


Lesson 11 - Security / Auditing / Monitoring

Security / Best Practices

Ecosystem

The Web3 Security Stack



This landscape is not exhaustive and contains Coinbase Ventures portfolio companies. See disclosures at the end of the article

Consensys Best Practices

General

- Prepare for Failure
- Stay up to Date
- Keep it Simple
- Rolling out
- Blockchain Properties
- Simplicity vs. Complexity

Precautions

- General
- Upgradeability
- Circuit Breakers
- Speed Bumps

- [Rate Limiting](#)
- [Deployment](#)
- [Safe Haven](#)

Solidity Specific

- [Assert, Require, Revert](#)
- [Modifiers as Guards](#)
- [Integer Division](#)
- [Abstract vs Interfaces](#)
- [Fallback Functions](#)
- [Payability](#)
- [Visibility](#)
- [Locking Pragmas](#)
- [Event Monitoring](#)
- [Shadowing](#)
- [tx.origin](#)
- [Timestamp Dependence](#)
- [Complex Inheritance](#)
- [Interface Types](#)
- [EXTCODESIZE Checks](#)

Token Specific

- [Standardization](#)
- [Frontrunning](#)
- [Zero Address](#)
- [Contract Address](#)

Documentation

- [General](#)
- [Specification](#)
- [Status](#)
- [Procedures](#)
- [Known Issues](#)
- [History](#)

- [Contact](#)

Attacks

- [Reentrancy](#)
 - [Oracle Manipulation](#)
 - [Frontrunning](#)
 - [Timestamp Dependence](#)
 - [Insecure Arithmetic](#)
 - [Denial of Service](#)
 - [Griefing](#)
 - [Force Feeding](#)
-

Audit Process and Reporting

The audit process varies greatly from company to company, and between individuals as there is, as yet, no generally-accepted industry standard process.

Smart contract auditing is a niche information security service. It arose out of necessity.

Smart contracts audits aim to prevent the pain entrepreneurs, developers and users experience when Ethereum contracts are hacked or otherwise fail.

Immutability implies that repair may be difficult and costly, or impossible.

Immutability implies a requirement for debut production releases to be free of defects, but errors and oversights are likely to remain commonplace as new developers enter the space.

The EVM is an unfamiliar platform, blockchain is, at first, an unfamiliar paradigm, and Solidity is, at first, an unfamiliar language. It is not reasonable to expect perfection from new developers.

Observing projects getting killed by preventable problems increased general awareness of the importance of preventative quality-assurance.

Two approaches shaped the formative Ethereum code security industry.

1. Bug Bounties

The first of these is Bug Bounties. Bug bounties are a time-tested approach to reinforcing information security. Organizations such as HackerOne , organize bug bounties for corporate clients. Bug Bounties are a way of reaching out to large numbers of qualified developers, to possibly discover critical issues.

2. Formal Verification

Formal verification is the process by which one proves properties of a system mathematically. In order to do that one writes a formal specification of the application behavior. The formal specification is analogous to our Statement of Intended Behavior, but it is written in a machine-readable language. The formal specification is later proved (or not) using one of the available tools.

What is an Audit

An audit is:

- An assessment of your secure development process.
- The best option available to identify subtle vulnerabilities.
- A systematic method for assessing the quality and security of code.

An opportunity to:

- Learn from experts
- Identify gaps in your process
- Identify underspecified areas of your system

An audit can not:

- Replace internal quality assurance
- Overcome excessive complexity or poor architecture
- Guarantee no bugs or vulnerabilities

Audit Companies

[Open Zeppelin](#)

[Certik](#)

[Peckshield](#)

[Extropy](#)

When choosing a company, you might want to look at the Rekt News
[LeaderBoard](#)

The Audit Process

Auditing a smart contract entails a methodical review of the in-scope source code, in order to provide reasonable assurance that the code behaves as expected, and contains no vulnerabilities.

Reasonable assurance is important because it is impossible to ensure a piece of code contains no bugs. Beware of this when wording reports. Declaring a code base is bug free is irresponsible, and can lead to liability problems.

The company receives a defense against possible liability. The auditor accepts reputational risk.

For emphasis, auditors should apply care to all forms of communication to avoid a situation in which the auditor appears to take on, perhaps unwittingly, liability for the project.

How Will They all Fit Together?

The best processes will mix and layer a number of approaches, increasing the probability of finding a bug, if one exists.

A recent example is MakerDAO's Multi Collateral DAI set of smart contracts. Most of the smart contracts were formally verified and an audit was conducted. This was the start of an excellent process. Even so, a USD \$50,000 critical bug was awarded by their Bug Bounty program, demonstrating the value of a Bug Bounty even after audits and formal verification.

The process we recommend is an audit, or audits, followed by a well-funded bug bounty that is open for sufficient time to build confidence in the project and with significant rewards for finding critical bugs.

Code freeze

From a software engineering perspective, a Freeze is a period when the rules that govern changes become more strict. Freezes are used for a variety of reasons. For example a team might implement a Feature Freeze to prevent any new features being added so they can focus on testing, issue resolution, even documentation and marketing collateral. A Specifications Freeze might block further design changes so that implementation of the specification can proceed.

In our case, a Code Freeze is a full code freeze - no changes of any kind while the audit is performed. Smart contract audits are normally performed on repository containing the code, so no commits are permitted during the audit.

This means development is finished. The developers made their best effort to create an application that behaves exactly as specified and contains no bugs.

This is very important. The main reason is obvious: Auditors should look at the version that is going to be deployed. Smart contracts are immutable (we'll get to upgradeability hacks shortly). The audit can be thought of as a dress rehearsal for actual deployment. After deployment, remediation of defects will be either extremely costly or completely impossible. An audit is always about a precise deployment candidate. Future versions of that candidate (if any) must be considered unaudited, since any change is potentially a source of new problems.

The business world applies tremendous pressure on this process. Deadline pressure will invariably push against the ideals of thoroughness and process integrity. As the auditor who accepts reputational risk and endorses the audit finding, your duty is to defend the integrity of the process.

Always request a commit and stick to that during the audit, while also documenting it in the report. Never try to audit a moving target. The effectiveness of your work will be impaired, as will your reputation.

Specifying intended behaviour

The auditor is tasked with ensuring the application behaves as specified. Where, exactly, is application behavior specified? This will vary greatly from project to project, but ideally there should exist a succinct document outlining the goal of the application, what is allowed and what is prevented. We call this a Statement of Intended Behavior. It should be precise and unambiguous so auditors can compare what the developers want to happen and the code that is intended to make it happen.

A Statement of Intended Behaviour will be presented as a separate document, sometimes as part of the repository's wiki or readme.md. Sometimes the document is simply non-existent. In such a case, request that the developer, along with the rest of his team create a document before the audit starts. Input

from business-focused professionals is valuable. Sometimes, they will have a clearer view of how the system should behave.

The size of the specification will be proportional to the complexity of the application. To generalize for any application, the specs should include:

- Goal of the application
- Main flows
- The actors / roles and what they do
- Access restrictions
- Failure states to be avoided

One caveat: You will stumble upon specifications that seem to be wrong, and in fact are. If you notice that the owner of the contract can drain the contract of user's funds, it seems obvious that it needs to be reported. But what if the client has specified this as intended behavior?

This is always a tough call, and has been discussed many times such as in [Adam Kolar's article](#) and recently in the [unsolicited audit of Compound Finance's contracts](#).

When in doubt, document the issue in the report. The whole purpose of our industry is to create systems where trust is not required, or its role is greatly minimized.

Estimating and price quotes

The goal of an estimate is to efficiently assess the key factors that tend to affect actual effort / hours. In this context, "efficiently" means to limit oneself to a superficial perusal of the code that won't take too long. The key is to know what to look for.

Many companies quote based on lines of code. In our experience, line count (quantity) is a very poor indicator. Complexity is a better indicator of the actual time required for the audit process. A very large, monolithic smart contract will often be easier to audit than a handful of very small smart contracts that interact in multiple ways.

In our experience, good indicators to note include:

- The count of external calls: The number of external calls is a good indicator because they impact the code base complexity in a number of ways. Even simple implementations such as an ERC20 token can have an impact on a calling smart contract: [USDT and OMG tokens do not return true for successful transfers](#), for example. Contracts can be maliciously altered too, so if you are calling untrusted contracts, this has to be accounted for. Recently [SpankChain was hacked and the attacker used a rogue ERC20 token implementation](#). The rogue contract implemented the ERC20 standard interface, but when called for a transfer would re-enter SpankChain's contract.
- The count of public / external functions: These are the points of entry. Execution starts here. They will determine the number of paths possible during execution.
- Use of Solidity Assembly: Solidity Assembly takes a lot longer to audit. Code is harder to read, several opcodes that are not accessible via Solidity are at the developer's disposal and none of Solidity's usual safeguards apply.
- Code Smell
- Other signs of cleverness, novel solutions: Anything not idiomatic

When the Client Proposes the Scope

- To audit only certain files in the overall project
- To audit an amended version of something that was audited before, possibly by someone else.

There are important considerations to keep in mind in these cases.

- **Treat all out-of-scope contracts as untrusted contracts.** This may be counter-intuitive to the client, because they trust them. Again, your duty is to safeguard the integrity of the process and your audit team's reputation. If you do not review them, treat them (and most importantly, calls to them from the in-scope contracts) as interactions with untrusted contracts.
- **Treat all audits as full audits.** It is not uncommon that clients request a follow-up audit on code that has previously been audited and changed just a bit. If you were not the first auditor, make sure to quote a full audit of the code.
Lastly, if you notice important parts of the code base are out of scope, take time to guide your client to understand the risks involved. Remember, clients and readers of your report are depending on you to identify and raise concerns.

The Process

Extropy uses a very particular process, that we feel is ideal for auditing smart contracts. All audits include three auditors in the team, with the exception of some very low complexity audits, in which case we allow teams of two.

We schedule a debrief meeting close to the delivery day.

It's not uncommon that a vulnerability will be found by say only two out of three. This is, itself, an advantage of layering independent audits, diverse sets of experience, and uniquely personal work processes.

We do not require the auditors to follow a prescribed process. Auditors are encouraged to audit using the tools they know and trust, inspecting code in the ways that best suit them.

In that debrief meeting, the reports are merged into the final Extropy report that is delivered to the client.



Remediation Period

After the report is delivered the project enters a phase in which the client can report fixes that will be verified and documented by the team. The effectiveness of the fixes is verified by the audit team. This is to confirm that the fixes actually work and, importantly, do not create new issues.

The commits in which each issue was fixed are included, as well as a last-reviewed version both in the summary and in the conclusion of the report.

Our reports can be public, at the discretion of the client.

After the Audit

We encourage clients to proceed to a bug bounty with significant rewards, as another way to layer mitigation of the risk of bugs and their impact.

In bug bounties, the hunters tend to look for critical bugs, but report whatever they see along the way. They tend to not look over the whole codebase, but they spend time in areas that appear to be high-risk. In combination with an audit, the entire code base is secured by an audit, and the high risk areas are further secured by more eyes and more imagination focused on the code. That's more experts applying their experience, their imagination and their skills to mitigate the risk that something subtle has gone unnoticed.

Audit Report

The Audit Report is the deliverable of the engagement. As such, it's important that it includes defined sections and communicates the project completely.

These are the normalized section headings of an audit report:

- Identification of the client
- Date
- Scope (list all files)
- Commit hash and repository address
- Bugs
- Audit Methodology
- Conclusion

Document who requested the audit. It's acceptable if the client requested anonymity. Your report should indicate this explicitly. Also document the date the audit was published, the files reviewed, bugs and concerns discovered and an overall conclusion about the health of the application.

Be aware of the audience, for example, the client might be a Venture Capitalist with limited understanding of the technical details.

Not all Audit Reports are prepared for such diverse audiences. If delivering to developers on a confidential basis, it may be acceptable to be less didactic while ensuring that bugs are clearly and concisely described and that the introduction and conclusion can be understood by the average ethereum user (a technically literate user).

In particular, be sure to describe the potential impact (why it matters) in terms that are understandable by the widest possible audience, and explanations in terms a developer can parse to comprehend the precise nature of the bug without further explanation.

Reporting Bugs

Bug reports are the main product of both audits and bug hunts. A bug report is only as good as the understanding it provokes in the mind of the receiver. The central task of a bug report is to make the issue crystal clear to other people.

Also keep in mind that the audience of a bug report is often the very people who either wrote the code or audited it. They have looked at it from many angles and your task is to change their minds about something they thought was correct. Explain in a matter-of-fact, non-accusatory tone and include sufficient information to support your claims.

Clearly describe the problem, the consequences, steps to get there, impact, severity and optionally a suggested direction for the fix.

Keep in mind that bugs are subjective. Indeed, considerable controversy can swirl around exactly what is and what is not a bug. For example, under certain conditions that probably cannot possibly exist, something terrible could happen. Or, under everyday conditions, something odd can happen but it is of no serious consequence.

Some good examples:

The ERC20 Approval Attack:

This is how the original ERC20 approval attack was described. Although the format is unusual, it has everything that a well-described bug should have: the context, the steps to the exploit, a brief analysis and a possible workaround.

CryptoKitties empty fallback:

This was found by Nick Johnson during the initial crypto kitties bug bounty. It follows a format more likely to be found in bug bounty and audit reports with concise explanation and consequences.

Categorization of Severity

Risk ratings, as well as the processes we've just seen, vary greatly between organizations. Each company will have its own way to classify bugs. Even when the familiar categories of critical, major, and minor are used, the definitions of what's included are inconsistent between firms.

This is another example of organizations in the space working independently on their own processes in a standards-free setting. When one finds a bug, it's important to categorize it properly, according to the local customs of the audit team or bug bounty program.

You need to be prepared to defend your classification of the bug as well as your description of the bug.

Several industry standards (in the wider security industry, not smart contract audits) address the topic. The most prominent of these is the OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) risk classification standard, which is used by the Ethereum Foundation and many others. Another is the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System).

OWASP

Risk = Likelihood * Impact

Risk equals the Likelihood of something materializing (or, in our case, the likelihood of the bug being exploited) times the Impact caused when it happens. This formulation is pervasive. It applies to everyone assessing risk across all domains.

With this understanding in mind, let's look at how OWASP breaks down likelihood and impact, making a previously purely interpretative assessment more objective.

Likelihood

OWASP breaks likelihood into two sub-dimensions. The final score is usually a simple average of all the values. The factors are:

Threat Agent Factors

Threat agent is the possible attacker. The goal here is to estimate the likelihood of a successful attack by this group of threat agents. Use the worst-case threat agent.

- **Skills:** How technically skilled is this group of threat agents?
- **Motive:** How motivated is this group of threat agents to find and exploit this vulnerability?
- **Opportunity:** What resources and opportunities are required for this group of threat agents to find and exploit this vulnerability?
- **Size:** How large is this group of threat agents?

Vulnerability Factors

The next set of factors are related to the vulnerability involved. The goal here is to estimate the likelihood of the particular vulnerability involved being discovered and exploited. Assume the threat agent selected above.

- Ease of discovery: How easy is it for this group of threat agents to discover this vulnerability?
- Ease of exploit: How easy is it for this group of threat agents to actually exploit this
- Awareness: How well-known is this vulnerability to this group of threat agents?
- Intrusion detection: How likely is an exploit to be detected?

Impact

Impact is usually measured in financial terms, in OWASP's case it also derives from a number of factors:

Technical Impact Factors

Technical impact can be broken down into factors aligned with the traditional security areas of concern: confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability. The goal is to estimate the magnitude of the impact on the system if the vulnerability were to be exploited.

- Loss of confidentiality
- Loss of integrity
- Loss of availability

- Loss of accountability

Business Impact Factors

The business impact stems from the technical impact, but requires a deep understanding of what is important to the company running the application. In general, you should be aiming to support your risks with business impact. The business risk is what justifies investment in fixing security problems.

The factors below are common areas for many businesses, but this area is even more unique to a company than the factors related to threat agent, vulnerability, and technical impact.

- Financial damage
- Reputation damage
- Non-compliance
- Privacy violation

OWASP provides a [nice spreadsheet](#) so we don't have to reinvent the wheel.

Although OWASP's model is the industry standard, when we look at our niche (Ethereum smart contracts), we'll find simpler models.

The model below is very simple, but can be applied to most smart-contract-only bug bounties:

- Critical: Stealing user funds, freezing funds in the smart contracts.
 - Major: A user obtains advantage over others in an unintended way.
 - Minor: Bugs that can cause friction to users, but put no funds at risk and create no unfair advantages for particular users.
 - Informational : A suggested better approach or optimisation
-

Auditing Techniques in more detail

It isn't a rule book to follow religiously but it's good to have these things in mind when you feel stuck in a particular project. The actual process of auditing is somewhat personal and you'll probably develop your own as you get more experienced, but here are a few guidelines:

High-Level Understanding

The first time you look into code, you don't necessarily need to be analytically looking for bugs or wrong implementations. You should aim to build a good mental model of how the whole system fits together. Unless some particular vulnerability jumps in front of you, don't focus too much on bugs on your first pass, just try and understand the system as a whole.

For this, a good practice is to skim over each file and read functions names and signatures. In most cases, although not always, the interface alone provides a good representation of functionality as well as the entry points of an application. Pay close attention to the inheritance scheme as it helps clarify the relationship between contracts.

Read the specification. Or not.

This topic is somewhat controversial. Some auditors do read the provided specification as a first step in an audit, as it helps to understand the intended behavior and save some time reasoning about the contracts. The counter argument is that most specifications are written by the developers themselves, and when you read their intentions, you will develop bias which might blind you to the objective facts of the code.

The detailed inspection

There is a multitude of approaches to this. For example, you could look through each `.sol` file individually or you could pick a functionality, say a deposit, and follow its flow, doing a kind of a mental transaction graph. Ideally, you should do both as each provides different kinds of insights.

A good practice is to take some time to actually run the code. Compile it if you can, run tests if they are present or even throw it on remix and use it a little just to get yourself familiar with it.



Auditing - the client perspective

Preparing for an Audit

Following these steps to prepare for an audit will go a long way to helping you get the best results.

1. Documentation
2. Clean code
3. Testing
4. Automated Analysis
5. Frozen code
6. Use a checklist

- We have a finite amount of time to audit your code.
- Preparation will help you get the most value from us.
- We must first understand your code, before we can identify subtle vulnerabilities.
- Imagine we're a new developer hired to join your team, but we only have a few days to ramp up.

1. Documentation

The less time we spend trying to understand your system, the faster we can get deep into your code, and the more time we can spend finding bugs. This is why the number one thing you can do to improve the quality of your audit is provide good documentation.

Good documentation starts with a *plain English* description of what you are building, and why you are building it. It should do this both for the overall system *and* for each unique contract within the system.


Another marker of good documentation is that it includes a specification of your system's intended functionality. For each contract, it should describe the most important properties or behaviors that should be maintained. It should also describe the actions and states that should not be possible.

One of the best examples we've seen is the [protocol spec for the OxProject](#). In particular, their use of flow charts nicely illustrates how the system fits together.

Trade settlement

A trade is initiated when an `order` is passed into the `Exchange` contract. If the `order` is valid, the `Exchange` contract will attempt to settle each leg of the trade by calling into the appropriate `AssetProxy` contract for each asset being exchanged. Each `AssetProxy` accepts and processes a payload of asset metadata and initiates a transfer. To simplify the trade settlement diagrams below, we assume that the orders being settled have zero fees.

ERC20 <> ERC20



Transaction #1

1. `Exchange.fillOrder(order, value)`
2. `ERC20Proxy.transferFrom(assetData, from, to, value)`
3. `ERC20Token(assetData.address).transferFrom(from, to, value)`
4. `ERC20Token: (revert on failure)`
5. `ERC20Proxy: (revert on failure)`
6. `ERC20Proxy.transferFrom(assetData, from, to, value)`
7. `ERC20Token(assetData.address).transferFrom(from, to, value)`
8. `ERC20Token: (revert on failure)`
9. `ERC20Proxy: (revert on failure)`
10. `Exchange: (return FillResults)`

Good documentation requires a lot of effort.

It can be useful for the auditors to document the code.

Writing our own documentation of the code's behavior is an excellent way to understand it. It can even lead us to discover vulnerabilities and unexpected edge cases.

What about a pseudocode spec? I placed an emphasis on "plain English" above (as opposed to rigid/formal English) because plain English more clearly expresses what you *want* the code to do. By contrast, the actual code is often so similar to the pseudocode specification that it can be hard to see when they both describe something you do not actually want.

Pseudocode does have its place and can be especially helpful for precisely describing complex mathematics, but it should always be accompanied by some English about what the math is meant to achieve.

The less time we spend trying to understand your system, the more time we can spend finding bugs.

GOOD DOCUMENTATION:

- Describes the overall system and its objectives

- Describes what should not be possible
- Lists which contracts are derived/deployed, and how they interact with one another

Documenting your code will also help you to improve it.

Example of good documentation: [Ox Protocol Specifications](#)

Example from [Polymath](#):

2. Clean up the code

Polished, well-formatted code is easier to read, which reduces the cognitive overhead needed to review it. A little bit of cleanup will go a long way towards allowing us to focus our energy on finding bugs.

1. Run a linter on your code. Fix any errors or warnings unless you have a good reason not to. For Solidity, we like [Ethlint](#). [Remix](#) also has a linter integrated at compile time. The [Solidity template]([Solidity Template](#)) bundles together some useful tools
 2. If the compiler outputs any warnings, address them.
 3. Remove any comments that indicate unfinished work (ie. `TODO` or `FIXME`).
(This is assuming it's your final audit before deploying to mainnet. If not, exercise your judgement about what makes sense to leave in.)
 4. Remove any code that has been commented out.
 5. Remove any code you don't need.
- Add helpful comments: explain the intent, i.e. what are you trying to do
 - Using [NatSpec](#) (natural specification) comments:

3. Testing

Write tests! A good goal is a test suite with [100% code coverage](#).

Review the list of test cases for gaps. Are your tests mostly focused on making sure the the ‘happy path’ works? Write some tests to verify undesirable actions are properly protected against, and that the contract fails properly instead of landing in an undesired state.

Important: Your README should give clear instructions for running the test suite. If any dependencies are not packaged with your code (e.g. Truffle), list them and their **exact** versions.

4. Automated Analysis

Ethereum has many good security analysis tools to help find some of the most common issues. We use some of these during our audits, though you can also run them in advance, which will allow us to spend our time looking for trickier bugs.

The [MythX](#) suite, which runs several kinds of analysis at once, is a great place to start. There are many ways to submit your contracts for analysis, including CLI tools for JavaScript and Python as well as plugins for Remix and Truffle.

You can find more security tools listed in [Smart Contract Best Practices](#).

There are useful plugins for Remix such as Mythx

In VSCode [Solidity Metrics](#) gives useful information.

The [Solidity 2 UML](#) tool is good for visualisation.

It’s not essential to do this, but it helps. A caveat is that you will often get warnings about issues that don’t actually exist.

5. Freeze the code

We can't audit a moving target

An audit is an investment in the security of your smart contract system. Besides selecting a high quality auditor for the work, there are several things you can do to make sure you get the most out of your investment.

At the start of our audit, confirm that you’ve “frozen the code” (i.e. halted development), and provide a specific git commit hash to be the target of our audit.

If a change comes in halfway through an audit, it means the auditors wasted time on old code. In addition, the auditors would have to stop and incorporate the change, which can have wide-ranging impacts on things like the threat model and other code that interacts with the changed code.

If your code won't be ready by the scheduled start date It's better to delay altogether than try to complete an audit while you continue development.


6. Use A Checklist

These steps are summarized in a [markdown checklist](#) that you can copy and paste for use in your own project.

Static Analysis and Visualisation Tools

Visualisation

- [EVM Lab](#)
- [Surya](#)



- [Piet](#)
- [Solidity Metrics](#)
- [Solidity 2 UML tool](#)

Static and Dynamic Analysis

- [Mythx] (<https://mythx.io/>) - also available as a remix plugin
- [Slither](#)
 - [List of Detectors](#)
- [Echidna](#)
 - [Vertigo](#) - Mutation testing framework

Introduction to Slither

See [repo](#)

Slither performs static analysis on source code, it has 'detectors' for known vulnerabilities / patterns.

It also includes some tools to help visualise / understand contracts and program flow.

Features

- Detects vulnerable Solidity code with low false positives (see the list of [trophies](#))
- Identifies where the error condition occurs in the source code
- Easily integrates into continuous integration and Truffle builds
- Built-in 'printers' quickly report crucial contract information
- Detector API to write custom analyses in Python
- Ability to analyze contracts written with Solidity ≥ 0.4
- Intermediate representation ([SlithIR](#)) enables simple, high-precision analyses
- Correctly parses 99.9% of all public Solidity code
- Average execution time of less than 1 second per contract

Slither can

1. Produce markdown reports:
2. Display inheritance
3. Produce call graphs
4. Show updatable variables and function authorisation
5. Check updatability
6. Flatten code
7. Read storage in a contract.

Installation

```
pip3 install slither-analyzer
```

Checklists

[SWC Registry](#)

[SCSVS](#)

Smart Contract Security Verification Standard 14-part checklist created to standardize the security of smart contracts.

Example Token [Checklist](#)

[Consensys Known Attacks](#)

- [Reentrancy](#)
- [Oracle Manipulation](#)
- [Frontrunning](#)
- [Timestamp Dependence](#)
- [Insecure Arithmetic](#)
- [Denial of Service](#)
- [Griefing](#)
- [Force Feeding](#)

[Development recommendations](#)

[Token Checklist](#)

[Solidity Bugs by version](#)

Ethereum Security Toolbox


Trail of Bits have a security [toolbox](#) :

This includes

- [Echidna](#) property-based fuzz tester
- [Etheno](#) integration tool and differential tester
- [Manticore](#) symbolic analyzer and formal contract verifier
- [Slither](#) static analysis tool
- [Rattle](#) EVM lifter
- [Not So Smart Contracts](#) repository

Install in docker with

```
docker pull trailofbits/eth-security-toolbox
docker run -it trailofbits/eth-security-toolbox
```



ZIION from Halborn

See [Docs](#)

[Download](#)

ZIION BENEFITS




TURN-KEY VM

Get engineers ready faster by having a turnkey VM with all the best blockchain security tools needed, already compiled



OPENSOURCE

Community driven which means it's always free to use and open-source



COMPREHENSIVE

Reduce friction points by having a working and tested VM for each architecture and protocol family

ZIION FEATURES

ZIION contains over 100 tools, utilities, dependencies, and packages to immediately begin working with Solidity/EVM and Rust-based blockchains like:

Blockchains targeted

- Ethereum (EVM)
- Bitcoin
- Solana
- Polygon
- BSC
- Substrate
- Near

This tool catalogues issues found in the code4rena and Sherlock platforms

The screenshot shows the Solodit web application interface. On the left, there is a sidebar with various filtering options:

- SOURCE: ALL
- IMPACT: HIGH (selected), MEDIUM
- FINDER: (empty input field)
- NUMBER OF FINDERS: More than 0
- REPORTED AFTER: (empty input field)
- QUALITY SCORE: 0
- GENERALIZATION SCORE: 0
- PROTOCOL Sponsor: (empty input field)

On the right, the main content area displays a list of 2991 reports found, with the first three items listed:

- M-1: The createMarket transaction lack of expiration timestamp check
20/03/2023 - Bond Protocol Update
whitehat
Q ★★★★★ G ★★★★★★
- M-2: "Equilibrium price" is not used to compute the capacity (OSDA Only)
20/03/2023 - Bond Protocol Update
xiaoming90, Bauer
Q ★★★★★ G ★★★★★★
- M-3: _validateAndGetPrice() doesn't check if Arbitrum sequencer is down in Chainlink feeds
20/03/2023 - Bond Protocol Update
Avci

At the bottom right, there is a navigation bar with page numbers from 1 to 10, followed by '...', '>', and '>>'.



M-1: The createMarket transaction lack of expiration timestamp check

20/03/2023 Bond Protocol Update at 25000 USDC

Submitted by whitehat

MEDIUM

QUALITY ★★★★★

GENERALIZATION ★★★★★



NONE

<> Details

Discussion

Issue M-1: The createMarket transaction lack of expiration timestamp check

Source: <https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-bond-judging/issues/60>

zkPoEX

See [Repo](#)

zkPoEX (zk proof of exploit) is a Proof-of-Concept developed at ETH Denver Hackathon with the aim to facilitate communication and collaboration between security experts and teams in the decentralised finance (DeFi) space by enabling white hat hackers to report live vulnerabilities in smart contracts while maintaining the confidentiality of the exploit.

Audit Competitions

You may want to submit your code to [Code Arena](#) or practice your skills by entering their competitions.

**C4 audit contests
find more bugs faster
than any other method.**

Start your audit within 48 hours. Seriously.

SHERLOCK



ACTIVE

Contest	Total Rewards	Started (BST)	Ends (BST)
 JOJO Exchange Time left: 12 hours 19 minutes JOJO Exchange is a DeFi-Native Perpetual Contract that is: Liquid, Safer, and Faster. Security is everything.	78,200 USDC	24 Apr 2023 16:00	10 May 2023 16:00
 Blueberry Update #2 Time left: 1 day 12 hours Blueberry unifies the DeFi experience: Aggregating, Automating, and Boosting Capital Efficiency for top DeFi Strategies.	36,400 USDC	4 May 2023 16:00	11 May 2023 16:00
 DODO Margin Trading This contest enables margin trading enabled by Aave for the popular DODO trading protocol, powered by the Proactive Market Making (PMM) algorithm	15,000 USDC	9 May 2023 16:00	12 May 2023 16:00

Example Audits

[The ERC20 Approval Attack:](#)

This is how the original ERC20 approval attack was described. Although the format is unusual, it has everything that a well-described bug should have: the context, the steps to the exploit, a brief analysis and a possible workaround.

[CryptoKitties empty fallback:](#)

This was found by Nick Johnson during the initial crypto kitties bug bounty. It follows a format more likely to be found in bug bounty and audit reports with concise explanation and consequences.

[Freeverse](#)[Celo](#)[1Inch](#)

Monitoring

Tenderly

Product

Monitoring

Stay up to date with your smart contracts and ensure that everything is going as planned by relying on accurate, real-time blockchain data.

Alerting

Get real-time alert notifications directly to your inbox to keep track of important or unexpected events related to your smart contracts or wallets.

Web3 Gateway

Eliminate node management overhead, connect to the blockchain with one URL, and get 8x faster read-heavy workloads backed by our all-in-one development tooling.

Web3 Actions

Use an automated serverless backend to react quickly to on-chain and off-chain events by writing custom code that executes in less than a second.

Simulator

Test custom solutions and play out transaction outcomes before sending them on-chain for confident execution both in development and production.

War Rooms

Follow a structured war room framework to guide your team, secure funds, minimize potential damage, and act quickly in case of a security breach.

Analytics

Rely on real-time blockchain data and track metrics essential to your project to respond to crucial events and stay one step ahead of the competition.

Supported Networks



Ethereum Mainnet



Polygon



BSC



Sepolia



Görli



Gnosis



POA



RSK



Avalanche



Optimism



Arbitrum



Fantom



Moonbeam




Moonriver



Cronos

See [Documentation] (<https://docs.tenderly.co/>)

Monitoring



Alerts

1 Type
Select an alert trigger type.

 Successful Transaction Triggers whenever a successful transaction happens	 Failed Transaction Triggers whenever a failed transaction happens	 Function Call Triggers whenever a specific function is called in one of your contracts	 Event Emitted Triggers whenever a specific event is emitted in one of your contracts	 Event Parameter Triggers whenever a specific argument in an event matches the set conditions
 ERC20 Token Transfer Triggers whenever an ERC20 transfer event is emitted in one of your contracts	 Allowlisted Callers Triggers whenever an address that is not allowlisted calls one of your contracts	 Blocklisted Callers Triggers whenever an address from this list calls one of your contracts	 ETH Balance Triggers when the ETH balance of an address falls below a certain threshold	 Transaction Value Triggers whenever a transaction value matches set conditions
 State Change Triggers whenever a state variable in one of your contracts changes	 View Function Triggers whenever a view function return value changes	 More Coming Soon Have an idea? Click here and send us what you think can be the next alert type		

Web3 Gateway

See [Docs](#)

Tenderly Web3 Gateway is a production node that offers reliable, fast, and consistent access to the blockchain.

Use the Tenderly node to:

- Read, stream, and analyze blockchain data with 100% consistency.
- [Run tx simulations before sending them on-chain](#) using a single RPC URL.

Simulators

Transaction Simulator allows you to see a transaction's execution without sending it to the blockchain. It gives you the results of running a transaction against any point in blockchain history, including the latest block.

With Transaction Simulator, your transactions are run in a lightweight simulation environment, delivering detailed information about state changes, emitted events (logs), gas usage, and all calls that a simulated transaction made.

For example you can simulate a DAI approval

The screenshot shows the tenderly web3 gateway interface for setting up a new simulation. The left sidebar contains various project management and development tools. The main area is titled "New Simulation".

Contract: Set to "Dai". There is a "Edit Contract Source" link.

Function: Set to "approve".

Input Parameters:

- address: Value is a placeholder of 16 zeros followed by f1, with a purple arrow pointing to the input field.
- uint256: Value is a placeholder of 299 followed by 0s, with a purple arrow pointing to the input field.

Transaction Parameters:

- Use Pending Block:** Enabled.
- Block Number:** Placeholder with a slash (/).
- Current block:** 16647676
- Tx Index:** Placeholder with a slash (/).
- From:** Placeholder with a placeholder value (0xdc...), with a purple arrow pointing to it. Below it is a note: "Use default from address".
- Gas:** Placeholder with the value 8000000.
- Gas Price:** Placeholder with the value 0.
- Value:** Placeholder with the value 0.

Block Header Overrides:

- Override Block Number:** Disabled.
- Block Number:** Placeholder with a slash (/).
- Override Timestamp:** Disabled.

Note: You can now execute simulations in the Web3 Gateway. Click the "Open in RPC Builder" button to see how to simulate via JSON-RPC.
*Applicable for Web3 Gateway supported networks: Mainnet, Ropsten, Rinkeby, Görli, Sepolia.

Editing contract Source in a simulation

You can edit the contract source on the fly while setting up your simulation or re-simulating, by showing the entire code and giving access to any line or parameter you would want to change.

ON-CHAIN DATA

Transactions

Contracts

Wallets

Simulator

Forks

Local Transactions

MONITORING

Networks

Analytics

Alerting

Actions

New Simulation

Contract
 Use Custom Contract

Edit Contract Source

Function

Input Parameters

address	tokenA
address	tokenB
uint256	amountADesired
uint256	amountBDesired
uint256	amountAMin
uint256	amountBMin
address	to
uint256	deadline

Transaction Parameters
 Use Pending Block

State Override

Optional Access Lists

ON-CHAIN DATA

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Networks

Analytics

Alerting

PROJECT

Collaborators

Settings

New Simulation

Contract
 Use Custom Contract

Compiler Info

Function

Input Parameters

address	0x00
uint256	0
address	0x00
address	0x00
uint256	0
uint256	0
address	0x00

Transaction Parameters
 Use Pending Block

Editing Source

Address
 KyberNetworkProxy

File

```

1 pragma solidity 0.4.18;
2
3 // File: contracts/ERC20Interface.sol
4
5 // https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20
6 interface ERC20 {
7   function totalSupply() public view returns (uint supply);
8   function balanceOf(address _owner) public view returns (uint balance);
9   function transfer(address _to, uint _value) public returns (bool success);
10  function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint _value) public returns (bool success);
11  function approve(address _spender, uint _value) public returns (bool success);
12  function allowance(address _owner, address _spender) public view returns (uint);
13  function decimals() public view returns(uint digits);
14  event Approval(address indexed _owner, address indexed _spender, uint _value);
15 }
16
17 // File: contracts/KyberNetworkInterface.sol
18

```

Select Contract Name

You can also change the following compiler parameters for the simulation execution:

- Compiler Version
- Optimization Used
- Optimization Count
- EVM Version

You can add a custom contract source to any contract you have chosen to edit or any address.

Forks

Tenderly Forks are a lightweight blockchain replica where you can run transaction simulations. You can base your Fork on one of [Tenderly's supported networks](#) and any of the blocks in a specific network's history. All transactions you simulate through Forks are recorded in an isolated timeline.

Additionally, you can do various custom actions on a Fork:

- [Advance/mine a block](#) (`evm_increaseBlocks`)
- [Advance time](#) on the Fork (setting the `timestamp`)
- [Move the head](#) of the Fork (`evm_snapshot` and `evm_revert`)
- [Manage account balances](#) (`tenderly_setBalance` and `tenderly_addBalance`)
- [Override smart contract storage](#) (`tenderly_setStorageAt`)

The screenshot shows the Tenderly web interface for a 'Test Fork'. The top navigation bar includes the Tenderly logo, project selection, search bar, documentation link, and user profile. The main header displays the fork name 'Test Fork' and buttons for 'New Simulation', 'Deploy Contract', 'Verify Contract', and more. Below this, a summary section shows the 'Network: Mainnet', 'Block: 16577349', and 'London Fork: Activated'. It also includes a note to 'Add a note' and an RPC URL. The central part of the screen is a table listing three simulated transactions:

Simulation Id	Tx Hash	From	To	Function
06436995-3391-4f4f-a8b0-c168d3103bd7 Add a note	0x997a7b6c...b115	0xf7ddedc6...e5dd	Dai	transferF
185d77a5-dbf5-4068-a82e-8828b5912709 Add a note	0x1de69eee...5f8c	0xe58b9ee9...8ce1	Dai	approve
00ea4f42-4921-4195-a713-766f3f838a95 Add a note	0x60c96da5...6af7	0xf2f2f2f2...f2f2	Dai	mint

At the bottom, there are pagination controls for 'Show 20 Per Page' and 'Page 1'.

CI / CD

See [Docs](#)

The docs have examples of using a fork for your CI, and an example github action workflow yaml file.

OZ Defender

See [Docs](#)

Available Networks

- [Polygon \(Matic\)](#) and **Mumbai**.
- [Arbitrum](#), [Arbitrum Nova](#), Arbitrum Rinkeby, and Arbitrum Goerli.
- [Optimism](#), Optimism Kovan, and Optimism Goerli.
- [Moonbeam](#) and **Moonriver**.
- [xDai](#) and **Sokol**.
- [Binance Smart Chain](#) and **BSC testnet**.
- [Avalanche C](#) and **FUJI C-Chain**.
- [Fuse](#).
- [Fantom](#) and **Fantom Testnet**.
- [Celo](#) and **Alfajores**.
- [Harmony Shard 0](#) and **Harmony Testnet Shard 0**.
- [Aurora](#) and **Aurora Testnet**.
- [Hedera](#) and **Hedera Testnet**.
- [zkSync 2.0 Goerli](#)

Components

Admin

Automate and secure all your smart contract administration.

Relay

Build with private and secure transaction infrastructure.

Sentinel

Monitor smart contracts and send notifications.

Autotask

Create automated scripts to call your smart contracts.

Advisor

Learn and implement security best practices.

Admin

The Defender Admin service acts as an interface to manage your smart contract project through secure multisig contracts or timelocks. Defender Admin holds no control at all over your system, which is fully controlled by the keys of the signers.

Relay

The Defender Relay service allows you to send transactions via a regular HTTP API, and takes care of private key secure storage, transaction signing, nonce management, gas pricing estimation, and resubmissions. This way you don't need to worry about securing your private keys in your backend scripts, or by monitoring your transactions to ensure they get mined.

Sentinels

The Defender Sentinel service offers 3 types of Sentinels, Contract Sentinels, Forta Sentinels and Forta Local Mode Sentinels. Contract Sentinels allow you to monitor transactions to a contract by defining conditions on events, functions, transaction parameters. Forta Sentinels allow you to monitor Forta Alerts by defining conditions on Forta Bots, contract addresses, alert IDs and severity. If a Sentinel matches a transaction or a Forta Alert based on your

defined conditions it will notify you via email, slack, telegram, discord, [Autotasks](#), and more.

Autotasks

The Defender Autotasks service allows you to run code snippets on a regular basis, via webhooks, or in response to a transaction. Thanks to tight integration to [Relay](#) and [Sentinels](#), you can use Autotasks to automate regular actions by easily sending transactions or reacting to events from your contracts.

Logging

Defender generates log trails of every potentially relevant event in the system. This includes manual actions, such as modifying an Autotask or Sentinel, as well as automated actions, such as sending a transaction or firing a notification. Logs can be optionally forwarded to Datadog or Splunk for aggregation.

Advisor

The Defender Advisor service contains a knowledge base of security best practices curated by the OpenZeppelin team. The best practices cover development, testing, monitoring and operations. Defender Advisor can be used as a checklist to prioritize efforts in implementing project security.