

# Financial Frictions and the Cleansing Effects of Recessions

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- Economic downturns are associated with increased patterns of reallocation.
- Literature on the Cleansing Effect suggests that these patterns are a productivity-enhancing phenomenon (Caballero & Hammour, 1993)
- This pattern shifted during the Great Recession (as identified by Foster, Grim, & Haltiwanger, 2016): the intensity of reallocation fell rather than rise



- ① How do **financial frictions** influence firms' decisions on optimal *capital* and *dividend* paths?
  - By developing a **theoretical model** incorporating financial frictions
- ② What are the *aggregate-level* effects of financial frictions on the **cleansing effect**?
  - Employing Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the impact of financial frictions



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# Flow of fund constraints and financial frictions

The flow of funds constraint is:

$$k_{t+1} = k_t(1 - \delta) - Rb_t - d_t + f(k_t) + b_{t+1} \quad (1)$$

Two types of financial frictions are included:

- 1 **Monitoring costs** of the financial intermediaries  $(1 - \mu)$  on the participation constraint:

$$R_t = \frac{R_f}{p} - \frac{1 - p}{p} \frac{\mu f(k_t)}{b_t} \quad (2)$$

- 2 **Financing constraint:**

$$b_t = l \cdot k_t \quad (3)$$



# The firm's inter-temporal problem

The firm's objective is to maximize:

$$\max_{\{d_t\}_{t=0}^{+\infty}} V_0 = \sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} \beta^t U(d_t)$$


subject to: (1),(2),(3). From the FOCs, we get:

Euler equations for dividends

$$U'(d_t) = \frac{\beta}{(1-l)} U'(d_{t+1}) \left[ f'(k_t) \frac{p + \mu - \mu p}{p} + \frac{p - \delta p - R_f l}{p} \right] \quad (4)$$



# Phase Diagram



# Reframing the problem with Bellman

$$\begin{cases} V(k_0) = U(d_0^*) + \beta V(k_1), \\ k_1 = \left[ \frac{p+\mu-\mu p}{p} f(k_0) + \frac{p-\delta p-R_f l}{p} k_0 - d_0^* \right] \cdot (1-l)^{-1}, \\ d_0^* = [\beta V'(k_1)]^{-1}, \\ p - \delta p - R_f l = 0 \quad (\text{Assumption}), \\ k_0 \text{ given.} \end{cases}$$

The solutions to the above systems are:

$$k_1^* = \left[ \frac{p + \mu(1-p)p}{p} Zk_0^\alpha \right] \frac{\alpha\beta}{1 - l\alpha\beta}, \quad (5)$$


The *policy function* is:

$$d_0^* = \left[ \frac{p + \mu(1-p)p}{p} Zk_0^\alpha \right] \frac{1 - \alpha\beta}{1 - l\alpha\beta},$$





## Effect of leverage to capital




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# Cleansing effect of recessions



- Incorporating monitoring costs and financial constraints into the model reveals a **reduction** in firms' steady-state *capital* and *dividends*.
- The impact of **fixed leverage** on capital varies and is dependent on the specific levels of capital and leverage.
- Monte Carlo simulations suggest that such financial frictions could **dampen** the cleansing effects traditionally observed in recessions.

