

Lawyers For The Talent

Entertainment Law

Richard Dooling

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Defamation

Defamation is probably as old as the human race, an ancient wrong made modern by new and pervasive forms of communication. False statements come in all guises in the law: fraud, perjury, false advertising, unfair competition, and so on. A false statement of fact that harms a person's reputation is called defamation. A tort.

Artists and entertainers have First Amendment rights to tell stories, or write songs, or make movies, but what happens when those free speech rights collide with the rights of others? What if an author's bestselling memoir names names and defames others in the telling of her tale? What if character in a television docu-drama (*Wild Wild Country* or *Making A Murderer*) makes false statements about a living person and harms their reputation?

What if by telling her own story, an author invades the privacy of others? "Steals" their "life story"? Publicly discloses embarrassing private facts about their lives?

Every major film attracts lawsuits, and some plaintiffs sue, even though they are not mentioned by name in the film, because they are just sure that everybody knows a certain character is based on them. Docu-dramas invite litigation, because they purport to dramatize "real" events.

What if filmmakers wearing hidden microphones and cameras make a documentary about a quack doctor who is selling banned substances, or unsafe herbal remedies? Invasion of privacy? Or investigative journalism? Or some other species of reality entertainment?

Stories, songs, movies, even photos about real people, may be defamatory if those works of art contain or suggest false statements of fact.

Restatement 2nd Torts § 558

Elements of a Cause of Action for Defamation

To create liability for defamation there must be:

1. a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
2. an unprivileged publication to a third party;

3. fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
4. either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.

[Restatement 2nd of Torts § 558 \(1977\)](#).

Libel v. Slander

The common law origins of defamation lie in the torts of “slander” (a spoken harmful statement in a transient form, especially speech) and “libel”, each of which gives a common law right of action.

Two forms: Libel and slander:

- Libel (for a handy mnemonic, it sounds like “label”) is defamation in print; it’s written or recorded, as in television or movies.
- Slander is defamation by way of the spoken word.

Restatement 2nd Torts § 559

Defamatory Communication Defined

A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.

[Restatement 2nd of Torts § 559 \(1977\)](#)

Pre-*New York Times v. Sullivan*

First let’s look at the rules for stating a claim for defamation as they existed before [New York Time v. Sullivan](#) (US 1968).

A plaintiff suing for defamation had to prove:

1. A statement had been made about the plaintiff;
2. The statement had been “published” to at least one other party;
3. The statement was false (presumed at common law);
4. The statement harmed the subject’s reputation by lowering his or her standing in at least some part of the community.

Defamation Per Se

All states, except Arizona, Arkansas, Missouri, and Tennessee, recognize that some categories of false statements are so harmful that they are considered to be *defamatory per se*. In the common law tradition, damages for such false statements are presumed and do not have to be proven.

Statements are defamatory *per se* when they falsely impute to the plaintiff one or more of the following:

1. Allegations or imputations “injurious to another in their trade, business, or profession”
2. Allegations or imputations “of loathsome disease” (historically leprosy and sexually transmitted disease, now also includes mental illness)
3. Allegations or imputations of “unchastity” (usually only in unmarried people and sometimes only in women)
4. Allegations or imputations of criminal activity (sometimes only crimes of [moral turpitude](#))

Defamation Meets First Amendment

Sometimes called the constitutionalization of defamation law, [New York Times v. Sullivan](#) changed everything for public officials who don't like the way they are portrayed in the press. It all started in Montgomery, Alabama and the civil rights movement in the South.

New York Times v. Sullivan

US Supreme Court 1964

- [New York Times Co. v. Sullivan](#) (US 1964).
- [Wikipedia](#).
- [NYTimes Editorial: The Uninhibited Press 50 Years Later](#).
- [Image of “Heed Their Rising Voices” ad](#)
- [Transcript of ”Heed Their Rising Voices ad](#)

On March 29th, 1960, civil rights groups, including The Committee To Defend Martin Luther King and The Struggle For Freedom In The South ran a full-page advertisement in the New York Times. The ad, captioned “[Heed Their Rising Voices](#),” began:

As the whole world knows by now, thousands of Southern Negro students are engaged in wide-spread non-violent demonstrations in

The New York Times.

NEW YORK, THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 1968

"The growing movement of peaceful mass demonstrations by Negroes is something new in the South, something understandable. . . . Let Congress heed their rising voices, for they will be heard."

—New York Times editorial
Saturday, March 19, 1968

Heed Their Rising Voices

As the whole world knows by now, thousands of Southern Negro students are engaged in widespread non-violent demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. In their efforts to uphold these guarantees, they are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would deny and negate that document which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modern freedom. . . .

In Orangeburg, South Carolina, where 600 students peacefully sought to buy doughnuts and coffee at lunch counters in the business district, they were brutally ejected, teargassed, soaked to the skin in freezing weather with fire hoses, arrested en masse and hauled into an open barbed-wire stockade to stand for hours in the bitter cold.

In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My Country, 'Tis of Thee" on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.

In Tallahassee, Florida, students were beaten, teargassed, and arrested, and a lone of other cities in the South, young American Negroes, in face of the entire weight of official state apparatus and police power, have boldly stepped forth as

protagonists of democracy. Their courage and amazing restraint have inspired millions and given a new dignity to the cause of freedom.

Still, wonder that the Southern violators of the Constitution fear this new, non-violent brand of freedom fighter . . . even as they fear the swelling right-to-vote movement. Still, wonder that they are determined to destroy the one man who, more than any other, symbolizes the new spirit now sweeping the South—the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., world-famous leader of the Montgomery Bus Protest. For it is his doctrine of non-violence which has inspired and guided the students in their widening wave of civil disobedience. It is this same Dr. King who founded and is president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference—the organization which is spearheading the surging right-to-vote movement. Under Dr. King's direction the Leadership Conference conducts Student Workshops and Seminars in the philosophy and technique of non-violent resistance.

Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have attacked his person. They have arrested him seven times—for "seditious" "inciting" and similar "offenses." And now they have charged him with "perjury"—a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years. Obviously, their real purpose is to remove him physically as the leader to whom the students and millions

of others look for guidance and support, and thereby to intimidate all leaders who may rise in the South. Their strategy is to belabor this affirmative movement, and thus to demoralize Negro Americans and weaken their will to struggle. The defense of Martin Luther King, spiritual leader of the student civil movement, clearly, therefore, is an integral part of the total struggle for freedom in the South.

Decent-minded Americans cannot help but applaud the creative daring of the students and the quiet heroism of Dr. King. But this is one of those moments in the sorry history of Freedom when men and women of good will must do more than applaud the rising glory of others. The America whose good name hangs in the balance before a wretched world, the America whose heritage of Liberty these Southern Uplifters of the Constitution are defending, is our America as well as theirs. . . .

We must heed their rising voices—yes—but we must add our own.

We must extend ourselves above and beyond moral support and render the material help so urgently needed by those who are taking the risks, facing jail, and even death in a glorious re-affirmation of our Constitution and its Bill of Rights.

We urge you to join hands with our fellow Americans in the South by supporting, with your dollars, this Combined Appeal for all three needs—the defense of Martin Luther King—the support of the embattled students—and the struggle for the right-to-vote.

Your Help Is Urgently Needed . . . NOW !!

Isaiah Adler
Raymond R. Alexander
Gail A. Anderson
Harry Van Arsdale
Harry Belafonte
Johnnie B. Bledsoe
Dr. Alvin R. Bell
Mae B. Belfrage
William B. Blevins
William B. Blevins
William B. Blevins
William B. Blevins
William B. Blevins
William B. Blevins
William B. Blevins
William B. Blevins

Joseph Cohen
Richard Cox
Nat King Cole
Cheryl Crawford
Dorothy Dandridge
Oscar Davis
James Davis, Jr.
Rufus D. Davis
Harry D. Davis
Tina Turner
Dr. Philip Elston
Dr. Henry Emerson
Franklin

Anthony F. Evans
Matthew Evans
James Evans
Rev. Donald H. Evans
Nat H. Evans
James H. Evans
W. H. Evans
Vernon Evans
Joseph Evans
W. H. Evans
W. H. Evans
W. H. Evans
W. H. Evans
W. H. Evans
W. H. Evans
W. H. Evans

Belle K. Kline
Belle K. Kline
Hugo Lang
John Lang
Yvonne Lang
David Lang
William Lang
Carl Lang
Dorothy Lang
John Lang
A. J. Lang
Ruth Lang
L. Joseph Lang

Albert F. Palmer
Gordon Palmer
Dorothy Palmer
Sidney Palmer
Michael Palmer
A. Philip Randolph
John R. R. R.
Eugene R. R.
Charles R. R.
John R. R.
A. J. R.
Robert R.
Robert R.
Robert R.

Frank R. R.
Loren R. R.
Hugo R. R.
David R. R.
John R. R.
George R. R.
Ray R. R.
Harold R. R.
Harold R. R.
Charles R. R.
Shirley R. R.
Shirley R. R.
Shirley R. R.
Shirley R. R.

We in the south who are struggling daily for dignity and freedom warmly endorse this appeal

Rev. Ralph D. Abernethy
(Montgomery, Ala.)
Rev. Paul L. Battistoni
(Houston, Ala.)
Rev. Kelly Miller Smith
(Wichita, Kan.)
Rev. W. A. Davis
(Tulsa, Okla.)
Rev. C. K. Steele
(Tulsa, Okla.)

Rev. William B. Blevins
(Tulsa, Okla.)
Rev. William Blevins
(Tulsa, Okla.)
Rev. Douglas Moore
(Tulsa, Okla.)
Rev. Wyatt T. Walker
(Tulsa, Okla.)

Rev. Walter L. Hamilton
(Tulsa, Okla.)
S. L. L.
(Tulsa, Okla.)
Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.
(Atlanta, Ga.)
Rev. Henry C. Butler
(Tulsa, Okla.)
Rev. S. S. S.
(Tulsa, Okla.)
Rev. Samuel W. Williams
(Tulsa, Okla.)

Rev. A. S. Davis
(New Orleans, La.)
Mrs. Kate S. Whitten
(New Orleans, La.)
Rev. W. H. Hall
(Tulsa, Okla.)
Rev. J. E. Lacey
(Tulsa, Okla.)
Rev. T. J. Jordan
(Tulsa, Okla.)

COMMITTEE TO DEFEND MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN THE SOUTH
312 West 125th Street, New York 27, N. Y. UNiversity 6-1700

Chairman: A. Philip Randolph, Dr. Gordon C. Taylor; Chairman of Cultural Division: Harry Belafonte, Sidney Poitier; Treasurer: Nat King Cole; Executive Director: Bayard Rustin; Chairman of Church Division: Father George R. Ford, Rev. Harry Emerson Fosdick, Rev. Thomas Kilgore, Jr., Rabbi Edward E. Kline; Chairman of Labor Division: Martin Luther King, Cleveland Robinson.

Please mail this coupon TODAY!

Committee To Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle For Freedom in the South
312 West 125th Street, New York 27, N. Y.
UNiversity 6-1700

I am enclosing my contribution of \$ _____
for the work of the Committee.

Name _____
Address _____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____

☐ I want to help ☐ Please send further information

Please make checks payable to:
Committee To Defend Martin Luther King

Figure 4: heed

positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. In their efforts to uphold these guarantees, they are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would deny and negate that document which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modern freedom.

The ad went on to list examples of official police intimidation and alleged that certain actions and events had deprived the students and demonstrators of their rights.

It is uncontroverted that some of the statements contained in the two paragraphs were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in Montgomery.

L.B. Sullivan was the police commissioner for the city of Montgomery. Even though he wasn't named in the ad, Sullivan filed suit against the *New York Times*, alleging that it had wrongfully implied that he was guilty of misconduct. Four other government officials also filed suit.

At trial the evidence showed that at least some of the statements in the ad were incorrect. The trial jury awarded Sullivan \$500,000 in damages, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the verdict.

A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, in essence overruling Alabama's interpretation of its own defamation laws. The Court held that the First Amendment required that in defamation actions brought by public officials, the plaintiff official must prove that the statement was made with "*actual malice*," meaning it was made *with knowledge that the statement was false* or *with reckless disregard for the truth*.

We consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide- open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public official.

To protect news organizations from defamation claims, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution required public officials to prove actual malice to state a claim. The Court also held that in defamation cases, appellate courts had to examine *the entire record* on review to insure that a trial judgment did not tread on First Amendment freedoms.

Lawsuits Over False Statements of Fact

In the wake of *New York Times v. Sullivan*, the defamation rules changed and prospective plaintiffs were sorted into at least four different categories:

- Private Figures (Ordinary People)
- Public Officials (Politicians)
- Public Figures (Celebrities)
- Limited Purpose Public Figures (ordinary people who suddenly become famous because of their association with a particular event or issue).

If a public official or a public figure (celebrity) wishes to sue someone for defaming them they must prove **actual malice**.

§ 580A Defamation of Public Official or Public Figure

One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a public official or public figure in regard to his conduct, fitness or role in that capacity is subject to liability, if, but only if, he

- (a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other person, or
- (b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters.

Actual Malice

Do not confuse *actual malice* with *legal malice*. In defamation law, actual malice means the defendant who allegedly made a defamatory statement did so with *with knowledge that the statement was false* or *with reckless disregard for the truth*. Actual malice does not mean evil intent or evil purpose, it means the defendant knew the statement was false and made it anyway, or had reckless disregard for the truth.

[Restatement 2nd of Torts § 580A \(1977\)](#)(Defamation of Public Official or Public Figure).

Complexity

Like the question of privacy rights, defamation law is complex. How complex? Take a look at a table we use in media law to decide fault standards, damages, and burdens of proof in defamation cases.

Plaintiff's Status	Minimum Fault Standard	Damages Available	Burden of Proof
Public official or figure	Clear Actual Malice	Presumed and Punitive	Plaintiff Proves Falsity
Private Figure, Public Concern	Negligence	Compensatory "Actual"	Plaintiff Proves Falsity
Private Figure, Private Concern	Probably Strict Liability	Presumed and Punitive	Truth a Defense ¹

¹ Not resolved by *Hepps*, in which a state statute said that defendants had the burden of proving that allegedly defamatory statements were true. The trial judge thought the statute was unconstitutional and instructed the jury that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving falsity:☒

To ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred, we hold that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant.

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps. (US 1986).

And that's just state and federal law in the United States.

International Comparisons Should the law force the allegedly defamed plaintiff to prove that the communications were false? Or should we instead force the defendant media company to prove that the statements were true?

At common law, the defamed plaintiff made her claim, and the allegedly defamatory statement was presumed to be false, and it was up to the defendant to assert truth as a defense. But modern American defamation law sometimes makes the plaintiff prove falsity.

In England, this development was specifically rejected in *Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd* (1993), and it was also rejected in Canada in *Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto* (1995), and more recently in *Grant v. Torstar Corp.* (2009).

In Australia, the High Court held in *Theophanous v. The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd* (1994) that the Australian constitution implied a freedom of political communication and a freedom to publish material discussing government and political matters, but *Theophanous* was overruled by the High Court of Australia in *Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (1997).

As in privacy rights and celebrity/publicity rights, the protection or licensing of rights call for expert contract draftsmanship.

Now let's look at some entertainment industry cases where public officials and figures alleged defamation.

Davis v. Constantin Costa-Gavras

US District Court, S.D. New York (1987)

- [case at Google Scholar](#)
- [case at Westlaw](#)
- [Loyola Entertainment Law Journal Case Note](#).

A summary of events leading up to the lawsuit:

Thomas Hauser wrote a book, *The Execution of Charles Horman*, which developed the thesis of Ed Horman, Charles' father, that the US military in Chile had known and approved of the killing of his son by Pinochet's troops. Four years later, Costa-Gavras made a well-received movie, *Missing*, starring Jack Lemmon in the role of Ed Horman and Sally Field as his wife. *Missing* was a fictionalized version of the book, *Execution*, with the U.S. military head named Ray Tower. Davis, who had not sued the book's author or publisher, sued the movie director and studio for defamation. The legal issue posed by the case was whether there was any evidence of "actual malice" that would satisfy the *New York Times* standard.

Paul C. Weiler, Gary Myers, *Entertainment, Media, and the Law: Text, Cases, and Problems* (4th Ed. 2011).

MILTON POLLACK, Senior District Judge.

The defamation charged in the complaint is that in their film, "Missing," defendants (including Universal Studios) allegedly portrayed with actual malice that plaintiff, the Commander of the United States Military Group and Chief of the United States Mission to Chile at the time of the 1973 coup in Chile, ordered or approved a Chilean order to kill Charles Horman, an American residing in Chile.

Actual malice is established in a public figure defamation litigation only where defendant publishes a statement "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." [New York Times v. Sullivan](#), (US 1964). Reckless disregard in such a case means that a defendant published after he "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." [St. Amant v. Thompson](#) (US 1968.)

Designated Evidence Offered by Plaintiff

Plaintiff alleges that there are four general categories of purported evidence in the paper defense to the motion from which to find actual malice on behalf of defendants:

1. that defendants' "entire purpose in making 'Missing' was to show plaintiff as responsible for Charles Horman's death";
2. that defendants' reliance on Thomas Hauser's book *The Execution of Charles Horman* ("Execution") was unreasonable;
3. that defendants never consulted with plaintiff on the facts presented in the film; and
4. that "Missing" contains scenes portraying certain episodes which defendants knew were embroidered.

An analysis of the record shows that to accept the plaintiff's opposition to summary judgment would require a distortion of the proofs, deviation from applicable law, and wrenching of the film out of its plain context.

A. *The Thesis of the Film* Plaintiff has produced no evidence in his papers to substantiate his assertion that the purpose of "Missing" was to make a non-fictional film establishing that Ray Davis, the plaintiff, was responsible for Charles Horman's death. To the contrary, the papers unalterably establish that the film is not a non-fictional documentary or aimed at Ray Davis as an individual, and that it cannot be understood as other than a dramatization of a true story. The film includes fictional characters and a composite portrayal of the American military presence in Chile at the time of the uprising and Allende coup. The theme of the film is the search for a missing man by his father and his wife. The man who disappeared is finally found to have been executed by the Chilean military. The film is *based upon* a true story. It is only in that setting that the composite conduct of the American governmental representatives in Chile at the time and the degree of their assistance in that search comes under scrutiny and criticism. There is no person named Ray Davis referred to in the film at any time. Ray Tower, with whom the plaintiff associates himself, is a symbolic fictional composite of the entire American political and military entourage in Chile.

The film derives from and is solidly documented and supported by the stories relied on by the filmmakers, taken from the acts and statements of the concerned father and the anguished wife set forth in detail in Thomas Hauser's book, *Execution*. Those sources are shown to have been heavily investigated and confirmed by the filmmakers, who entertained no serious doubts of their truth or knowledge to the contrary of what they portrayed.

We pause to point out that the Supreme Court has emphasized that “actual malice” in the context of the First Amendment does not even include “spite, hostility or intention to harm.” ... Rather, the actual malice inquiry focuses on the publisher’s state of mind regarding the truth of his statements....

B. Defendants’ Reliance on Hauser’s Book “Missing” is a dramatic portrayal of events and interpretations detailed in Thomas Hauser’s book, *Execution*. The substance of the movie’s scenes is extracted directly from *Execution*. To meet those facts, plaintiff purports to suggest that defendants’ reliance on Hauser’s book was unreasonable and that Hauser’s credentials would have disclosed him to be “suspect” had a good faith search by defendants been made.

As a matter of law, to prevail on a defamation claim against a public official a plaintiff must do more than propound potential avenues of investigation that a defendant might have pursued. “[M]ere proof of failure to investigate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for the truth.” *Gertz v. Robert Welch* (US 1974),

Rather, a public figure defamation plaintiff must show either that the publisher actually entertained serious doubts about the veracity of the publication, or that there are ‘*obvious* reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.’”...

There is nothing in the record tending to show that the filmmakers questioned Hauser’s credentials or his book in any respect at the time “Missing” was made. The record is to the contrary. The filmmakers met with Hauser, went over his investigation and sources, supplied him with drafts of the script under preparation and were satisfied that there was no reason to doubt his work. No evidence whatever challenges those facts. Certainly the filmmakers obtained no knowledge contradicting the veracity or accuracy of Hauser’s book and the stories of the Hormans as told to them and reflected in the book. There is no suggestion to the contrary from any provable sources. Indeed, nothing in plaintiff’s papers demonstrates that either Hauser’s credentials or his book, which was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize, are in fact “suspect” in any way.

The filmmakers knew that Hauser was a lawyer who had served as a judicial clerk in the Chambers of a Federal Judge and then worked for a prestigious Wall Street law firm. They knew that Hauser interviewed Captain Ray Davis, as well as other United States officials in Chile and numerous other persons when preparing *Execution*. The filmmakers also knew that no legal action whatsoever was taken against the book in the approximately four years since its publication. In an August 1980 meeting where Costa-Gavras, the film’s director, and Stewart, the co-scriptwriter, met with Hauser to verify the accuracy of his book, Hauser

described his meticulous research methods and broad inquiries. There is no evidence to the contrary.

The filmmakers then met with Charles Horman's parents, his wife, and one Terry Simon, a close friend who was in Chile with Charles around the time of his disappearance. Each of these individuals made clear to Costa-Gavras and Stewart that Hauser's book accurately and reliably depicted events as they knew and believed them. There is no evidence that any of defendants' further research and review of documents regarding Horman and events in Chile during the coup caused them to doubt the veracity of Hauser's book.

Plaintiff argues that an effective search of Hauser's background would have disclosed "fraudulent letters" sent by Hauser to political figures and The New York Times. This allusion is to Hauser's political satires where he had written on public issues to officials in the voice of a nine-year old boy, "Martin Bear." The New York Times, in fact, solicited from Hauser and published on its "op-ed" page one of these satirical pieces, which can hardly be reason to "suspect" the veracity of his book.

In any event, plaintiff has neither presented nor designated specific facts suggesting or from which it could be reasonably inferred and found that defendants entertained serious doubts as to Hauser's account or that there were obvious reasons to doubt the veracity or accuracy of Hauser's book. Absent such evidence, reliance on *Execution* is not evidence of actual malice. *Herbert v. Lando* (plaintiff must show either that publisher "entertained serious doubts" or "obvious reasons" to doubt source). *St. Amant* ("[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published or would have investigated before publishing.")

C. Failure to Consult Plaintiff Prior to Making Film Plaintiff argues that defendant's failure to consult plaintiff personally prior to presentation of the film is evidence of actual malice.

However, plaintiff cannot prove actual malice merely by asserting that a publisher failed to contact the subject of his work. See *Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc.* (5th Cir. 1975) (failure to verify story with plaintiff prior to publication insufficient evidence of actual malice.).

The actual malice standard cannot be satisfied by evidence of a failure to check with third parties prior to publication without proof that a publisher knew his publication was false, entertained serious doubts as to its truth, or had obvious reasons to doubt the veracity or accuracy of the source of published information. See *New York Times v. Sullivan* (and others).

While “verification of facts” of a story with its subjects and with others is a desirable and responsible practice and “an important reporting standard, a reporter, without a ‘high degree of awareness of their probable falsity,’ may rely on statements made by a single source even though they reflect only one side of the story without fear of libel prosecution....” *New York Times v. Connor* (5th Cir. 1966).

Plaintiff has not designated specific facts suggesting an awareness or even suspicion by defendants of probable falsity of their source material.

D. Scenes in “Missing” as Evidence Of Actual Malice Plaintiff enumerates nine scenes in “Missing” which the filmmakers allegedly created, or in which they distorted the context, or made baseless suggestions. None of these scenes provides or contributes to the requisite evidence of actual malice.

It should be made clear that “Missing” is not a documentary, but a dramatization of the Horman disappearance and search. The film does not purport to depict a chronology of the events precisely as they actually occurred; it opens with the prologue: “This film is *based on* a true story. The incidents and facts are documented. Some of the names have been changed to protect the innocent and also to protect the film.” (emphasis supplied). No one challenged the accuracy and veracity of Hauser’s book to the knowledge of defendants. Defendants concede that although the substance of the film’s scenes is extracted almost directly from Thomas Hauser’s book, not everything in their film is literally faithful to the actual historical record as if in a documentary. That is not to say that which was not historical was set out in bad faith, portrayed with actual malice, or established or increased the defamatory impact.

The film is not a documentary. A documentary is a non-fictional story or series of historical events portrayed in their actual location; a film of real people and real events as they occur. A documentary maintains strict fidelity to fact.

“Missing,” on the other hand, is an art form sometimes described as “Docu-Drama.” The line separating a documentary from a docudrama is not always sharply defined, but is nonetheless discernible. Both forms are necessarily selective, given the time constraints of movies and the attention span of the viewing audience. The docudrama is a dramatization of an historical event or lives of real people, using actors or actresses. Docudramas utilize simulated dialogue, composite characters, and a telescoping of events occurring over a period into a composite scene or scenes. This treatment is singularly appropriate and unexceptionable if the context is not distorted when dealing with public and political figures.

Self-evidently a docudrama partakes of author’s license — it is a creative

interpretation of reality — and if alterations of fact in scenes portrayed are not made with serious doubts of truth of the essence of the telescoped composite, such scenes do not ground a charge of actual malice.

Each scene questioned by the plaintiff is a telescoped composite of events, personalities, and of the American representatives in Chile who are involved therein. Each uses permissible literary license to fit historical detail into a suitable dramatic context. Such dramatic embellishments as are made do not distort the fundamental story being told — the frantic search by his family for a missing man who has suddenly disappeared, their emotions, anxieties, impatience, frustration, and doubts of assistance from American officialdom. The scenes are thus a hybrid of fact and fiction which however do not materially distort the analysis. Always to be remembered is that they fairly represent the source materials for the film believed to be true by the filmmakers. Leeway is properly afforded to an author who thus attempts to recount a true event.

As a matter of law, the dramatic overlay supplied by the film does not serve to increase the impact of what plaintiff charges as defamatory since it fairly and reasonably portrays the unassailable beliefs of the Hormans, the record thereof in the Hauser book, and the corroborative results of the authors' inquiries. In docudrama, minor fictionalization cannot be considered evidence or support for the requirement of actual malice.

The nine scenes selected by plaintiff as support for the requirement of actual malice do no such thing. Each is related solely and unquestionably to the theme of this film. The movie's Ray Tower character is a fictional composite of the American presence operating in Chile at the time. He is a symbolic figure. The artistic input in the scenes questioned is found in permissible syntheses and composite treatment in the film. Although in actuality particular individuals were not physically present when certain dialogue occurred, in the movie scene the composite character portrayed was.

The content of the film reflects what happened according to the book, the persons who complained, and the sources relied on by defendants. While the actual persons involved in the events portrayed do not appear in on-scene interviews to describe their experiences, actions, and motivations, the real names of some individuals are employed. But the name Ray Davis is never mentioned. Real life personalities are accordingly represented by telescoped composites in many instances.

The cases on point demonstrate that the First Amendment protects such dramatizations and does not demand literal truth in every episode depicted; publishing a dramatization is not of itself evidence of actual malice.

In *Street v. National Broadcasting Co.*, (6th Cir. 1981), the Court of Appeals

affirmed a ruling on a directed verdict that the dramatization embodied in defendant's broadcast program on the Scottsboro rape trial was protected by the *New York Times v. Sullivan* standard, and not chargeable with actual malice. While the dramatization contained certain literal falsehoods, including undocumented statements and conversations ... the movie was based "in all material respects" on the Judge's findings in the Scottsboro case, and a book by a historian documenting the Scottsboro trial. *Id.* at 1237.

Such techniques do not rise to the constitutional level of clear and convincing showing of reckless disregard ... Deviations from or embellishments upon the information obtained from the primary sources relied upon were miniscule and can be attributed to the leeway afforded an author who attempts to recount and popularize an historic event."

Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche (2d Cir. 1977). Defendant published a book which purported to quote derogatory remarks by Ernest Hemingway about plaintiff. Defendant did not print the literal words used by Hemingway, and "was fictionalizing to some extent." *Hotchner*. The Court of Appeals held that such fictionalization or dramatization does not satisfy the requirement of clear and convincing evidence from which a jury might reasonably find that defendant published the alleged libel with actual malice. Actual malice could not be inferred because "the change did not increase the defamatory impact or alter the substantive content" of Hemingway's original statement which defendants relied upon. *Id.*

Conclusion The issue on the motion is not the truth of whether Davis (qua Ray Tower) ordered or approved a Chilean order to kill Charles Horman because he "knew too much" about alleged American involvement in the Chilean coup; the issue is whether the filmmakers intentionally portrayed such a defamatory suggestion, knowing that it was false or with serious doubts of its truth. There is no doubt that Ed Horman, the father of the missing man, asserted such a theory and that assertion is documented in Hauser's book. Plaintiff has not presented evidence that defendants knew the theory of the father was false, or entertained serious doubts as to its truth. There is no evidence that defendants acted with actual malice or disbelieved what the Hormans thought and said or what Hauser wrote.

In sum, returning to the *ratio decidendi*; no provable, clear and convincing, affirmative evidence nor specific facts showing actual malice on the part of the defendants in publishing the alleged defamation have been shown, and the complaint by plaintiff, a public figure, falls as not sustainable under the law.

The complaint is dismissed, with costs.
SO ORDERED.

APPENDIX

The plaintiff has designated the following nine scenes in the film purportedly as the evidence he has that defendants published the film with actual malice.

1. *Initial Embassy Scene* The scene depicts a meeting where it is reported that Tower and his staff have conducted interviews in the area where Charles was last seen. Tower states he is having dinner with the Junta's chief-of-staff Admiral Huidobro, implying close connections with the Chilean military, and asks Beth Horman for a list of Charles' friends which was refused.

Every element in the dramatized scene is traceable to an actual fact about or statement by Ray Davis derived from Hauser's book. The book establishes that Ray Davis was in charge of the American investigation into Charles Horman's disappearance.

2. *The Hotel Meeting* The film depicts a meeting at the Hormans' hotel at which Putnam, Clay, and Tower are present. Clay states that a fingerprint check made at all the morgues came up negative in the search for Horman's whereabouts and that Captain Tower checked them himself.

The book describes the fingerprint report by governmental officials, and this scene is a composite of those who checked on the morgue and the fingerprints. *Execution* chronicles Ray Davis' statements that he made inquiries with friends in the Chilean military and was checking "all possible leads."

3. *The Stadium* In this scene the language is taken straight from *Execution*; the scene indicates that Tower and Putnam accompany Ed and Beth Horman to the National Stadium to search for Charles. American official presence at the stadium, including the suggestion that Davis was involved in the investigation into Charles' disappearance, are clearly indicated in Hauser's account. Indeed, *Execution* portrays that Ray Davis was "in charge of the investigation."

4. *The Final Embassy Meeting* In this scene Ed Horman tells Tower and the Embassy officials that he does not think that the military would kill Charles "unless an American official co-signed a kill order" and further indicates that he believes that American officials knew from the start that Charles was dead.

These statements by Horman in the film directly reflect his beliefs as described in Hauser's book and as known to the filmmakers.

5. *The Airport Scene* In this scene Ed Horman tells Putnam, with Tower standing nearby, "I'm gonna sue you, Phil, and Tower and the Ambassador, and everybody who let that boy die." While the locale for this confrontation is not placed at an airport by *Execution*, the speech accurately depicts Ed Horman's state of mind as described in *Execution*. Horman did sue eleven government officials.

6. *The Bathroom Scene* This scene shows Beth Horman in the bathtub at Tower's house when Tower walks into the bathroom with a drink in his hand. Tower says, "You know, if I were you, I'd quit living in the past. I think it's about time you started thinking about your future." Tower exhorts Beth to "stay ahead of the power curve" as Beth quickly exits the room.

Each of these events is taken almost directly from Hauser's book. According to Costa-Gavras' affidavit, Joyce Horman told Costa-Gavras that the book's description of events at Ray Davis's home was actually understated and overly charitable to Davis, both in describing how much he had to drink and in detailing precisely what occurred when he entered her bathroom.

7. *The Meeting with Paris* In this scene, Paris, described as a desperate former employee of the Junta, tells Ed Horman that a friend was present and saw Charles detained at the Ministry of Defense in the office of Chilean General Lutz, after he was arrested. According to the friend, an American official was present in the office when the decision was made that the prisoner "must 'disappear' " because "he knew too much." Paris could not identify the American official but noted that, "The ministry is full of them. Their Milgroup office is just down the hall from the General."

This scene is taken directly from Hauser's book, which describes in detail the allegations of a Chilean defector and former employee of the Chilean Intelligence Service, Rafael Gonzalez.

8. *The Mafia Speech* Tower analogizes Charles' death with the murder of someone who becomes involved with the Mafia. In fact, plaintiff Ray Davis himself made such a statement and this is documented in *Execution*. Interestingly, these statements were made by Davis to Thomas Hauser while the latter was researching his book.

9. The Telephone Repair Scene This scene contains the suggestion that Ed Horman's telephone at his hotel is wiretapped. A telephone repairman leaves the hotel room and Ed Horman tells him there was nothing wrong with the phone, and Beth is portrayed as saying, "hello Ray Tower, how's every little thing."

Execution documents the incident with Ed Horman's clear impression that either the Chilean government or American officials had bugged his phone.

Public Figures

Most defamation and privacy cases deal early on with the issue of whether plaintiff is a public or a private figure. In struggling with these question, courts have discussed at least three varieties of public figures.

1. General-purpose public figures;
2. Limited-purpose public figures;
3. Involuntary public figures.

General Purpose Public Figures. These are easy to spot, as the D.C. Circuit put it in [*Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications*](#):

A general public figure is a well-known "celebrity," his name a "household word." The public recognizes him and follows his words and deeds, either because it regards his ideas, conduct, or judgment as worthy of the attention or because he actively pursues that consideration.

Limited-Purpose Public Figure In its leading opinion on public figures, [*Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.* \(US 1974\)](#), as opposed to public officials, [*New York Times v. Sullivan* \(US 1968\)](#), the United States Supreme Court identified at least two kinds of public figures:

In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an *individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues*. In either case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.

Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a more

meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.

The states and federal circuits have developed different tests for deciding whether and when a person is a limited-purpose public figure. The Fifth Circuit uses a three-part test:

1. The controversy at issue must be public both in the sense that people are discussing it and people other than the immediate participants in the controversy are likely to feel the impact of its resolution;
2. The plaintiff must have more than a trivial or tangential role in the controversy; and,
3. The alleged defamation must be germane to the plaintiff's participation in the controversy.

The Second Circuit uses a four-factor inquiry, which focuses on plaintiff's participation in the public controversy. This test requires the defendant to prove that plaintiff:

1. Successfully invited public attention to his views in an effort to influence others prior to the incident that is the subject of litigation;
2. Voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy related to the subject of the litigation;
3. Assumed a position of prominence in the public controversy; and
4. Maintained regular and continuing access to the media.

Lerman v. Flynt Distrib, Co. (2d Cir. 1984).

Other circuits use a three-part test, like the one the D.C. Circuit used most recently in *Kahn v. Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.* (2d Cir. 2017). To determine if Kahl, a tax protester, was a limited purpose public figure, the D.C. Circuit said that:

1. First, the court must identify the relevant controversy and determine whether it is a public controversy.
2. Second, the plaintiff must have played a significant role in that controversy.
3. Third, the defamatory statement must be germane to the plaintiff's participation in the controversy.

DC Circuit Discusses "Limited Purpose" Public Figures By Anthony B. Cavender
Posted May 16, 2017

The plaintiff in *Street v. NBC* (below) is a textbook example of a public figure for a limited purpose.

Involuntary Public Figures Some read [Gertz](#) as identifying yet a third variety of public figure, the involuntary public figure, based upon the Court's observation that:

Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, *but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare*. For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.

These distinction in the small number of cases discussing involuntary public figures seems to turn on whether the plaintiff voluntarily sought to play a public role in the controversy that gave rise to her notoriety. Modern commentators suggest that even vigorous use of social media (Twitter, Facebook, and the like) could be used as evidence of one's public figure status.

Street v. National Broadcasting Co.

(6th Circuit 1981)

- [Case in Google Scholar](#)
- [Case in Wikipedia](#)
- [Case in Westlaw](#)

This is a Tennessee diversity case against the National Broadcasting Company for libel and invasion of privacy. The plaintiff-appellant, Victoria Price Street, was the prosecutrix and main witness in the famous rape trials of the Scottsboro boys, which occurred in Alabama more than forty years ago. NBC televised a play or historical drama entitled "Judge Horton and the Scottsboro Boys," dramatizing the role of the local presiding judge in one of those trials.

The movie portrays Judge Horton as a courageous and tragic figure struggling to bring justice in a tense community gripped by racial prejudice and intent on vengeance against nine blacks accused of raping two white women. In the movie Judge Horton sets aside a jury verdict of guilty because he believes that the evidence shows that the prosecutrix — plaintiff in this action — falsely accused the Scottsboro defendants. The play portrays the plaintiff in the derogatory light that Judge Horton apparently viewed her: as a woman attempting to send nine innocent blacks to the electric chair for a rape they did not commit.

This case presents the question of what tort and First Amendment principles apply to an historical drama that allegedly defames a living person who participated in the historical events portrayed. The plaintiff's case is based on principles of libel law and "false light" invasion of privacy arising from the derogatory portrayal. NBC raises alternative claims and defenses: (1) the claim that the published material is not defamatory; (2) the claim of truth; (3) the common law privilege of fair comment; (4) the common law privilege of fair report on a judicial proceeding; (5) the First Amendment claim that because the plaintiff is a public figure recovery must be based on a showing of malice; and (6) even if the malice standard is inapplicable, the claim that recovery must be based on a showing of negligence.

At the end of all the proof, District Judge Neese directed a verdict for defendant on the ground that even though plaintiff was not a public figure at the time of publication the defamatory matter was not negligently published. We affirm for the reason that the historical events and persons portrayed are "public" as distinguished from "private." A malice standard applies to public figures under the First Amendment, and there is no evidence that the play was published with malice.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

In April 1931, nine black youths were accused of raping two young white women while riding a freight train between Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Huntsville, Alabama. The case was widely discussed in the local, national, and foreign press. The youths were quickly tried in Scottsboro, Alabama, and all were found guilty and sentenced to death. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.

The United States Supreme Court reversed all convictions on the ground that the defendants were denied the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The defendants were retried separately after a change of venue from Scottsboro to Decatur, Alabama. Patterson was the first defendant retried, and this trial was the subject of the NBC production. In a jury trial before Judge Horton, he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. Judge Horton set the verdict aside on the ground that the evidence was insufficient. Patterson and one other defendant, Norris, were then tried before another judge on essentially the same evidence, convicted, and sentenced to death. The judge let the verdicts stand, and the convictions were affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court.

The United States Supreme Court again reversed, this time because blacks were systematically excluded from grand and petit juries. At his fourth retrial, Patterson was convicted and sentenced to seventy-five years in prison. Defendants Weems and Andrew Wright were also convicted on retrial and

sentenced to a term of years. Defendant Norris was convicted and his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by the Alabama governor. Defendants Montgomery, Roberson, Williams, and Leroy Wright were released without retrial. Powell pled guilty to assault allegedly committed during an attempted escape. The last Scottsboro defendant was paroled in 1950.

The Scottsboro case aroused strong passions and conflicting opinions in the 1930s throughout the nation. Several all white juries convicted the Scottsboro defendants of rape. Two trial judges and the Alabama Supreme Court, at times by divided vote, let these verdicts stand. Judge Horton was the sole trial judge to find the facts in favor of the defendants. Liberal opinion supported Judge Horton's conclusions that the Scottsboro defendants had been falsely accused.

During the lengthy course of the Scottsboro trials, newspapers frequently wrote about Victoria Price. She gave some interviews to the press. Thereafter, she disappeared from public view. The Scottsboro trials and her role in them continued to be the subject of public discussion, but there is no evidence that Mrs. Street sought publicity. NBC incorrectly stated in the movie that she was no longer living. After the first showing of "Judge Horton and the Scottsboro Boys," plaintiff notified NBC that she was living, and shortly thereafter she filed suit. Soon after plaintiff filed suit, NBC rebroadcast the dramatization omitting the statement that plaintiff was no longer living.

The Dramatization The script for "Judge Horton and the Scottsboro Boys" was based on one chapter of a book by Dr. Daniel Carter, an historian, entitled *Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South*. The movie is based almost entirely on the information in Dr. Carter's book, which, in turn, was based on Judge Horton's findings at the 1933 trial, the transcript of the trial, contemporaneous newspaper reports of the trial, and interviews with Judge Horton and others. NBC purchased the movie from an independent producer.

Plaintiff's major libel and invasion of privacy claims are based on nine scenes in the movie in which she is portrayed in a derogatory light. The essential facts concerning these claims are as follows:

1. After an opening prologue, black and white youths are shown fighting on a train. The train is halted, and the blacks are arrested. The next scene shows plaintiff standing next to Ruby Bates at the tracks. Plaintiff claims that this scene, in effect, makes her a perjurer because she testified at the 1933 trial and in this case that she fainted while alighting from the train and did not regain consciousness until she was taken to a local grocery store. Judge Horton, in his opinion sustaining the motion for a new trial, found that the observations of other witnesses and the testimony of the

examining doctor contradicted her testimony in this respect. Horton concluded that it was unlikely that Victoria Price had fainted.

2. As plaintiff and Ruby Bates are led away from the tracks by the sheriff and his men, the sheriff in the play calls the two women a “couple of bums.” There is no indication in Judge Horton’s opinion, in the 1933 trial transcript, or in Dr. Carter’s book that this comment was actually made.
3. In a pretrial conversation between two lawyers representing the defendant, the play portrays one of them as advising restraint in the cross-examination of plaintiff Price. He says to the other defense lawyer: “The Scottsboro transcripts are really clear The defense at the last trial made one thing very clear, Victoria was a *whore*, and they got it in the neck for it” (Emphasis added.) There is no evidence that this specific conversation between the two defense lawyers actually occurred. Dr. Carter does state in his book that one of the purposes of the defense in cross-examining plaintiff was to discredit her testimony by introducing evidence that she was a common prostitute. *Scottsboro* at 206.
4. Plaintiff in this action contends that the movie falsely portrays her as defensive and evasive during her direct and cross-examination.
5. Plaintiff claims that the last question put to her on cross-examination in the play is inaccurate. In the movie the defense attorney asks: “One more question: have you ever heard of a white woman being arrested for perjury when she was the complaining witness against Negroes in the entire history of the state of Alabama?” According to the 1933 trial transcript, the actual question was, “I want to ask you if you have ever heard of any single white woman ever being locked up in jail when she is the complaining witness against Negroes in the history of the state of Alabama?” Plaintiff objects to the insertion of the word “perjury” in the play.
6. In the play, Dr. Marvin Lynch, one of the doctors who examined plaintiff after she alighted from the train, approaches Judge Horton outside the courtroom and confides that he does not believe that the two women were raped by the Scottsboro boys. Dr. Lynch refuses to go on the witness stand and so testify, however. Plaintiff argues that this scene is improper because it is not supported in the 1933 trial record. This is true. Neither the 1933 trial transcript nor Judge Horton’s opinion make reference to this incident. The Carter book does state, however, that Judge Horton told the author in a later interview that this incident occurred. *Scottsboro* at 214-15.
7. The play portrays events leading up to plaintiff’s trip to Chattanooga with her friend, Ruby Bates. It was on the return trip to Alabama that the rape alleged occurred. Lester Carter, a defense witness in the play, testifies that

he had intercourse with Ruby Bates on the night before the trip to Chattanooga and that plaintiff had intercourse with Jack Tiller. During the testimony there is a flashback that shows an exchange in a boxcar in which Ruby Bates suggests that they all go to Chattanooga and plaintiff says, “[m]aybe Ruby and me could hustle there while you two [Carter and Tiller] got some kind of fill-in work. What do you say?” This is an accurate abridgement of the substance of the actual testimony of Lester Carter at the 1933 trial, although Price denied, both at the 1933 trial and in the defamation trial below, that she had had intercourse with Tiller. Judge Horton specifically found that she did not tell the truth. The dramatization quoted or closely paraphrased substantial portions of Judge Horton’s 1933 opinion.

8. Lester Carter also testifies in the play that plaintiff urged him to say that he had seen her raped. The 1933 trial transcript reveals that Carter actually testified that he overheard plaintiff tell another white youth that “if you don’t testify according to what I testify I will see that you are took off the witness stand....” Judge Horton in his opinion observed that there was evidence presented at the trial showing that Price encouraged others to support her version of what had happened.
9. Another witness in the play, Dallas Ramsey, testifies that he saw plaintiff and Ruby Bates in a “hobo jungle” near the train tracks in Chattanooga the night before the train trip back to Alabama. Ramsey testifies that plaintiff stated that she and her husband were looking for work and that “her old man” was uptown scrounging for food. The play dramatizes Ramsey’s testimony while he is on the stand by a flashback to the scene at the “hobo jungle.” The flashback gives the impression that plaintiff is perhaps inviting sexual advances from Ramsey, although the words used do not state this specifically. The substance of Ramsey’s testimony, as portrayed in the play, is found in the 1933 trial transcript. The record provides no basis for the suggestive flashback.

II. COMMON LAW CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

A. Defamatory Nature of the Published Material Taken as a whole, the play conveys a defamatory image of the plaintiff. Although the words “bum” and “hustle” may be considered rhetorical hyperbole and therefore not necessarily defamatory, *Letter Carriers v. Austin*, (US 1974), the reference to plaintiff as a “whore” and her portrayal as a perjurer and a suborner of perjury is obviously defamatory. The suggestive flashbacks showing her inviting sexual advances of Ramsey and Tiller reinforce the defamation. The effect of the drama as a whole

is to create a character, Victoria Price. She is portrayed as a loose woman who falsely accuses the Scottsboro boys of raping her. This image of her character is created throughout the play by her own words and actions in the flashbacks and in the witness chair and by what others say about her.

B. The Privilege of Fair Comment The portrayal of Victoria Price in this way is not expressed in the play as a matter of opinion. The characterization is expressed as concrete fact. The common law privilege of fair comment, adopted in Tennessee ... is now protected as opinion under the First Amendment, *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, (US 1974). But this play does not say to the viewer that this is NBC's opinion about the character and actions of Victoria Price. It shows her inviting sexual intercourse and swearing falsely. We do not believe this characterization fits within the traditional fair comment privilege protecting opinion. See *Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co.*, (2nd Cir. 1980, as amended Oct. 27, 1980) (magazine article interpreting evidence of rape not expression of opinion).

C. The Defense of Truth and the Privilege of Fair Report of a Judicial Proceeding In his opinion setting aside the verdict, Judge Horton found, in effect, that NBC's characterization of Victoria Price was true. The movie characterizes her as Judge Horton found the facts in his opinion. This does not mean, however, that the case should be withdrawn from the jury on the basis of the defense of truth or the privilege of fair report of a judicial proceeding.

Neither Judge Horton's findings nor the final convictions based on the testimony of Victoria Price and affirmed on appeal settle the question of truth. That still remains an open question. Technical doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply in this context. Neither Victoria Price nor NBC were parties in the 1930s trials. In addition, citizens obviously have a right to attack the fairness of a trial. Judicial proceedings resolve disputes, but they do not establish the truth for all time. In libel cases the question of truth is normally one for the jury in a defamation action.

Many of the scenes actually quote or paraphrase the trial transcript, but the movie is not a completely accurate report of the trial. Witnesses who corroborate Victoria Price's version of the facts are omitted. The portions of the original trial that show her as a perjurer and a promiscuous woman are emphasized. The flashbacks consistently show plaintiff's conduct in a derogatory light. The flashbacks entirely accept the theory of the case presented by Judge Horton and the defense and reject the theory of the case presented by the state and the plaintiff. Under such circumstances the common law privilege permitting

publication of defamatory material as a part of a fair and accurate report on judicial proceedings is not satisfied. The element of balance and neutrality is missing.

III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSES

A. Plaintiff was a Public Figure During the Scottsboro Trials Since common law defenses do not support the directed verdict for NBC, we must reach the constitutional issues, particularly the question whether plaintiff should be characterized as a “public figure.” In *Gertz*, the Supreme Court held that one characterized as a “public figure,” as distinguished from a private individual, “may recover for injury to reputation *only on clear and convincing proof* that the defamatory falsehood was made *with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.*” *Gertz* (emphasis added). In balancing the need to protect “private personality” and reputation against the need “to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that ‘breathing space’ essential to their free exercise,” the Supreme Court has developed a general test to determine public figure status.

Gertz establishes a two-step analysis to determine if an individual is a public figure. First, does a “public controversy” exist? Second, what is “the nature and extent of [the] individual’s participation” in that public controversy? *Gertz*. Three factors determine the “nature and extent” of an individual’s involvement: the extent to which participation in the controversy is voluntary, the extent to which there is access to channels of effective communication in order to counteract false statements, and the prominence of the role played in the public controversy. *Gertz*.

The Supreme Court has not clearly defined the elements of a “public controversy.” It is evident that it is not simply any controversy of general or public interest. Not all judicial proceedings are public controversies. Several factors, however, lead to the conclusion that the Scottsboro case is the kind of public controversy referred to in *Gertz*. The Scottsboro trials were the focus of major public debate over the ability of our courts to render even-handed justice. It generated widespread press and attracted public attention for several years. It was also a contributing factor in changing public attitudes about the right of black citizens to equal treatment under law and in changing constitutional principles governing the right to counsel and the exclusion of blacks from the jury.

The first factor in determining the nature and extent of plaintiff’s participation is the prominence of her role in the public controversy. She was the only alleged victim, and she was the major witness for the State in the prosecution of the nine black youths. Ruby Bates, the other young woman who earlier had testified

against the defendants, later recanted her incriminating testimony. Plaintiff was left as the sole prosecutrix. Therefore, she played a prominent role in the public controversy.

The second part of the test of public figure status is also met. Plaintiff had “access to the channels of effective communication and hence ... a ... realistic opportunity to counteract false statements.” *Gertz*. The evidence indicates that plaintiff recognized her importance to the criminal trials and the interest of the public in her as a personality. The press clamored to interview her. She clearly had access to the media and was able to broadcast her view of the events.

The most troublesome issue is whether plaintiff “voluntarily” “thrust” herself to the forefront of this public controversy. It cannot be said that a rape victim “voluntarily” injects herself into a criminal prosecution for rape. See *Time, Inc. v. Firestone* (US 1976). In such an instance, voluntariness in the legal sense is closely bound to the issue of truth. If she was raped, her participation in the initial legal proceedings was involuntary for the purpose of determining her public figure status; if she falsely accused the defendants, her participation in this controversy was “voluntary.” But legal standards in libel cases should not be drawn so that either the courts or the press must first determine the issue of truth before they can determine whether an individual should be treated as a public or a private figure. The principle of libel law should not be drawn in such a way that it forces the press, in an uncertain public controversy, to guess correctly about a woman’s chastity.

When the issue of truth and the issue of voluntariness are the same, it is necessary to determine the public figure status of the individual without regard to whether she “voluntarily” thrust herself in the forefront of the public controversy. If there were no evidence of voluntariness other than that turning on the issue of truth, we would not consider the fact of voluntariness. In such a case, the other factors — prominence and access to media — alone would determine public figure status. But in this case, there is evidence of voluntariness not bound up with the issue of truth. Plaintiff gave press interviews and aggressively promoted her version of the case outside of her actual courtroom testimony. In the context of a widely-reported, intense public controversy concerning the fairness of our criminal justice system, plaintiff was a public figure under *Gertz* because she played a major role, had effective access to the media and encouraged public interest in herself.

B. Plaintiff Remains a Public Figure The Supreme Court has explicitly reserved the question of “whether or when an individual who was once a public figure may lose that status by the passage of time.” *Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc.* (US 1979). In *Wolston* the District of Columbia Circuit found that plaintiff

was a public figure and retained that status for the purpose of later discussion of the espionage case in which he was called as a witness. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff's role in the original public controversy was so minor that he was not a public figure. It therefore reserved the question of whether a person retains his public figure status.

Plaintiff argues that even if she was a public figure at the time of the 1930s trial, she lost her public figure status over the intervening forty years. We reject this argument and hold that once a person becomes a public figure in connection with a particular controversy, that person remains a public figure thereafter for purposes of later commentary or treatment of *that controversy*. This rule finds support in both case law and analysis of the constitutional malice standard.

On this issue the Fifth Circuit has reached the same conclusion as the District of Columbia Circuit in *Wolston*. In *Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co. Inc.* (5th Cir. 1980), plaintiff sued when a newspaper implied that she was reviving a long-dormant romantic relationship with Elvis Presley. The Fifth Circuit concluded that although the passage of time might narrow the range of topics protected by a malice standard, plaintiff remained a public figure when the defendant commented on her romantic relationship. The court noted that plaintiff's name continued to be connected with Presley even after her retirement from show business.

Other courts have assumed *sub silentio* that the public figure status was retained over the passage of time. See, e. g., *Meeropol v. Nizer*, (2d Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, (US 1978) (having spent most of their early years in limelight, sons of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are public figures for purposes of subsequent commentary on Rosenberg trials). Some courts have relied on a pre-*Gertz* "newsworthiness" analysis to support a finding that the passage of time did not alter the standard of liability.

Our nation depends on "robust debate" to determine the best answer to public controversies of this sort. The public figure doctrine makes it possible for publishers to provide information on such issues to the debating public, undeterred by the threat of liability except in cases of actual malice. Developed in the context of contemporaneous reporting, the doctrine promotes a forceful exchange of views.

Considerations that underlie the public figure doctrine in the context of contemporaneous reporting also apply to later historical or dramatic treatment of the same events. Past public figures who now live in obscurity do not lose their access to channels of communication if they choose to comment on their role in the past public controversy. And although the publisher of history does not operate under journalistic deadlines it generally makes little difference in

terms of accuracy and verifiability that the events on which a publisher is reporting occurred decades ago. Although information may come to light over the course of time, the distance of years does not necessarily make more data available to a reporter: memories fade; witnesses forget; sources disappear.

There is no reason for the debate to be any less vigorous when events that are the subject of current discussion occurred several years earlier. The mere passage of time does not automatically diminish the significance of events or the public's need for information. A nation that prizes its heritage need have no illusions about its past. It is no more fitting for the Court to constrain the analysis of past events than to stem the tide of current news. From Alfred Dreyfus to Alger Hiss, famous cases have been debated and reinterpreted by commentators and historians. A contrary rule would tend to restrain efforts to shed new light on historical events and reconsideration of past errors.

The plaintiff was the pivotal character in the most famous rape case of the twentieth century. It became a political controversy as well as a legal dispute. As the white prosecutrix of nine black youths during an era of racial prejudice in the South, she aroused the attention of the nation. The prosecutions were among the first to focus the conscience of the nation on the question of the ability of our system of justice to provide fair trials to blacks in the South. The question persists today. As long as the question remains, the Scottsboro boys case will not be relegated to the dusty pages of the scholarly treatise. It will remain a living controversy.

C. Evidence Insufficient to Support Malice A plaintiff may not recover under the malice standard unless there is “clear and convincing proof” that the defamation was published “with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.” *Gertz*,. There is no evidence that NBC had knowledge that its portrayal of Victoria Price was false or that NBC recklessly disregarded the truth. The derogatory portrayal of Price in the movie is based in all material respects on the detailed findings of Judge Horton at the trial and Dr. Carter in his book. When the truth is uncertain and seems undiscoverable through further investigation, reliance on these two sources is not unreasonable.

We gain perspective on this question when we put to ourselves another case. Dr. Carter, in his book, persuasively argues, based on the evidence, that the Communist Party financed and controlled the defense of the Scottsboro boys. A different playwright might choose to portray Judge Horton as some Southern newspapers portrayed him at the time — as an evil judge who associated himself with a Communist cause and gave his approval to interracial rape in order to curry favor with the eastern press. The problem would be similar had Judge

Horton — for many years before his death an obscure private citizen — sued the publisher for libel.

Some controversial historical events like the Scottsboro trials become symbolic and take on an overlay of political meaning. Speech about such events becomes in part political speech. The hypothetical case and the actual case before us illustrate that an individual's social philosophy and political leanings color his historical perspective. His political opinions cause him to draw different lessons from history and to see historical events and facts in a different light. He believes the historical evidence he wants to believe and casts aside other evidence to the contrary. So long as there is no evidence of bad faith or conscious or extreme disregard of the truth, the speaker in such a situation does not violate the malice standard. His version of history may be wrong, but the law does not punish him for being a bad historian.

The malice standard is flexible and encourages diverse political opinions and robust debate about social issues. It tolerates silly arguments and strange ways of yoking facts together in unusual patterns. But it is not infinitely expandable. It does not abolish all the common law of libel even in the political context. It still protects us against the “big political lie,” the conscious or reckless falsehood. We do not have that in this case.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Defamation Still Hot

Did Amber Heard defame Johnny Depp when she wrote an op-ed for the Washington Post titled “I spoke up against sexual violence — and faced our culture's wrath. That has to change.” Depp isn't mentioned by name, but in Virginia (where he's suing and the Post has its printing presses) plaintiffs can pursue claims for defamation by inference, implication or insinuation. [*Johnny Depp Seeks Defamation Trial Delay*](#).

Sarah Palin will proceed to trial against The New York Times next February (2021), pandemic permitting. U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff rejected the paper's summary judgment motion in a big libel case over an editorial about gun violence. The editorial linked one of Palin's political action committee ads to a 2011 mass shooting that severely wounded then-Arizona Congresswoman Gabby Giffords. The New York federal judge concluded that Palin had provided enough evidence to establish actual malice on the part of the paper's former op-ed chief. [*Sarah Palin Gets Libel Trial Against New York Times | Hollywood Reporter*](#).

Summary Judgment in Defamation Cases

Surviving summary judgment is a landmark in any litigation, but especially so in a defamation lawsuit. Recall from your Civil Procedure class, that in [*Anderson v. Liberty Lobby*](#), (US 1986), the United States Supreme Court held under Federal Rule 56 a trial court weighing a motion for summary judgment must take into account the burden plaintiff will have to meet at trial. In other words, if plaintiff is a public figure suing a tabloid, plaintiff will have to prove actual malice at trial, and the appropriate summary judgment question will be whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not.

Critics of [*Anderson*](#) argue that this amounts to a trial on paper, because a court must “pre-screen” many factual issues, which are usually the province of jurors. Whether the issue is a matter of public or private concern is a question for the judge, and some circuits say that this is so even if disputed facts preclude resolution of the issue at the summary judgment stage. Questions like: How widely known is the plaintiff? Did plaintiff have access to the media to defend herself? Was her participation voluntary?

Some explain the odds of winning a defamation lawsuit by way of the rule of three-fourths. Defendants win 75% of defamation suits by way of summary judgment, usually on the “actual malice” issue. Of cases that go to trial, plaintiffs win more than 75% of the jury verdicts with median awards over a \$1 million. On appeal, 75% of the defendants get the verdicts at least partially reversed.

What About Other Torts?

What if instead of suing for defamation, the unhappy public figure sues for intentional infliction of emotional distress?

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,

United States Supreme Court (1988)

- [Hustler v. Falwell at Google Scholar](#).
- [Hustler v. Falwell at Westlaw](#)
- [Hustler v. Falwell at Wikipedia](#).
- [Image of the Campari ad](#).

The inside front cover of the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a “parody” of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur that contained the name

and picture of preacher Jerry Falwell and was entitled “Jerry Falwell talks about his first time.” This parody was modeled after actual Campari ads that included interviews with various celebrities about their “first times.” Although it was apparent by the end of each interview that this meant the first time they sampled Campari, the ads clearly played on the sexual double entendre of the general subject of “first times.” Copying the form and layout of these Campari ads, Hustler’s editors chose respondent as the featured celebrity and drafted an alleged “interview” with him in which he states that his “first time” was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The Hustler parody portrays respondent and his mother as drunk and immoral, and suggests that respondent is a hypocrite who preaches only when he is drunk. In small print at the bottom of the page, the ad contains the disclaimer, “ad parody — not to be taken seriously.” The magazine’s table of contents also lists the ad as “Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody.”

Soon after the November issue of Hustler became available to the public, Falwell sued Hustler Magazine and Larry Flynt to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy (celebrity/publicity rights), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case proceeded to trial. At the close of the evidence, the District Court granted a directed verdict for Flynt and Hustler on the invasion of privacy (celebrity/publicity rights) claim. The jury then found against Falwell on the libel claim, specifically finding that the ad parody could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about Falwell or actual events in which he participated.” The jury found for Falwell on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, however, and stated that he should be awarded \$100,000 in compensatory damages, as well as \$50,000 each in punitive damages from petitioners. Petitioners’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed ... rejecting Flynt and Hustler’s argument that the “actual malice” standard of *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* (US 1964) must be met before Falwell (concededly a public figure) could recover for emotional distress.

In the Fourth Circuit’s view, the *New York Times* decision emphasized the constitutional importance not of the falsity of the statement or the defendant’s disregard for the truth, but of the heightened level of culpability embodied in the requirement of “knowing . . . or reckless” conduct. Here, the *New York Times* standard is satisfied by the state-law requirement, and the jury’s finding, that the defendants have acted intentionally or recklessly, and that the sole issue before the court was “whether the ad’s publication was sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.”

This case presents us with a novel question involving First Amendment

limitations upon a State's authority to protect its citizens from the intentional infliction of emotional distress. We must decide whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most. Falwell would have us find that a State's interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved. This we decline to do....

Of course, this does not mean that *any* speech about a public figure is immune from sanction in the form of damages. Since [*New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*](#) (US 1964), we have consistently ruled that a public figure may hold a speaker liable for the damage to reputation caused by publication of a defamatory falsehood, but only if the statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." ... False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective. See [*Gertz*](#). But even though falsehoods have little value in and of themselves, they are "nevertheless inevitable in free debate," and a rule that would impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual assertions would have an undoubted "chilling" effect on speech relating to public figures that does have constitutional value. "Freedoms of expression require breathing space." ... This breathing space is provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only when they can prove *both* that the statement was false and that the statement was made with the requisite level of culpability.

Respondent argues, however, that a different standard should apply in this case because here the State seeks to prevent not reputational damage, but the severe emotional distress suffered by the person who is the subject of an offensive publication. Cf. [*Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.*](#), (US 1977) (ruling that the "actual malice" standard does not apply to the tort of appropriation of a right of publicity). In respondent's view, and in the view of the Court of Appeals, so long as the utterance was intended to inflict emotional distress, was outrageous, and did in fact inflict serious emotional distress, it is of no constitutional import whether the statement was a fact or an opinion, or whether it was true or false. It is the intent to cause injury that is the gravamen of the tort, and the State's interest in preventing emotional harm simply outweighs whatever interest a speaker may have in speech of this type.

Generally speaking the law does not regard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which should receive much solicitude, and it is quite understandable that

most if not all jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the conduct in question is sufficiently “outrageous.” But in the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment. In *Garrison v. Louisiana* (US 1964), we held that even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill will his expression was protected by the First Amendment:

“Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.” *Id.*, at 73.

Thus while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public figures.

Were we to hold otherwise, there can be little doubt that political cartoonists and satirists would be subjected to damages awards without any showing that their work falsely defamed its subject. Webster’s defines a caricature as “the deliberately distorted picturing or imitating of a person, literary style, etc. by exaggerating features or mannerisms for satirical effect.” The appeal of the political cartoon or caricature is often based on exploitation of unfortunate physical traits or politically embarrassing events — an exploitation often calculated to injure the feelings of the subject of the portrayal. The art of the cartoonist is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-sided. One cartoonist expressed the nature of the art in these words:

“The political cartoon is a weapon of attack, of scorn and ridicule and satire; it is least effective when it tries to pat some politician on the back. It is usually as welcome as a bee sting and is always controversial in some quarters.”

Several famous examples of this type of intentionally injurious speech were drawn by Thomas Nast, probably the greatest American cartoonist to date, who was associated for many years during the post-Civil War era with Harper’s Weekly. In the pages of that publication Nast conducted a graphic vendetta against William M. “Boss” Tweed and his corrupt associates in New York City’s “Tweed Ring.” It has been described by one historian of the subject as “a sustained attack which in its passion and effectiveness stands alone in the history of American graphic art.” ... Another writer explains that the success of the Nast cartoon was achieved “because of the emotional impact of its presentation. It continuously goes beyond the bounds of good taste and conventional manners.”

Despite their sometimes caustic nature, from the early cartoon portraying George

Washington as an ass down to the present day, graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political debate. Nast's castigation of the Tweed Ring, Walt McDougall's characterization of Presidential candidate James G. Blaine's banquet with the millionaires at Delmonico's as "The Royal Feast of Belshazzar," and numerous other efforts have undoubtedly had an effect on the course and outcome of contemporaneous debate. Lincoln's tall, gangling posture, Teddy Roosevelt's glasses and teeth, and Franklin D. Roosevelt's jutting jaw and cigarette holder have been memorialized by political cartoons with an effect that could not have been obtained by the photographer or the portrait artist. From the viewpoint of history it is clear that our political discourse would have been considerably poorer without them.

Falwell contends, however, that the caricature in question here was so "outrageous" as to distinguish it from more traditional political cartoons. There is no doubt that the caricature of respondent and his mother published in *Hustler* is at best a distant cousin of the political cartoons described above, and a rather poor relation at that. If it were possible by laying down a principled standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would probably suffer little or no harm. But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description "outrageous" does not supply one.

"Outrageousness" in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An "outrageousness" standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience. See [*NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.*](#) (US 1982) ("Speech does not lose its protected character. . . simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action").

We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the publication *contains a false statement of fact* which was made with "actual malice," *i.e.*, with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.

For reasons heretofore stated this claim cannot, consistently with the First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages when the conduct in question is the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody involved here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly

Reversed.

Helpful Links

- [Wikipedia: Defamation Per Se](#)
- [Special Note on the Impact of the First Amendment of the Constitution on the Law of Defamation](#)
- [“Fact-Based Stories” from the Independent Producers Survival Guide: A Business and Legal Sourcebook 4th Ed. 2009.](#)
- [Defamation Law Made Simple at Nolo.com.](#)
- [FreeAdvice: How to Prove Libel or Slander.](#)
- [Eric E. Johnson, Defamation Flowchart.](#)

Reference/Footnote Cases

- [Spahn v. Julian Mesner](#), 260 NYS2d 451 (1965).
- [False Light at Wikipedia.](#)

Totally Optional Readings & Viewings

‘American Hustle’ Sparks \$1 Million Libel Lawsuit Former New Yorker writer and journalist, [Paul Brodeur says his reputation was damaged by claims about microwaves that the film falsely attributes to him.](#):

It’s a very brief exchange in American Hustle: Jennifer Lawrence’s character Roslyn tells her husband, Irving, played by Christian Bale, that microwaves take the nutrition out of food. “That’s bullshit,” Irving replies, and his wife shows him a magazine and says, “It’s not bullshit. I read it in an article. Look, by Paul Brodeur.”

The real Brodeur is a science journalist who was a staff writer at The New Yorker for nearly 40 years. He’s even written books (such as *The Zapping of America*) about the dangers of microwave radiation. But he’s never said that they take the nutrition out of food, he claims in a new lawsuit.

[A judge is allowing Paul Brodeur to proceed with claims](#) that in the film, he was harmfully named as the source of information that microwaves take nutrition out of food.

“Wolf of Wall Street” Defamation Lawsuit [Paramount \(Almost\) Beats ‘Wolf of Wall Street’ Defamation Lawsuit](#)

Andrew Greene, who was on the board of directors at Stratton Oakmont when Jordan Belfort resigned after a federal law enforcement crackdown, filed the lawsuit in February 2014.

According to his complaint, he was the basis for the toupee-wearing character of Nicky “Rugrat” Koskoff, played by actor P.J. Byrne, who memorably was the subject of mean comments from others including Leonardo DiCaprio’s Belfort, who remarked, “Swear to God, I want to choke him to death.”

Greene says the film changed his nickname from “Wigwam” to “Rugrat,” but that his likeness was unmistakable and that the film “portrayed [him] as a criminal, drug user, degenerate, depraved, and/or devoid of any morality or ethics.”

More

- [The People Versus Larry Flynt](#) (stars Woody Harrelson and Courtney Love). This is a love song to the First Amendment directed by Czech director Milos Forman telling the tale of preacher Jerry Falwell’s [landmark Supreme Court case](#) against Larry Flynt, the publisher of *Hustler Magazine* (on reserve in Schmid Library).
- Amy J. Field, [A Curtain Call for Docudrama-Defamation Actions: A Clear Standard Takes a Bow](#). Casenote discussing *Davis v. Costa-Gavras* (SDNY 1987).
- [Reverse defamation, the Newsweek Bitcoin story, and Satoshi Nakamoto](#)
- [What is More Defamatory? A False Accusation of Homophobia or of Homosexuality?](#)

Scarlett Johanssen Sues French Novelist

- [Seeing read: Scarlett Johansson sues French novelist.](#)
- [Scarlett Johansson wins defamation case against French novelist.](#)

Courtney Love & Defamation via Twitter

- [Courtney Love commits defamation via Twitter—Twice!](#)
- [Courtney Love wins ‘Twibel’ case](#)

Because the attorney was deemed to be a limited-purpose public figure as a result of her connection to a celebrity, Holmes needed to demonstrate that Love acted with malice. Love defended herself by saying she meant the tweet to be a private direct message, and when

she learned it had been sent to the public accidentally, quickly deleted it.

Love also testified that she believed her message to be true when she sent it. That might have been the prevailing defense. The jury answered no to the question, “Did Rhonda Holmes prove by clear and convincing evidence that Courtney Love knew it was false or doubted the truth of it?”

Who Are “The News Media?” Blurred lines: Ninth Circuit applies same First Amendment protections to bloggers as traditional media. [Bloggers enjoy same First Amendment Protections as Traditional Media.](#)