

Welfare Implications of Healthcare Platforms

Chiara Canta¹, Leonardo Madio², Andrea Mantovani¹ and
Carlo Reggiani³

¹Toulouse Business School ²University of Padova and CESifo ³University of
Manchester and JRC Seville

XXXVII Jornadas de Economía Industrial, JEI 2023

Discussant: Riccardo Silvestrini

*University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Bilbao
7-8 September 2023*

Summary

The paper models the adoption of **healthcare platforms**:

→ focus on physicians' and patients' incentives to join, and welfare effects of adoption under a regulated price.

Main results:

- Healthcare platforms are socially desirable: efficiency gains surpass usage costs, but distributional effects.
- Distortions: for any given price, the allocation of physicians and patients on the platform is generally suboptimal
→ second best price that mitigates the distortions.

Extensions and Open Questions

- ① Why is healthcare special? The paper does a good job identifying some key factors: (i) regulated prices (ii) privacy

→ Can we have more? Endogenous privacy concerns as $f(\cdot)$?
Time dimension? Both as public good and physicians' profits.
- ② Intensity of the fee? Premium sponsored membership, as no one looks after the first page, see Farronato's papers.
- ③ Utility concave in n , plausible? Crowding? Or does it mean that best physicians enter first? Then, linear $v(n) = vn$

→ How does it work? Marginal is v , but often way higher than *average* \bar{v} , and the benefit is vn , not just v .