

Module 4

Network Security and Privacy

Network basics

- Five-Layer Model:

If Alice sends Bob (web server) a GET request:

- It is an HTTP/HTTPS message (**Layer 5**)
- It is wrapped in a TCP segment to deliver to the right port and guarantee order and correctness (**Layer 4**)
- It is then wrapped in an IP packet to deliver to the right IP address (**Layer 3**)
- It is then wrapped in a data link (e.g. Ethernet) frame for the MAC address of the closest router interface (**Layer 2**)
- It is then sent onto the wire (**Layer 1**)

Network basics

- Five-Layer Model:

5: Application

4: Transport

3: Network

2: Data Link

1: Physical

Security in the five-layer model

- Layer 5: TLS, Tor (this module), etc.
- Layer 4: TCP (poor security!)
- Layer 3: IP (poor security!)
- Layer 2: Ethernet (no assumed security)
- Layer 1: Physical (no assumed security)

Issues with TCP/IP Security


- No authentication of IP (send your packets to me, I am <web server>)
- No authentication of transmission path (send your packets to me, I will deliver them to <web server>)
- Various ways to achieve DoS (Denial of Service)
- Leveraging services for DDoS attacks
- (Others)

The early Internet was built on an assumption of honesty


Network basics

When you connect to a website:

1. DNS resolution of **website name** into **IP address**
(for humans) (for machines)




I want to go to
www.bob.com



OK! They are at
66.33.204.254


DNS
resolver



Network basics

When you connect to a website:


2. Create packet with your IP/port and website IP/port



Network basics

When you connect to a website:


3. Packet is sent across the Internet towards the target server, carried by ISPs through TCP/IP



Discovering Victims

Port scanning

- Send packet to port, reply: open, closed, no reply
- Detect vulnerable network-facing programs
- Can scan the entire Internet in minutes
- Important component of pentests



Attacks

We will discuss two types of attacks:

- Impersonation Attacks (“Spoofing”)
 - Faking identity
 - Manipulates user trust of the Internet
- DoS Attacks
 - Take down services/targets
 - Redirection and Amplification

Impersonation Attacks

Fake host names:

- Register a web address similar to a real one
 - Typo: payapl.com
 - Visual: paypa1.com
 - Phonetic: paypel.com
 - Conceptual: paypalsecurity.com
- Link shorteners

Impersonation Attacks

IP spoofing:

- Write a fake address as your IP for your packets, pretending to be someone else
- Redirects return traffic to spoofed target
- Basis of many other attacks - unexpected behavior/denial of service




I am Alice!
I am attacking you!

Impersonation Attacks

DNS cache poisoning:

- Makes a DNS server “remember” a wrong IP address for a human-readable address
- Redirects traffic to attacker's control
- Attacker can then compromise confidentiality, or feed fake files to the user
- Similar: Web cache poisoning



Impersonation Attacks

DNS cache poisoning:

- Normally, recursive DNS servers ask *authoritative* servers for responses
- An attacker spoofs the IP of the authoritative server to reply, because there is no “proof” of an authoritative DNS server
- DNSSEC resolves this issue by using signature/verification schemes

Impersonation Attacks

Phishing:

- Tempts users (generally web-browsing or e-mail) to click a link or perform an action
- Spear-phishing: Highly targeted, personalized, uses data available on social media
 - Very hard to defend against! (e.g. cannot filter with firewall)

DoS Attacks

Smurf attack: (Amplification)

- Spoof victim's IP
- Send packet to network broadcast address
- Machines on the network will respond to this packet to the spoofed IP
- Nowadays: Packets to broadcast addresses are blocked

Attacker

Hi everyone!
I'm Alice!



Hi Alice!
Hi Alice!

Hi Alice!
Hi Alice!

???



DoS Attacks

SYN flood:

- SYN is the start-up message of TCP
- Send many SYN messages, force server to open many connections
- Connections are memory-intensive

I have opened
a TCP connection.
Please keep it open.

Please keep it open.

I have opened
a TCP connection.

I have opened
a TCP connection.
Please keep it open.

DoS Attacks

TCP/IP Fragmentation:

- Maximum IP datagram size is 65535 bytes, maximum ethernet frame size is usually 1500 bytes
- During transmission a single IP datagram can be fragmented into many packets
- Each IP datagram has an offset to aid in assembly
- Poor implementation of fragmentation caused vulnerabilities: ping of death, teardrop attack

DoS Attacks

Ping of death:

- Maximum offset field is a 13-bit number parsed as number of octets: 65528 bytes $(2^{13} - 1) \times 8$
- Maximum IP datagram size is 65535 bytes
- $65528 + 1500 > 65535$
- If you implemented packets with an array:
> `char packet_contents[65535];`
You can now have a buffer overflow!

*check size first
and put content*

DoS Attacks

Teardrop attack:


- Since the attacker can set offset and contents herself, she can craft special IP fragments that have contradictions or problems

- 1) Send many tiny fragments to eat up CPU, never allowing reassembly
- 2) Send a fragment that would be completely contained in a previous fragment

Attacker

Bytes 1 to 6 are: HELLO!
Bytes 3 to 5 are: LLO

Crash!



DoS Attacks

Distributed DoS: *not require
can do by one machine*

- Control many machines, flood the victim
- Attacks are often short, hit critical moments
- Amplification:
 - Increase attack size
 - e.g. DNS response >> query size
- Reflection:
 - Redirect to target by spoofing target, then making query

NTP amplification on CloudFlare

- NTP service allows online clock synchronization
- NTP allows 206-times amplification
- 400 Gbps amplified by 4500 NTP servers from possibly single server


people stop pinging NTP server

I'm Alice. Return the last 600 IP address that accessed this NTP server to me!

Attacker


OK!

NTP Server




DDoS on Dyn

- Dyn was a DNS resolver
- 1200 Gbps requests to Dyn from massive IoT botnet called Mirai
- Many top sites taken down for a day
- Mirai simply logged in using factory-default passwords
- No amplification!



Botnets

- Consists of:
 - Many zombie computers (bots)
 - A master
- Spam, DDoS, social media, bitcoin mining



Source: BotMiner (Gu et al.)

Botnets

- Command and Control systems:
 - Public channels (IRC, Twitter, etc.)
 - Peer-to-peer
 - Fast-flux: repeatedly registering different IP addresses for one domain at DNS
 - Domain Generation Algorithm: register many random domain names at DNS
 - Bots contact random domain names as well
 - e.g. Conficker (generates 50,000 domains and contacts 500 every day)
- Defended by: Sinkholing, usually with ISP cooperation or registrar cooperation

Defenses

Many attacks can be mitigated by packet filtering:



Packets can be filtered based on:

- headers (source, destination, size, etc.)
- contents (payload)

Firewall



Most computers have *personal* firewalls
But there are also *network-based* firewalls

don't know what's behind

Firewall

Firewall features:

doesn't have memory to do anything

- Stateless packet filtering: can block malicious IPs, attack code, “legitimate” but vulnerable protocols
- Egress/ingress filtering: Block IPs that don't make sense based on the network structure
- Deep Packet Inspection: Read packet content to decide what to block
- Intrusion prevention

attack
 $A \rightarrow B$
block

go out *go in* *IP come from outside not belong to yourself*
address

Intrusion Detection System

- Detects intrusions, but does not block them
- Logs intrusions, raises alarm
- Two types, often used together:
 - Network-based
 - Host-based
- Subject to the base rate fallacy



Base rate fallacy

attack? attack✓

- True Positive Rate = Percentage of intrusions that raise alarms
- False Positive Rate = Percentage of non-intrusions that raise alarms *attack? attackX*
- Even if TPR (“accuracy”) is very high, if the FPR is greater than the base rate of intrusions, then the majority of alarms are false (low precision)
- e.g. Boy who cries wolf (TPR = 100%, but low precision; eaten by wolf)

Intrusion Detection System

Network-based (NIDS):

- Detects malicious **packets**
- Monitors traffic after a firewall
- Behavior-based, or signature-based
 - Similar to malware scanning
- May be offline for efficiency reasons

Intrusion Detection System

Host-based (HIDS):

- Detects malicious **system (filesystem)** changes
- Scans and saves clean system
- Later, scans new system after changes
- Detects malicious changes to critical aspects of system




compare



after possible attack

Proxies (HTTP Request)



Proxies

Also useful for *anonymity*:

- Attackers can see source, destination IP (metadata)
- Sending packet from Alice to proxy:

Source IP: <Alice>

Destination IP: <Proxy>

- Sending packet from proxy to true destination:

Source IP: <Proxy>

Destination IP: <Destination>

- Can also encrypt to improve confidentiality/integrity (but you have to trust the proxy)
- Application-specific

VPN


Similar to proxies, except:

- Always uses encryption
- Routes all network traffic
- May have many hops (not necessarily encrypted within the hops)



Anonymity Network

*not know
the resource destination
at same time*



Anonymity Network


A chain of proxies with these properties:

- Only the **first** proxy knows who you are.
- Only the **final** proxy knows your destination.
- Encryption is layered such that only the **final** proxy can read your packets.
- e.g. Remailer systems, Tor




email

Tor



$$Enc_{K1, K2, K3}(M) = Enc_{K1}(Enc_{K2}(Enc_{K3}(M)))$$


Onion Routing Circuit



- Protects privacy, anonymity
- Usable directly with Tor Browser
- Some sites block it while others adjust for it
- Relies on volunteer nodes, which may misbehave
 - Peek into your packets
 - De-anonymization attacks

Tor

- Tor bridges:
 - Secret instead of publicly known
 - Only carries traffic to Tor nodes
 - Censorship resistance



Tor

- Hidden services
 - Allows web servers and clients to communicate over Tor
 - Client accesses the server using a .onion address, never knows their real IP
 - Used to protect the server's privacy
 - “Dark Web”, “Onionland”