32, ptr %b.addr,
    ret i32 %0
7 }
8
  define i32 @main() {
    %a = alloca i32
10
11 %call = call i32 @foo(i32 0)
12 store i32 %call, i32* %a
13
   ret i32 0
14 }
```

ICFGNode	SVFStmt	LLVM Value
	CopyStmt: Var1 ← Var0	ptr null (constant data)
	AddrStmt: Var19 ← Var20	i32 0 (constant data)
GlobalICFGNode0	AddrStmt: Var4 ← Var5	foo
	AddrStmt: Var13 ← Var14	main
FunEntryICFGNode1	fun: foo	
IntraICFGNode2	AddrStmt: Var8 ← Var9	%b.addr = alloca i32
IntraICFGNode3	StoreStmt Var8 ← Var7	store i32 %b, ptr %b.addr
IntraICFGNode4	LoadStmt: Var11 ← Var8	%0 = load i32, ptr %b.addr
IntraICFGNode5	fun:foo	ret i32 %0
FunExitICFGNode6	PhiStmt: [Var6 ← ([Var11, ICFGNode5],)]	ret i32 %0
FunEntryICFGNode7	fun: main	
IntraICFGNode8	AddrStmt: [Var16 ← Var17]	%a = alloca i32
CallICFGNode9	CallPE: [Var7 ← Var19]	%call = call i32 @foo(i32 0)
RetICFGNode10	RetPE: [Var18 ← Var6]	%call = call i32 @foo(i32 0)
IntraICFGNode11	StoreStmt: [Var16 ← Var18]	store i32 %call, ptr %a
IntraICFGNode12	fun: main	ret i32 0
FunExitICFGNode13	PhiStmt: [Var15 ← ([Var19, ICFGNode12],)]	ret i32 0

What's next?

- (1) Compile two C programs (SVFIR/src/example.c and SVFIR/src/swap.c) into their LLVM IR.
 - A guide can be found at https://github.com/SVF-tools/Software-Security-Analysis/wiki/SVFIR
 - Understand the mapping from a C program to its corresponding LLVM IR.
- (2) Generate and visualize the graph representation of LLVM IR (example.11 swap.11).
 - https://github.com/SVF-tools/Software-Security-Analysis/wiki/SVFIR# 3-run-and-debug-your-svfir
- (3) Write code to iterate SVFVars and also the nodes and edges of ICFG and print their contents.
 - https://github.com/SVF-tools/Software-Security-Analysis/blob/main/ SVFIR/SVFIR.cpp#L74-L98
- (4) More about LLVM IR and SVF's graph representation
 - LLVM language manual https://llvm.org/docs/LangRef.html
 - SVF website https://github.com/SVF-tools/SVF


Control-Flow and Reachability Analysis

(Week 2)

Yulei Sui

School of Computer Science and Engineering University of New South Wales, Australia

Today's Class



Control-Flow and Data-Flow

What are control-flow and data-flow?

Control-control or control-dependence

- Execution order between two program statements/instructions.
- Can program point B be reached from point A in the control-flow graph of a program?
- Obtained through traversing the ICFG of a program

Data-data or data-dependence

- Definition-use relation between two program variables.
- Will the definition of a variable X be used and passed to another variable Y?
- Obtained through analyzing the SVFIR of a program
- Combining SVFIR with ICFG to conduct symbolic execution (mimic the runtime path-based execution) of a program.

Why learn control- and data-dependence?

A program dependence relation by its nature is the reachability property on a graph, particularly useful in program understanding, optimizations and bug detection.

Why learn control- and data-dependence?

A program dependence relation by its nature is the reachability property on a graph, particularly useful in program understanding, optimizations and bug detection.

- Applications of control-dependence
 - Dead code elimination: If a subgraph of an ICFG is not connected from the entry block of a program, that subgraph is possibly dead code.

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Applications of control-dependence

- Dead code elimination: If a subgraph of an ICFG is not connected from the entry block of a program, that subgraph is possibly dead code.
- Identifying infinite loops: If the exit block is unreachable from the entry block, an infinite loop may exist.
- . .

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Applications of control-dependence

- Dead code elimination: If a subgraph of an ICFG is not connected from the entry block of a program, that subgraph is possibly dead code.
- Identifying infinite loops: If the exit block is unreachable from the entry block, an infinite loop may exist.
- •

Applications of data-dependence

 Pointer alias analysis: statically determine possible runtime values of a pointer to detect memory errors, such as null pointer dereferences and use-after-frees.

Why learn control- and data-dependence?

A program dependence relation by its nature is the reachability property on a graph, particularly useful in program understanding, optimizations and bug detection.

Applications of control-dependence

- Dead code elimination: If a subgraph of an ICFG is not connected from the entry block of a program, that subgraph is possibly dead code.
- Identifying infinite loops: If the exit block is unreachable from the entry block, an infinite loop may exist.
- . . .

Applications of data-dependence

- Pointer alias analysis: statically determine possible runtime values of a pointer to detect memory errors, such as null pointer dereferences and use-after-frees.
- Taint analysis: if two program variables v1 and v2 are aliases (e.g., representing the same memory location), if v1 is tainted by user inputs, then v2 is also tainted.
-

We say that a program statement (ICFG node) snk is control-flow dependent on src if src can reach snk on the ICFG.

- Context-insensitive control-dependence
 - control-flow traversal without matching calls and returns.
 - fast but imprecise

We say that a program statement (ICFG node) snk is control-flow dependent on src if src can reach snk on the ICFG.

- Context-insensitive control-dependence
 - control-flow traversal without matching calls and returns.
 - fast but imprecise
- Context-sensitive control-dependence
 - control-flow traversal by matching calls and returns.
 - precise but maintains an extra abstract call stack (storing a sequence of callsite ID information) to mimic the runtime call stack.

```
int bar(int s){
    return s;
}
int main(){
    int a = source();
    if (a > 0){
        int p = bar(a);
        sink(p);
}else{
        int q = bar(a);
        sink(q);
}
```


https://github.com/SVF-tools/Software-Security-Analysis/blob/main/SVFIR/src/control-flow.c

```
define i32 @bar(i32 %s) #0 {
1 entry:
2 ret i32 %s
3 }
  define i32 @main() #0 {
4 entry:
5 %call = call i32 (...) @source()
6 %cmp = icmp sqt i32 %call, 0
7 br i1 %cmp, label %if.then, label %if.else
  if.then:
                   ; preds = %entry
9 %call1 = call i32 @bar(i32 %call)
10 call void @sink(i32 %call1)
11 br label %if.end
12
  if.else:
                    : preds = %entry
13 %call2 = call i32 @bar(i32 %call)
14 call void @sink(i32 %call2)
15 br label %if.end
16
  if.end:
                 : preds = %if.else. %if.then
17 ret i32 0
18 1
```


```
define i32 @bar(i32 %s) #0 {
1 entry:
                                                        6 %call = call i32 (...) @source()
2 ret i32 %s
                                                         7 %cmp = icmp sat i32 %call. 0
3 }
                                                        8 br i1 %cmp, label %if.then, label %if.else
  define i32 @main() #0 {
4 entry:
                                                                                call2 i32 @bar(i32 %call)
                                              call1 i32 @bar(i32 %call)
5 %call = call i32 (...) @source()
6 %cmp = icmp sqt i32 %call, 0
7 br i1 %cmp, label %if.then, label %if.else
   if then:
                   : preds = %entry
9 %call1 = call i32 @bar(i32 %call)
                                                                  1define i32 @bar(i32 %s) #0
10 call void @sink(i32 %call1)
                                                                  2entry:
                                                                  3ret i32 %s
11 br label %if.end
12
   if.else:
                     : preds = %entry
                                              ret1
                                                                                  ret2
13 %call2 = call i32 @bar(i32 %call)
                                               %call1 = call1 i32 @bar(i32 %call) %call2 = call2 i32 @bar(i32 %call)
14 call void @sink(i32 %call2)
15 br label %if.end
16
  if.end:
                 : preds = %if.else. %if.then
17 ret i32 0
18 1
                                               11 call void @sink(i32 %call1)
                                                                                  16 call void @sink(i32 %call2)
```

ICFG

```
define i32 @bar(i32 %s) #0 {
1 entry:
2 ret i32 %s
  define i32 @main() #0 {
4 entry:
5 %call = call i32 (...) @source()
6 %cmp = icmp sqt i32 %call, 0
7 br i1 %cmp, label %if.then, label %if.else
   if then:
                    : preds = %entry
9 %call1 = call i32 @bar(i32 %call)
10 call void @sink(i32 %call1)
11 br label %if.end
12
   if.else:
                     : preds = %entry
13 %call2 = call i32 @bar(i32 %call)
14 call void @sink(i32 %call2)
15 br label %if.end
16
  if end:
                 : preds = %if.else. %if.then
17 ret i32 0
18 1
```



Obtaining a path from source to sink on ICFG




Basic DFS on ICFG: source → sink

```
visited: set<NodeID>
path: vector<NodeID>

DFS(visited, path, src, dst)
  visited.insert(src);
  path.push_back(src);
  if src == dst then
      Print path;
  foreach edge e ∈ outEdges(src) do
      if (e.dst ∉ visited)
            DFS(visited, path, e.dst, dst);
  visited.erase(src);
  path.pop_back();
```

Obtaining paths from node 6 to node 11 on the ICFG




```
Basic DFS on ICFG: source → sink
```

```
visited: set<NodeID>
path: vector<NodeID>

DFS(visited, path, src, dst)
  visited.insert(src);
  path.push_back(src);
  if src == dst then
    Print path;
  foreach edge e ∈ outEdges(src) do
    if (e.dst ∉ visited)
        DFS(visited, path, e.dst, dst);
  visited.erase(src);
  path.pop_back();
```

```
ICFG paths: node 6 \rightarrow node 11
Path 1:
6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call1} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret1} \rightarrow 11
Path 2:
6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call2} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret1} \rightarrow 11
```

Feasible paths from node 6 to node 11



Basic DFS on ICFG: source → sink

```
visited: set<NodeID>
path: vector<NodeID>


DFS(visited, path, src, dst)
  visited.insert(src);
  path.push_back(src);
  if src == dst then
    Print path;
  foreach edge e ∈ outEdges(src) do
    if (e.dst ∉ visited)
        DFS(visited, path, e.dst, dst);
  visited.erase(src);
  path.pop_back();
```

```
ICFG paths: node 6 \rightarrow node 11

Path 1: feasible path
6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call1} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret1} \rightarrow 11

Path 2:
6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call2} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret1} \rightarrow 11
```

Infeasible path from node 6 to node 11



Basic DFS on ICFG: source → sink

```
visited: set<NodeID>
path: vector<NodeID>

DFS(visited, path, src, dst)
   visited.insert(src);
   path.push_back(src);
   if src == dst then
        Print path;
   foreach edge e ∈ outEdges(src) do
        if (e.dst ∉ visited)
        DFS(visited, path, e.dst, dst);
   visited.erase(src);
   path.pop_back();
```


```
ICFG paths: node 6 \rightarrow node 11

Path 1:
6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call1} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret1} \rightarrow 11

Path 2:
6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call2} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret1} \rightarrow 11

spurious path
```

Obtaining paths from node 6 to node 16 on ICFG




```
Basic DFS on ICFG: source → sink
```

```
visited: set<NodeID>
path: vector<NodeID>

DFS(visited, path, src, dst)
    visited.insert(src);
    path.push_back(src);
    if src == dst then
        Print path;
    foreach edge e ∈ outEdges(src) do
        if (e.dst \ visited)
            DFS(visited, path, e.dst, dst);
    visited.erase(src);
    path.pop_back();
```

```
ICFG paths: node 6 \rightarrow node 16
Path 3: 6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call2} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret2} \rightarrow 16
Path 4: 6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call1} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret2} \rightarrow 16
```

Feasible paths using from node 6 to node 16 on the ICFG



Basic DFS on ICFG: source → sink


```
visited: set<NodeID>
path: vector<NodeID>

DFS(visited, path, src, dst)
   visited.insert(src);
   path.push_back(src);
   if src == dst then
        Print path;
   foreach edge e ∈ outEdges(src) do
        if (e.dst ∉ visited)
            DFS(visited, path, e.dst, dst);
   visited.erase(src);
   path.pop_back();
```

```
ICFG paths: node 6 \rightarrow node 16

Path 3: feasible path
6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call2} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret2} \rightarrow 16
Path 4:
6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call1} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret2} \rightarrow 16
```

Infeasible paths using from node 6 to node 16 on the ICFG



```
Basic DFS on ICFG: source → sink
```

```
visited: set<NodeID>
path: vector<NodeID>

DFS(visited, path, src, dst)
  visited.insert(src);
  path.push_back(src);
  if src == dst then
    Print path;
  foreach edge e ∈ outEdges(src) do
    if (e.dst ∉ visited)
    DFS(visited, path, e.dst, dst);
  visited.erase(src);
  path.pop_back();
```

```
ICFG paths: node 6 \rightarrow node 16

Path 3:
6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call2} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret2} \rightarrow 16

Path 4:
6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow \mathbf{call1} \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \mathbf{ret2} \rightarrow 16

spurious path
```

Context-Sensitive Control-Dependence

An extension of the context-insensitive algorithm by matching calls and returns.

- Get only feasible interprocedural paths and exclude infeasible ones
- Requires an extra callstack to store and mimic the runtime calling relations.


Context-Sensitive Control-Flow (Algorithm)

Algorithm 1: 1 Context sensitive control-flow reachability

```
Input: curNode: ICEGNode snk: ICEGNode path: vector/ICEGNode) callstack: vector/SVFInstruction
         visited : set(ICFGNode, callstack):
  dfs(curNode.dst)
    pair = (curNode, callstack);
    if pair ∈ visited then
        return:
    visited.insert(pair);
    path.push_back(curNode);
    if arc == ank then
      collectICFGPath(path):
    foreach edge ∈ curNode.getOutEdges() do
      if edge.isIntraCFGEdge() then
         dfs(edge.dst,snk);
11
      else if edge.isCallCFGEdge() then
12
         callstack.push_back(edge.getCallSite());
13
         dfs(edge.dst.snk):
14
         callstack.pop_back();
15
      else if edge.isRetCFGEdge() then
16
         if callstack \neq \emptyset && callstack.back() == edge.getCallSite() then
17
18
             callstack.pop_back();
             dfs(edge.dst.snk):
19
             callstack.push_back(edge.getCallSite());
         else if callstack == Ø then
21
             dfs(edge.dst.snk);
22
    visited.erase(pair);
    path.pop_back():
```

Context-Sensitive Control-Dependence (Example)

call1 matches with ret1




Algorithm 2: 1 Context sensitive control-flow reachability

```
Input: curNode: ICFGNode snk: ICFGNode path: vector(ICFGNode)
         callstack: vector(SVFInstruction) visited: set(ICFGNode, callstack):
1 dfs(curNode.dst)
    pair = (curNode, callstack):
    if pair ∈ visited then
       return:
    visited.insert(pair);
    path.push_back(curNode);
    if src == snk then
     collectICFGPath(path):
    foreach edge ∈ curNode.getOutEdges() do
     if edge.isIntraCFGEdge() then
         dfs(edge.dst,snk);
11
     else if edge.isCallCFGEdge() then
12
         callstack.push_back(edge.getCallSite());
13
         dfs(edge.dst.snk):
14
         callstack.pop_back();
15
     else if edge.isRetCFGEdge() then
16
17
         if callstack \neq \emptyset && callstack.back() == edge.getCallSite() then
             callstack.pop_back();
18
            dfs(edge.dst.snk):
19
            callstack.push_back(edge.getCallSite());
20
         else if callstack == Ø then
21
          dfs(edge.dst, snk);
22
    visited.erase(pair):
    path.pop_back();
```

Context-Sensitive Control-Dependence (Example)

call2 does not match with ret1



Algorithm 3: 1 Context sensitive control-flow reachability

```
Input: curNode: ICFGNode snk: ICFGNode path: vector(ICFGNode)
         callstack: vector(SVFInstruction) visited: set(ICFGNode, callstack):
1 dfs(curNode.dst)
    pair = (curNode, callstack):
    if pair ∈ visited then
       return:
    visited.insert(pair);
    path.push_back(curNode);
    if src == snk then
     collectICFGPath(path):
    foreach edge ∈ curNode.getOutEdges() do
     if edge.isIntraCFGEdge() then
         dfs(edge.dst,snk);
11
     else if edge.isCallCFGEdge() then
12
         callstack.push_back(edge.getCallSite());
13
         dfs(edge.dst.snk):
14
         callstack.pop_back();
15
     else if edge.isRetCFGEdge() then
16
17
         if callstack \neq \emptyset && callstack.back() == edge.getCallSite() then
             callstack.pop_back();
18
            dfs(edge.dst.snk):
19
            callstack.push_back(edge.getCallSite());
20
         else if callstack == Ø then
21
          dfs(edge.dst, snk);
22
    visited.erase(pair):
    path.pop_back();
```

What's next?

- Understand control-flow reachability in this slides
- Debug and work with the code under the SVFIR and CodeGraph folders
- If you finished Quiz-1 and Lab-Exercise-1, you could have a look at the spec of Assignment-1. Once the data flow is taught in Week 3, you could start coding Assignment-1
 - Assignment-1's specification: https: //github.com/SVF-tools/Software-Security-Analysis/wiki/Assignment-1