

# Cyberthon: CSIT

## From 8 to 5 [1800]

A malware was found on one of the ShoppingBaba's servers beaconing back to the cyberattackers' C2 at very regular intervals.

Files: [base32\\_example.py](#), [Base32.py](#), [from8to5\\_traffic\\_responses.zip](#), [how to use SNORT.txt](#), [malware.zip](#)

## Part 1

Attached (zipped file of `from8to5_traffic_responses.txt`) is the Base32-encoded string from each traffic packet that is the response sent by the C2 encoded using proprietary base32 encoding.

Luckily for us, we found a message that was sent out in clear.

```
Message:
      "ID:csit; USERNAME:S.BaBa-Server\User-Profiles; MESSAGE:Awaiting
command. TIME:1583432540"
```

First, use this knowledge and the Base32 encoder/decoder script (`Base32.py` and `base32_example.py`) to help you figure out the proprietary Base32 key used in this malware.

## Tedium

*Tedium* is the best way to describe this part of the challenge.

Remember that `code.org` ciphertext you did in the Livestream training session? Hopefully not — `code.org` is a terrible place — but you'll need some of that knowledge to grok this part of the write-up.

Anyway, `from8to5_traffic_responses.txt` is a long, *long* list of similar strings of equal length:

```
$ wc from8to5_traffic_responses.txt
h 456976 456980 67175416 from8to5_traffic_responses.txt
$ head from8to5_traffic_responses.txt
ty17zxo5ny3sdr1whl1wcsa5tw1szzi0rt3zcxtlhlaqcmsy0t0yhkjy0rdw6ksvnizdxiosen3cf
hl6z0ptfryjd1fozlyqb0r77lmddfxo0n3q16w1ttw1szntwe6isb05zecksb999
ty17zxo5nyp7dr1whl1wcsa5tw1szzi0rt3zcxtlhlaqcmsy0t0yhkjy0rdw6ksvnizdxiosen3cf
hl6z0ptfryjd1fozlyqb0r77lmddfxo0n3q16w1ttw1szntwe6isb05zecksr999
ty17zxo5nypsdr1whl1wcsa5tw1szzi0rt3zcxtlhlaqcmsy0t0yhkjy0rdw6ksvnizdxiosen3cf
hl6z0ptfryjd1fozlyqb0r77lmddfxo0n3q16w1ttw1szntwe6isb05zecksh999
ty17zxo5nya7dr1whl1wcsa5tw1szzi0rt3zcxtlhlaqcmsy0t0yhkjy0rdw6ksvnizdxiosen3cf
hl6z0ptfryjd1fozlyqb0r77lmddfxo0n3q16w1ttw1szntwe6isb05zecksn999
```

*If you didn't catch the hint; they're modified-base32*

Stuck in the middle of all of that is a single bit of known-plaintext:

```
$ grep -n ID from8to5_traffic_responses.txt
47548:ID:csit; USERNAME:S.BaBa-Server\User-Profiles; MESSAGE:Awaiting command
```

As from the challenge description, we must find some way to obtain the unknown base32 key to decrypt `malware.zip`. Using the plaintext as a crib, we can piece together the proprietary base32 key with an algorithm like so:

```
def find_key(encoded, plaintext):
    key = 'ABC...XYZ<>()' //imperative that the initial key contains unique
    characters not found in the real key
    for i in range [0, len(encoded)]:
        output = base64(plaintext, using_key=key)
        if output[i] != encoded[i]:
            index = key.index(output[i])
            key[index] = encoded[i]
    return key
draft_key =
find_key('ty17zxjslyisdr1wh1lwcsa5tw1szzi0rt3zcxthlaqcmsy0t0yhkjy0rdw6ksvnizdxi
osen3cfphsh16z0ptfryjd1fozlyqb0r77lmdfxo0n3ql6w1ttw1szntwe6isrniabzisa999','ID:
csit; USERNAME:S.BaBa-Server\User-Profiles; MESSAGE:Awaiting command.
TIME:1583432539') //this plaintext is not perfect, but is close
//further manipulations on draft_key to fix it
```

If you follow that algorithm, you'll eventually get a key looking something like `6517cyberthon10v3paszwdqxifjkm<>`. That will be *close*, but not quite the end.

For one, you'll notice that the plaintext isn't quite correct: I stole the `ty17...` above from the encoded line *directly above* the line containing `ID:csit`, and the correct plaintext would actually have `ID:csis`:

```
ID:csis; USERNAME:S.BaBa-Serv
ID:csit; USERNAME:S.BaBa-Serv
ID:csiu; USERNAME:S.BaBa-Serv
```

**AN:** This doesn't actually affect anything.

Additionally, the encoded text we chose is missing a few characters, namely `u` and `g`. Although there are smarter ways to accomplish this, I just bruteforced the last character:

```
for c in {a..z}
do unzip -P 6517cyberthon10v3paszwdqxifjkmuc malware.zip
done
```

With that, we get the key:

**Key:** `6517cyberthon10v3paszwdqxifjkmug`

## Part 2

*The malware is encrypted after the attack was discovered. Decrypt the malware using the base32 key found in Part 1 and connect it back to the C2.*

- Run the malware from terminal using  
    `./malware`
- Enter the following webserver and port  
    `http://p7ju6oidw6ayykt9zeglwxyired60yct.ctf.sg:7253`

*Write SNORT rules to help you detect the genuine C2 command (Cyberthon flag) that the C2 server will send back.*

*Note: It might take a while (<5 mins) until you capture the C2 command, but if your snort did not alert you after more than 5 minutes, you might want to recheck your rules.*

## A chortle of chronology

In lieu of a proper explanation, here's a narration of what went down as the afternoon progressed:


### Snorting at snort

I tried to deal with `snort`, and all of its eccentricities. An hour's worth of struggle with `/etc/snort/rules/local.rules`, and I was convinced enough to ditch it for lower tools.

### Playing with pcaps

Following that, I took a gander at `tcpdump`, and tried to look through `port http` traffic to see if I could sniff out the malware's pings.

For reasons unbeknownst to me, all of the TCP streams in the trace turned up blank.



I moved on.

### Bowling over Binaries

It then occurred to me that I should've started with the one thing I'm good at: poking at stuff with IDA Pro

```
while ( 1 )
{
    std::__cxx11::basic_string<char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>>::basic_string(&v7, v4);
    v11 = curl_easy_init();
    if ( v11 )
    {
        curl_easy_setopt(v11, 10002LL, &v8);
        std::operator<<<std::char_traits<char>>>((std::ostream *)&std::cout, "Malware HTTP request sent! -> ");
        curl_easy_setopt(v11, 20011LL, WriteCallback);
        curl_easy_setopt(v11, 10001LL, &v7);
        v10 = curl_easy_perform(v11);
        if ( v10 )
        {
            v5 = curl_easy_strerror(v10);
            v4 = "C2 beaconing failed! Debug the error: %s\n";
            fprintf(stderr, "C2 beaconing failed! Debug the error: %s\n", v5);
        }
        else
        {
            v6 = std::operator<<<std::char_traits<char>>>((std::ostream *)&std::cout, "C2 HTTP response received!");
            v4 = (const char *)std::endl<char,std::char_traits<char>>;
            std::ostream::operator<<(&v6, std::endl<char,std::char_traits<char>>);
        }
        curl_easy_cleanup(v11);
    }
    v0 = std::literal::chrono::literal::operator"" </char\40\(\).
```

*Usually C++ decompilation is hell. Usually.*

Even if you don't know exactly what the output above means, it's enough to know that the binary does no special parsing of webserver url. Ergo, we can simulate `./malware` using basic command-line tools<sup>1</sup>.

We can run `curl` for about five minutes (as in the directive), and parse the output later on.

```
for i in `seq 1 300`  
do curl http://p7ju6oidw6ayykt9zeglwxiored60yct.ctf.sg:7253 >> output.curl  
sleep 1  
done
```

The result will be *even more* base32 codes:

```
$ cat output.curl  
ty17znpdbxma6whsrwtck3hlrzmyboa1ny5b1ohsnwienioaophqbioaywrecjjblydbhkijc5bzhzfs  
ry7zh0a7vypbhkszl6xbkuf7l5adbf16vyqqhkp60lad1ks7l6d16m7rlyia6fosc5qbum560pzbhr7b  
lp3d0oshbic76joshlhw1zjvhw5c0aowvzma6w1ttw1szntwe6k7b053brjs6999  
ty17znpde6ma6whsrwtck3hlrzmyboa1ny5b1ohsnwienioaophqbioaywrecjjblydbhkijc5bzhzfs  
ry7zh0a7vyp7bkszl6xbkufilmfa6m7rlyqbdr7z15zqbr7t0n3erf7yc5sbxxoemccxlor0waw0usw  
hie7hsj7hlkynfseo53whphxoynccfaovzma6w1ttw1szntwe6k7b053brks6999  
... (~300 lines total)
```

If you decode all of them with the base32 key we found earlier, a few of those lines will have the flag:

```
$ python decode.py  
ID:266; USERNAME:S.BaBa-Server\User-Profiles; MESSAGE:Cyberth0n{Check your  
search, this is not the flag.j6H0msSUQSoUBGIu}; TIME:1588380270  
...  
ID:205; USERNAME:S.BaBa-Server\User-Profiles; MESSAGE:Cyberthon{cmd:send--  
"/etc/passwd","/etc/shadow";op_time:0800-1700;}; TIME:1588379660  
...
```

## Flag

```
cyberthon{cmd:send--"/etc/passwd","/etc/shadow";op_time:0800-1700;}
```

## Footnotes

1. I am well-aware this is not the intended solution. `snort` is difficult.