# Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies

Week 6 - Chapter 8: Alternative Mining Puzzles

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- Alternative Mining Puzzles
  - ASIC Resistant Puzzles
  - Proof of Useful Work

- - Peercoin: Coin Age-Based Selection
  - Tezos: Liquid Proof of Stake
  - Algorand: Pure Proof of Stake

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# Bitcoin Mining Puzzles

Mining puzzles are at the core of Bitcoin:

- determine the incentive system
- limit the ability to control the consensus process
- play an important role in steering and guiding participation

# Essential Puzzle Requirements

Provide non trivial problem, miners have to invest to reach the next block, but It has to not be that difficult

- reasonable difficulty: puzzles are difficult, but not too hard
- fast verification: puzzle solutions need to be quick to verify
- adjustable difficulty: the difficulty can be changed over time
- progress free: probability of winning a puzzle solution should be roughly proportional to the hash power used

## The Bitcoin Puzzle

## Example (Bitcoin): SHA-256 hash below threshold

- checking solution is trivial
- simple to adjust mining difficulty
- puzzle solutions are found at a fairly predictable rate (roughly10 minutes)


Digiconomist, "Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index": https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-consumtion

## The Bitcoin Puzzle

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# Problem: Energy Consumption of Mining



Digiconomist, "Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index": https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-consumtion

# Bitcoin consumes more energy than Switzerland, according to new estima

Though researchers acknowledge that reliable estimates are 'rare'

By James Vincent | Jul 4, 2019, 8:33am EDT



# **Energy Usage Ranking**



The average yearly energy consumption of the Bitcoin network exceeds that of the entire nation of Switzerland. | Source:

Source: Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index https://www.cbeci.org/

## Alternative Mining Puzzles

Are there different ways to design the puzzles?

## **Approaches**

- ASIC resistance: some computers (ordinary) are less efficient than others (ASIC supported) at mining
- pool resistance: users delegate their participation to large centralized mining pools
- ..

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#### **ASIC** Resistant Puzzles

Mining with specialized ASICs is more efficient than general-purpose computing equipment  $\rightarrow$  ASIC-mining results in a major performance gain over normal hardware mining

#### **ASIC** Resistant

- Goal:
  - allow ordinary computers to mine!
  - prevent the large ASIC manufacturers from dominating the bitcoin mining
- Approach: reduce the "gap" between customized hardware and general purpose computers

# Memory-Hard Puzzles

Most widely used puzzles designed to be ASIC Resistant Fact: the performance of memory is more stable than for processors




Figure: CPU-memory performances gap

Main idea: design mining puzzles that require a large amount of memory to solve

Figure from Nowak, A. (2014). Opportunities and choice in a new vector era. Journal of Physics: Conference Series. 523. 012002. 10.1088/1742-6596/523/1/012002

# Scrypt

Most famous memory-hard mining puzzle used in many cryptocurrencies, such as Litecoin


- same puzzle condition (find hash below threshold)
- uses the memory-hard hash function scrypt instead of SHA-2
- requires fixed (large) amount of memory to be computed
- used for other security purposes (i.e., password hashing)

# Scrypt Pseudocode

```
def scrypt(H, N, X):
      // initialize memory buffer of length N
      V = [0] * N
      // Fill up memory buffer with pseudorandom data
      V[0] = H(X)
      for i in range(1, N):
          V[i] = H(V[i-1])
      // Access memory buffer in a pseudorandom order
10
      A = H(V[N-1])
11
      for i in range(N):
12
     // choose a random index based on A
13
          i = A \% N
14
     // update A based on this index
15
          A = Hy
16
           (A ^ V[j])
      return A
18
```

# Scrypt computation

- fill a large buffer of random access memory with random values
- 2 read from this memory in a pseudorandom order



(1) Write

(2) Read

# Scrypt disadvantages

- Scrypt trades memory for computation speed
- Scrypt verification requires the same amount of memory/computation: N steps and N memory to check the correctness of the proof
- some scrypt ASICs are already available

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#### Proof of Useful Work

#### Bitcoin:

- consensus protocol not designed for doing useful computations
- solving puzzles has wasted electric power

Could we design a puzzle that does not only waste energy, but is useful for the solution of practical computational problems?

# Popular Volunteer Distributed Computing Projects

Project	Founded	Goal	Impact
Great Internet	1996	Finding large	Found the new "largest prime num-
Mersenne Prime		Mersenne primes	ber" twelve straight times
Search			
distributed.net	1997	Cryptographic	First successful public brute force of a
		brute-force demos	64-bit cryptographic key
SETI@home	1999	Identifying signs of	Largest project to date with more
		extraterrestrial life	than 5 million participants
Folding@home	2000	Atomic-level simu-	Greatest computing capacity of any
		lations of protein	volunteer computing project
		folding	

These projects may be suitable for using as computation puzzles but what is the measure of success?

#### Primecoin

Puzzle based on finding chains of prime numbers

## Cunningham chain

- A Cunningham chain of length k is a sequence  $p_1, p_2, p_3, ..., p_k$  where each  $p_i$  is a large prime number and  $p_i = 2p_{i-1} + 1$ .
- The longest known Cunningham chain has length 19 and starts at 79.
- Conjecture: Cunningham chains exist for each length *k*.

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## Computation puzzle with parameters m, n, and k

- Given a challenge x (the hash of the previous block), take the first m bits of x
- valid solution: any chain of length  $\geq k$  where the first element is an n-bit integer and has the same m leading bits as x

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## Puzzle gets harder

- increasing n polynomial
- increasing m (large enough to avoid precomputation)
- increasing k (exponentially harder, perhaps infeasible)

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# Primary Disadvantages to Proof of Work Systems





Figure: Loop on mining in Proof of work algorithms

# Primary Disadvantages to Proof of Work Systems

## Mining process burns energy and raw materials



- Energy usage: enormous amounts of energy to secure the blockchain
- Mining pools: large make the blockchain centralized

Digiconomist, "Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index": https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-consumption

# Virtual Mining

Allocate mining "power" to currency holders in proportion to amount of coins held



# Virtual Mining

Allocate mining "power" to currency holders in proportion to amount of coins held



## Why virtual mining?

- remove the wasteful half of the proof of work mining cycle
- may also remove the problem of trending toward centralization (large mining pool)

#### Proof of stake

- each coin holder has "stake" (i.e., account balance) in the coin system
- the miner of the next block is chosen randomly
- size of stake determines the probability to be chosen for mining

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# Peercoin: Coin Age-Based Selection

## Stake based on coin age

- age of a coin = time since last use of the coin
- stake is determined by age

Miners must solve a SHA-256-based computational puzzle, but the difficulty of this puzzle is lowered for older coins

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#### Tezos

Tezos is a 3rd generation blockchain featuring

- blockchain and cryptocurrency
- expressive contract language
- Iive-upgrade of protocol and governance

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#### PoS in Tezos

- Proof of Stake (PoS) assigns minting power based on the proportion of coins held
- Besides minting there is validation also based on stake
- "Liquid": coin holders can delegate their coins to others for minting or validating.

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
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#### Remark


Peers that mint new coins are called bakers in Tezos

#### Trust Model

- bakers deposit a certain amount of coins as stake (security deposit)
- bakers lose their stake if they approve invalid transactions



## Tezos Architecture Overview



#### Node

The local component of the system

- manage the context as the local knowledge of the Tezos blockchain state and sync with the Tezos network
- communicate with other nodes via P2P network
- connect local endorser, baker, accuser, and client to the network

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### Client

Interface to the node

Job Descriptions

Baker

Baking (creating) new blocks

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#### Endorser

Verifying the validity of a block and agreeing on a block by endorsing that block.

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#### Accuser

Monitoring all blocks and looking for invalid transactions

- Everything's organized in cycles
- Baking rights and endorsement rights: determined at the beginning of a cycle.
- Incentivize: rewarded for baking and endorsing.
- Double-baking or double-endorsement: a security deposit is frozen and could be released or burnt.

## Tezos Basic Concepts

#### Cycles

Blocks are group into cycles of BLOCKS\_PER\_CYCLE = 4,096 blocks.

- TIME\_BETWEEN\_BLOCKS = one minute: (1 cycle = 2 days, 20 hours, and 16 minutes)
- the current cycle: n, the nth cycle from the beginning of the chain
- PRESERVED\_CYCLES = 5 cycles (14 days, 5 hours, and 20 minutes).

## Tezos Basic concepts

#### Rolls

A roll represents a set of coins delegated to a given key:  $TOKENS\_PER\_ROLL = 10,000$  (8,000 currently) tokens.

- each delegate has a stack of roll ids.
- roll snapshots are taken every BLOCKS\_PER\_ROLL\_SNAPSHOT = 256 blocks (16 times per cycle).
- rolls are used to determine baking and endorsement rights

## Tezos Basic concepts

## **Delegations**

#### Active and passive delegates

- a passive delegate cannot be selected for baking or endorsing.
- a baker becomes passive for cycle n: if it failed to create any blocks or endorsements in the past PRESERVED\_CYCLES cycles

- A baker has to hold at least one roll (owned or delegated).
  - ▶ holding 2/10 of those rolls
  - ⇒ 20% probability of being given the rights to create the next block.
  - ▶ holding 10,000 XTZ or 19,999 XTZ: same probability to earn baking rights in the system.

#### Baking rights are priorities

• For example: the net randomly selects a priority list as follows.

```
Priority0 = Roll 6
Priority1 = Roll 9
Priority2 = Roll 4
Priority3 = Roll 5
...
Priority9 = Roll 7
```

- Priority9 = Roll I
- the holder of Roll 6 will have first priority in proposing the block.
- If "Roll 6" does not create and broadcast a block within 1 minute, the owner of Roll 9 may take over, and so on

## Minimal block delays

A block is valid only if its timestamp has a minimal delay with respect to the previous block's timestamp.

TIME\_BETWEEN\_BLOCKS[0] + TIME\_BETWEEN\_BLOCKS[1] \* p + DELAY\_PER\_MISSING\_ENDORSEMENT \* MAX (0, INITIAL\_ENDORSERS - e), where:

- $\bullet \ \mathsf{TIME\_BETWEEN\_BLOCKS}[0] = 60 \ \mathsf{seconds}$
- TIME\_BETWEEN\_BLOCKS[1] = 40 seconds,
- DELAY\_PER\_MISSING\_ENDORSEMENT = 8 seconds,
- INITIAL\_ENDORSERS = 24,
- p is the block's priority ,
- e is the number of endorsements the block contains.

## Baking reward

```
\label{eq:Reward} \begin{aligned} \mathsf{Reward} &= \mathsf{block} \ \mathsf{reward} + \mathsf{all} \ \mathsf{fees} \ \mathsf{paid} \ \mathsf{by} \ \mathsf{transactions} \\ \mathsf{Block} \ \mathsf{reward} &= e \cdot \mathsf{BAKING\_REWARD\_PER\_ENDORSEMENT}[p'] \end{aligned}
```

- BAKING\_REWARD\_PER\_ENDORSEMENT = [1.250, 0.1875]
- e is the number of endorsements the block contains
- p' depends on p

## Baking reward

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## Security deposit

- BLOCK\_SECURITY\_DEPOSIT = 512 XTZ per block created
- frozen for PRESERVED\_CYCLES = 5 cycles.

#### Tezos Endorsements

ENDORSERS\_PER\_BLOCK = 32 endorsers by randomly selecting active rolls.

- verify the last block baked (at level n) and emits an endorsement operation baked in block n+1.
- once block n+1 is baked  $\Rightarrow$  no other endorsement for block n will be considered valid.
- an endorser may have more than one endorsement slot.

## Tezos Endorsements

#### **Endorsement reward**

## $e * ENDORSEMENT_REWARD[p']$

- ENDORSEMENT\_REWARD = [1.250, 0.833333]
- e is the number of endorsement slots

## Security deposit

ENDORSEMENT\_SECURITY\_DEPOSIT = 64 XTZ per endorsement slot.

## Tezos Delegation

#### Nodes can delegate coins to a baker

- not enough XTZ
- do not want to set up computing infrastructure to bake blocks
- delegation lets coin owners "lend" their coins to a baker: no transfer of ownership; baker cannot spend delegated coins.
- the baker has a higher probability of being selected.
- the baker shares the additional revenue with the coin holder.

#### Tezos Fork Choice Rule

The canonical chain based on the number of bakers that endorsed the block

- at every block height, 32 random rolls are selected to endorse a block.
- the block with the most endorsements is treated as the canonical one.

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# Algorand: Pure Proof of Stake

## Algorand (https://algorand.com)

- new method to implement a public ledger
- convenience and efficiency of a centralized system, without the inefficiencies and weaknesses of current decentralized implementations.
- Based on ALGOrithmic RANDomness to select verifiers in charge of constructing the next block
- selections are provably immune from manipulations and unpredictable
- no different classes of users (as "miners" and "ordinary users" in Bitcoin)
- $\bullet$  consensus based on fast algorithm for Byzantine agreement: probability of forks very small (  $\approx 10^{-18})$

from Algorand white paper https://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.01341.pdf

# Algorand Proof of Stake Algorithm

Stake determined by tokens (coins) held by user

#### Phase 1: Proposal

- a token is randomly chosen among all tokens
- the owner of this token proposes, signs, and broadcast a new block

#### Phase 2: Agreement

- 1,000 tokens are randomly chosen among all tokens
- the owners of these tokens agree on (sign) the proposed block (from Phase 1)

#### Remark

all choices are public and consensual

# Algorand Proof of Stake Algorithm

How to choose proposers and verifiers?

#### Self-selecting

- based on the last block . . .
- each user runs his/her own lottery, cannot cheat, but can prove the winning
- winners broadcast their winning tickets and their agreements about the proposed block

#### Remark

- a new community (of 1,000) is chosen for each proposed block
- not predictable ⇒ very hard to subvert

A new block is generated via a message-passing Byzantine agreement protocol (BA\*)

## A new Byzantine agreement protocol

- its binary-input version consists of 3-step loop, in which a player i sends a single message  $m_i$  to all other players
- each loop of the protocol ends in agreement

The members of a selected community "quickly" agree on a new block via the this BA\* protocol

#### Cryptographic sortition

- the players of BA\* are selected to be a much smaller subset of the set of all users
- each new block  $B^r$  will be constructed and agreed upon, via a new execution of BA\* by a separate set of selected verifiers,  $SV^r$

## The quantity (seed) $Q_r$

The last block  $B_{r-1}$  is used to determine the next verifier set as well as the leader in charge of constructing the new block  $B_r$ 

- $\bullet$   $Q_r$  is unpredictable (therefore not influenceable) by powerful adversary
- users play a special role in the generation of the rth block

 $Q_{r-1}$  contained in  $B_{r-1} \Rightarrow$  adversary might immediately corrupt all verifier and the leader

## Secret cryptographic sortition and secret credentials

- leaders and verifiers secretly and independently learn of their role
- they can compute a proper credential to prove possession of the role
- the leader for the next block, secretly assembles the proposed new block and then disseminates it for certification with proof-of-leadership

# Algorand's Properties

- amount of computation is minimal
- new block generated in less than 10 minutes
- will never leave the blockchain (no fork, almost certainly)
- all power resides with the users themselves

# Algorand: Pure Proof of Stake

```
Decentralized ✓

Scalable ✓

Secure ✓
```

# Thanks!