

# **RICARDO FONSECA**

[www.ricardobafonseca.com](http://www.ricardobafonseca.com)

[ricardo\\_fonseca@brown.edu](mailto:ricardo_fonseca@brown.edu)

## **BROWN UNIVERSITY**

Placement Director: Toru Kitagawa	<a href="mailto:toru.kitagawa@brown.edu">toru.kitagawa@brown.edu</a>	401-863-3688
Graduate Administrator: Angelica Spertini	<a href="mailto:angelica.spertini@brown.edu">angelica.spertini@brown.edu</a>	401-863-2465

### **Office Contact Information**

Department of Economics, Box B  
Brown University  
Providence, Rhode Island 02912  
phone: +1 (401) 744-0238

### **References**

Professor **Bobak Pakzad-Hurson**  
Department of Economics, Box B  
Brown University  
Providence, Rhode Island 02912  
[bph@brown.edu](mailto:bph@brown.edu)

Professor **Roberto Serrano**  
Department of Economics, Box B  
Brown University  
Providence, Rhode Island 02912  
[roberto\\_serrano@brown.edu](mailto:roberto_serrano@brown.edu)

Professor **Jack Fanning**  
Department of Economics, Box B  
Brown University  
Providence, Rhode Island 02912  
[jack\\_fanning@brown.edu](mailto:jack_fanning@brown.edu)

### **EDUCATION**

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<b>Brown University</b>	Providence, RI, USA
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics	2017 –present
Expected Completion Date: May 2024	

<b>Brazilian School of Economics and Finance (FGV-EPGE)</b>	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
M.A. Economics	2015 –2017

<b>Federal University of Pernambuco</b>	Recife, Brazil
B.A. Economics	2011 –2015

### **TEACHING AND RESEARCH FIELDS**

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Microeconomic Theory, Market Design, and Experimental Economics

# JOB MARKET PAPER

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## Staggered Rollout for Innovation Adoption

### *Abstract*

I consider a mechanism design approach to innovation adoption, and show how it is optimal for the principal to induce artificial scarcity to expedite it. Take-up of a new product generates information about its value for others, so agents want to free-ride off that learning before irreversibly adopting it themselves. This causes a time-delay externality that the principal - seeking to achieve an adoption target as quickly as possible - seeks to avoid. The principal can create competition for the good to reduce free-riding and speed up learning. This objective is common in many settings. For instance, a government trying to reach mass immunity through vaccination while agents are uncertain of their personal vaccination benefits, not internalizing the positive externality of reaching mass immunity. I also show that optimal supply plans involve scarcity and are simple in that there is a batched release of supply with fewer batches than types. I fully characterize such optimal plans for settings with up to three types and show that (non-optimal) supply plans may be Pareto improving.

## OTHER RESEARCH PAPERS

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Peer Preferences in Centralized School Choice Markets: Theory and Evidence 2023  
with **Natalie Cox**, **Bobak Pakzad-Hurson**, and **Matthew Pecenco**

Keeping Experts Honest 2023

Maximal Preference Domains for the Existence of Efficient and  
Strategyproof Mechanisms (in progress) 2023

Iterative Reasoning Through Heuristics (in progress) 2023  
with **Geoffroy De Clippel**, **Pietro Ortoleva**, **Kareem Rozen** and **Giacomo Rubbini**

Stable Matchings in School Choice Markets with Peer Preferences (in progress) 2023  
with **Bobak Pakzad-Hurson** and **Matthew Pecenco**

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT

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Brown University Economics Department Providence, RI  
Research Assistant for **Jack Fanning** and **Teddy Mekonnen** 2021

Federal University of Pernambuco Recife, Brazil  
Research Assistant for **Andrea Melo** and **Francisco Ramos** 2012–2014

## TEACHING (SYLLABUS LINKS ON THE RIGHT)

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### Main Instructor

- Behavioral Game Theory:  
Experiments in Strategic Interaction (*Pre-College Program*) Summer 2020, 2021, 2023
- Math Camp (*PhD*) Summer 2019, 2020

### Teaching Assistant at Brown University

- Bargaining Theory and Applications (*Professor: Jack Fanning*) Fall 2019, Spring 2022
- Introduction to Game Theory (*Professor: Geoffroy De Clippel*) Spring 2020, Fall 2020
- Microeconomic Theory II (PhD) (*Professor: Kareen Rozen*) Spring 2019
- Microeconomic Theory I (PhD) (*Professors: Roberto Serrano and Pedro Dal Bó*) Fall 2018, Fall 2022

### Teaching Assistant at EPGE

- Microeconomic Theory II (PhD) (*Professor: Carlos Costa*) 2016

## SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

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- Merit Dissertation Fellowship, Brown University Department of Economics 2021
- Graduate Student Scholarship, Brown University 2017-present
- FAPERJ Nota 10 Scholarship (Given to the two best first-year master's students) 2016
- Scholarship for Master's Studies – (CAPES) 2015

## OTHER

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- **Presentations (includes upcoming):** LACEA-LAMES 2021, SBE 2021, LACEA-LAMES 2023, SBE 2023, EWMES 2023
- **Languages:** Portuguese (native), English (fluent) and French (Basic)